§1001 — Determination of amount of and recognition of gain or loss

633 citing cases

(a)Computation of gain or loss

The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized.

(b)Amount realized

The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received. In determining the amount realized—

(1)

there shall not be taken into account any amount received as reimbursement for real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed on the purchaser, and

(2)

there shall be taken into account amounts representing real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed on the taxpayer if such taxes are to be paid by the purchaser.

(c)Recognition of gain or loss

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized.

(d)Installment sales

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent (in the case of property sold under contract providing for payment in installments) the taxation of that portion of any installment payment representing gain or profit in the year in which such payment is received.

(e)Certain term interests
(1)In general

In determining gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of a term interest in property, that portion of the adjusted basis of such interest which is determined pursuant to section 1014, 1015, or 1041 (to the extent that such adjusted basis is a portion of the entire adjusted basis of the property) shall be disregarded.

(2)Term interest in property defined

For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “term interest in property” means—

(A)

a life interest in property,

(B)

an interest in property for a term of years, or

(C)

an income interest in a trust.

(3)Exception

Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a sale or other disposition which is a part of a transaction in which the entire interest in property is transferred to any person or persons.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1Computation of gain or loss Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    (a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained. The amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property (other than money) received. The fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value. The general method of computing such gain or loss is prescribed by section 1001 (a) through (d) which contemplates that from the amount realized upon the sale or exchange there shall be withdrawn a sum sufficient to restore the adjusted basis prescribed by section 1011 and the regulations thereunder (i.e., the cost or other basis adjusted for receipts, expenditures, losses, allowances, and other items chargeable against and applicable to such cost or other basis). The amount which remains after the adjusted basis has been restored to the taxpayer constitutes the realized gain. If the amount realized upon the sale or exchange is insufficient to restore to the taxpayer the adjusted basis of the property, a loss is sustained to the extent of the difference between such adjusted basis and the amount realized. The basis may be different depending upon whether gain or loss is being computed. For example, see section 1015(a) and the regulations thereunder. Section 1001(e) and paragraph (f) of this section prescribe the method of computing gain or loss upon the sale or other disposition of a term interest in property the adjusted basis (or a portion) of which is determined pursuant, or by reference, to section 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent), section 1015 (relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), or section 1022 (relating to the basis of property acquired from certain decedents who died in 2010). For rules determining the amount realized for purposes of computing the gain or loss upon the sale, exchange, or other disposition of digital assets, as defined in § 1.6045-1(a)(19), other than a digital asset not required to be reported as a digital asset pursuant to § 1.6045-1(c)(8)(ii), (iii), or (iv), see § 1.1001-7.

    (b) Real estate taxes as amounts received. (1) Section 1001(b) and section 1012 state rules applicable in making an adjustment upon a sale of real property with respect to the real property taxes apportioned between seller and purchaser under section 164(d). Thus, if the seller pays (or agrees to pay) real property taxes attributable to the real property tax year in which the sale occurs, he shall not take into account, in determining the amount realized from the sale under section 1001(b), any amount received as reimbursement for taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the purchaser. Similarly, in computing the cost of the property under section 1012, the purchaser shall not take into account any amount paid to the seller as reimbursement for real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the purchaser. These rules apply whether or not the contract of sale calls for the purchaser to reimburse the seller for such real property taxes paid or to be paid by the seller.

    (2) On the other hand, if the purchaser pays (or is to pay) an amount representing real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the seller, that amount shall be taken into account both in determining the amount realized from the sale under section 1001(b) and in computing the cost of the property under section 1012. It is immaterial whether or not the contract of sale specifies that the sale price has been reduced by, or is in any way intended to reflect, the taxes allocable to the seller. See also paragraph (b) of § 1.1012-1.

    (3) Subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to a seller who, in a taxable year prior to the taxable year of sale, pays an amount representing real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed on the purchaser, if such seller has elected to capitalize such amount in accordance with section 266 and the regulations thereunder (relating to election to capitalize certain carrying charges and taxes).

    (4) The application of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

    (c) Other rules. (1) Even though property is not sold or otherwise disposed of, gain is realized if the sum of all the amounts received which are required by section 1016 and other applicable provisions of subtitle A of the Code to be applied against the basis of the property exceeds such basis. Except as otherwise provided in section 301(c)(3)(B) with respect to distributions out of increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1, 1913, such gain is includible in gross income under section 61 as “income from whatever source derived”. On the other hand, a loss is not ordinarily sustained prior to the sale or other disposition of the property, for the reason that until such sale or other disposition occurs there remains the possibility that the taxpayer may recover or recoup the adjusted basis of the property. Until some identifiable event fixes the actual sustaining of a loss and the amount thereof, it is not taken into account.

    (2) The provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

    (d) Installment sales. In the case of property sold on the installment plan, special rules for the taxation of the gain are prescribed in section 453.

    (e) Transfers in part a sale and in part a gift. (1) Where a transfer of property is in part a sale and in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property. However, no loss is sustained on such a transfer if the amount realized is less than the adjusted basis. For the determination of basis of property in the hands of the transferee, see § 1.1015-4. For the allocation of the adjusted basis of property in the case of a bargain sale to a charitable organization, see § 1.1011-2.

    (2) Examples. The provisions of subparagraph (1) may be illustrated by the following examples:

    (f) Sale or other disposition of a term interest in property—(1) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (f)(3) of this section, for purposes of determining gain or loss from the sale or other disposition after October 9, 1969, of a term interest in property (as defined in paragraph (f)(2) of this section), a taxpayer shall not take into account that portion of the adjusted basis of such interest that is determined pursuant, or by reference, to section 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent), section 1015 (relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), or section 1022 (relating to the basis of property acquired from certain decedents who died in 2010) to the extent that such adjusted basis is a portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property (as defined in § 1.1014-5). Where a term interest in property is transferred to a corporation in connection with a transaction to which section 351 applies and the adjusted basis of the term interest:

    (i) Is determined pursuant to sections 1014, 1015, or 1022; and

    (ii) Is also a portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property, a subsequent sale or other disposition of such term interest by the corporation will be subject to the provisions of section 1001(e) and this paragraph (f) to the extent that the basis of the term interest so sold or otherwise disposed of is determined by reference to its basis in the hands of the transferor as provided by section 362(a). See paragraph (f)(2) of this section for rules relating to the characterization of stock received by the transferor of a term interest in property in connection with a transaction to which section 351 applies. That portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property that is assignable to such interest at the time of its sale or other disposition shall be determined under the rules provided in § 1.1014-5. Thus, gain or loss realized from a sale or other disposition of a term interest in property shall be determined by comparing the amount of the proceeds of such sale with that part of the adjusted basis of such interest that is not a portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property.

    (2) Term interest defined. For purposes of section 1001(e) and this paragraph, a term interest in property means—

    (i) A life interest in property,

    (ii) An interest in property for a term of years, or

    (iii) An income interest in a trust.

    Generally, subdivisions (i), (ii), and (iii) refer to an interest, present or future, in the income from property or the right to use property which will terminate or fail on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur. Such divisions do not refer to remainder or reversionary interests in the property itself or other interests in the property which will ripen into ownership of the entire property upon termination or failure of a preceding term interest. A term interest in property also includes any property received upon a sale or other disposition of a life interest in property, an interest in property for a term of years, or an income interest in a trust by the original holder of such interest, but only to the extent that the adjusted basis of the property received is determined by reference to the adjusted basis of the term interest so transferred.

    (3) Exception. Paragraph (1) of section 1001(e) and subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to a sale or other disposition of a term interest in property as a part of a single transaction in which the entire interest in the property is transferred to a third person or to two or more other persons, including persons who acquire such entire interest as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, or tenants in common. See § 1.1014-5 for computation of gain or loss upon such a sale or other disposition where the property has been acquired from a decedent or by gift or transfer in trust.

    (4) Illustrations. For examples illustrating the application of this paragraph, see paragraph (d) of § 1.1014-5.

    (g) Debt instruments issued in exchange for property—(1) In general. If a debt instrument is issued in exchange for property, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument as determined under § 1.1273-2 or § 1.1274-2, whichever is applicable. If, however, the issue price of the debt instrument is determined under section 1273(b)(4), the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is its stated principal amount reduced by any unstated interest (as determined under section 483).

    (2) Certain debt instruments that provide for contingent payments—(i) In general. Paragraph (g)(1) of this section does not apply to a debt instrument subject to either § 1.483-4 or § 1.1275-4(c) (certain contingent payment debt instruments issued for nonpublicly traded property).

    (ii) Special rule to determine amount realized. If a debt instrument subject to § 1.1275-4(c) is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument as determined under § 1.1274-2(g), increased by the fair market value of the contingent payments payable on the debt instrument. If a debt instrument subject to § 1.483-4 is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is its stated principal amount, reduced by any unstated interest (as determined under section 483), and increased by the fair market value of the contingent payments payable on the debt instrument. This paragraph (g)(2)(ii), however, does not apply to a debt instrument if the fair market value of the contingent payments is not reasonably ascertainable. Only in rare and extraordinary cases will the fair market value of the contingent payments be treated as not reasonably ascertainable.

    (3) Coordination with section 453. If a debt instrument is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, this paragraph (g) applies rather than § 15a.453-1(d)(2) to determine the taxpayer's amount realized attributable to the debt instrument.

    (4) Effective date. This paragraph (g) applies to sales or exchanges that occur on or after August 13, 1996.

    (h) Severances of trusts—(1) In general. The severance of a trust (including without limitation a severance that meets the requirements of § 26.2642-6 or of § 26.2654-1(b) of this chapter) is not an exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent if—

    (i) An applicable state statute or the governing instrument authorizes or directs the trustee to sever the trust; and

    (ii) Any non-pro rata funding of the separate trusts resulting from the severance (including non-pro rata funding as described in § 26.2642-6(d)(4) or § 26.2654-1(b)(1)(ii)(C) of this chapter), whether mandatory or in the discretion of the trustee, is authorized by an applicable state statute or the governing instrument.

    (2) Effective/applicability date. This paragraph (h) applies to severances occurring on or after August 2, 2007. Taxpayers may apply this paragraph (h) to severances occurring on or after August 24, 2004, and before August 2, 2007.

    (i) Effective/applicability date. Except as provided in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this section, this section applies on and after January 19, 2017. For rules before January 19, 2017, see § 1.1001-1 as contained in 26 CFR part 1 revised as of April 1, 2016.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(a)General rule. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    General rule. Except as otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained. The amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property (other than money) received. The fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value. The general method of computing such gain or loss is prescribed by section 1001 (a) through (d) which contemplates that from the amount realized upon the sale or exchange there shall be withdrawn a sum sufficient to restore the adjusted basis prescribed by section 1011 and the regulations thereunder (i.e., the cost or other basis adjusted for receipts, expenditures, losses, allowances, and other items chargeable against and applicable to such cost or other basis). The amount which remains after the adjusted basis has been restored to the taxpayer constitutes the realized gain. If the amount realized upon the sale or exchange is insufficient to restore to the taxpayer the adjusted basis of the property, a loss is sustained to the extent of the difference between such adjusted basis and the amount realized. The basis may be different depending upon whether gain or loss is being computed. For example, see section 1015(a) and the regulations thereunder. Section 1001(e) and paragraph (f) of this section prescribe the method of computing gain or loss upon the sale or other disposition of a term interest in property the adjusted basis (or a portion) of which is determined pursuant, or by reference, to section 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent), section 1015 (relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), or section 1022 (relating to the basis of property acquired from certain decedents who died in 2010). For rules determining the amount realized for purposes of computing the gain or loss upon the sale, exchange, or other disposition of digital assets, as defined in § 1.6045-1(a)(19), other than a digital asset not required to be reported as a digital asset pursuant to § 1.6045-1(c)(8)(ii), (iii), or (iv), see § 1.1001-7.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(b)Real estate taxes as amounts received. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Real estate taxes as amounts received. (1) Section 1001(b) and section 1012 state rules applicable in making an adjustment upon a sale of real property with respect to the real property taxes apportioned between seller and purchaser under section 164(d). Thus, if the seller pays (or agrees to pay) real property taxes attributable to the real property tax year in which the sale occurs, he shall not take into account, in determining the amount realized from the sale under section 1001(b), any amount received as reimbursement for taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the purchaser. Similarly, in computing the cost of the property under section 1012, the purchaser shall not take into account any amount paid to the seller as reimbursement for real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the purchaser. These rules apply whether or not the contract of sale calls for the purchaser to reimburse the seller for such real property taxes paid or to be paid by the seller.

    (2) On the other hand, if the purchaser pays (or is to pay) an amount representing real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed upon the seller, that amount shall be taken into account both in determining the amount realized from the sale under section 1001(b) and in computing the cost of the property under section 1012. It is immaterial whether or not the contract of sale specifies that the sale price has been reduced by, or is in any way intended to reflect, the taxes allocable to the seller. See also paragraph (b) of § 1.1012-1.

    (3) Subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to a seller who, in a taxable year prior to the taxable year of sale, pays an amount representing real property taxes which are treated under section 164(d) as imposed on the purchaser, if such seller has elected to capitalize such amount in accordance with section 266 and the regulations thereunder (relating to election to capitalize certain carrying charges and taxes).

    (4) The application of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(c)Other rules. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Other rules. (1) Even though property is not sold or otherwise disposed of, gain is realized if the sum of all the amounts received which are required by section 1016 and other applicable provisions of subtitle A of the Code to be applied against the basis of the property exceeds such basis. Except as otherwise provided in section 301(c)(3)(B) with respect to distributions out of increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1, 1913, such gain is includible in gross income under section 61 as “income from whatever source derived”. On the other hand, a loss is not ordinarily sustained prior to the sale or other disposition of the property, for the reason that until such sale or other disposition occurs there remains the possibility that the taxpayer may recover or recoup the adjusted basis of the property. Until some identifiable event fixes the actual sustaining of a loss and the amount thereof, it is not taken into account.

    (2) The provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(d)Installment sales. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Installment sales. In the case of property sold on the installment plan, special rules for the taxation of the gain are prescribed in section 453.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(e)Transfers in part a sale and in part a gift. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Transfers in part a sale and in part a gift. (1) Where a transfer of property is in part a sale and in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property. However, no loss is sustained on such a transfer if the amount realized is less than the adjusted basis. For the determination of basis of property in the hands of the transferee, see § 1.1015-4. For the allocation of the adjusted basis of property in the case of a bargain sale to a charitable organization, see § 1.1011-2.

    (2) Examples. The provisions of subparagraph (1) may be illustrated by the following examples:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(f)Sale or other disposition of a term interest in property—(1) General rule. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Sale or other disposition of a term interest in property—(1) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (f)(3) of this section, for purposes of determining gain or loss from the sale or other disposition after October 9, 1969, of a term interest in property (as defined in paragraph (f)(2) of this section), a taxpayer shall not take into account that portion of the adjusted basis of such interest that is determined pursuant, or by reference, to section 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent), section 1015 (relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), or section 1022 (relating to the basis of property acquired from certain decedents who died in 2010) to the extent that such adjusted basis is a portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property (as defined in § 1.1014-5). Where a term interest in property is transferred to a corporation in connection with a transaction to which section 351 applies and the adjusted basis of the term interest:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(g)Debt instruments issued in exchange for property—(1) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Debt instruments issued in exchange for property—(1) In general. If a debt instrument is issued in exchange for property, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument as determined under § 1.1273-2 or § 1.1274-2, whichever is applicable. If, however, the issue price of the debt instrument is determined under section 1273(b)(4), the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is its stated principal amount reduced by any unstated interest (as determined under section 483).

    (2) Certain debt instruments that provide for contingent payments—(i) In general. Paragraph (g)(1) of this section does not apply to a debt instrument subject to either § 1.483-4 or § 1.1275-4(c) (certain contingent payment debt instruments issued for nonpublicly traded property).

    (ii) Special rule to determine amount realized. If a debt instrument subject to § 1.1275-4(c) is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument as determined under § 1.1274-2(g), increased by the fair market value of the contingent payments payable on the debt instrument. If a debt instrument subject to § 1.483-4 is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, the amount realized attributable to the debt instrument is its stated principal amount, reduced by any unstated interest (as determined under section 483), and increased by the fair market value of the contingent payments payable on the debt instrument. This paragraph (g)(2)(ii), however, does not apply to a debt instrument if the fair market value of the contingent payments is not reasonably ascertainable. Only in rare and extraordinary cases will the fair market value of the contingent payments be treated as not reasonably ascertainable.

    (3) Coordination with section 453. If a debt instrument is issued in exchange for property, and the income from the exchange is not reported under the installment method of section 453, this paragraph (g) applies rather than § 15a.453-1(d)(2) to determine the taxpayer's amount realized attributable to the debt instrument.

