§101 — Certain death benefits

389 cases·32 followed·30 distinguished·8 questioned·6 criticized·4 limited·6 overruled·303 cited8% support

(a)Proceeds of life insurance contracts payable by reason of death
(1)General rule

Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), subsection (d), subsection (f), and subsection (j), gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured.

(2)Transfer for valuable consideration

In the case of a transfer for a valuable consideration, by assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance contract or any interest therein, the amount excluded from gross income by paragraph (1) shall not exceed an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of such consideration and the premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the transferee. The preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of such a transfer—

(A)

if such contract or interest therein has a basis for determining gain or loss in the hands of a transferee determined in whole or in part by reference to such basis of such contract or interest therein in the hands of the transferor, or

(B)

if such transfer is to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or officer.

The term “other amounts” in the first sentence of this paragraph includes interest paid or accrued by the transferee on indebtedness with respect to such contract or any interest therein if such interest paid or accrued is not allowable as a deduction by reason of section 264(a)(4).

(3)Exception to valuable consideration rules for commercial transfers
(A)In general

The second sentence of paragraph (2) shall not apply in the case of a transfer of a life insurance contract, or any interest therein, which is a reportable policy sale.

(B)Reportable policy sale

For purposes of this paragraph, the term “reportable policy sale” means the acquisition of an interest in a life insurance contract, directly or indirectly, if the acquirer has no substantial family, business, or financial relationship with the insured apart from the acquirer’s interest in such life insurance contract. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term “indirectly” applies to the acquisition of an interest in a partnership, trust, or other entity that holds an interest in the life insurance contract.

(b)Repealed. Pub. L. 104–188, title I, § 1402(a), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1789]
(c)Interest

If any amount excluded from gross income by subsection (a) is held under an agreement to pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included in gross income.

(d)Payment of life insurance proceeds at a date later than death
(1)General rule

The amounts held by an insurer with respect to any beneficiary shall be prorated (in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary) over the period or periods with respect to which such payments are to be made. There shall be excluded from the gross income of such beneficiary in the taxable year received any amount determined by such proration. Gross income includes, to the extent not excluded by the preceding sentence, amounts received under agreements to which this subsection applies.

(2)Amount held by an insurer

An amount held by an insurer with respect to any beneficiary shall mean an amount to which subsection (a) applies which is—

(A)

held by any insurer under an agreement provided for in the life insurance contract, whether as an option or otherwise, to pay such amount on a date or dates later than the death of the insured, and

(B)

equal to the value of such agreement to such beneficiary

(i)

as of the date of death of the insured (as if any option exercised under the life insurance contract were exercised at such time), and

(ii)

as discounted on the basis of the interest rate used by the insurer in calculating payments under the agreement and mortality tables prescribed by the Secretary.

(3)Application of subsection

This subsection shall not apply to any amount to which subsection (c) is applicable.

(e)Repealed. Pub. L. 98–369, div. A, title IV, § 421(b)(2), July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 794]
(f)Proceeds of flexible premium contracts issued before January 1, 1985 payable by reason of death
(1)In general

Any amount paid by reason of the death of the insured under a flexible premium life insurance contract issued before

January 1, 1985

shall be excluded from gross income only if—

(A)

under such contract—

(i)

the sum of the premiums paid under such contract does not at any time exceed the guideline premium limitation as of such time, and

(ii)

any amount payable by reason of the death of the insured (determined without regard to any qualified additional benefit) is not at any time less than the applicable percentage of the cash value of such contract at such time, or

(B)

by the terms of such contract, the cash value of such contract may not at any time exceed the net single premium with respect to the amount payable by reason of the death of the insured (determined without regard to any qualified additional benefit) at such time.

(2)Guideline premium limitation

For purposes of this subsection—

(A)Guideline premium limitation

The term “guideline premium limitation” means, as of any date, the greater of—

(i)

the guideline single premium, or

(ii)

the sum of the guideline level premiums to such date.

(B)Guideline single premium

The term “guideline single premium” means the premium at issue with respect to future benefits under the contract (without regard to any qualified additional benefit), and with respect to any charges for qualified additional benefits, at the time of a determination under subparagraph (A) or (E) and which is based on—

(i)

the mortality and other charges guaranteed under the contract, and

(ii)

interest at the greater of an annual effective rate of 6 percent or the minimum rate or rates guaranteed upon issue of the contract.

(C)Guideline level premium

The term “guideline level premium” means the level annual amount, payable over the longest period permitted under the contract (but ending not less than 20 years from date of issue or not later than age 95, if earlier), computed on the same basis as the guideline single premium, except that subparagraph (B)(ii) shall be applied by substituting “4 percent” for “6 percent”.

(D)Computational rules

In computing the guideline single premium or guideline level premium under subparagraph (B) or (C)—

(i)

the excess of the amount payable by reason of the death of the insured (determined without regard to any qualified additional benefit) over the cash value of the contract shall be deemed to be not greater than such excess at the time the contract was issued,

(ii)

the maturity date shall be the latest maturity date permitted under the contract, but not less than 20 years after the date of issue or (if earlier) age 95, and

(iii)

the amount of any endowment benefit (or sum of endowment benefits) shall be deemed not to exceed the least amount payable by reason of the death of the insured (determined without regard to any qualified additional benefit) at any time under the contract.

(E)Adjustments

The guideline single premium and guideline level premium shall be adjusted in the event of a change in the future benefits or any qualified additional benefit under the contract which was not reflected in any guideline single premiums or guideline level premium previously determined.

(3)Other definitions and special rules

For purposes of this subsection—

(A)Flexible premium life insurance contract

The terms “flexible premium life insurance contract” and “contract” mean a life insurance contract (including any qualified additional benefits) which provides for the payment of one or more premiums which are not fixed by the insurer as to both timing and amount. Such terms do not include that portion of any contract which is treated under State law as providing any annuity benefits other than as a settlement option.