    (4) Effective date. This paragraph (g) applies to sales or exchanges that occur on or after August 13, 1996.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(h)Severances of trusts—(1) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Severances of trusts—(1) In general. The severance of a trust (including without limitation a severance that meets the requirements of § 26.2642-6 or of § 26.2654-1(b) of this chapter) is not an exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent if—

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(i)Effective/applicability date. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Effective/applicability date. Except as provided in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this section, this section applies on and after January 19, 2017. For rules before January 19, 2017, see § 1.1001-1 as contained in 26 CFR part 1 revised as of April 1, 2016.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2Discharge of liabilities Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    (a) Inclusion in amount realized—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (a) (2) and (3) of this section, the amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition.

    (2) Discharge of indebtedness. The amount realized on a sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability does not include amounts that are (or would be if realized and recognized) income from the discharge of indebtedness under section 61(a)(12). For situations where amounts arising from the discharge of indebtedness are not realized and recognized, see section 108 and § 1.61-12(b)(1).

    (3) Liability incurred on acquisition. In the case of a liability incurred by reason of the acquisition of the property, this section does not apply to the extent that such liability was not taken into account in determining the transferor's basis for such property.

    (4) Special rules. For purposes of this section—

    (i) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a nonrecourse liability discharges the transferor from the liability;

    (ii) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability discharges the transferor from the liability if another person agrees to pay the liability (whether or not the transferor is in fact released from liability);

    (iii) A disposition of property includes a gift of the property or a transfer of the property in satisfaction of liabilities to which it is subject;

    (iv) Contributions and distributions of property between a partner and a partnership are not sales or other dispositions of property; and

    (v) The liabilities from which a transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition of a partnership interest include the transferor's share of the liabilities of the partnership.

    (b) Effect of fair market value of security. The fair market value of the security at the time of sale or disposition is not relevant for purposes of determining under paragraph (a) of this section the amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged or treated as discharged. Thus, the fact that the fair market value of the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it secures does not prevent the full amount of those liabilities from being treated as money received from the sale or other disposition of the property. However, see paragraph (a)(2) of this section for a rule relating to certain income from discharge of indebtedness.

    (c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples. In each example assume the taxpayer uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, makes a return on the basis of the calendar year, and sells or disposes of all property which is security for a given liability.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(a)Inclusion in amount realized—(1) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Inclusion in amount realized—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (a) (2) and (3) of this section, the amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition.

    (2) Discharge of indebtedness. The amount realized on a sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability does not include amounts that are (or would be if realized and recognized) income from the discharge of indebtedness under section 61(a)(12). For situations where amounts arising from the discharge of indebtedness are not realized and recognized, see section 108 and § 1.61-12(b)(1).

    (3) Liability incurred on acquisition. In the case of a liability incurred by reason of the acquisition of the property, this section does not apply to the extent that such liability was not taken into account in determining the transferor's basis for such property.

    (4) Special rules. For purposes of this section—

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(b)Effect of fair market value of security. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Effect of fair market value of security. The fair market value of the security at the time of sale or disposition is not relevant for purposes of determining under paragraph (a) of this section the amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged or treated as discharged. Thus, the fact that the fair market value of the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it secures does not prevent the full amount of those liabilities from being treated as money received from the sale or other disposition of the property. However, see paragraph (a)(2) of this section for a rule relating to certain income from discharge of indebtedness.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(c)Examples. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples. In each example assume the taxpayer uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, makes a return on the basis of the calendar year, and sells or disposes of all property which is security for a given liability.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(i)§1.1001-2(i) Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    The sale or other disposition of property that secures a nonrecourse liability discharges the transferor from the liability;

    (ii) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability discharges the transferor from the liability if another person agrees to pay the liability (whether or not the transferor is in fact released from liability);

    (iii) A disposition of property includes a gift of the property or a transfer of the property in satisfaction of liabilities to which it is subject;

    (iv) Contributions and distributions of property between a partner and a partnership are not sales or other dispositions of property; and

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(v)The liabilities from which a transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition of a partnership interest include the transferor's share of the liabilities of the partnership. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    The liabilities from which a transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or disposition of a partnership interest include the transferor's share of the liabilities of the partnership.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3Modifications of debt instruments Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    (a) Scope—(1) In general. This section provides rules for determining whether a modification of the terms of a debt instrument results in an exchange for purposes of § 1.1001-1(a). This section applies to any modification of a debt instrument, regardless of the form of the modification. For example, this section applies to an exchange of a new instrument for an existing debt instrument, or to an amendment of an existing debt instrument. This section also applies to a modification of a debt instrument that the issuer and holder accomplish indirectly through one or more transactions with third parties. This section, however, does not apply to exchanges of debt instruments between holders.

    (2) Tax-exempt bonds. For special rules governing whether tax-exempt bonds are retired for purposes of sections 103 and 141 through 150 of the Internal Revenue Code, see § 1.150-3.

    (b) General rule. For purposes of § 1.1001-1(a), a significant modification of a debt instrument, within the meaning of this section, results in an exchange of the original debt instrument for a modified instrument that differs materially either in kind or in extent. A modification that is not a significant modification is not an exchange for purposes of § 1.1001-1(a). Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section define the term modification and contain examples illustrating the application of the rule. Paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section provide rules for determining when a modification is a significant modification. Paragraph (f) of this section also provides rules for determining whether the modified instrument received in an exchange will be classified as an instrument or property right that is not debt for federal income tax purposes. Paragraph (g) of this section contains examples illustrating the application of the rules in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.

    (c) Modification defined—(1) In general—(i) Alteration of terms. A modification means any alteration, including any deletion or addition, in whole or in part, of a legal right or obligation of the issuer or a holder of a debt instrument, whether the alteration is evidenced by an express agreement (oral or written), conduct of the parties, or otherwise.

    (ii) Alterations occurring by operation of the terms of a debt instrument. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, an alteration of a legal right or obligation that occurs by operation of the terms of a debt instrument is not a modification. An alteration that occurs by operation of the terms may occur automatically (for example, an annual resetting of the interest rate based on the value of an index or a specified increase in the interest rate if the value of the collateral declines from a specified level) or may occur as a result of the exercise of an option provided to an issuer or a holder to change a term of a debt instrument.

    (2) Exceptions. The alterations described in this paragraph (c)(2) are modifications, even if the alterations occur by operation of the terms of a debt instrument.

    (i) Change in obligor or nature of instrument. An alteration that results in the substitution of a new obligor, the addition or deletion of a co-obligor, or a change (in whole or in part) in the recourse nature of the instrument (from recourse to nonrecourse or from nonrecourse to recourse) is a modification.

    (ii) Property that is not debt. An alteration that results in an instrument or property right that is not debt for Federal income tax purposes is a modification unless the alteration occurs pursuant to a holder's option under the terms of the instrument to convert the instrument into equity of the issuer (notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2)(iii) of this section). The rules of paragraph (f)(7) of this section apply to determine whether an alteration or modification results in an instrument or property right that is not debt.

    (iii) Certain alterations resulting from the exercise of an option. An alteration that results from the exercise of an option provided to an issuer or a holder to change a term of a debt instrument is a modification unless—

    (A) The option is unilateral (as defined in paragraph (c)(3) of this section); and

    (B) In the case of an option exercisable by a holder, the exercise of the option does not result in (or, in the case of a variable or contingent payment, is not reasonably expected to result in) a deferral of, or a reduction in, any scheduled payment of interest or principal.

    (3) Unilateral option. For purposes of this section, an option is unilateral only if, under the terms of an instrument or under applicable law—

    (i) There does not exist at the time the option is exercised, or as a result of the exercise, a right of the other party to alter or terminate the instrument or put the instrument to a person who is related (within the meaning of section 267(b) or section 707(b)(1)) to the issuer;

    (ii) The exercise of the option does not require the consent or approval of—

    (A) The other party;

    (B) A person who is related to that party (within the meaning of section 267(b) or section 707(b)(1)), whether or not that person is a party to the instrument; or

    (C) A court or arbitrator; and

    (iii) The exercise of the option does not require consideration (other than incidental costs and expenses relating to the exercise of the option), unless, on the issue date of the instrument, the consideration is a de minimis amount, a specified amount, or an amount that is based on a formula that uses objective financial information (as defined in § 1.446-3(c)(4)(ii)).

    (4) Failure to perform—(i) In general. The failure of an issuer to perform its obligations under a debt instrument is not itself an alteration of a legal right or obligation and is not a modification.

    (ii) Holder's temporary forbearance. Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section, absent a written or oral agreement to alter other terms of the debt instrument, an agreement by the holder to stay collection or temporarily waive an acceleration clause or similar default right (including such a waiver following the exercise of a right to demand payment in full) is not a modification unless and until the forbearance remains in effect for a period that exceeds—

    (A) Two years following the issuer's initial failure to perform; and

    (B) Any additional period during which the parties conduct good faith negotiations or during which the issuer is in a title 11 or similar case (as defined in section 368(a)(3)(A)).

    (5) Failure to exercise an option. If a party to a debt instrument has an option to change a term of an instrument, the failure of the party to exercise that option is not a modification.

    (6) Time of modification—(i) In general. Except as provided in this paragraph (c)(6), an agreement to change a term of a debt instrument is a modification at the time the issuer and holder enter into the agreement, even if the change in the term is not immediately effective.

    (ii) Closing conditions. If the parties condition a change in a term of a debt instrument on reasonable closing conditions (for example, shareholder, regulatory, or senior creditor approval, or additional financing), a modification occurs on the closing date of the agreement. Thus, if the reasonable closing conditions do not occur so that the change in the term does not become effective, a modification does not occur.

    (iii) Bankruptcy proceedings. If a change in a term of a debt instrument occurs pursuant to a plan of reorganization in a title 11 or similar case (within the meaning of section 368(a)(3)(A)), a modification occurs upon the effective date of the plan. Thus, unless the plan becomes effective, a modification does not occur.

    (d) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section:

    (e) Significant modifications. Whether the modification of a debt instrument is a significant modification is determined under the rules of this paragraph (e). Paragraph (e)(1) of this section provides a general rule for determining the significance of modifications not otherwise addressed in this paragraph (e). Paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section provide specific rules for determining the significance of certain types of modifications. Paragraph (f) of this section provides rules of application, including rules for modifications that are effective on a deferred basis or upon the occurrence of a contingency.

    (1) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(6) of this section, a modification is a significant modification only if, based on all facts and circumstances, the legal rights or obligations that are altered and the degree to which they are altered are economically significant. In making a determination under this paragraph (e)(1), all modifications to the debt instrument (other than modifications subject to paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section) are considered collectively, so that a series of such modifications may be significant when considered together although each modification, if considered alone, would not be significant.

    (2) Change in yield—(i) Scope of rule. This paragraph (e)(2) applies to debt instruments that provide for only fixed payments, debt instruments with alternative payment schedules subject to § 1.1272-1(c), debt instruments that provide for a fixed yield subject to § 1.1272-1(d) (such as certain demand loans), and variable rate debt instruments. Whether a change in the yield of other debt instruments (for example, a contingent payment debt instrument) is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

    (ii) In general. A change in the yield of a debt instrument is a significant modification if the yield computed under paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section varies from the annual yield on the unmodified instrument (determined as of the date of the modification) by more than the greater of—

    (A)

    1/4 of one percent (25 basis points); or

    (B) 5 percent of the annual yield of the unmodified instrument (.05 × annual yield).

    (iii) Yield of the modified instrument—(A) In general. The yield computed under this paragraph (e)(2)(iii) is the annual yield of a debt instrument with—

    (1) An issue price equal to the adjusted issue price of the unmodified instrument on the date of the modification (increased by any accrued but unpaid interest and decreased by any accrued bond issuance premium not yet taken into account, and increased or decreased, respectively, to reflect payments made to the issuer or to the holder as consideration for the modification); and

    (2) Payments equal to the payments on the modified debt instrument from the date of the modification.

    (B) Prepayment penalty. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2)(iii), a commercially reasonable prepayment penalty for a pro rata prepayment (as defined in § 1.1275-2(f)) is not consideration for a modification of a debt instrument and is not taken into account in determining the yield of the modified instrument.

    (iv) Variable rate debt instruments. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2), the annual yield of a variable rate debt instrument is the annual yield of the equivalent fixed rate debt instrument (as defined in § 1.1275-5(e)) which is constructed based on the terms of the instrument (either modified or unmodified, whichever is applicable) as of the date of the modification.

    (3) Changes in timing of payments—(i) In general. A modification that changes the timing of payments (including any resulting change in the amount of payments) due under a debt instrument is a significant modification if it results in the material deferral of scheduled payments. The deferral may occur either through an extension of the final maturity date of an instrument or through a deferral of payments due prior to maturity. The materiality of the deferral depends on all the facts and circumstances, including the length of the deferral, the original term of the instrument, the amounts of the payments that are deferred, and the time period between the modification and the actual deferral of payments.

    (ii) Safe-harbor period. The deferral of one or more scheduled payments within the safe-harbor period is not a material deferral if the deferred payments are unconditionally payable no later than at the end of the safe-harbor period. The safe-harbor period begins on the original due date of the first scheduled payment that is deferred and extends for a period equal to the lesser of five years or 50 percent of the original term of the instrument. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(3)(ii), the term of an instrument is determined without regard to any option to extend the original maturity and deferrals of de minimis payments are ignored. If the period during which payments are deferred is less than the full safe-harbor period, the unused portion of the period remains a safe-harbor period for any subsequent deferral of payments on the instrument.

    (4) Change in obligor or security—(i) Substitution of a new obligor on recourse debt instruments—(A) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4)(i) (B), (C), or (D) of this section, the substitution of a new obligor on a recourse debt instrument is a significant modification.

    (B) Section 381(a) transaction. The substitution of a new obligor is not a significant modification if the acquiring corporation (within the meaning of section 381) becomes the new obligor pursuant to a transaction to which section 381(a) applies, the transaction does not result in a change in payment expectations, and the transaction (other than a reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(F)) does not result in a significant alteration.

    (C) Certain asset acquisitions. The substitution of a new obligor is not a significant modification if the new obligor acquires substantially all of the assets of the original obligor, the transaction does not result in a change in payment expectations, and the transaction does not result in a significant alteration.

    (D) Tax-exempt bonds. The substitution of a new obligor on a tax-exempt bond is not a significant modification if the new obligor is a related entity to the original obligor as defined in section 168(h)(4)(A) and the collateral securing the instrument continues to include the original collateral.

    (E) Significant alteration. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(4), a significant alteration is an alteration that would be a significant modification but for the fact that the alteration occurs by operation of the terms of the instrument.

    (F) Section 338 election. For purposes of this section, an election under section 338 following a qualified stock purchase of an issuer's stock does not result in the substitution of a new obligor.

    (G) Bankruptcy proceedings. For purposes of this section, the filing of a petition in a title 11 or similar case (as defined in section 368(a)(3)(A)) by itself does not result in the substitution of a new obligor.

    (ii) Substitution of a new obligor on nonrecourse debt instruments. The substitution of a new obligor on a nonrecourse debt instrument is not a significant modification.

    (iii) Addition or deletion of co-obligor. The addition or deletion of a co-obligor on a debt instrument is a significant modification if the addition or deletion of the co-obligor results in a change in payment expectations. If the addition or deletion of a co-obligor is part of a transaction or series of related transactions that results in the substitution of a new obligor, however, the transaction is treated as a substitution of a new obligor (and is tested under paragraph (e)(4)(i)) of this section rather than as an addition or deletion of a co-obligor.

    (iv) Change in security or credit enhancement—(A) Recourse debt instruments. A modification that releases, substitutes, adds or otherwise alters the collateral for, a guarantee on, or other form of credit enhancement for a recourse debt instrument is a significant modification if the modification results in a change in payment expectations.

    (B) Nonrecourse debt instruments. (1) A modification that releases, substitutes, adds or otherwise alters a substantial amount of the collateral for, a guarantee on, or other form of credit enhancement for a nonrecourse debt instrument is a significant modification. A substitution of collateral is not a significant modification, however, if the collateral is fungible or otherwise of a type where the particular units pledged are unimportant (for example, government securities or financial instruments of a particular type and credit quality). In addition, the substitution of a similar commercially available credit enhancement contract is not a significant modification, and an improvement to the property securing a nonrecourse debt instrument does not result in a significant modification.

    (2) Applicability date. Paragraph (e)(4)(iv)(B)(1) of this section applies to modifications occurring on or after July 6, 2011.

    (v) Change in priority of debt. A change in the priority of a debt instrument relative to other debt of the issuer is a significant modification if it results in a change in payment expectations.