(B)Premiums paid

The term “premiums paid” means the premiums paid under the contract less any amounts (other than amounts includible in gross income) to which section 72(e) applies. If, in order to comply with the requirements of paragraph (1)(A), any portion of any premium paid during any contract year is returned by the insurance company (with interest) within 60 days after the end of a contract year—

(i)

the amount so returned (excluding interest) shall be deemed to reduce the sum of the premiums paid under the contract during such year, and

(ii)

notwithstanding the provisions of section 72(e), the amount of any interest so returned shall be includible in the gross income of the recipient.

(C)Applicable percentage

The term “applicable percentage” means—

(i)

140 percent in the case of an insured with an attained age at the beginning of the contract year of 40 or less, and

(ii)

in the case of an insured with an attained age of more than 40 as of the beginning of the contract year, 140 percent reduced (but not below 105 percent) by one percent for each year in excess of 40.

(D)Cash value

The cash value of any contract shall be determined without regard to any deduction for any surrender charge or policy loan.

(E)Qualified additional benefits

The term “qualified additional benefits” means any—

(i)

guaranteed insurability,

(ii)

accidental death benefit,

(iii)

family term coverage, or

(iv)

waiver of premium.

(F)Premium payments not disqualifying contract

The payment of a premium which would result in the sum of the premiums paid exceeding the guideline premium limitation shall be disregarded for purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(i) if the amount of such premium does not exceed the amount necessary to prevent the termination of the contract without cash value on or before the end of the contract year.

(G)Net single premium

In computing the net single premium under paragraph (1)(B)—

(i)

the mortality basis shall be that guaranteed under the contract (determined by reference to the most recent mortality table allowed under all State laws on the date of issuance),

(ii)

interest shall be based on the greater of—

(I)

an annual effective rate of 4 percent (3 percent for contracts issued before

July 1, 1983

), or

(II)

the minimum rate or rates guaranteed upon issue of the contract, and

(iii)

the computational rules of paragraph (2)(D) shall apply, except that the maturity date referred to in clause (ii) thereof shall not be earlier than age 95.

(H)Correction of errors

If the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that—

(i)

the requirements described in paragraph (1) for any contract year was not satisfied due to reasonable error, and

(ii)

reasonable steps are being taken to remedy the error,

the Secretary may waive the failure to satisfy such requirements.

(I)Regulations

The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection.

(g)Treatment of certain accelerated death benefits
(1)In general

For purposes of this section, the following amounts shall be treated as an amount paid by reason of the death of an insured:

(A)

Any amount received under a life insurance contract on the life of an insured who is a terminally ill individual.

(B)

Any amount received under a life insurance contract on the life of an insured who is a chronically ill individual.

(2)Treatment of viatical settlements
(A)In general

If any portion of the death benefit under a life insurance contract on the life of an insured described in paragraph (1) is sold or assigned to a viatical settlement provider, the amount paid for the sale or assignment of such portion shall be treated as an amount paid under the life insurance contract by reason of the death of such insured.

(B)Viatical settlement provider
(i)In general

The term “viatical settlement provider” means any person regularly engaged in the trade or business of purchasing, or taking assignments of, life insurance contracts on the lives of insureds described in paragraph (1) if—

(I)

such person is licensed for such purposes (with respect to insureds described in the same subparagraph of paragraph (1) as the insured) in the State in which the insured resides, or

(II)

in the case of an insured who resides in a State not requiring the licensing of such persons for such purposes with respect to such insured, such person meets the requirements of clause (ii) or (iii), whichever applies to such insured.

(ii)Terminally ill insureds

A person meets the requirements of this clause with respect to an insured who is a terminally ill individual if such person—

(I)

meets the requirements of sections 8 and 9 of the Viatical Settlements Model Act of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and

(II)

meets the requirements of the Model Regulations of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (relating to standards for evaluation of reasonable payments) in determining amounts paid by such person in connection with such purchases or assignments.

(iii)Chronically ill insureds

A person meets the requirements of this clause with respect to an insured who is a chronically ill individual if such person—

(I)

meets requirements similar to the requirements referred to in clause (ii)(I), and

(II)

meets the standards (if any) of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for evaluating the reasonableness of amounts paid by such person in connection with such purchases or assignments with respect to chronically ill individuals.

(3)Special rules for chronically ill insureds

In the case of an insured who is a chronically ill individual—

(A)In general

Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to any payment received for any period unless—

(i)

such payment is for costs incurred by the payee (not compensated for by insurance or otherwise) for qualified long-term care services provided for the insured for such period, and

(ii)

the terms of the contract giving rise to such payment satisfy—

(I)

the requirements of section 7702B(b)(1)(B), and

(II)

the requirements (if any) applicable under subparagraph (B).

For purposes of the preceding sentence, the rule of section 7702B(b)(2)(B) shall apply.

(B)Other requirements

The requirements applicable under this subparagraph are—

(i)

those requirements of section 7702B(g) and section 4980C which the Secretary specifies as applying to such a purchase, assignment, or other arrangement,

(ii)

standards adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners which specifically apply to chronically ill individuals (and, if such standards are adopted, the analogous requirements specified under clause (i) shall cease to apply), and

(iii)

standards adopted by the State in which the policyholder resides (and if such standards are adopted, the analogous requirements specified under clause (i) and (subject to section 4980C(f)) standards under clause (ii), shall cease to apply).

(C)Per diem payments

A payment shall not fail to be described in subparagraph (A) by reason of being made on a per diem or other periodic basis without regard to the expenses incurred during the period to which the payment relates.

(D)Limitation on exclusion for periodic payments

For limitation on amount of periodic payments which are treated as described in paragraph (1), see section 7702B(d).

(4)Definitions

For purposes of this subsection—

(A)Terminally ill individual

The term “terminally ill individual” means an individual who has been certified by a physician as having an illness or physical condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death in 24 months or less after the date of the certification.

(B)Chronically ill individual

The term “chronically ill individual” has the meaning given such term by section 7702B(c)(2); except that such term shall not include a terminally ill individual.

(C)Qualified long-term care services

The term “qualified long-term care services” has the meaning given such term by section 7702B(c).

(D)Physician

The term “physician” has the meaning given to such term by section 1861(r)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(r)(1)).

(5)Exception for business-related policies

This subsection shall not apply in the case of any amount paid to any taxpayer other than the insured if such taxpayer has an insurable interest with respect to the life of the insured by reason of the insured being a director, officer, or employee of the taxpayer or by reason of the insured being financially interested in any trade or business carried on by the taxpayer.

(h)Survivor benefits attributable to service by a public safety officer who is killed in the line of duty
(1)In general

Gross income shall not include any amount paid as a survivor annuity on account of the death of a public safety officer (as such term is defined in section 1204 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as in effect immediately before the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013) killed in the line of duty—

(A)

if such annuity is provided, under a governmental plan which meets the requirements of section 401(a), to the spouse (or a former spouse) of the public safety officer or to a child of such officer; and

(B)

to the extent such annuity is attributable to such officer’s service as a public safety officer.

(2)Exceptions

Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to the death of any public safety officer if, as determined in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—

(A)

the death was caused by the intentional misconduct of the officer or by such officer’s intention to bring about such officer’s death;

(B)

the officer was voluntarily intoxicated (as defined in section 1204 of such Act) at the time of death;

(C)

the officer was performing such officer’s duties in a grossly negligent manner at the time of death; or

(D)

the payment is to an individual whose actions were a substantial contributing factor to the death of the officer.

(i)Certain employee death benefits payable by reason of death of certain terrorist victims or astronauts
(1)In general

Gross income does not include amounts (whether in a single sum or otherwise) paid by an employer by reason of the death of an employee who is a specified terrorist victim (as defined in section 692(d)(4)).

(2)Limitation
(A)In general

Subject to such rules as the Secretary may prescribe, paragraph (1) shall not apply to amounts which would have been payable after death if the individual had died other than as a specified terrorist victim (as so defined).

(B)Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to incidental death benefits paid from a plan described in section 401(a) and exempt from tax under section 501(a).

(3)Treatment of self-employed individuals

For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “employee” includes a self-employed individual (as defined in section 401(c)(1)).

(4)Relief with respect to astronauts

The provisions of this subsection shall apply to any astronaut whose death occurs in the line of duty.

(j)Treatment of certain employer-owned life insurance contracts
(1)General rule

In the case of an employer-owned life insurance contract, the amount excluded from gross income of an applicable policyholder by reason of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not exceed an amount equal to the sum of the premiums and other amounts paid by the policyholder for the contract.

(2)Exceptions

In the case of an employer-owned life insurance contract with respect to which the notice and consent requirements of paragraph (4) are met, paragraph (1) shall not apply to any of the following:

(A)Exceptions based on insured’s status

Any amount received by reason of the death of an insured who, with respect to an applicable policyholder—

(i)

was an employee at any time during the 12-month period before the insured’s death, or

(ii)

is, at the time the contract is issued—

(I)

a director,

(II)

a highly compensated employee within the meaning of section 414(q) (without regard to paragraph (1)(B)(ii) thereof), or

(III)

a highly compensated individual within the meaning of section 105(h)(5), except that “35 percent” shall be substituted for “25 percent” in subparagraph (C) thereof.

(B)Exception for amounts paid to insured’s heirs

Any amount received by reason of the death of an insured to the extent—

(i)

the amount is paid to a member of the family (within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)) of the insured, any individual who is the designated beneficiary of the insured under the contract (other than the applicable policyholder), a trust established for the benefit of any such member of the family or designated beneficiary, or the estate of the insured, or

(ii)

the amount is used to purchase an equity (or capital or profits) interest in the applicable policyholder from any person described in clause (i).

(3)Employer-owned life insurance contract
(A)In general

For purposes of this subsection, the term “employer-owned life insurance contract” means a life insurance contract which—

(i)

is owned by a person engaged in a trade or business and under which such person (or a related person described in subparagraph (B)(ii)) is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under the contract, and

(ii)

covers the life of an insured who is an employee with respect to the trade or business of the applicable policyholder on the date the contract is issued.

For purposes of the preceding sentence, if coverage for each insured under a master contract is treated as a separate contract for purposes of sections 817(h), 7702, and 7702A, coverage for each such insured shall be treated as a separate contract.

(B)Applicable policyholder

For purposes of this subsection—

(i)In general

The term “applicable policyholder” means, with respect to any employer-owned life insurance contract, the person described in subparagraph (A)(i) which owns the contract.

(ii)Related persons

The term “applicable policyholder” includes any person which—

(I)

bears a relationship to the person described in clause (i) which is specified in section 267(b) or 707(b)(1), or

(II)

is engaged in trades or businesses with such person which are under common control (within the meaning of subsection (a) or (b) of section 52).

(4)Notice and consent requirements

The notice and consent requirements of this paragraph are met if, before the issuance of the contract, the employee—

(A)

is notified in writing that the applicable policyholder intends to insure the employee’s life and the maximum face amount for which the employee could be insured at the time the contract was issued,

(B)

provides written consent to being insured under the contract and that such coverage may continue after the insured terminates employment, and

(C)

is informed in writing that an applicable policyholder will be a beneficiary of any proceeds payable upon the death of the employee.

(5)Definitions

For purposes of this subsection—

(A)Employee

The term “employee” includes an officer, director, and highly compensated employee (within the meaning of section 414(q)).