    (vi) Change in payment expectations—(A) In general. For purposes of this section, a change in payment expectations occurs if, as a result of a transaction—

    (1) There is a substantial enhancement of the obligor's capacity to meet the payment obligations under a debt instrument and that capacity was primarily speculative prior to the modification and is adequate after the modification; or

    (2) There is a substantial impairment of the obligor's capacity to meet the payment obligations under a debt instrument and that capacity was adequate prior to the modification and is primarily speculative after the modification.

    (B) Obligor's capacity. The obligor's capacity includes any source for payment, including collateral, guarantees, or other credit enhancement.

    (5) Changes in the nature of a debt instrument—(i) Property that is not debt. A modification of a debt instrument that results in an instrument or property right that is not debt for Federal income tax purposes is a significant modification. The rules of paragraph (f)(7) of this section apply to determine whether a modification results in an instrument or property right that is not debt.

    (ii) Change in recourse nature—(A) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(5)(ii)(B) of this section, a change in the nature of a debt instrument from recourse (or substantially all recourse) to nonrecourse (or substantially all nonrecourse) is a significant modification. Thus, for example, a legal defeasance of a debt instrument in which the issuer is released from all liability to make payments on the debt instrument (including an obligation to contribute additional securities to a trust if necessary to provide sufficient funds to meet all scheduled payments on the instrument) is a significant modification. Similarly, a change in the nature of the debt instrument from nonrecourse (or substantially all nonrecourse) to recourse (or substantially all recourse) is a significant modification. If an instrument is not substantially all recourse or not substantially all nonrecourse either before or after a modification, the significance of the modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

    (B) Exceptions—(1) Defeasance of tax-exempt bonds. A defeasance of a tax-exempt bond is not a significant modification even if the issuer is released from any liability to make payments under the instrument if the defeasance occurs by operation of the terms of the original bond and the issuer places in trust government securities or tax-exempt government bonds that are reasonably expected to provide interest and principal payments sufficient to satisfy the payment obligations under the bond.

    (2) Original collateral. (i) A modification that changes a recourse debt instrument to a nonrecourse debt instrument is not a significant modification if the instrument continues to be secured only by the original collateral and the modification does not result in a change in payment expectations. For this purpose, if the original collateral is fungible or otherwise of a type where the particular units pledged are unimportant (for example, government securities or financial instruments of a particular type and credit quality), replacement of some or all units of the original collateral with other units of the same or similar type and aggregate value is not considered a change in the original collateral.

    (ii) Applicability date. Paragraph (e)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(i) of this section applies to modifications occurring on or after July 6, 2011.

    (6) Accounting or financial covenants. A modification that adds, deletes, or alters customary accounting or financial covenants is not a significant modification.

    (f) Rules of application—(1) Testing for significance—(i) In general. Whether a modification of any term is a significant modification is determined under each applicable rule in paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section and, if not specifically addressed in those rules, under the general rule in paragraph (e)(1) of this section. For example, a deferral of payments that changes the yield of a fixed rate debt instrument must be tested under both paragraphs (e) (2) and (3) of this section.

    (ii) Contingent modifications. If a modification described in paragraphs (e) (2) through (5) of this section is effective only upon the occurrence of a substantial contingency, whether or not the change is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section rather than under paragraphs (e) (2) through (5) of this section.

    (iii) Deferred modifications. If a modification described in paragraphs (e) (4) and (5) of this section is effective on a substantially deferred basis, whether or not the change is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section rather than under paragraphs (e) (4) and (5) of this section.

    (2) Modifications that are not significant. If a rule in paragraphs (e) (2) through (4) of this section prescribes a degree of change in a term of a debt instrument that is a significant modification, a change of the same type but of a lesser degree is not a significant modification under that rule. For example, a 20 basis point change in the yield of a fixed rate debt instrument is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(2) of this section. Likewise, if a rule in paragraph (e)(4) of this section requires a change in payment expectations for a modification to be significant, a modification of the same type that does not result in a change in payment expectations is not a significant modification under that rule.

    (3) Cumulative effect of modifications. Two or more modifications of a debt instrument over any period of time constitute a significant modification if, had they been done as a single change, the change would have resulted in a significant modification under paragraph (e) of this section. Thus, for example, a series of changes in the maturity of a debt instrument constitutes a significant modification if, combined as a single change, the change would have resulted in a significant modification. The significant modification occurs at the time that the cumulative modification would be significant under paragraph (e) of this section. In testing for a change of yield under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, however, any prior modification occurring more than 5 years before the date of the modification being tested is disregarded.

    (4) Modifications of different terms. Modifications of different terms of a debt instrument, none of which separately would be a significant modification under paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section, do not collectively constitute a significant modification. For example, a change in yield that is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(2) of this section and a substitution of collateral that is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(4)(iv) of this section do not together result in a significant modification. Although the significance of each modification is determined independently, in testing a particular modification it is assumed that all other simultaneous modifications have already occurred.

    (5) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

    (i) Issuer and obligor are used interchangeably and mean the issuer of a debt instrument or a successor obligor.

    (ii) Variable rate debt instrument and contingent payment debt instrument have the meanings given those terms in section 1275 and the regulations thereunder.

    (iii) Tax-exempt bond means a state or local bond that satisfies the requirements of section 103(a).

    (iv) Conduit loan and conduit borrower have the same meanings as in § 1.150-1(b).

    (6) Certain rules for tax-exempt bonds—(i) Conduit loans. For purposes of this section, the obligor of a tax-exempt bond is the entity that actually issues the bond and not a conduit borrower of bond proceeds. In determining whether there is a significant modification of a tax-exempt bond, however, transactions between holders of the tax-exempt bond and a borrower of a conduit loan may be an indirect modification under paragraph (a)(1) of this section. For example, a payment by the holder of a tax-exempt bond to a conduit borrower to waive a call right may result in an indirect modification of the tax-exempt bond by changing the yield on that bond.

    (ii) Recourse nature—(A) In general. For purposes of this section, a tax-exempt bond that does not finance a conduit loan is a recourse debt instrument.

    (B) Proceeds used for conduit loans. For purposes of this section, a tax-exempt bond that finances a conduit loan is a recourse debt instrument unless both the bond and the conduit loan are nonrecourse instruments.

    (C) Government securities as collateral. Notwithstanding paragraphs (f)(6)(ii) (A) and (B) of this section, for purposes of this section a tax-exempt bond that is secured only by a trust holding government securities or tax-exempt government bonds that are reasonably expected to provide interest and principal payments sufficient to satisfy the payment obligations under the bond is a nonrecourse instrument.

    (7) Rules for determining whether an alteration or modification results in an instrument or property right that is not debt—(i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (f)(7)(ii) of this section, the determination of whether an instrument resulting from an alteration or modification of a debt instrument will be recharacterized as an instrument or property right that is not debt for Federal income tax purposes shall take into account all of the factors relevant to such a determination.

    (ii) Financial condition of the obligor—(A) Deterioration in financial condition of the obligor generally disregarded. Except as provided in paragraph (f)(7)(ii)(B) of this section, in making a determination as to whether an instrument resulting from an alteration or modification of a debt instrument will be recharacterized as an instrument or property right that is not debt, any deterioration in the financial condition of the obligor between the issue date of the debt instrument and the date of the alteration or modification (as it relates to the obligor's ability to repay the debt instrument) is not taken into account. For example, any decrease in the fair market value of a debt instrument (whether or not the debt instrument is publicly traded) between the issue date of the debt instrument and the date of the alteration or modification is not taken into account to the extent that the decrease in fair market value is attributable to the deterioration in the financial condition of the obligor and not to a modification of the terms of the instrument.

    (B) Substitution of a new obligor; addition or deletion of co-obligor. If there is a substitution of a new obligor or the addition or deletion of a co-obligor, the rules in paragraph (f)(7)(ii)(A) of this section do not apply.

    (g) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section:

    (h) Effective/applicability date—(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, this section applies to alterations of the terms of a debt instrument on or after September 24, 1996. Taxpayers, however, may rely on this section for alterations of the terms of a debt instrument after December 2, 1992, and before September 24, 1996.

    (2) Exception. Paragraph (f)(7) of this section applies to an alteration of the terms of a debt instrument on or after January 7, 2011. A taxpayer, however, may rely on paragraph (f)(7) of this section for alterations of the terms of a debt instrument occurring before that date.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(a)Scope—(1) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Scope—(1) In general. This section provides rules for determining whether a modification of the terms of a debt instrument results in an exchange for purposes of § 1.1001-1(a). This section applies to any modification of a debt instrument, regardless of the form of the modification. For example, this section applies to an exchange of a new instrument for an existing debt instrument, or to an amendment of an existing debt instrument. This section also applies to a modification of a debt instrument that the issuer and holder accomplish indirectly through one or more transactions with third parties. This section, however, does not apply to exchanges of debt instruments between holders.

    (2) Tax-exempt bonds. For special rules governing whether tax-exempt bonds are retired for purposes of sections 103 and 141 through 150 of the Internal Revenue Code, see § 1.150-3.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(b)General rule. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    General rule. For purposes of § 1.1001-1(a), a significant modification of a debt instrument, within the meaning of this section, results in an exchange of the original debt instrument for a modified instrument that differs materially either in kind or in extent. A modification that is not a significant modification is not an exchange for purposes of § 1.1001-1(a). Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section define the term modification and contain examples illustrating the application of the rule. Paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section provide rules for determining when a modification is a significant modification. Paragraph (f) of this section also provides rules for determining whether the modified instrument received in an exchange will be classified as an instrument or property right that is not debt for federal income tax purposes. Paragraph (g) of this section contains examples illustrating the application of the rules in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(c)Modification defined—(1) In general—(i) Alteration of terms. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Modification defined—(1) In general—(i) Alteration of terms. A modification means any alteration, including any deletion or addition, in whole or in part, of a legal right or obligation of the issuer or a holder of a debt instrument, whether the alteration is evidenced by an express agreement (oral or written), conduct of the parties, or otherwise.

    (ii) Alterations occurring by operation of the terms of a debt instrument. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, an alteration of a legal right or obligation that occurs by operation of the terms of a debt instrument is not a modification. An alteration that occurs by operation of the terms may occur automatically (for example, an annual resetting of the interest rate based on the value of an index or a specified increase in the interest rate if the value of the collateral declines from a specified level) or may occur as a result of the exercise of an option provided to an issuer or a holder to change a term of a debt instrument.

    (2) Exceptions. The alterations described in this paragraph (c)(2) are modifications, even if the alterations occur by operation of the terms of a debt instrument.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(d)Examples. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(e)Significant modifications. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Significant modifications. Whether the modification of a debt instrument is a significant modification is determined under the rules of this paragraph (e). Paragraph (e)(1) of this section provides a general rule for determining the significance of modifications not otherwise addressed in this paragraph (e). Paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section provide specific rules for determining the significance of certain types of modifications. Paragraph (f) of this section provides rules of application, including rules for modifications that are effective on a deferred basis or upon the occurrence of a contingency.

    (1) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(6) of this section, a modification is a significant modification only if, based on all facts and circumstances, the legal rights or obligations that are altered and the degree to which they are altered are economically significant. In making a determination under this paragraph (e)(1), all modifications to the debt instrument (other than modifications subject to paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section) are considered collectively, so that a series of such modifications may be significant when considered together although each modification, if considered alone, would not be significant.

    (2) Change in yield—(i) Scope of rule. This paragraph (e)(2) applies to debt instruments that provide for only fixed payments, debt instruments with alternative payment schedules subject to § 1.1272-1(c), debt instruments that provide for a fixed yield subject to § 1.1272-1(d) (such as certain demand loans), and variable rate debt instruments. Whether a change in the yield of other debt instruments (for example, a contingent payment debt instrument) is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

    (ii) In general. A change in the yield of a debt instrument is a significant modification if the yield computed under paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section varies from the annual yield on the unmodified instrument (determined as of the date of the modification) by more than the greater of—

    (A)

    1/4 of one percent (25 basis points); or

    (B) 5 percent of the annual yield of the unmodified instrument (.05 × annual yield).

    (iii) Yield of the modified instrument—(A) In general. The yield computed under this paragraph (e)(2)(iii) is the annual yield of a debt instrument with—

    (1) An issue price equal to the adjusted issue price of the unmodified instrument on the date of the modification (increased by any accrued but unpaid interest and decreased by any accrued bond issuance premium not yet taken into account, and increased or decreased, respectively, to reflect payments made to the issuer or to the holder as consideration for the modification); and

    (2) Payments equal to the payments on the modified debt instrument from the date of the modification.

    (B) Prepayment penalty. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2)(iii), a commercially reasonable prepayment penalty for a pro rata prepayment (as defined in § 1.1275-2(f)) is not consideration for a modification of a debt instrument and is not taken into account in determining the yield of the modified instrument.

    (iv) Variable rate debt instruments. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2), the annual yield of a variable rate debt instrument is the annual yield of the equivalent fixed rate debt instrument (as defined in § 1.1275-5(e)) which is constructed based on the terms of the instrument (either modified or unmodified, whichever is applicable) as of the date of the modification.

    (3) Changes in timing of payments—(i) In general. A modification that changes the timing of payments (including any resulting change in the amount of payments) due under a debt instrument is a significant modification if it results in the material deferral of scheduled payments. The deferral may occur either through an extension of the final maturity date of an instrument or through a deferral of payments due prior to maturity. The materiality of the deferral depends on all the facts and circumstances, including the length of the deferral, the original term of the instrument, the amounts of the payments that are deferred, and the time period between the modification and the actual deferral of payments.

    (ii) Safe-harbor period. The deferral of one or more scheduled payments within the safe-harbor period is not a material deferral if the deferred payments are unconditionally payable no later than at the end of the safe-harbor period. The safe-harbor period begins on the original due date of the first scheduled payment that is deferred and extends for a period equal to the lesser of five years or 50 percent of the original term of the instrument. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(3)(ii), the term of an instrument is determined without regard to any option to extend the original maturity and deferrals of de minimis payments are ignored. If the period during which payments are deferred is less than the full safe-harbor period, the unused portion of the period remains a safe-harbor period for any subsequent deferral of payments on the instrument.

    (4) Change in obligor or security—(i) Substitution of a new obligor on recourse debt instruments—(A) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4)(i) (B), (C), or (D) of this section, the substitution of a new obligor on a recourse debt instrument is a significant modification.

    (B) Section 381(a) transaction. The substitution of a new obligor is not a significant modification if the acquiring corporation (within the meaning of section 381) becomes the new obligor pursuant to a transaction to which section 381(a) applies, the transaction does not result in a change in payment expectations, and the transaction (other than a reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(F)) does not result in a significant alteration.

    (C) Certain asset acquisitions. The substitution of a new obligor is not a significant modification if the new obligor acquires substantially all of the assets of the original obligor, the transaction does not result in a change in payment expectations, and the transaction does not result in a significant alteration.

    (D) Tax-exempt bonds. The substitution of a new obligor on a tax-exempt bond is not a significant modification if the new obligor is a related entity to the original obligor as defined in section 168(h)(4)(A) and the collateral securing the instrument continues to include the original collateral.

    (E) Significant alteration. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(4), a significant alteration is an alteration that would be a significant modification but for the fact that the alteration occurs by operation of the terms of the instrument.

    (F) Section 338 election. For purposes of this section, an election under section 338 following a qualified stock purchase of an issuer's stock does not result in the substitution of a new obligor.

    (G) Bankruptcy proceedings. For purposes of this section, the filing of a petition in a title 11 or similar case (as defined in section 368(a)(3)(A)) by itself does not result in the substitution of a new obligor.

    (ii) Substitution of a new obligor on nonrecourse debt instruments. The substitution of a new obligor on a nonrecourse debt instrument is not a significant modification.

    (iii) Addition or deletion of co-obligor. The addition or deletion of a co-obligor on a debt instrument is a significant modification if the addition or deletion of the co-obligor results in a change in payment expectations. If the addition or deletion of a co-obligor is part of a transaction or series of related transactions that results in the substitution of a new obligor, however, the transaction is treated as a substitution of a new obligor (and is tested under paragraph (e)(4)(i)) of this section rather than as an addition or deletion of a co-obligor.

    (iv) Change in security or credit enhancement—(A) Recourse debt instruments. A modification that releases, substitutes, adds or otherwise alters the collateral for, a guarantee on, or other form of credit enhancement for a recourse debt instrument is a significant modification if the modification results in a change in payment expectations.

    (B) Nonrecourse debt instruments. (1) A modification that releases, substitutes, adds or otherwise alters a substantial amount of the collateral for, a guarantee on, or other form of credit enhancement for a nonrecourse debt instrument is a significant modification. A substitution of collateral is not a significant modification, however, if the collateral is fungible or otherwise of a type where the particular units pledged are unimportant (for example, government securities or financial instruments of a particular type and credit quality). In addition, the substitution of a similar commercially available credit enhancement contract is not a significant modification, and an improvement to the property securing a nonrecourse debt instrument does not result in a significant modification.