(B)Insured

The term “insured” means, with respect to an employer-owned life insurance contract, an individual covered by the contract who is a United States citizen or resident. In the case of a contract covering the joint lives of 2 individuals, references to an insured include both of the individuals.

  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1 Exclusion from gross income of proceeds of life insurance contracts payable by reason of death
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(a) §1.101-1(a)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(b) Transfers of life insurance policies.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(c) Reportable policy sale—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(d) Substantial relationship—(1) Substantial family relationship.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(e) Interest in a life insurance contract—(1) Definition.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(f) Definitions.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(g) Examples.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(i) Treatment of policy interest transferred to Partnership F.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(v) §1.101-1(v)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2 Employees' death benefits
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(a) If such amounts are paid under an annuity contract purchased by an employer which is an organization referred to in section 170(b)(1)(A) (ii) or (vi) or which is a religious organization (other than a trust) and which is exempt from tax under section 501(a).
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(b) §1.101-2(b)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(c) If such “total payment” is paid in full within one taxable year of the payee beginning after December 31, 1957.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(d) Nonforfeitable rights.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(e) Annuity payments.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(f) Distributions on behalf of a self- employed individual.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(i) The exclusion from gross income provided by section 101(b) does not apply to amounts, paid as an annuity, with respect to which the employee possessed, immediately before his death, a nonforfeitable right to receive the amounts while living, or to amounts paid as an annuity in lieu thereof.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-2(v) Where more than one beneficiary, or more than one death benefit, is involved, the exclusion provided by section 101(b) shall be apportioned to the various beneficiaries and benefits in accordance with the proportion that the present value of each benefit bears to the total present value of all the benefits.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-3 Interest payments
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-3(a) Applicability of section 101(c).
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-3(b) Determination of “present value”.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-4 Payment of life insurance proceeds at a date later than death
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-4(a) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.101-4(b) Amount held by an insurer.

389 Citing Cases

57-47, supra, are not materially distinguishable from the.instant case.

DIST. Roderick E. & Jeanette S. Carlson, Petitioner 116 T.C. No. 9 · 2001

Unlike the definition of the term “insolvent” in section 101(26) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.

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But the right is confined to the soil in its natural condition.

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ties, interest, and other amounts collected based on information provided by Whistleblower” were “$179,672.20” and that the recommended award percentage was 1%, subject to a modest reduction under the Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §§ 101–103, 125 Stat. 240, 241–46, as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 901, 126 Stat. 2313, 2370. The Report cited section 7623(b)(2) to justify the amount of the award and did not analyze the claim numbers i

l Archives and Record Service was transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration, which was established as an independent agency in the executive branch. National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-497, sec. 101, 98 Stat. at 2280 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. sec. 2102 (2018)); National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, sec. 103(a), 98 Stat. at 2283. 50 Codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. sec. 1504 (Supp. IV 2017). 51 Codified as amen

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730, 750–52 (1989) (applying common law agency principles to determine whether person was employee within the meaning of copyright law); Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc.

§ 101.501(a)(1), (7) (West 2011). Petitioners provided neither the list of ownership percentages nor the written statement, and that information is not otherwise contained within Co-Working’s articles of organization. Additionally, petitioners assert that, during taxable year 2011, they, on Getify’s behalf, made capital contributions to Co-Working

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st government programs and agencies during the budgetary process. Sequestration applies to all nonexempt direct spending when Congress fails to enact certain budgetary legislation for the fiscal year. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §§ 101–103, 125 Stat. 240, 241–46, as amended by American Taxpayer 20 [*20] correctly explains how payments in excess of $10,000 are subject to a federal income tax withholding amount,16 reflecting a net payment amount (after withholdings) to be recei

Peti- tioner's counter-parties had contingent rights to payment from him because he was obligated to return their advances (with a premium) ifthe litigation they supported was successful. The counter-parties thus had "claims" against his estate for bank- ruptcy purposes, as the bankruptcy court reasoned. - 26 - [*26] For tax purpos

101 (2018) (defining "fixed" in the context oftitle 17). Petitioner does not contend, and the Court does not find, that the processed seismic data is an original work ofauthorship protected by U.S. copyright law. Rather, the processed data is more akin to a useful article, a category to which Congress has not extended copyright protection.2° T

rovide accurate information and documents on time", "to keep records", and "to pay taxes on time". NTA 2007 report at 488-489. -21- publish a TBOR along the lines proposed by Ms. Olson. H.R. 5716, 110th Cong., sec. 2 (2008); H.R. 5047, 111th Cong., sec. 101 (2010); S. 3215, 111th Cong., sec. 101 (2010); H.R. 6050, 112th Cong., sec. 101 (2012); S. 3355, 112th Cong., sec. 101 (2012). Each ofthose bills stated that the proposed TBOR would "not create or confer any rights or obligations not otherwis

101(b)(1), 88 Stat. at 2358. There is no reason to believe - 29 - that the Congress which enacted FETIA 35 years later focused on the clause in section 6305(a) excluding interest and additions to tax, let alone that it considered (but decided against) providing such an exclusion in section 6201(a)(4).¹² C. Tax Loss vs. Civil Tax Liability The

101(b)(1), 88 Stat. at 2358. There is no reason to believe - 29 - that the Congress which enacted FETIA 35 years later focused on the clause in section 6305(a) excluding interest and additions to tax, let alone that it considered (but decided against) providing such an exclusion in section 6201(a)(4).¹² C. Tax Loss vs. Civil Tax Liability The

101(c)(1), 95 Stat. at 183. ¹#The observation, in dictum, ofthe U.S. District Court for the Southern District ofOhio in Hubbard-Ragsdale, 15 F.2d at 411, that the use ofcapital by law firms and similar service businesses is "merely incidental" does not establish that a law firm that in fact has significant capital need not provide its owners w

rn for the economy, Congress enacted section 168(k), which granted a "special allowance" for qualified property acquired after September 10, 2001, and before January 1, 2005. See Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, sec. 101, 116 Stat. at 22. Section 167(a) offered a depreciation deduction for qualified property "for the taxable year in which such property is placed in service" which included an allowance equal to 30% ofthe adjusted basis ofthe qualified property

Thomas Edward Settles, Petitioner 138 T.C. No. 19 · 2012

Petitioner contends that the dismissal ofthe instant cases would not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) because 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) stays the commencement or continuation ofan action, but not its dismissal. We are guided by the decisions ofa number ofother courts that have considered whether 3We note, howev

Daniel & Reizel Stern, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2012-204 · 2012

1401 (2006) (specifying who shall be nationals and citizens ofthe United States at birth); see also id.

Patel v. Commissioner 138 T.C. 395 · 2012

, 1885 WL 4179 (1885); see also Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Va. 1990), and a right of way over the lands has been retained by the grantor, Powell, 60 S.E.2d at 899 (citing 1 Minor on Real Property (2d ed.), 1 Ribble, at 140, sec. 101); Jennings, 21 S.E.2d 769. These easements by necessity pass to the successors in title of the building, and they will not be extinguished by the destruction of the building but will survive and adhere to the new building the owner of the des

Ira & Tracy Nathel, Petitioner 131 T.C. No. 17 · 2008

* * * Moreover, §§ 101 through 136 employ the same construction [as section 108] to exclude various items from gross income : "Gross income does not include .

Sheldon & Ann M. Nathel, Petitioner 131 T.C. No. 17 · 2008

* * * Moreover, §§ 101 through 136 employ the same construction [as section 108] to exclude various items from gross income : "Gross income does not include .

Section 61(a) provides that gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including "Interest" and "Income from life insurance ." Sec .

101 (1999); Fla. Stat. Ann. - 13 - sec. 826.01 (West 2006). While we believe that the State of Florida had no reason to suspect that the Florida marriage was void ab initio, we do not find that the subsequent annulment gave validity to either the marriage entered into in Florida or the cohabitation of petitioner and Mr. Khalil Aly in Delaware

101(10) (1994) (definition of “creditor”); id. sec. 502(a) (general rule regarding allowance of claims against the bankruptcy estate). Accordingly, if the debtor makes the sec. 1398(d)(2) election, his tax liability for the first short taxable year becomes an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate as a claim arising prior to the bankrup

101(10) (1994) (definition of “creditor”); id. sec. 502(a) (general rule regarding allowance of claims against the bankruptcy estate). Accordingly, if the debtor makes the sec. 1398(d)(2) election, his tax liability for the first short taxable year becomes an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate as a claim arising prior to the bankrup

Eric N. Umbach, Petitioner 117 T.C. No. 9 · 2001

essarily mean that the individual’s abode is in the United States. 20Sec. 911(d)(9) originally was designated sec. 911(d)(7) in sec. 111(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97- 34, 95 Stat. 194. It was redesignated sec. 911(d)(8) by sec. 101(c)(1) of the Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97- 448, 96 Stat. 2366, and then further redesignated sec. 911(d)(9) by sec. 1233(b) of TRA 1986, 100 Stat. 2564. 21Furthermore, the regulations would be valid under the (continued...)

101(10) (1994) (definition of “creditor”); id. sec. 502(a) (general rule regarding allowance of claims against the bankruptcy estate). Accordingly, if the debtor makes the sec. 1398(d)(2) election, his tax liability for the first short taxable year becomes an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate as a claim arising prior to the bankrup

Respondent points out that section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA of 1978 provided that if any natural gas qualified under more than one provision of the NGPA, the provision which allowed the highest price applied.

Eldon R. & Susan M. Kenseth, Petitioner 114 T.C. No. 26 · 2000

101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 183. (repealing sec. 804(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969). 30 In 1986, Congress repealed the income averaging provisions almost entirely (exception carved out for farming income). Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117. Congress believed that changes to the individual income tax prov

hat (1) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1841(c)(1) (1994), as amended by CEBA, sec. 101, 101 Stat. 554-557. Congress maintained certain express exclusions from the definition of the term “bank” and provided certain, additional limited exceptions for, among other institutions, credit card banks. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1841(c)(2) (199

John Edward Tucker, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1999-373 · 1999

itary subsistence and uniform allowances and other amounts received as commutation of quarters are excluded from gross income. See sec. 1.61-2(b), Income Tax Regs. - 4 - The Reserve Officers' Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-647, sec. 101, 78 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. section 2031 (1994)) provided for the establishment of JROTC units at public and private schools. Retired commissioned or noncommissioned officers may serve as instructors and administrators in

Mel T. Nelson, Petitioner 110 T.C. No. 12 · 1998

7806(b) (No inference, implication, etc., as to legal effects to be drawn from arrangement, classification, location, grouping, descriptive (continued...) - 36 - There’s a significant difference between COD under section 108, on the one hand, and items such as life insurance proceeds under section 101 and tax-exempt bond interest under section 103, on the other.