    (2) Applicability date. Paragraph (e)(4)(iv)(B)(1) of this section applies to modifications occurring on or after July 6, 2011.

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(f)Rules of application—(1) Testing for significance—(i) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Rules of application—(1) Testing for significance—(i) In general. Whether a modification of any term is a significant modification is determined under each applicable rule in paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section and, if not specifically addressed in those rules, under the general rule in paragraph (e)(1) of this section. For example, a deferral of payments that changes the yield of a fixed rate debt instrument must be tested under both paragraphs (e) (2) and (3) of this section.

    (ii) Contingent modifications. If a modification described in paragraphs (e) (2) through (5) of this section is effective only upon the occurrence of a substantial contingency, whether or not the change is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section rather than under paragraphs (e) (2) through (5) of this section.

    (iii) Deferred modifications. If a modification described in paragraphs (e) (4) and (5) of this section is effective on a substantially deferred basis, whether or not the change is a significant modification is determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section rather than under paragraphs (e) (4) and (5) of this section.

    (2) Modifications that are not significant. If a rule in paragraphs (e) (2) through (4) of this section prescribes a degree of change in a term of a debt instrument that is a significant modification, a change of the same type but of a lesser degree is not a significant modification under that rule. For example, a 20 basis point change in the yield of a fixed rate debt instrument is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(2) of this section. Likewise, if a rule in paragraph (e)(4) of this section requires a change in payment expectations for a modification to be significant, a modification of the same type that does not result in a change in payment expectations is not a significant modification under that rule.

    (3) Cumulative effect of modifications. Two or more modifications of a debt instrument over any period of time constitute a significant modification if, had they been done as a single change, the change would have resulted in a significant modification under paragraph (e) of this section. Thus, for example, a series of changes in the maturity of a debt instrument constitutes a significant modification if, combined as a single change, the change would have resulted in a significant modification. The significant modification occurs at the time that the cumulative modification would be significant under paragraph (e) of this section. In testing for a change of yield under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, however, any prior modification occurring more than 5 years before the date of the modification being tested is disregarded.

    (4) Modifications of different terms. Modifications of different terms of a debt instrument, none of which separately would be a significant modification under paragraphs (e) (2) through (6) of this section, do not collectively constitute a significant modification. For example, a change in yield that is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(2) of this section and a substitution of collateral that is not a significant modification under paragraph (e)(4)(iv) of this section do not together result in a significant modification. Although the significance of each modification is determined independently, in testing a particular modification it is assumed that all other simultaneous modifications have already occurred.

    (5) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(g)Examples. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section:

  • Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(h)Effective/applicability date—(1) In general. Show full text ▾ Collapse ▴

    Effective/applicability date—(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, this section applies to alterations of the terms of a debt instrument on or after September 24, 1996. Taxpayers, however, may rely on this section for alterations of the terms of a debt instrument after December 2, 1992, and before September 24, 1996.

    (2) Exception. Paragraph (f)(7) of this section applies to an alteration of the terms of a debt instrument on or after January 7, 2011. A taxpayer, however, may rely on paragraph (f)(7) of this section for alterations of the terms of a debt instrument occurring before that date.

633 Citing Cases

Pesarik v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2026-20 · 2026 · T.C.

Adjusted Basis Under section 1001, the gain from the sale of property is the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis.

Tooke v. Commissioner 164 T.C. No. 2 · 2025

981, 983–85 (2019). However, Appeals has a long history and has operated under many names, adopted various structures, and existed pursuant to several authorities throughout the years. Tucker I, 135 T.C. at 135–36. A. A Brief History of the Independent Office of Appeals Established by the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1301(d), 40

Debra Reed & Timothy Reed, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2025-4 · 2025

981, 983 (2019). We use the office’s name at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 3 [*3] the Notice of Determination. These statements include allegations of longstanding IRS accounting errors stemming from petitioner Debra Reed’s being an identity theft victim in 2012 and the failure of the IR

These cases are inapposite: They involved taxpayer attempts to revoke prior elections that were valid on their face; the question here is whether GWA’s election was valid to begin with.

Remus Beleiu & Naomi J. Beleiu, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2025-70 · 2025

981, 983 (2019). 7 [*7] burden of proving fraud, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. See I.R.C. § 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Richardson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-69, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 981, 996, aff’d, 509 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2007). II. Supervisory Approval Section 6751(b)(1) provides that “[n]o penalty under thi

nd the Greens. The Notices of Deficiency determined that no deductions should be allowed with respect to the 9 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). 9 [*9] Contributed Artifacts because “the requirements of section 170 [have not] been satisfied.”10 The Notices also determined gross valuation misstatement penalties under section 6662(a), (b)(3), and (h) or, in the

Bauche v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2025-48 · 2025

981, 983 (2019). Each name was in effect for part of the time period relevant to this case, and we refer to each as Appeals. 3 We reach the merits of petitioner’s Opposition even though it was untimely filed. See infra Background Part V. After extensions, we set a September 30, 2024, deadline for petitioner to file a response to r

Scott A. Blum & Audrey R. Blum, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2025-18 · 2025

981, 983 (2019). Although the record is unclear, it seems that petitioners had a separate CDP hearing for the proposed levy. Respondent collected by levy. 17 [*17] which respondent applied for 1998. By that date, petitioners had paid their 1999 assessed balance, less the amount of the interest to be abated, in full. After petitio

Varela v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-92 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). 2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Prac

Johnson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-94 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to the case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 [*4] Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On May 26, 2023, the D.C. Circuit resolved the jurisdictional question. See Lissack v. Commissioner, 68 F.4th 1312, (D.C. Cir. 2023), vacated and

135 [*135] We hold that LHDC is permitted to deduct the entire $2,770,775 of salary-and-wage deductions reported on its 2010 return, the entire $2,326,407 of salary-and-wage deductions reported on its 2011 tax return, and the entire $1,818,542 of professional-fee deductions reported on its 2011 tax return.

Mukhi v. Commissioner 163 T.C. No. 8 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 a Collection Due Process Hearing, dated July 9, 2018. Respondent issued Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Rights to a Hearing under IRC 6320, dated November 27, 2018. Petitioner timel

Cloar v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-17 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). Served 02/06/24 2 [*2] Background This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122. The stipulated facts, which are derived from the administrative record of Mr. Cloar’s CDP hearings, are incorporated in our findings by this reference.3 Mr. Cloar resided in Arkansas when he timely filed his Petition. I. Ta

James E. Keith & Julie Keith, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2024-81 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). Served 08/28/24 2 [*2] Background We held a hearing for both Motions at our San Francisco, California, trial session. The following background is drawn from the pleadings, the parties’ Motion papers, the administrative record, and the hearing transcript. Petitioners resided in California when they filed their Pet

Mukhi v. Commissioner 162 T.C. No. 8 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). 5 Case Memorandum, detailing AO’s determinations regarding each of petitioner’s arguments. III. CDP Notices and Hearing During the postassessment conference, respondent began taking collection actions related to the foreign reporting penalties. Respondent issued CP90, Final Notice–Notice of Intent to Levy and Not

Schwartz v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-63 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). 3 Petitioner has a pending Tax Court case assigned Docket No. 25213-21L, in which he is disputing a notice of determination concerning collection action for tax Served 06/03/24 2 [*2] Summary Judgment (Motion), and for the reasons discussed below, we will grant respondent’s Motion. Background The following facts

O'Nan v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-57 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the IRS Office of Appeals. 5 [*5] provided some or all of the funds for the overpayment)[.] In her Petition, filed March 2, 2017, Mrs. O’Nan contended (in relevant part): [T]he lien recorded by the IRS in April 2015 was improper. It was not

Stegman v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-32 · 2024

Section 1001 provides rules for determining the amount of and recognition of gain or loss, which for a gain is determined by the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis, and for a loss by the excess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized.

981, 983 (2019). Served 08/22/24 2 [*2] issue).3 Petitioners argue that IRS Appeals abused its discretion in denying Ralph W. Baumgardner, Jr., and Patricia L. Baumgardner’s offer-in-compromise (OIC). Petitioners also contend that the settlement officer (SO) erred in calculating the Baumgardners’ reasonable collection potential (

Infinity Aerospace Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2024-12 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to these cases, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 11 Patricia was issued two notices of deficiency. One indicated her joint liability—with Lloyd—for the gift tax and additions to tax associated with the Trust’s shares. Lloyd received an identical deficienc

Thompson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-14 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). As the events in these cases predate this change, we will use the name in effect at all times relevant to these cases, i.e., the Office of Appeals. 9 [*9] 2016 Schedule F Income Amount Cattle Sales $216,739 Simmons – Chicken/Egg Income 140,645 Less: Cattle Sales on Schedule F, Line 1(a) (1,000) Less: Gross Cattle

issioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-303, aff’d per curiam, 149 F.3d 1168 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision). 3 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 The Petition sought review of both the notice of deficiency and a concurrently issued notice of determinati

Mathew v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2024-69 · 2024

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. Served 06/24/24 2 [*2] June 28, 2023, petitioner timely filed a Petition commencing this case. Petitioner resided in Rhode Island when the Petition was filed with the Court. The issue for decision is whether the Office

Balint v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-118 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 3 Petitioner now concedes that the determination for 2013 is correct. Served 09/25/23 2 [*2] 2014 federal income tax return and (2) Appeals’ determination to sustain the proposed levy was an abuse of discret

981, 983 (2019). 3 [*3] Petitioner represented to the settlement officer that the only ground on which it challenged the collection activities was respondent’s lack of compliance with section 6751(b) related to the 2008 section 6662A penalty.4 Petitioner requested that the collection due process hearing be rescheduled to allow fo

Applicability of Section 1001 Having established that the open transaction doctrine does not apply, and that any gain derived from the transactions is classified as short-term capital gain, we turn to the calculation of decedent’s gain at the moments of the exchanges.

§ 1001; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d)(1)(i) (discussing the assignment of income to categories at the CRAT level). Although not taxable to the CRAT, that gain must be tracked and affects the treatment of distributions from the CRAT.30 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d)(1)(viii) (providing examples illustrating the rules). Congress has e

981, 983 (2019). 3 The account transcripts for the years at issue reflect that the credit transfers occurred for tax year 2017 on April 15, 2018, tax year 2018 on March 4, 2019, tax year 2019 on March 9, 2020, tax year 2020 on March 8, 2021, tax year 2021 on March 21, 2022, and tax year 2022 on March 6, 2023. 3 for tax year 2016

Sowards v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-99 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. Served 08/03/23 2 [*2] returns for each of the years at issue; (2) respondent should be equitably estopped from maintaining that petitioner is not entitled to those credits; (3) respondent’s disallowance of

Jacobowitz v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-107 · 2023

ot opine on the nature of the income, which is the focus of the dispute here; rather, at issue in L&C Springs Assocs. was at what time the taxpayer abandoned certain property, thereby triggering gain from cancellation of indebtedness for purposes of section 1001. L&C Springs Assocs., 188 F.3d at 868. In 2925 Briarpark, Ltd., the issue was whether the taxpayer-partner and the limited partnership realized gain from dealings in property under section 61(a)(3), rather than cancellation of indebtedne

Hyde v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-76 · 2023

981, 983–85 (2019). 4 [*4] grounds that this Court and others had previously found frivolous. Petitioner did not raise any spousal defenses or request any collection alternatives. Respondent acknowledged receipt of petitioner’s request for a CDP hearing regarding the NFTL filing. Later, in a letter from Appeals’ SO Chavez, petiti

Wright v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-153 · 2023

ion is that she did not intend or authorize a joint return to be filed on her behalf for any of the years at 3 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 5 [*5] issue. She maintains that Mr. Wright misled or deceived her and filed joint returns without her knowle

DeCrescenzo v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-7 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). 7 [*7] In April 2017 petitioner and Martin D. Fried, an Appeals officer (AO), both signed an IRS Form 872, Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax, extending the time to assess tax for the years at issue until March 31, 2018. In November 2017, petitioner, and, in December 2017, AO Fried signed another Form 872,

Kraske v. Commissioner 161 T.C. No. 7 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 3 The parties stipulated that petitioner’s letter was “submitted” on July 16, 2014. The letter, a copy of which was also stipulated, is dated July 16, 2014, and bears a “Received” stamp of the Small Business

981, 983 (2019).) The Whittakers’ timing couldn’t have been worse—their appeal hit IRS Appeals just as the pandemic hit the country. After a hearing in March 2020, the record shows that the settlement officer 4 The IRS requires taxpayers who want an OIC to pay an application fee and submit an initial partial payment. The Whittaker

Neel Kamal & Preeti Sharma, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2023-80 · 2023

§§ 1001, 1012; see also O’Boyle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-149, 2010 WL 2766818, at *3, aff’d per curiam, 464 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Taxpayers bear the burden of establishing their basis in the property. See Rule 142(a); O’Boyle v. 16 [*16] Commissioner, 2010 WL 2766818, at *3. Gain from the sale of a capital asset, such as stock, may c

981, 983 (2019). Served 08/29/23 2 ending June 2014, September 2014, December 2014, and March 2015 (periods at issue). Following a brief trial the issues for decision are (1) whether petitioner is entitled to contest the section 6672 trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP) liabilities for the periods at issue and (2) whether Appeals’

981, 983 (2019). 4 [*4] It is further stipulated that the liability was abated without prejudice to respondent’s right to reassess the civil penalties under I.R.C. § 6694(b) for the taxable year 2011 pursuant to the procedures prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code, to the extent permitted by law. After the abatement, respondent

Saccato v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-96 · 2023

§§ 1001, 1012; Hacker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022- 16, 123 T.C.M. (CCH) 1088, 1098. The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing his basis (if any) in the property. O’Neill v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 44, 50 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1957-193. The IRS determined in the notice of deficiency that petitioner for 2014 had net taxable capital

Zaimes v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-121 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the “Office of Appeals.” 2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, and regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 5 [*5] not seek collection due process hearings, it is undisputed that the time for seeking such hearings has lapsed. In a further effort to collect the Beltons’ unpaid tax liabilities, the IRS issued a noti

Plotkin v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-125 · 2023

tion of the ten-year period for collecting assessed tax liabilities and (2) the $6,000 amount. Id. at *8, *57. On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116- 25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). On May 20, 2020, we reconsidered our April 2019 Memorandum Opinion. We did so on Motion of petitioner, who argued that Appeals had obtained information that his financial situation was such that it was impossible to

Ogawa v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-70 · 2023

determined deficiencies for the years in issue and additions to tax under sections 6651 and 6654 as follows: 4 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 5 The deficiency notice determined that for tax years 2009 and 2011, the section 6651(a)(2) additions to tax

Conmac Investments Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2023-40 · 2023

2008 Act § 1001(2)(A) provides: “The term ‘base acres’, with respect to a covered commodity on a farm, means the number of acres established under section 1101 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 as in effect on September 30, 2007,” subject to any adjustment by the 2008 Act.

Shapiro v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-144 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). 15 [*15] $8 million in liquid assets that he reported was attributable to the settlement. On February 26, 2021, AO Armenia and Dr. Shapiro’s representative held the section 6330 hearing by telephone. AO Armenia informed Dr. Shapiro’s representative that, after her review of the information that Dr. Shapiro provid

Stanojevich v. Commissioner 160 T.C. No. 7 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 3 Given that 2015 and a proposed levy are no longer at issue, we hereinafter limit our discussion to the subject years and the NFTL filing. 4 Respondent disputes that SFT should be characterized as a valid tr

Kosmides v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-138 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. Served 11/16/23 2 [*2] Background This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122. The stipulated facts are incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in Maryland when he timely filed his Pet

Liberty Global, Inc., Petitioner 161 T.C. No. 10 · 2023

federal income tax.12 Second, in the event we disagree with this outcome, Liberty Global argues that section 904(f)(3) is by necessity ambiguous and that Treasury Regulation § 1.904(f)-2(d)(1) requires it to treat all its gain as foreign-source income.

dated February 4, 2020, and signed by the IRS examiner’s immediate supervisor on February 4, 2020, meets the 5 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 6 section 6751(b) written supervisory approval requirement. The Court agrees. Further, the record shows an un

Lem v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2023-110 · 2023

981, 983 (2019). Served 08/28/23 2 [*2] levy action pursuant to section 6330(d).3 In filing his Motion, the Commissioner contends that the settlement officer did not abuse her discretion in disallowing the proposed collection alternative to the proposed levy action because Ms. Lem did not (1) meaningfully participate in the colle

s are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. 2 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. Served 05/12/22 2 [*2] (SO) did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the proposed levy. We agree and will therefore gr

Thus, pursuant to section 1001, Hoops was required to take into account the amount of the deferred compensation liability in computing its gain or loss from the sale.