Venture Funding, Ltd., Petitioner 110 T.C. No. 19 · 1998

ng items:" and then lists 15 items specifically included in gross income. Section 61(b) provides: "For items specifically included in gross income, see part II (sec. 71 and following). For items specifically excluded from gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following)." Section 79 uses the same articulation as section 83 in providing that the cost of employees' group-term life insurance "shall be included in the gross income" of employees. The same is true for reimbursed moving expenses und

Mercedes Arcia, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-178 · 1998

1242 (1970), 21 U.S.C. secs. 801-971). On October 5, 1992, petitioners filed a Notice of Claim, claiming an interest in the seized real property, and an Answer to Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem and Demand for Jury Trial. On December 7, 1992, petitioners and the United States signed a Stipulation of Dismissal and Settlement Agree

Nelson v. Commissioner 110 T.C. 114 · 1998

There’s a significant difference between COD under section 108, on the one hand, and items such as life insurance proceeds under section 101 and tax-exempt bond interest under section 103, on the other.

ng items:” and then lists 15 items specifically included in gross income. Section 61(b) provides: “For items specifically included in gross income, see part II (sec. 71 and following). For items specifically excluded from gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following).” Section 79 uses the same articulation as section 83 in providing that the cost of employees’ group term life insurance “shall be included in the gross income” of employees. The same is true for reimbursed moving expenses und

101 (1994) (a nonexclusive license is not within the definition of the term “transfer of copyright ownership”). Petitioner possessed all of the significant benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to those magnetic tapes. NTI simply did not retain a residuary interest in the NTI software load commensurate with an interest typically retai

101, 1983-1 C.B. at 745. The component method of depreciation is not permitted under ACRS. Sec. 168(f)(1).25 The component method of depreciation is 25 Sec. 168(f) provides in pertinent part as follows: SEC. 168(f) Special rules for application of this section. --For purposes of this section-- (1) Components of section 1250 class property.-- (

David A. & Louise A. Gitlitz, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-286 · 1997

relating to interest) or sections 61(a)(10) and 101 (relating to insurance). Respondent argues that, as an illustration, death benefits are first realized under section 61(a)(10) and then certain death benefits are excluded, i.e., not recognized, by section 101. Respondent argues that no such realization occurs in the case of discharge of indebtedness. Section 61 requires that certain amounts be included in income, i.e., items of income. Specifically, section 61(a)(12) requires that income from

101, 1983-1 C.B. at 745. The component method of depreciation is not permitted under ACRS. Sec. 168(f)(1). The component method of depreciation is a method of depreciation that “fragments an item of property, often a building, into its elements (e.g., shell, plumbing, and wiring) and applies individual useful lives and salvage values to each s

101, 1983-1 C.B. at 745. The component method of depreciation is not permitted under ACRS. Sec. 168(f)(1).25 The component method of depreciation is 25 Sec. 168(f) provides in pertinent part as follows: SEC. 168(f) Special rules for application of this section. --For purposes of this section-- (1) Components of section 1250 class property.-- (

101 (1994) (a nonexclusive license is not within the definition of the term “transfer of copyright ownership”). Petitioner possessed all of the significant benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to those magnetic tapes. NTI simply did not retain a residuary interest in the NTI software load commensurate with an interest typically retai