Mattson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-118 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. 4 [*4] July 9, 2009, the SO issued a notice of determination sustaining the lien and levy collection actions for both tax years. On August 11, 2009, Mr. Mattson petitioned this Court for review of that notice of determ

981, 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. Served 03/15/22 2 [*2] The parties dispute whether the settlement officer acted within her discretion in sustaining the NFTL. Based on the record before us, we find that

Rogerson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-49 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. 15 With respect to the yachts, the notice elaborated that “Appeals previously determined that a similar activity . . . was a valid rental activity despite the extremely limited rental income generated; therefore, [Reven

Goddard v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-96 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). We use the name in effect at the time relevant to these cases, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 These amounts reflect those reported in the Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 for petitioner Mr. Goddard; and the Final Notice-Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Y

Shaddix v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-11 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). 3 [*3] She also told petitioner that he was not entitled to challenge his underlying liability for any year at issue. Her determination that he could not challenge his underlying liabilities seems to have been based on her belief that petitioner’s tax returns had been audited. She wrote in her notes: “He admits t

eferences are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. 2 On July 1, 2019, the Office of Appeals was renamed the Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 891, 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the time relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. Served 02/03/22 2 [*2] by Mr. Flynn. Seeing no abuse of discretion, we w

Mamadou v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-121 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). 4 [*4] underlying tax liabilities for 2015–2016. He stated that he was an independent contractor and alleged that the IRS had failed to allow de- ductions for his “self-employed expenses.” On March 18, 2022, after several unsuccessful efforts to com- municate with petitioner, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

Donald Furrer & Rita Furrer, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2022-100 · 2022

The corn and soy- beans were ordinary income property in petitioners’ hands. See § 1221(a)(1) (defining “capital asset” to exclude “property of a kind which would properly be included in inventory of the taxpayer”). The crop sales were effected in the ordinary course of business by Co-Alliance LLP, in whose grain elevators the crops had bee

Schwartz v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-125 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). Since both names were in effect at different times relevant to this case, we will refer to them both as Appeals. Served 12/21/22 2 [*2] the years in issue. Petitioner seeks review of Appeals’ determinations, as supplemented, pursuant to section 6330(d)(1).3 The issues for decision are (1) whether we have jurisdic

Middleton v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-28 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). 4 [*4] settlement officer was assigned to the case, and she sent petitioner Letter 4837 scheduling a CDP hearing for January 15, 2019. In the letter she requested the following documents: (1) a completed Form 433–A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self- Employed Individuals; (2) signed tax r

981, 983 (2019). 3 [*3] that all other requirements of law and administrative procedure had been met. The SO convened a telephone conference during which petitioners requested abatement of the 2013 additions to tax. The SO explained that they did not qualify for “first time abatement” under an IRS administrative policy. That was

Luu v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-126 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 [*4] based on his protest disagreeing with the IRS audit findings and seeking an increase in the proposed tax deficiency amounts. On or about August 29, 2018, the WBO sent petitioner a preliminary award re

Chinweze v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-56 · 2022

eferences are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. 2 On July 1, 2019, the Office of Appeals was renamed the Independent Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the time relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. Served 06/07/22 2 [*2] that Mr. Chinweze is precluded from challenging h

981, Served 03/10/22 2 [*2] that the Buntons do not owe the accuracy-related penalties because the initial determination to impose these penalties was not approved by a supervisor as required by section 6751(b). We therefore do not sustain the levy action as to the penalties. We sustain the levy action as to the other liabilities

§§ 1001, 1012; see also O’Boyle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-149, 2010 WL 2766818, at *3, aff’d per curiam, 464 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Petitioners bear the burden of establishing basis in their property. See Rule 142(a); O’Boyle v. Commissioner, 2010 WL 2766818, at *3. Petitioners purchased the Cleveland Ave. property in June 2004 for $27,

Soler v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2022-78 · 2022

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 5 [*5] marital status requirement. Lastly, Appeals determined that, although Mrs. Soler met the threshold requirements for relief under section 6015(f), no relief would be granted because Mrs. Soler did not

981, 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals or Appeals. 4 [*4] accompanying Exhibits, we conclude that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. I. Claim of Right Section 1341 addresses instances in which a taxpayer includes an item in gross income for a pri

Galloway v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2021-24 · 2021

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 3 - [*3] Background The following facts are based on the parties’ pleadings and motion papers, including the attached declarations and exhibits.3 See Rule 121(b). Mr.

Pazden v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2021-108 · 2021

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times most relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 3 - [*3] by section 6020(b). The notice determined a deficiency of $449,934, as well as additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for failure to file her tax return, section 6651(a)(2) for failure to pay tax, a

Lufkin v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2021-71 · 2021

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). - 6 - [*6] Where a taxpayer properly challenges the validity of his underlying liability for the period in question, we review the matter on a de novo basis. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Petitioner has the burden of proof regarding his underlying liabilities. See Rule 142(a); Thompson v. C

46See sec. 721(a). - 51 - [*51] by structuring the transaction as “a contribution to the partnership, followed (or preceded) by a tax-free distribution from the partnership.”47 Generally, a partner who contributes property to a partnership will receive nonrecognition treatment, while a partner who sells property to a partnership must re

New Capital Fire, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2021-67 · 2021

Background on F Reorganizations Section 1001 requires taxpayers to recognize any gain or loss realized on the sale or exchange of property unless an exception exists.

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 3 - [*3] Boettchers’ income tax withholdings for these years, however, covered only a fraction of their reported liabilities. The IRS assessed for each year the repor

Cashaw v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2021-123 · 2021

153 referenced an “enclosed Form 2751”, Proposed Assessment of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty, but no such form was submitted into evidence. 7 This office is now referred to as the Independent Office of Appeals. Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, sec. 1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). 8 Petitioner did not propose as part of her request or hearing any collection alternatives, such as an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. - 6 - [*6] financial information from petitioner, which petitio

Kidz University, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2021-101 · 2021

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the time relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 3 - [*3] A. Kidz University’s 2012 and 2013 Tax Liabilities Kidz University is an Arkansas childcare company owned by Michella Gillum. Between June 2014 and October 20

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). The IRS issues a so-called 30-day letter, which allows the taxpayer to request Appeals consideration, only if there are at least 240 days remaining on the period of limitations. IRM pt. 4.10.8.12.1(1) and (2) (Sept. 12, 2014). If fewer than 240 days remain, the case remains unagreed, and the taxpayer does not con

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). 4The parties agreed to put the CDP case in suspense to allow the estate and the U.S. Department of Justice time to explore a global settlement (which included a refund claim filed by the estate of decedent’s spouse) and the estate to file an appeal of the 2010 decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 6 - and demand for payment was properly mailed to petitioner's last known address. SO Thompson sent petitioner a letter requesting that he submit a completed Form 433

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predate that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office ofAppeals. 3The term "computational adjustment" means "the change in the tax liability ofa partner which properly reflects the treatment under this subchapter ofa partnership item."

d have been paid by former partner". Petitioner checked the boxes for the following collection alternatives: 3This office is now called the "Independent Office ofAppeals". M sec. 6320(b)(1) (as amended by the Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, sec. 1001, 133 Stat. at 983) (2019). 4Respondent asserts that IRS records show the TFRPs were reduced on account ofpayments made for some ofthe periods at issue by petitioner's former partner under the terms ofan offer-in-compromise. - 5 - [*5] "Insta

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office of Appeals. - 3 - [*3] Payroll had its principal place ofbusiness in Monroe, Michigan, when it timely filed its petition. A. 2010 and 2011 Tax Liabilities Patrick's Payroll was an

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019)). 4When the petition was filed, petitioner's principal place ofbusiness was in New York. - 3 - Backgrounds I. Petitioner's Employment Tax Returns and Requests for Abatement Petitioner is a corporation that is exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3). Yitzchok Kaplan is petitioner's president and adm

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). As the events in this case predated that change, we will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the Office ofAppeals. - 3 - [*3] $191,715 and Federal income tax of$41,857. On her 2014 return she reported taxable income of$206,411 and tax of$56,186. Ms. Biggs-Owens' income tax withholdin

1001, 133 Stat. at 983 (2019). - 4 - [*4] petitioner submitted a supplemental protest; and Exam submitted a rebuttal to petitioner's supplemental protest. On June 21, 2016, AO Tate held a pre-conference meeting with petitioner, petitioner's representatives, and Exam personnel. On August 10, 2016, AO Tate held a settlement conference with peti

.38, the Court stated: - 16 - [*16] Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless ofwhether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 38We note that respondent has determined only that the six trust deposits actual

is sufficiently secured); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43 (denying open transaction treatment and requiring ratable gain recognition as annuity payments received). More recently, in 2006, the Commissioner proposed amendments to the regulations under sec. 1001 that, ifadopted as proposed, would require immediate gain recognition upon an exchange of appreciated property for a private annuity--regardless ofthe security supporting the annuity payments. REG-141901-05, 71 Fed. Reg. 61441 (Oct. 18, 200

.38, the Court stated: - 16 - [*16] Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless ofwhether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 38We note that respondent has determined only that the six trust deposits actual

.38, the Court stated: - 16 - [*16] Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless ofwhether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 38We note that respondent has determined only that the six trust deposits actual

.38, the Court stated: - 16 - [*16] Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless ofwhether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 38We note that respondent has determined only that the six trust deposits actual

The Commissioner argues that the sale and the debt forgiveness are part ofthe same "sale or exchange"--that the debt discharged is included in the amount realized under section 1001 and any income would be "[g]ains derived from dealings in property" under section 61(a)(3).

.38, the Court stated: - 16 - [*16] Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless ofwhether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 38We note that respondent has determined only that the six trust deposits actual

Section 1001(c) provides that, except as otherwise allowed by the Code,3 the entire amount ofthe gain determined under section 1001 on the sale ofproperty is to be recog- nized.

shares comprises a liability from * * * [decedent]'s viewpoint, I display the dollar amounts as negative quantities." (Emphasis added.) Because decedent had only obligations under the contracts-- and obligations are not property--the VPFCs were not property under section 1001, and therefore section 1001 is inapplicable.

adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation. Sec. 301(c)(2). The amount ofthe distribution that is not a dividend or does not reduce basis is generally treated as gain from the sale or exchange ofproperty. Sec. 301(c)(3); see also sec. 1001. A distribution need not be formally declared or even intended by a corporation but can be constructive. Noble v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 439, 442- 443 (9th Cir. 1966), § T.C. Memo. 1965-84. Whether a payment is a constructive distribution de

09 1,029,685.29 - 9 - [*9] 2000 85,956,744.42 83,270,467 (2,686,277.42) 2001 19,845,551.14 19,780,965 (64,586.14) 2002 25,469,075.42 24,652,495 (816,580.42) 2003 108,175,314.60 108,459,909 284,594.40 2004 217,789,364.91 217,001,644 (787,720.91) He made no attempt to match the sale ofa security with its purchase--data that would be necessary under section 1001 to determine his gain and make a mark-to- market election (but more on that later).

1001 (2006), and the Internal Revenue Code in Gallade v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 355, 361 (1996), as follows: ERISA was enacted to establish "a comprehensive federal scheme for the protection ofpension plan participants and their beneficiaries." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1979). ERISA was intended to assure th

or independent contractor. Gains derived from the sale or exchange ofproperty are included in gross income unless excluded by law. Sec. 1.61-6(a), Income Tax Regs. The specific rules for computing gain or loss on the sale ofproperty are governed by section 1001. Id. It is "well settled" that the transfer ofpropertyby deed in lieu offoreclosure constitutes a "sale or exchange" for Federal income tax purposes. Allan v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 655, 659 (1986), M, 856 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1988); Freel

adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation. Sec. 301(c)(2). The amount ofthe distribution that is not a dividend or does not reduce basis is generally treated as gain from the sale or exchange ofproperty. Sec. 301(c)(3); see also sec. 1001. A distribution need not be formally declared or even intended by a corporation but can be constructive. Noble v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 439, 442- 443 (9th Cir. 1966), § T.C. Memo. 1965-84. Whether a payment is a constructive distribution de

Petitioners attempt to distinguish the above-cited caselaw by contending that the capitalization ofthe 2008-09 interest was a true discharge ofthe interest because there was a "substantial modification" ofthe promissory note under section 1.1001-3, Income Tax Regs.

interest in financial instruments. Such an exchange fails to meet the "like kind" requirement outlined in the Code and the regulations. Thus, petitioner must recognize the gain it received in 1999 on the sale ofthe Powerton and Collins plants under section 1001. V. 2001 Interest Expense Deductions and Rental Income Six months after the closing ofthe test transactions, petitioner received prepayment ofall rent from CPS and MEAG due under the respective sublease agreements. Petitioner reported th

Backemeyerwould still have been entitled to the deduction; and since section 1001 requires a taxpayerto recognize gain only to the extent sale proceeds exceed basis, no gain is recognized since there is a section 1014 basis step-up.

1001; Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 512 (1941); R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247, 248 (3d Cir. 1948), affg 8 T.C. 1165 (1947). - 17 - [*17] property and satisfied--in full or in part--from the proceeds ofthe foreclosure sale). Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 336, 344 (1982); see Commissioner v. Green, 126 F.2d 70, 71

interest in financial instruments. Such an exchange fails to meet the "like kind" requirement outlined in the Code and the regulations. Thus, petitioner must recognize the gain it received in 1999 on the sale ofthe Powerton and Collins plants under section 1001. V. 2001 Interest Expense Deductions and Rental Income Six months after the closing ofthe test transactions, petitioner received prepayment ofall rent from CPS and MEAG due under the respective sublease agreements. Petitioner reported th

1977); see also Siewert v.

stead from another source, CCFH. Yet in Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 536, likewise, the omitted item did not flow through to the taxpayer - 46 - corporation from the partnership but instead arose under section 1001. And here, as in Rhone-Poulenc, there will have been an omission only ifthe adjustments in the FPAA are sustained. Id. at 551. Given these essential similarities, we think that Rhone-Poulenc squarely applies to the facts before us.3¹ Petit

CNT Investors, LLC v. Commissioner 144 T.C. 161 · 2015

NT but instead from another source, CCFH. Yet in Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 536, likewise, the omitted item did not flow through to the taxpayer corporation from the partnership but instead arose under section 1001. And here, as in Rhone-Poulenc, there will have been an omission only if the adjustments in the FPAA are sustained. Id. at 551. Given these essential similarities, we think that Rhone-Poulenc squarely applies to the facts before us. Peti

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

1001 provides "[t]he gain from the sale or disposition ofproperty shall be the excess ofthe amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis".

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

ound. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-61. Ordinarily, shareholders ofa C corporation can dispose oftheir interests in two ways: an asset sale or a stock sale. In an asset sale, the C corporation triggers the built-in gain in its appreciated assets, sec. 1001, and upon a liquidating distributionto the shareholders, triggers the built-in gain in the stock itself, secs. 331, 1001. In addition, the corporation's payment ofthe corporate level tax reduces the amount ofcash available for distributiont

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

dto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against

edto the trust bank accounts. Second, and - 75 - conclusivelyhere, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche ofreceivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloafunder section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors' payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf.38 IV. In The Penalty Box39 A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties agains

Kenna Trading, LLC v. Commissioner 143 T.C. 322 · 2014

erred to the trust bank accounts. Second, and conclusively here, we found that in these 2005 transactions, the investors each purchased a tranche of receivables from Sugarloaf, making the money paid into the trust accounts income to Sugarloaf under section 1001. So, regardless of whether the 2005 investors’ payments went into the trust accounts or directly to Sugarloaf, those amounts were still income to Sugarloaf. IV. In the Penalty Box A. Section 6662 Respondent determined penalties against al

Barkett v. Commissioner 143 T.C. 149 · 2014

1001 provides that “[t]he gain from the sale or disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis”.