Estate of Harmon v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 329 · 1985
Kovacs v. United States 614 F.3d 666 · Cir.
Nancy Ellen Kovacs v. United States · Cir.
Ocean Pines Ass'n v. Commissioner 672 F.3d 284 · Cir.
Hersh v. United States Ex Rel. Mukasey 553 F.3d 743 · Cir.
Karen Leclerc Guillaume Jarry Beatrice Boulord Maureen D. Affleck, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross v. Daniel E. Webb, Daniel E. Webb Harry J. Phillips, in Their Respective Official Capacities as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Louisiana Committee on Bar Admissions Jeffery P. Victory Jeannette Theriot Knoll Chet D. Traylor Catherine D. Kimball, A/K/A Kitty Kimball John L. Weimer Bernette Joshua Johnson, in Their Official Capacities as Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Defendants-Appellees-Cross Caroline Wallace Emily Maw v. Pascal F. Calogero Jr., in His Official Capacity as Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court Jeffrey P. Victory Jeannette Theriot Knoll Chet D. Traylor Catherine D. Kimball John L. Weimer Bernett J. Johnson, in Their Official Capacities as Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court Daniel E. Webb Harry J. Phillips, Jr., in Their Respective Official Capacities as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Louisiana Committee on Bar Admissions 419 F.3d 405 · Cir.
Carlson v. Commissioner 116 T.C. 87 · 2001
Ying v. Commissioner 99 T.C. 273 · 1992
Estate of Skaggs v. Commissioner 75 T.C. 191 · 1980
Harrison v. Commissioner 59 T.C. 578 · 1973
Lilly v. Commissioner 45 T.C. 168 · 1965
Jones v. Commissioner 40 T.C. 249 · 1963
Shiffman v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 1073 · 1959
Best Lock Corp. v. Commissioner 31 T.C. 1217 · 1959
Best Lock Corp. v. Commissioner 29 T.C. 389 · 1957
Danz v. Commissioner 18 T.C. 454 · 1952
Stein v. Commissioner 14 T.C. 494 · 1950
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner 14 T.C. 922 · 1950
Orton v. Commissioner 9 T.C. 533 · 1947
Cambridge Literary Properties, Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.M.B.H. & Co. Kg. 510 F.3d 77 · Cir.
Lewis v. Hunt 492 F.3d 565 · Cir.
Byers v. Intuit, Inc. 600 F.3d 286 · Cir.
Tolwinsky v. Commissioner 86 T.C. 1009 · 1986
Estate of Blaine v. Commissioner 22 T.C. 1195 · 1954
Templeton v. O'Cheskey (In Re American Housing Foundation) 785 F.3d 143 · Cir.
Robert Templeton v. Walter O'Cheskey · Cir.
Robert Templeton v. Walter O'Cheskey · Cir.
Knight v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n 457 F.3d 331 · Cir.
Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Counties Servs., Inc. 901 F.3d 718 · Cir.
Donald J. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG 943 F.3d 627 · Cir.
Davis v. Commissioner 22 T.C. 1091 · 1954
Dreymann v. Commissioner 11 T.C. 153 · 1948
Floyd v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 744 · 1943
In Re: Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware, Inc., Debtor Baltimore County, Maryland Montgomery County, Maryland Prince George's County, Maryland State of Maryland v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust Patricia A. Staiano, Trustee State of Maryland, Baltimore County, Maryland, Montgomery County, Maryland, and Prince George's County, Maryland 335 F.3d 243 · Cir.
Evans v. Commissioner 56 T.C. 1142 · 1971
Chapman v. Commissioner 48 T.C. 358 · 1967
John C. Nordt Co. v. Commissioner 46 T.C. 431 · 1966
Evans v. Commissioner 39 T.C. 570 · 1962
Lake Forest, Inc. v. Commissioner 36 T.C. 510 · 1961
Estate of Moyer v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 515 · 1959
Kolkey v. Commissioner 27 T.C. 37 · 1956
Title & Trust Co. v. Commissioner 15 T.C. 510 · 1950
Tully Trust v. Commissioner 1 T.C. 611 · 1943
Brodie v. Commissioner 1 T.C. 275 · 1942
Knudsen v. Internal Revenue Service 581 F.3d 696 · Cir.
In Re South Beach Securities, Inc. 606 F.3d 366 · Cir.
United States v. Gary France 782 F.3d 820 · Cir.
Anders Knudsen v. Internal Revenue Service · Cir.
Dennis Berkovich v. California Franchise Tax Board 15 F.4th 997 · Cir.
Behrmann v. National Heritage Foundation, Inc. 663 F.3d 704 · Cir.
Roger Schlossberg, Trustee-Appellant v. Jean Barney, Debtor-Appellee 380 F.3d 174 · Cir.
Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison 484 F.3d 284 · Cir.
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc. 716 F.3d 736 · Cir.
Morehouse Enterprises, LLC v. Bureau of ATF 78 F.4th 1011 · Cir.
Timothy J. Lewis, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2022-47 · 2022
Stuart v. Commissioner 144 T.C. 235 · 2015
Michael D. Brown & Mary M. Brown, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2013-275 · 2013
Michael D. Brown & Mary M. Brown, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2013-275 · 2013
Michael D. Brown & Mary M. Brown, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2013-275 · 2013
Settles v. Commissioner 138 T.C. 372 · 2012
Klein v. Commissioner 135 T.C. 166 · 2010
Nathel v. Commissioner 131 T.C. 262 · 2008
Pieter Weyts, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2003-68 · 2003
Katz v. Commissioner 116 T.C. 5 · 2001
Gold Kist Inc. v. Commissioner 104 T.C. 696 · 1995
La Rue v. Commissioner 90 T.C. 465 · 1988
Rivera v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 343 · 1987
Smith v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 889 · 1985
McKenzie v. Commissioner 85 T.C. 875 · 1985
Van Kalker v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 91 · 1983
Olson v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 318 · 1983
Magneson v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 767 · 1983
Sjoroos v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 971 · 1983
Habersham-Bey v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 304 · 1982
Lyle v. Commissioner 76 T.C. 668 · 1981
McClamma v. Commissioner 76 T.C. 754 · 1981
Graff v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 743 · 1980
Faura v. Commissioner 73 T.C. 849 · 1980
Carson v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 252 · 1978
Rafter v. Commissioner 60 T.C. 1 · 1973
Cleary v. Commissioner 60 T.C. 133 · 1973
Tanenbaum v. Commissioner 58 T.C. 1 · 1972
Funkhouser v. Commissioner 58 T.C. 940 · 1972
Orton v. Commissioner 56 T.C. 147 · 1971
Anderson v. Commissioner 56 T.C. 1370 · 1971
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 275 · 1970
Rodney v. Commissioner 53 T.C. 287 · 1969
Estate of Wells v. Commissioner 50 T.C. 871 · 1968
Morgan v. Commissioner 42 T.C. 1080 · 1964
Greenvine Corp. v. Commissioner 40 T.C. 926 · 1963
Griswold v. Commissioner 39 T.C. 620 · 1962
Westphal v. Commissioner 37 T.C. 340 · 1961
Zeltzerman v. Commissioner 34 T.C. 73 · 1960
Cooper Agency v. Commissioner 33 T.C. 709 · 1960
Davey Co. v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 743 · 1959
Mayock v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 966 · 1959