Reynoso v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2013-25 · 2013

Section 1001 defines gain from the sale ofproperty as the excess of the amount realized on the sale ofthe property over the adjusted basis ofthe property sold or exchanged. See also sec. 1.61-6, Income Tax Regs. A. Amount Realized The first step in determining gain on the sale ofproperty involves calculating the amount realized. The amount realized

Reynoso v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2013-25 · 2013

Section 1001 defines gain from the sale ofproperty as the excess of the amount realized on the sale ofthe property over the adjusted basis ofthe property sold or exchanged. See also sec. 1.61-6, Income Tax Regs. A. Amount Realized The first step in determining gain on the sale ofproperty involves calculating the amount realized. The amount realized

r negligent misrepresentation(s) ofthe information contained in this application may result in civil liability and/or criminal penalties including, but not limited to, fine or imprisonment or both under the provisions ofTitle 18, United States Code, Section 1001, et. seq.". OPINION The primary issue in this case is whether Mr. Abdallah fraudulently underreported his income with regard to his 1999 through 2004 returns. The parties have stipulated or otherwise conceded on briefthat Mr. Abdallah fa

R Ball for R Ball III by Appt, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-39 · 2013

Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part, the following: - 14 - [*14] SEC.

ach exchange group is recognizedto the extent ofthe lesser ofthe gain realized and the amount ofthe "exchange group deficiency", ifany. Id. Regarding the residual group, the recognized gain or loss determined under the general rules is prescribed by section 1001. Id. A separate provision, section 121, excludes from income gain realized and recognized in certain propertytransfers. In particular, for taxpayers filingjoint returns, section 121 excludes from gross income up to $500;000 ofgain from t

's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences ofa gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain or loss."). Once a realization event has occurred, the amount ofrealized gain must be calculated pursuant to section 1001. Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part, the following: - 14 - [*14] SEC. 1001. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF AND RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS. (a) Computation ofGain or Loss --The gain from the sale or other disposition ofproperty shall b

's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences ofa gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain or loss."). Once a realization event has occurred, the amount ofrealized gain must be calculated pursuant to section 1001. Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part, the following: - 14 - [*14] SEC. 1001. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF AND RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS. (a) Computation ofGain or Loss --The gain from the sale or other disposition ofproperty shall b

R Ball Children Trust 9/9/1969, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-39 · 2013

's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences ofa gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain or loss."). Once a realization event has occurred, the amount ofrealized gain must be calculated pursuant to section 1001. Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part, the following: - 14 - [*14] SEC. 1001. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF AND RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS. (a) Computation ofGain or Loss --The gain from the sale or other disposition ofproperty shall b

Ethel Ball For A L Ball AS Appt, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-39 · 2013

's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences ofa gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain or loss."). Once a realization event has occurred, the amount ofrealized gain must be calculated pursuant to section 1001. Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part, the following: - 14 - [*14] SEC. 1001. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF AND RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS. (a) Computation ofGain or Loss --The gain from the sale or other disposition ofproperty shall b

Tax Practice Management, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2012-149 · 2012

See sec: 1368(b)(1) Unlike D'Errico & McCollor and D'Errico & Wedge, D'Errico & Associates was liquidated. Amounts reËeived'by a shareholder in a complete liquidation ofa corporation are treated as full payment in exchange for the shareholder's stock. Sec. 331(a). The in or loss to a shareholder from a liquidating distribution is determined u er section 1001 by subtracting the cost or other basis ofthe stock from the amount ofthe distribution.

Gaggero v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2012-331 · 2012

Section 1001.also tells us that the amount that Gaggero realized in disposing ofa part-ownership ofthe house is the sum ofthe cash and the value ofany property received. The problem here is that BCC didn't give Gaggero cash or property in exchange for its interest; it gave its services in exchange for one-halfofthe increase in market value ofthe pr

Section 1001 requires that a taxpayer recognize any gain or loss realized on the sale or exchange ofproperty, absent a contrary provision in subtitle A ofthe Code.

Diaz v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2012-241 · 2012

Under section 1001, the gain from the sale ofproperty is the excess ofthe amount realized over the adjusted basis and the loss is the excess ofthe adjusted basis over the amount realized. Adjustments in the basis ofproperty can be made for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items properly chargeable to the capital accounts. Sec. 1016(a)(1). Petitio

ated, that he had disallowed the loss because either (1) the “purported nonrecognition transaction” did not meet the requirements of section 351, including but not limited to the business purpose requirement, so that Quanex’s basis was determined by section 1001 (as opposed to a carryover basis); (2) QHMC’s assumption of the MPBs reduced the basis of the stock received in the exchange pursuant to section 358(d)(1) because the MPBs obligation is not a liability excluded under section 357(c)(3); o

Oglesby v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2011-93 · 2011

1001 (defining gain on the sale of property as the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis); sec. 1011 (giving general rule that the adjusted basis is basis under section 1012 as adjusted by section 1016); sec. 1012 (defining basis as the cost of property); sec. 1016(a) (1) (increasing basis by expenditures properly chargeable to

Knowles v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2011-23 · 2011

Pursuant to section 1001, taxpayers generally must recognize gain when the amount realized from the disposition of their property exceeds the adjusted basis in the property.

Grunsted v. Commissioner 136 T.C. No. 21 · 2011

return penalties under sec. 6702, I.R.C., which were validly assessed because the district director responsibilities were reassigned under the savings provision of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 1001, 112 Stat. 689, and IRS Deleg. Order 1-23 (formerly IRS Deleg. Order 193, Rev. 6), Internal Revenue Manual pt. 1.2.40.22 (Nov. 8, 2000). 2. Held, further, R may proceed with collection. 3. Held, further, P is not subject to a penalty under se

1001; - 52 - Rev. Rul. 61-201, 1961-2 C.B. 46 (ordinary loss allowed on a taxpayer's surrender of a single premium refund annuity contract for cash consideration). In summary, Enron paid Mr. and Mrs. Lay $10 million in exchange for the annuity contracts. Enron intended for the full amount of its payment to be consideration for the annuity con

1001; see also In re Estate of Stowell, 595 A.2d 1022, "We note that Mr. Dalton Sr. died on Sept. 13, 1999. Mrs. Dalton Sr. suffered from advanced demeltia and Alzheimer's disease and was moved from the residenze to an assisted living facility in 2004. - 46 - 1025 (Me. 1991), they do not necessarily require a finding of a nominee interest. As

Section 1001 provides that gain from the sale or other disposition of property equals the excess of the amount realized from the sale over the adjusted basis in the property sold.

Similarly, section 1 .1275-2(j), Income Tax Regs ., provides that : If the terms of a debt instrument are modified to defer one or more payments, and the modification does not cause.

Pierre v. Commissioner 133 T.C. No. 2 · 2009

The Commissioner held that B's purchase of 50 percent of A's ownership interest in the LLC is treated as the purchase of a 50-percent interest in each of thegLLC's assets, "which are treated as held directly by a for federal tax purposes ." Id . Therefore, the Commissioner . continued : "Under § 1001, A recognizes gain or loss from the deemed sale of the 50% interest in each asset of the LLC to B ." Id . In the intervening 10 years, the Commissioner has issued numerous letter rulings consistent

Section 1001 provides that the loss on the sale of property is the excess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized on the sale .

Otis E. & Judy Robertson, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2009-91 · 2009

At trial respondent argued that, evidence relating to the bases of the assets sold by .QES was not relevant . In his posttrial brief. respondent generally ignored the requirement that partners recognize gain on the sale of assets by the partnership and instead sought to tax the distribution of the proceeds . Accordingly, we find tha

1001 ,(2006) ; Holmes v . Gen. Dynamics Corp . , 22 Cal . Rptr . 2d 172 (Ct . App . 1993)) ; (2) whistleblowing (Cal . Lab . Code secs . 98 .6, 1102 .5, and 1105 (West 2003 & Supp . 200 ) ; Cal . Govt . Code secs . 8547 .3, 8547 .8, 19683 (West 2005 & Supp .2009)) ; (3) refusal to commit illegal acts (Cal . Lab. Code sec 2856 (West 2003)) . B.

The Section 6662 Penalty The Angles have conceded that they substantially understated their income tax liability for 1995 within the meaning of section 6662(d)(1)(A) .11 However, they claim that they are not subject to the 20-percent accuracy-related penalty because, underiall the facts and circumstances, they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith by relying on the professional advice of both Norman and Schneider .

Samueli v. Commissioner 132 T.C. 37 · 2009

That capital gain is taxed as a short-term capital gain because the Samuelis held the Securities for less than a year. See sec. 1222. IV. Secondary Issue Concerning Interest Deductions The secondary issue for decision involves petitioners’ claim to interest deductions. Our decision as to this issue also does not turn on any disputed fact

Pierre v. Commissioner 133 T.C. 24 · 2009

Therefore, the Commissioner continued: “Under § 1001, A recognizes gain or loss from the deemed sale of the 50% interest in each asset of the LLC to B.” Id.

Similarly, section 1.1275-2(j), Income Tax Regs., provides that If the terms of a debt instrument are modified to defer one or more payments, and the modification does not cause an exchange under section 1001, then, solely for purposes of sections 1272 and 1273, the debt instrument is treated as retired and then reissued on the date of the modification for an amount equal to the instrument’s adjusted issue price on that date.

Petitioner's gain or loss on the short sale of the South Wabash Avenue property is computed pursuant to section 1001 .

Conner's correct tax liability for 1997 by calculating the income incurred by the aforementioned transaction as follows : ' Form 1099-C - Cancellation of Debt $260,883 .00 Form 1099-C - Cancellation of Debt 68,161 .5 9 Total Cancellation of Debt 329,044 .97 Amount Realized (Section 1001) 329,045 .0 0 Adjusted Basis in Property (239,000 .00 ) Total Amount Realized 90,045 .0 0 Mr .

Code Section 1001 and Section 1010. * * * * * * * SUBSTITUTE FORM 1099 SELLER STATEMENT: The information contained herein is important tax information and is being furnished to the Internal Revenue Service. If you are required to file a return, a negligence penalty or other sanction will be imposed on you if this item is required to be reported and the

Richardson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2006-69 · 2006

Alternatively, a taxpayer (other than a - 49 - corporation) may claim losses on the sale or exchange of capital assets to the extent of the lesser of $3,000 ($1,500 if married filing separately) or the excess of such capital losses over capital gains. Sec. 1211(b). Once more, in what is becoming a familiar refrain, the record is devoid

Richardson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2006-69 · 2006

Alternatively, a taxpayer (other than a - 49 - corporation) may claim losses on the sale or exchange of capital assets to the extent of the lesser of $3,000 ($1,500 if married filing separately) or the excess of such capital losses over capital gains. Sec. 1211(b). Once more, in what is becoming a familiar refrain, the record is devoid

Coburn v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2005-283 · 2005

The parties in the instant case dispute whether the loan is recourse or nonrecourse.' The regulations under section 1001 distinguish between a debtor's disposition of collateral in satisfaction of an underlying nonrecourse liability and a debtor's disposition of collateral in satisfaction of an underlying recourse liability.8 Specifically, section 1.1001- 2(a), Income Tax Regs.,9 provides that the amount realized on the 'Respondent concedes that the loan

$1,375,000,000 is the amount realized in 1998 under Code section 1001 by TMD in exchange for the 100% common stock interest in MB [Bender].

- 11 - stock on the date of disposition was $9,2576, and petitioner would have a realized and recognized capital gain of $30,743 under section 1001 for 2001.

Sam F. & Ingrid D. Ford, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2005-18 · 2005

section 1001 (2000) with making false statements to the SEC. Second, Mr. Ford was charged under section 7206(1) with filing a false tax return for 1986. He pled guilty on November 15, 1990, to both of these felonies. In an allocution incident to this plea that he made under oath and while represented by counsel, Mr. Ford stated: - 5 - In * * * [pe

Storaasli v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2005-59 · 2005

1.61-6(a), Income Tax Regs. The amount realized is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any other property received, reduced by the expenses of selling the property. Sec. 1001(b); Chapin v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 235, 238 (1949), affd. 180 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1950). Section 1011 provides that a taxpayer’s adjust

ur Rules provide for tseveral exceptions to the 3In. addition, Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404, was promulgated in.direct response to a congressional mandate -in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 1001, 112 Stat. 689, that directed the Commissioner to develop a plan to prohibit ex parte communications between Appeals officers and other employees of the Internal Revenue Service. See Drake v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. (2005) (slip. op. at 13-1

Tribune Co. v. Commissioner 125 T.C. 110 · 2005

$1,375,000,000 is the amount realized in 1998 under Code section 1001 by TMD in exchange for the 100% common stock interest in MB [Bender].

Maciel v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2004-28 · 2004

e that respondent, in contrast to petitioner, correctly includes, as an amount realized, that portion of the liability of which petitioner is relieved by virtue of the sales agreement.30 “If a partnership interest is sold or exchanged, the reduction in the transferor partner’s share of partnership liabilities is treated as an amount realized under section 1001 and the regulations thereunder.” Secs.

Medlin v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2003-224 · 2003

to a willing buyer, “neither being under compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”59 Applying that 59A foreclosure, like a voluntary sale, is a disposition within the scope of the gain or loss provisions of sec. 1001. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); 2925 Briarpark, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 163 F.3d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1999), affg. (continued...) - 81 - approach in this case, if petitioner sold the Citrus County Property to a willing buyer for i

Sam F. & Ingrid D. Ford, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2003-241 · 2003

1001, and to one count of filing a false tax return for the taxable year 1986, pursuant to section 7206(1). In his allocution incident to the guilty plea, petitioner stated: In this 1986 federal personal income tax return, I failed to include income in excess of $2.8 million dollars I had received from the sale of securities belonging to me wh

ontention that the foreclosure of the Hazelwood property was tantamount to a casualty loss. Rather, the disposition of mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale is treated as a sale or exchange from which the mortgagor may realize gain or loss under section 1001. See - 11 - Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941). We therefore turn to that matter. 4. Foreclosure Loss Petitioner contends that the foreclosure loss occurred in 1997 because “That’s when the bank came and said: 'This is my building n

come. Respondent determined that petitioner had unreported DOI income of $6,005 in 1995. Gross income generally includes all income from whatever source derived including gains from dealings in property and income from DOI. See sec. 61(a)(3), (12); sec. 1001. Where a debt is discharged upon the debtor’s transfer of property to his creditor, such transaction is treated as a sale or exchange of the debtor’s property. See Gehl v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 784 (1994), affd. without published opinion 50

The regulations under section 1001 provide guidance to taxpayers in applying section 1001(a) to facts that are analogous to the facts presented in the instant case.

Under section 1001, gain on the sale of property generally is recognized in an amount equal to the excess of the amount of money received over the adjusted basis of the property. Under sections 1011(a) and 1012, the adjusted basis 4We need not discuss respondent’s alternative argument (and the position taken in the notice of deficiency) that the Compton

Because the JBLP - 26 - agreement does not give the limited partners the ability to effect a section 754 election, in this case the election would have to be made by the general partner. Elliott opined that a hypothetical buyer would demand a discount for built-in gains. He acknowledged in his report a 75- to 80-percent chance that an e

Cohen v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2001-249 · 2001

On petitioner’s 1989 and 1990 returns, he reported capital gain from the sale of stock in the amounts of $10,490 and $9,227, respectively. The attached Schedules D, Capital Gains and Losses, each show a sales price equal to the full amount reported as gain and neither reflect nor deduct therefrom any “Cost or other basis”. At trial, howe

Johnson v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2001-97 · 2001

he deduction in question might also be sustained for any number of other reasons, among them the following: The sale of mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale is treated as a sale or exchange from which the mortgagor may realize gain or loss under section 1001. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941). In the present case, the facts suggest that there may have been a gain on the foreclosure, and not a loss, because the Merritt Island property was sold for an amount greater than its origina

Tietig v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2001-190 · 2001

Since section 453 is substantively unavailable to Farm & Grove, the established realization and recognition principles under section 1001 are controlling.

Posnanski v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2001-26 · 2001

The material fact concealed was the true amount of interest earned by petitioner, Lois Posnanski, and petitioner’s mother, Mary Posnanski. Count One also charged petitioner with falsifying bank records pertaining to loan - 5 - interest payments in order to gain a tax deduction. Count Two of the plea agreement charged petitioner w

Carlson v. Commissioner 116 T.C. 87 · 2001

The regulations under section 1001 provide guidance to taxpayers in applying section 1001(a) to facts that are analogous to the facts presented in the instant case.

Estate of Jones v. Commissioner 116 T.C. 121 · 2001

Because the JBLP agreement does not give the limited partners the ability to effect a section 754 election, in this case the election would have to be made by the general partner. Elliott opined that a hypothetical buyer would demand a discount for built-in gains. He acknowledged in his report a 75- to 80-percent chance that an election

Section 1001 generally requires gain or loss to be 4 The tax treatment of the stock redemption is not in dispute. - 5 - recognized upon an exchange of property. See also sec. 1271(a)(1) (amounts received by the holder on the retirement of any debt instrument are considered to be amounts received in exchange for the instrument). Respondent asserts,

Jensen v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2000-341 · 2000

Battagline that respondent was now treating the matter as a taxable exchange under section 1001 and that respondent therefore needed documentation regarding petitioner’s basis in the property.

McGee v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2000-308 · 2000

We must determine whether petitioner reported the - 26 - correct amount of capital gain on the sale of Sipsey Harbor lots and the sale of trucks. Sipsey Harbor Petitioner contends that he sold Sipsey Harbor in one transaction, while respondent contends that the Sipsey Harbor lots were disposed of in several transactions. Sipsey Harbor c

Ashley v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2000-376 · 2000

Before we address the items to be included in the adjusted basis computation, we conclude that the amount realized consists of the sales proceeds of $216,000 less costs related to the sale ($2,834.31 + $1,500), which petitioner has substantiated. In order to determine the adjusted basis of the Longport property, we first address petition

McGee v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2000-308 · 2000

We must determine whether petitioner reported the - 26 - correct amount of capital gain on the sale of Sipsey Harbor lots and the sale of trucks. Sipsey Harbor Petitioner contends that he sold Sipsey Harbor in one transaction, while respondent contends that the Sipsey Harbor lots were disposed of in several transactions. Sipsey Harbor c

Richard L. & Kelly D. Robson, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-201 · 2000

The gain or loss to a shareholder from a liquidating distribution is determined under section 1001 by subtracting the cost or other basis of the stock from the amount of the distribution.

Michael & Kazuko Yang, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-263 · 2000

y/our signature(s) on this application and acknowledge my/our understanding that any intentional or negligent misrepresentation(s) of the information contained in this application may result in civil liability and/or criminal penalties including, but not limited to, fine or imprisonment or both under the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, et seq.

Textron Inc. v. Commissioner 115 T.C. 104 · 2000

Section 1001 generally requires gain or loss to be recognized upon an exchange of property. See also sec. 1271(a)(1) (amounts received by the holder on the retirement of any debt instrument are considered to be amounts received in exchange for the instrument). Respondent asserts, however, that the loss suffered by Paul Revere on the note redemption

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 and Cottage Savings . . . . . . . . . . 103 IV. Petitioner's Contention That CINS Transactions Are Imbued With Economic Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A. Business Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 B. Economic Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 C. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

The Department of Labor regulations state that a fiduciary will satisfy the prudent investor requirements of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) if the fiduciary (i) gives appropriate consideration to the relevant facts and circumstances of the investment or investment course of action and (ii) acts accordingly. See 29 C.F.R. sec. 2550.40

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Khalaf v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1999-74 · 1999

Under section 1001, a gain or loss realized by shareholders upon receipt of property in complete liquidation of a corporation is determined by comparing the value of the - 13 - property distributed with the cost basis the shareholders had in their shares of stock. We have concluded that the jewelry inventory Khalaf received from Al Zuni in September of

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 provides the general rules regarding the computation and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Section 1001(c) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property * * * shall be recognized." Section 351 sets forth a

Section 1001 and Cottage Savings . . . . . . . . . . 103 IV. Petitioner's Contention That CINS Transactions Are Imbued With Economic Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A. Business Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 B. Economic Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 C. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Richard D. & Yvonne Frazier, Petitioner 111 T.C. No. 11 · 1998

Notwithstanding the similar facts and circumstances, Aizawa is distinguishable from the instant case on one key matter. In Aizawa, the amount that the lender paid for the property at the foreclosure sale was equal to the fair market value of the property. In Aizawa v. Commissioner, supra at 200- 201, the Court stated: It cannot be gainsaid that the property was sold for $72,700 (an amount which we have no reason to conclude did not represent the fair market value of the property) and that petiti

Hahn v. Commissioner 110 T.C. No. 14 · 1998

Section 1001 governs the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property.

Novoa v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1998-192 · 1998

Gain Recognized on Sale of Truck Section 1001 provides that gain from the sale of property equals the excess of the amount realized from the sale over the adjusted basis in the property sold.

Smith v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1998-148 · 1998

Thus, respondent contends that for purposes of determining the amount realized from the sale pursuant to section 1001, the coins received must be classified as "property" rather than "money".

David A. & Marilyn P. Knight, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-107 · 1998

Section 1001 generally requires recognition of the entire amount of gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property. Section 1031(a)(1), however, provides for the nonrecognition of such gain or loss on "the exchange of property held for productive -5- use in a trade or business or for investment if such property is exchanged solely for property o

Larry A. & Kathleen T. Monico, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-10 · 1998

554 (1991) (exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under section 1001 so long as the exchanged properties are “materially different”; i.e., so long as they embody a legally distinct entitlement).

Shedco, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-295 · 1998

We conclude that the prudent investor principles of ERISA section 404 apply to an exclusive benefit determination under section 401(a)(2), regardless of whether title I of ERISA applies to the plan. We find support for our conclusion in the following excerpt from the conference report on ERISA: Basic fiduciary rules Prudent man s

Dahlgren v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1998-32 · 1998

section 1001 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Law, as amended, D.C. code section 1-2511 et seq., which * * * [petitioner] * * * may now have, [has] ever had or may in the future have, which arise out of or are in any way connected with * * * [petitioner's] past employment with CMS or the termination of said employment or which ari

Frazier v. Commissioner 111 T.C. 243 · 1998

As discussed above, petitioners’ gain or loss on their disposition of the Dime Circle property is computed pursuant to section 1001 and, as a general rule, the amount realized includes the full amount of the remaining debt.

Hahn v. Commissioner 110 T.C. 140 · 1998

Section 1001 governs the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 304 (1983). Generally, gain or loss from the disposition of property is measured by the amount realized less the adjusted basis of the property. Sec. 1001(a). Section 1014 generally provides that the basis of property acqu

Section 1001 addresses the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property. The sale or exchange requirement for capital gain or loss treatment is introduced in section 1222. The majority has failed to explain exactly what property was disposed of when a forward contract was canceled, how the partnership’s adjusted basis in the dis

Because debt is considered property in the hands of the holder, an exchange of debt for other property is usually treated as a section 1001 taxable exchange.

Kroposki v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1997-563 · 1997

Section 1001 et seq.; any and all claims under the Connecticut fair employment practices statutes, CGS §46a-60 et seq.; any and all contract or tort claims; and any and all other claims under any federal, state or local statute or ordinance or under any federal, state or local common law. 8. It is acknowledged that Releasor may hereafter discover c

Burke v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1997-237 · 1997

Property that is transferred in cancellation of debt may generate gain from a sale or exchange under section 1001, measured by the excess of the property's fair market value over its adjusted basis.

For purposes of section 61(a)(3), section 1001 and the regulations thereunder govern the method by which the amount of gain or loss realized upon a sale or disposition of property is calculated.

Burke v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1997-237 · 1997

Property that is transferred in cancellation of debt may generate gain from a sale or exchange under section 1001, measured by the excess of the property's fair market value over its adjusted basis.

Section 1001 addresses the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property. The sale or exchange requirement for capital gain or loss treatment is introduced in section 1222. The majority has failed to explain exactly what property was disposed of when a forward contract was canceled, how the partnership’s adjusted basis in the dis

Gary L. & Mary C. Pierce, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-411 · 1997

lly capitalized the costs of development and determined an adjusted basis of each lot sold. While this is consistent with a specific identity inventory method, it is also consistent with proper capitalization of costs for determination of gain under sec. 1001. We have previously rejected taxpayers’ contentions that capitalization of land and building costs is an inventory method. See, e.g., W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 619, 631 (1983). - 16 - defined in the Code or regula

David & Naomi Dobrich, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-477 · 1997

Section 1001 provides that the gain from the sale of property is the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis. The adjusted basis of property is its basis (cost) as determined under section 1011 and as adjusted by section 1016. Sec. 1012. The basis is adjusted for the costs of improvements and betterments made to the property. Sec. 101

David & Naomi Dobrich, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-477 · 1997

Section 1001 provides that the gain from the sale of property is the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis. The adjusted basis of property is its basis (cost) as determined under section 1011 and as adjusted by section 1016. Sec. 1012. The basis is adjusted for the costs of improvements and betterments made to the property. Sec. 101

Because debt is considered property in the hands of the holder, an exchange of debt for other property is usually treated as a section 1001 taxable exchange.

Gallade v. Commissioner 106 T.C. No. 20 · 1996

1001, and the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). ERISA was enacted to establish “a comprehensive federal scheme for the protection of pension plan participants and their beneficiaries.” American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1979). ERISA was intended to assure that American workers “may look forward with anticipation to a r

Gammon v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1996-4 · 1996

Until these arguments can be statutorily disposed of, Petitioner contends that the FMV of services can be included in gross income only by violating § 1001 and, 26 CFR 1.1001-1(a).

9, 109. Venue for such appeals was set forth in section 1002 of the Revenue Act of 1926. Section - 54 - 1002(a) of the act provided review for "an individual" by the circuit "whereof he is an inhabitant". Section 1002(b) of the act provided review for "a person (other than an individual)" by the circuit in which is located the

Talmage v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1996-114 · 1996

And even if we apply section 1001 to determine petitioner's gain, his basis is defined under sections 1011 and 1012 as his cost, not fair market value.

OPINION Section 1001 governs the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property.

Paul A. & Janet Mae Rendina, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-392 · 1996

We also look at whether petitioner assumed, or took subject to, WSAI liabilities, because the amount realized under section 1001 on the liquidation exchange is the net value of the distribution, and that amount must be reduced by the amount of liabilities assumed or taken subject to.

B. Theodore & Wendy Chapin, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-56 · 1996

On the other hand, the leasing activity gives rise to gross income and deductions, and the net income or loss generally is realized and recognized during each taxable year that the property is rented. See secs. 61, 441. When section 469 applies to rental real estate, it operates to suspend losses from the leasing activity. Accordingly, w

Pabst Brewing Company, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-506 · 1996

On its tax returns, petitioner reported the distribution of the Transferred Assets as a sale subject to section 1001, and it used the $190,287,375 amount set forth in the Allocation Agreement as the amount realized on the sale.

Charles R. & Sue I. Bowden, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-318 · 1996

- 34 - derived from the total of all claims paid by Prudential Bancorp in the settlement agreement, rather than the ultimate sale price to third parties.18 Generally, a transfer of property by a debtor to a creditor in satisfaction, in whole or in part, of an indebtedness constitutes a “sale or exchange” under section 1001, and the excess of the fair market value over the basis of the property applied against the indebtedness constitutes taxable gain.

Raymond St. Laurent, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-150 · 1996

OPINION Section 1001 generally requires recognition of the entire amount of gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property.

Waters v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1995-535 · 1995

y, respondent determined that petitioner's gain on the sale of his old residence was equal to the full sales price of the property; no reduction was taken for petitioner's adjusted basis in the property, although such a reduction is provided for in section 1001. The Court brought this matter to the attention of the parties, and they filed a supplemental stipulation of facts agreeing that the $125,000 selling price included in petitioner's income should be reduced by $10,780 of costs and expenses

Baker v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1995-495 · 1995

Thus, the amended petition alleges in part as follows: During the years of 1990, 1991, and 1992 the Petitioner did in fact receive payment for services actually rendered in a fair market value exchange under 26 USC §83, §1001, §1011 and §1012 not comprising taxable income, said acts performed as Unalienable rights to life, liberty, pursue happiness and acquire property, with labor being property.

Mark R. & Diane R. Webb, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1995-486 · 1995

of such property, and that the loss shall be the excess of adjusted basis over the amount - 9 - realized. The sale of mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale is treated as a sale or exchange from which the mortgagor may realize gain or loss under section 1001. Helvering v. Hammell, 311 U.S. 504 (1941). The parties agree that the foreclosure sale of the lot constituted a sale for tax purposes. Id. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that petitioner's basis in the foreclosed property was $520,37

Baker v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 1995-495 · 1995

Thus, the amended petition alleges in part as follows: During the years of 1990, 1991, and 1992 the Petitioner did in fact receive payment for services actually rendered in a fair market value exchange under 26 USC §83, §1001, §1011 and §1012 not comprising taxable income, said acts performed as Unalienable rights to life, liberty, pursue happiness and acquire property, with labor being property.

Evert E. & Eva F. Berglund, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1995-536 · 1995

The specific rules for computing the amount of gain or loss are contained in section 1001 and the regulations thereunder.

Jerome J. & Beatrice A. Mack, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1995-482 · 1995

Section 1001 states that the gain from a sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the amount realized over the taxpayer's adjusted basis as provided in section 1011. Section 1001(b) defines the amount realized as the sum of any money received plus property received. Liabilities assumed or paid by a purchaser are included in the amount

001(a), taxpayers must recognize as taxable income gain realized on the sale or exchange of property. Since debt constitutes property in the hands of the holder, an exchange of debt for other property is generally treated as a taxable exchange under section 1001. Cottage Sav. Association v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991); San Antonio Sav. Association v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-204; Emery v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 979, 985 (1947), affd. 166 F.2

Jerry & Patricia A. Dixon, Petitioner 90 T.C. No. 17 · 1988

The government's case rested heavily upon evidence, obtained pursuant to an illegal search of a third party, which Payner moved to suppress. The events leading up to the search were not in dispute. In 1965, the IRS launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. The project, known as "Operatio

Dixon v. Commissioner 90 T.C. 237 · 1988

The Government’s case rested heavily upon evidence, obtained pursuant to an illegal search of a third party, which Payner moved to suppress. The events leading up to the search were not in dispute. In 1965, the IRS launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. The project, known as “Operatio

Edward K. & Jeri L. Glover, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2011-109 · 2011
Anschutz Company, Petitioner 135 T.C. No. 5 · 2010
Anschutz Co. v. Commissioner 135 T.C. 78 · 2010
Dalton v. Commissioner 135 T.C. 393 · 2010
Estate of Israel v. Commissioner 108 T.C. 208 · 1997
Gallade v. Commissioner 106 T.C. 355 · 1996
Jenkins v. Commissioner 102 T.C. 550 · 1994
James J. v. Commissioner 102 T.C. 784 · 1994
Powell v. Commissioner 101 T.C. 489 · 1993
Estate of Durkin v. Commissioner 99 T.C. 561 · 1992
DiLeo v. Commissioner 96 T.C. 858 · 1991
Zabolotny v. Commissioner 97 T.C. 385 · 1991
Lockwood v. Commissioner 94 T.C. 252 · 1990
Davis v. Commissioner 88 T.C. 122 · 1987
Gershkowitz v. Commissioner 88 T.C. 984 · 1987
Bailey v. Commissioner 88 T.C. 1293 · 1987
Leib v. Commissioner 88 T.C. 1474 · 1987
Bhada v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 959 · 1987
Rutland v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 1137 · 1987
Michaels v. Commissioner 87 T.C. 1412 · 1986
Allan v. Commissioner 86 T.C. 655 · 1986
Madorin v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 667 · 1985
Smith v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 889 · 1985
Jones v. Commissioner 82 T.C. 586 · 1984
Smith v. Commissioner 82 T.C. 705 · 1984
Magneson v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 767 · 1983
Paulsen v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 291 · 1982
Eisenberg v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 336 · 1982
Kast v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 1154 · 1982
Guest v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 9 · 1981
Stern v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 614 · 1981
Shereff v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 1140 · 1981
Freeland v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 970 · 1980
Stern v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 1075 · 1980
Griffith v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 933 · 1980
Yamamoto v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 946 · 1980
Simmons v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 1009 · 1980
Doug-Long, Inc. v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 71 · 1979
Danenberg v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 370 · 1979
Paparo v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 692 · 1979
McShain v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 998 · 1979
Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 701 · 1979
Estate of Taracido v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 1014 · 1979
Watson v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 544 · 1978
Withers v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 900 · 1978
212 Corp. v. Commissioner 70 T.C. 788 · 1978
Considine v. Commissioner 68 T.C. 52 · 1977
Cocker v. Commissioner 68 T.C. 544 · 1977
Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner 68 T.C. 837 · 1977
Bolles v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 342 · 1977
Mitchell v. Commissioner 65 T.C. 1099 · 1976
Baier v. Commissioner 63 T.C. 513 · 1975
Kuper v. Commissioner 61 T.C. 624 · 1974
Alexander v. Commissioner 61 T.C. 278 · 1973
Mele v. Commissioner 61 T.C. 358 · 1973
Estate of Bell v. Commissioner 60 T.C. 469 · 1973
Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner 60 T.C. 663 · 1973
Rodman v. Commissioner 57 T.C. 113 · 1971
Edgar v. Commissioner 56 T.C. 717 · 1971
Kent Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 820 · 1971
Maher v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 441 · 1970
Lull v. Commissioner 51 T.C. 841 · 1969
Rodney v. Commissioner 53 T.C. 287 · 1969
Abegg v. Commissioner 50 T.C. 145 · 1968
Branham v. Commissioner 51 T.C. 175 · 1968
Clodfelter v. Commissioner 48 T.C. 694 · 1967
Collins v. Commissioner 46 T.C. 461 · 1966
Feinberg v. Commissioner 45 T.C. 635 · 1966
Dix v. Commissioner 46 T.C. 796 · 1966
Haserot v. Commissioner 46 T.C. 864 · 1966
Baan v. Commissioner 45 T.C. 71 · 1965
Rogers v. Commissioner 44 T.C. 126 · 1965
Potter v. Commissioner 44 T.C. 159 · 1965
Lowe v. Commissioner 44 T.C. 363 · 1965
Riley v. Commissioner 37 T.C. 932 · 1962
Maytag v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 270 · 1959
Davis v. Commissioner 30 T.C. 462 · 1958
Weele v. Commissioner 27 T.C. 340 · 1956
Wiedemann v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 565 · 1956
Faulk v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 948 · 1956
Showell v. Commissioner 23 T.C. 495 · 1954
United States v. Plezia 115 F.4th 379 · Cir.
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R Ball for R Ball III by Appt v. Commissioner of IRS 742 F.3d 552 · Cir.
Rusby Adams, Jr. v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. 758 F.3d 743 · Cir.
Bonnie Fish v. Greatbanc Trust Company 749 F.3d 671 · Cir.
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 482 F.3d 184 · Cir.
Gary Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc. 772 F.3d 1056 · Cir.
Munro-Kienstra v. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Trust Fund 790 F.3d 799 · Cir.
Trustees of the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund v. Plumbing Services, Inc. 791 F.3d 436 · Cir.
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Cler, Barbara v. IL Educ Association 423 F.3d 726 · Cir.
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Jennifer Durand v. The Hanover Insurance Group 806 F.3d 367 · Cir.
Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc. 332 F.3d 339 · Cir.
Wright v. Commissioner 809 F.3d 877 · Cir.
Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. · Cir.
Lewis v. Bank of America NA 347 F.3d 587 · Cir.
Bodine v. Employers Casualty Co. 352 F.3d 245 · Cir.
United States v. Saldana · Cir.
United States v. Saldana · Cir.
Kelley v. Fidelity Management Trust Co. 829 F.3d 55 · Cir.
Starla Rollins v. Dignity Health 830 F.3d 900 · Cir.
William Lee v. Verizon Communications, Inc. 837 F.3d 523 · Cir.
Daniel Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund 844 F.3d 576 · Cir.
United States v. John Ballard 850 F.3d 292 · Cir.
Ronald Tussey v. ABB 850 F.3d 951 · Cir.
United States v. Karen Kimble 855 F.3d 604 · Cir.
United States v. Chaka Fattah, Jr. 858 F.3d 801 · Cir.
Pasternack v. Shrader 863 F.3d 162 · Cir.
Retirement Committee of DAK Americas LLC v. Brewer 867 F.3d 471 · Cir.
Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives 877 F.3d 1213 · Cir.
Green v. United States 880 F.3d 519 · Cir.
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor 885 F.3d 360 · Cir.
United States v. Ezell Brown, Jr. 898 F.3d 636 · Cir.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Findlay Indus., Inc. 902 F.3d 597 · Cir.
Estate of Andrew J. McKelvey v. Commr. of Internal Revenue 906 F.3d 26 · Cir.
United States v. Cox 906 F.3d 1170 · Cir.
Bruce Schwartz v. Ardis Bogen 913 F.3d 777 · Cir.
Walid Jammal v. Am. Family Ins. Co. · Cir.
Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System 933 F.3d 859 · Cir.
Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System · Cir.
Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System · Cir.
United States v. Vahan Kelerchian 937 F.3d 895 · Cir.
United States v. Vahan Kelerchian · Cir.
Donald J. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG 943 F.3d 627 · Cir.
Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 945 F.3d 739 · Cir.
United States v. Kenneth Smukler 986 F.3d 229 · Cir.
United States v. Kenneth Smukler 991 F.3d 472 · Cir.
United States v. Jane Boyd 991 F.3d 1077 · Cir.
Victor Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Merrick Garland 996 F.3d 190 · Cir.
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. Ca Secure Choice Retire. Svg. 997 F.3d 848 · Cir.
United States v. Jon Frank 8 F.4th 320 · Cir.
Mayer v. Ringler Associates Inc. and Af. 9 F.4th 78 · Cir.
Liberty University v. Timothy Geithner 671 F.3d 391 · Cir.
Liberty University v. Timothy Geithner · Cir.
In Re Citigroup ERISA Litigation 662 F.3d 128 · Cir.
United States v. Jay Schmeltz 667 F.3d 685 · Cir.
United States v. Moyer 674 F.3d 192 · Cir.
Nichols Ex Rel. Alcatel Network Systems Salaried Retirees Benefit Program v. Alcatel USA, Inc. 532 F.3d 364 · Cir.
United States v. Teresa Barringer 25 F.4th 239 · Cir.
Lisa Milkovich v. United States 28 F.4th 1 · Cir.
United States v. Wofford 560 F.3d 341 · Cir.
Yosaun Smith v. CommonSpirit Health 37 F.4th 1160 · Cir.
United States v. Gregory VanDemark 39 F.4th 318 · Cir.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co. 285 F.3d 415 · Cir.
Perreca v. Gluck 295 F.3d 215 · Cir.
Berwind Corp. v. Commissioner of Social Secutity 307 F.3d 222 · Cir.
Benefits Committee of Saint-Gobain Corp. v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A. 313 F.3d 919 · Cir.
United States v. Banks 27 F. App'x 354 · Cir.
Lampkins v. Golden 28 F. App'x 409 · Cir.
MICI Corp. v. Mager, Monahan, Scott, & Alber, P.C. 33 F. App'x 168 · Cir.
Stoll v. Western & Southern Life Insurance 64 F. App'x 986 · Cir.
Gary A. Davolt v. The Executive Committee of O'Reilly Automotive, as Trustee and Plan Administrator of the O'Reilly Automotive Employee Health Plan 206 F.3d 806 · Cir.
Dianne L. Shea v. Sidney Esensten 208 F.3d 712 · Cir.
In Re: Gerald E. Taylor Betty Taylor, Debtors. Gerald E. Taylor Betty A. Taylor v. United States 212 F.3d 395 · Cir.
Michael R. King, Mark D. Urbanski, Donald E. Renfro v. National Human Resource Committee, Inc. 218 F.3d 719 · Cir.
United States v. Jeffrey S. Chmielewski 218 F.3d 840 · Cir.
David T. Hunter (99-3620) Robert Allison (99-3623) v. Caliber System, Inc., F/k/a Roadway Services, Inc. 220 F.3d 702 · Cir.
Mary L. Schatz v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, Mutual of Omaha 220 F.3d 944 · Cir.
Bernard Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trades Pension Plan 223 F.3d 827 · Cir.
Reg G. Garratt v. James E. Knowles, Nancy Knowles, Charles L. Knowles, Katherine Knowles Strasburg, Margaret Knowles Schink, E. Lawrence Keyes, R. Euguene Goodson, Defrees & Fisk and John W. Hupp 245 F.3d 941 · Cir.
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, a Pension Trust, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Gary L. White and Inge T. White 258 F.3d 636 · Cir.
Kenneth G. Helfrich v. Pnc Bank, Kentucky, Inc. 267 F.3d 477 · Cir.
Bruce A. Mead v. Intermec Technologies Corporation Short Term Disability Plan for Employees of Norand Corporation 271 F.3d 715 · Cir.
Flahertys Arden Bowl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 271 F.3d 763 · Cir.
John Beatty v. North Central Companies, Inc. 282 F.3d 602 · Cir.
Chao v. Hall Holding Company, Inc. 285 F.3d 415 · Cir.
Perreca v. Gluck 295 F.3d 215 · Cir.
Nick J. D'Amico Cliff Hollihan Joseph G. Muto Kevin Beam v. CBS Corporation, F/k/a Westinghouse, Inc the Westinghouse Electric Company Pension Plan 297 F.3d 287 · Cir.
Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-1201) John J. And Ophelia J. Mall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-1208) Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased and Bonnie Sobo, and Bonnie Sobo, Surviving Wife v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2795) Akhileshi S. And Dipti A. Desai v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2981) Kevin T. And Cheryl McManus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2985) Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2994) Lakewood Radiology, P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2995) Neonatology Associates, P.A., John J. And Ophelia Mall, Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased, and Bonnie Sobo, and Bonnie Sobo, Surviving Wife, Akhilshi S. And Dipti A. Desai, Kevin T. And Cheryl McManus Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz and Lakewood Radiology, P.A. 299 F.3d 221 · Cir.
Russell Mushalla v. Teamsters Local No. 863 Pension Fund 300 F.3d 391 · Cir.
John A. Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 303 F.3d 884 · Cir.
United States v. Hans Tschebaum 306 F.3d 540 · Cir.
Berwind Corporation v. Commissioner of Social Security United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Michael H. Holland William P. Hobgood Marty D. Hudson Thomas O.S. Rand Elliot A. Segal Carl E. Vanhorn Gail R. Wilensky, as Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan A. Frank Dunham, as Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan United States of America United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund, Michael H. Holland, William P. Hobgood, Marty D. Hudson, Thomas O.S. Rand, Elliot A. Segal, Carl E. Vanhorn, Gail R. Wilensky, the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan, A. Frank Dunham, United States of America, Berwind Corporation v. Commissioner of Social Security United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Michael H. Holland William P. Hobgood Marty D. Hudson Thomas O.S. Rand Elliot A. Segal Carl E. Vanhorn Gail R. Wilensky, as Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan A. Frank Dunham, as Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan United States of America Berwind Corporation v. Commissioner of Social Security United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Michael H. Holland William P. Hobgood Marty D. Hudson Thomas O.S. Rand Elliot A. Segal Carl E. Vanhorn Gail R. Wilensky, as Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan A. Frank Dunham, as Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan United States of America Commissioner of Social Security 307 F.3d 222 · Cir.
Benefits Committee Of Saint-Gobain Corporation v. Key Trust Company Of Ohio, N.A. 313 F.3d 919 · Cir.
Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Company 324 F.3d 616 · Cir.
John Bauer v. Summit Bancorp 325 F.3d 155 · Cir.
William H. Burstein, M.D. v. Retirement Account Plan For Employees Of Allegheny Health Education And Research Foundation 334 F.3d 365 · Cir.
Judy Gettings v. Building Laborers Local 310 Fringe Benefits Fund 349 F.3d 300 · Cir.
Edward A. Chambers, Jr. v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company 351 F.3d 848 · Cir.
Andrew Albert v. Oshkosh Corporation 47 F.4th 570 · Cir.
California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Worldcom, Inc. 368 F.3d 86 · Cir.
United States v. Robert Ike George, Also Known as "Robert George Ike," Also Known as "George Edward Carter" 386 F.3d 383 · Cir.
Arnold v. Lucks 392 F.3d 512 · Cir.
United States v. Duane Huber, United States of America v. Huber Farms, Inc., United States of America v. Huber Farms General Partnership, United States of America v. Duane Huber Huber Farms, Inc. Huber Farmers General Partnership 404 F.3d 1047 · Cir.
Cecilia Nichols v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Docket No. 04-1445-Cv 406 F.3d 98 · Cir.
Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service 411 F.3d 621 · Cir.
Cler v. Illinois Education Association 423 F.3d 726 · Cir.
New York State Teamsters Conference Pension And Retirement Fund v. Express Services, Inc. 426 F.3d 640 · Cir.
United States v. Samuel Saldana, Jr., United States of America v. Saul Saldana 427 F.3d 298 · Cir.
Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corporation 435 F.3d 666 · Cir.
Sandra J. Chronister v. Baptist Health Unum Life Insurance Company of America, Sandra J. Chronister v. Baptist Health Unum Life Insurance Company of America 442 F.3d 648 · Cir.
Hattem v. Schwarzenegger 449 F.3d 423 · Cir.
United States v. Adrian Riley 452 F.3d 160 · Cir.
David and Lynette Kindred v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 454 F.3d 688 · Cir.
Charles P. Stepnowski v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Hercules Incorporated 456 F.3d 320 · Cir.
Joseph F. Hutchison v. Fifth Third Bancorp 469 F.3d 583 · Cir.
United States v. Barry Trupin 475 F.3d 71 · Cir.
McCARTHY v. DUN & BRADSTREET CORPORATION 482 F.3d 184 · Cir.
West v. Ak Steel Corporation 484 F.3d 395 · Cir.
Bradley J. Hillstrom, M.D. v. John R. Kenefick Briggs and Morgan, Pa Ge Group Life Assurance Company, Formerly Known as Phoenix American Insurance Company, Bradley J. Hillstrom, M.D. v. John R. Kenefick Briggs and Morgan, Pa v. Ge Group Life Assurance Company, Formerly Known as Phoenix American Insurance Company 484 F.3d 519 · Cir.
Richard Jakimas Dianne Flynn, Association Member Louis Ristagno, Association Member All Other Association Members John M. Adair John J. Adzima Bruce J. Aiello Thomas Aiello Jack Bailey Gerald A. Barrett Walter Beniuk Bruce Blanchard Rene Reis Braga Tedeusz Bukowski Edward Cabral Angelo Capalbo Richard Carlson Ralph Caso James Castelli Samuel Castronovo, Jr. Peter Chapman Paul D. Ciuppa Gary Cocozzo Laura Carbo Alan L. Curtis Paul Day Charles Delorenzi Peter Demodica, III Joseph Digiacomo Stefan Dziaba Walter Dziaba Michael Faron Ramond J. Feiner Andrew Feraco Paul Franek Lawrence Gelok Robert L. Glover Raymond Goetz Joseph Gomes Anthony Greco Daniel Green Johnny Haddley William J. Hahn Richard Hall David Hanrahan Deborah Helfrich Ronald Jones Alojzy Kalata James F. Kane Joseph M. Kaprowski Bernard Kapuscinski Jan Kasprowicz Michael Kennedy Robert J. Kohler Edward Kwasnik Flavio Labagnara Rosa Labagnara Robert J. Lenik Wojciech Leozenia Joseph MacDiarmid James F. Madigan William R. Malloy, Sr. Albert A. Marchione Anthony Mariano Edward B. Mayo Henry M. McAuliffe Mike Meechan Stephen E. Mellinger Lawrence Memice Donald A. Meyer Robert P. Mundt Nick Nardone Cheryl Negron Joseph M. Orolen Edward Pajak Robert Pavone Roger M. Perri Frank J. Petrasek William Pitt Peter Plafta Julian Pokrywa Ronald Pokrywa Roque N. Rivera Antonio Rizzi Barbara Robinson Samuel Rosamilia Roger Rotondi Chuck L. Rutan Albert Rybacki Andrew J. Saccoccia Jan Serafin Robert Shallcross Martha X. Skinner Donald D. Smith Anthony Spagnuolo Anthony J. Spano Sara Spano Anthony Spera Natale Turano Stephen R. Tyburczy Robert J. Veleber, Jr. William Villino Michael A. Vocaturo Marian Wojciechowski Leonard A. Zummo Ricki Blohm Frank Cavaliere Charlene Johnson Donald Breen John Tomaskovic 485 F.3d 770 · Cir.
Gill v. OPM · Cir.
David McCorkle v. Bank of America Corporation 688 F.3d 164 · Cir.
National Security Systems, Inc. v. Iola 700 F.3d 65 · Cir.
United States v. Coplan 703 F.3d 46 · Cir.
United States v. Deleon 704 F.3d 189 · Cir.
American Psychiatric Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. 821 F.3d 352 · Cir.
California Public Employees' Retirement System v. WorldCom, Inc. 368 F.3d 86 · Cir.
Arnold v. Lucks 392 F.3d 512 · Cir.
New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund v. Express Services, Inc. 426 F.3d 640 · Cir.
Hattem v. Schwarzenegger 449 F.3d 423 · Cir.
Coan v. Kaufman 457 F.3d 250 · Cir.
Harvard Secured Creditors Liquidation Trust v. Internal Revenue Service 568 F.3d 444 · Cir.
Gray v. Citigroup Inc. 662 F.3d 128 · Cir.
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health & Human Services 682 F.3d 1 · Cir.
United States v. Trupin 119 F. App'x 323 · Cir.
United States v. McNeally 132 F. App'x 63 · Cir.
In re Rodriguez 304 F. App'x 947 · Cir.
In re Rodriguez 304 F. App'x 947 · Cir.
United States v. Poltonowicz 353 F. App'x 690 · Cir.
United States v. Poltonowicz 353 F. App'x 690 · Cir.
United States v. Zhen Zhou Wu 711 F.3d 1 · Cir.
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc. 716 F.3d 736 · Cir.
United States v. Rae 645 F. App'x 376 · Cir.
McCutcheon v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 62 F.4th 674 · Cir.
United States ex rel. Shannon Martin, M.D. v. Darren Hathaway 63 F.4th 1043 · Cir.
TBL Licensing LLC, f/k/a the Timberland Co.Subsid v. Werfel 82 F.4th 12 · Cir.
Julie Su v. Brian Bowers 89 F.4th 1169 · Cir.
Cunningham v. Cornell University 86 F.4th 961 · Cir.
Julie Su v. Brian Bowers · Cir.
Julie Su v. Brian Bowers · Cir.

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