Burroughs Corp. v. Commissioner 33 T.C. 389 · 1959
Estate of Howes v. Commissioner 30 T.C. 909 · 1958
McKay Machine Co. v. Commissioner 28 T.C. 185 · 1957
Cunningham v. Commissioner 28 T.C. 670 · 1957
Boman v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 660 · 1956
Ohio Furnace Co. v. Commissioner 25 T.C. 179 · 1955
Weil v. Commissioner 23 T.C. 424 · 1954
Seasongood v. Commissioner 22 T.C. 671 · 1954
Audigier v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 665 · 1954
Rohmer v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 1099 · 1954
Peters v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 55 · 1953
Kaplan v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 134 · 1953
Estate of Caswell v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 1190 · 1952
Morse v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 1244 · 1952
Estate of Dwight v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 1317 · 1952
Joplin v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 1526 · 1952
Forbes v. Commissioner 18 T.C. 321 · 1952
Thompson v. Commissioner 18 T.C. 742 · 1952
Glinske v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 562 · 1951
Higgs v. Commissioner 16 T.C. 16 · 1951
Topeka Insurors v. Commissioner 12 T.C. 428 · 1949
Marsh v. Commissioner 12 T.C. 1083 · 1949
Hart Furniture Co. v. Commissioner 12 T.C. 1103 · 1949
Putnam v. Commissioner 6 T.C. 702 · 1946
Hazard v. Commissioner 7 T.C. 372 · 1946
Lurie v. Commissioner 4 T.C. 1065 · 1945
Hackett v. Commissioner 5 T.C. 1325 · 1945
Nicholson v. Commissioner 3 T.C. 596 · 1944
Moore, Inc. v. Commissioner 4 T.C. 404 · 1944
Estate of Gray v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 97 · 1943
Scott v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 726 · 1943
Stoeckel v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 975 · 1943
Nichols v. Commissioner 1 T.C. 328 · 1942
Harmon v. Commissioner 1 T.C. 40 · 1942
Gordon Green v. David Leibowitz 108 F.4th 530 · Cir.
In re: Eric S. Gilbert v. · Cir.
In re: Eric S. Gilbert v. · Cir.
The Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas 506 F.3d 333 · Cir.
Bosiger v. US Airways, Inc. 510 F.3d 442 · Cir.
National Labor Relations Board v. MacY's Inc. · Cir.
Insight Terminal Solutions v. Cecelia Fin. Mgmt. · Cir.
National Labor Relations Board v. MacY's Inc. · Cir.
United States v. Kittson · Cir.
Robert A. Sears v. Joseph H. Badami 734 F.3d 810 · Cir.
In Re Laughlin 602 F.3d 417 · Cir.
Scattered Corporatio v. William Nea · Cir.
Nathel v. Commissioner 615 F.3d 83 · Cir.
United States v. Crooker 608 F.3d 94 · Cir.
Young v. United States 233 F.3d 56 · Cir.
United States v. Yellin (In Re Weinstein) 272 F.3d 39 · Cir.
Spookyworld, Inc. v. Town of Berlin 346 F.3d 1 · Cir.
Fleet National Bank v. Gray 375 F.3d 51 · Cir.
Muniz-Olivari v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc. 496 F.3d 29 · Cir.
Cole v. Commissioner 637 F.3d 767 · Cir.
Mallo v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Mallo) 774 F.3d 1313 · Cir.
Robert Donahue v. CIR · Cir.
Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater New York, Local Union 1974 of I.U.P.A.T., AFL-CIO v. Nastasi & Associates Inc. 488 F.3d 88 · Cir.
Schlossberg v. Barney · Cir.
IRS v. White · Cir.
IRS v. Westberry · Cir.
United States v. Crum, Ellis · Cir.
Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In Re Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, Inc.) 335 F.3d 243 · Cir.
United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. 432 F.3d 161 · Cir.
Milavetz & Gallop v. United States · Cir.
Leclerc v. Webb 444 F.3d 428 · Cir.
Willy v. Administrative Review Board 423 F.3d 483 · Cir.
Zazzali v. United States (In Re DBSI, Inc.) 869 F.3d 1004 · Cir.
Sun v. Commissioner 880 F.3d 173 · Cir.
Marilyn Marshall v. Denise Blake 885 F.3d 1065 · Cir.
Marilyn Marshall v. Denise Blake · Cir.
Spiridon Spireas v. Commissioner of Internal Reven 886 F.3d 315 · Cir.
Spiridon Spireas v. Commissioner of Internal Reven · Cir.
Peaje Investments LLC v. PR Highways and Transportation · Cir.
United States v. Musso 914 F.3d 26 · Cir.
Estate of Frank D. Streightoff v. CIR 954 F.3d 713 · Cir.
Coffey v. NH Judicial Ret. Plan 957 F.3d 45 · Cir.
Michael Holland v. Westmoreland Coal Compan 968 F.3d 526 · Cir.
In re Murray Energy Holdings Co. · Cir.
Mayo Clinic v. United States 997 F.3d 789 · Cir.
United States v. Reed 668 F.3d 978 · Cir.
Deborah Seafort v. Beverly Burden 669 F.3d 662 · Cir.
In re: Howard D. Juntoff · Cir.
City of Chicago v. Marcella M. Mance 31 F.4th 1014 · Cir.
Esden v. Bank of Boston 229 F.3d 154 · Cir.
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food & Drug Administration 318 F.3d 92 · Cir.
Thomas Laughlin v. Nouveau Body and Tan, LLC, et a 602 F. Supp. 3d 417 · Cir.
United States v. Graham 59 F. App'x 660 · Cir.
In Re: Wilbur G. Westberry, Debtor. Internal Revenue Service v. Wilbur G. Westberry 215 F.3d 589 · Cir.
Esden v. Bank Of Boston 229 F.3d 154 · Cir.
Charles Francisco Cecilia Francisco v. United States 267 F.3d 303 · Cir.
United States v. Ellis J. Crum and Norma N. Crum 288 F.3d 332 · Cir.
Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-1201) John J. And Ophelia J. Mall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-1208) Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased and Bonnie Sobo, and Bonnie Sobo, Surviving Wife v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2795) Akhileshi S. And Dipti A. Desai v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2981) Kevin T. And Cheryl McManus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2985) Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2994) Lakewood Radiology, P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Tax Court No. 97-2995) Neonatology Associates, P.A., John J. And Ophelia Mall, Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased, and Bonnie Sobo, and Bonnie Sobo, Surviving Wife, Akhilshi S. And Dipti A. Desai, Kevin T. And Cheryl McManus Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz and Lakewood Radiology, P.A. 299 F.3d 221 · Cir.
In Re Kenneth Allen Knight Trust, Debtor. Angela Lynn Brady-Morris Denise Michele Brady v. J. Baxter Schilling, Trustee 303 F.3d 671 · Cir.
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food And Drug Administration 318 F.3d 92 · Cir.
Gualandi v. Adams 385 F.3d 236 · Cir.
In Re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation 429 F.3d 370 · Cir.
The Universal Church v. Robert L. Geltzer, as Trustee of the Estate of Darnelle Boisrond 463 F.3d 218 · Cir.
In Re Charles A. White, Jr. Anita D. White, Debtors. Internal Revenue Service, Creditor-Appellee v. Charles A. White, Jr. Anita D. White, Debtors-Appellants, and John F. Logan, Chapter 13 Trustee, Trustee 487 F.3d 199 · Cir.
DRYWALL TAPERS AND POINTERS OF GREATER NEW YORK, LOCAL UNION 1974 OF v. NASTASI & ASSOCIATES INC. 488 F.3d 88 · Cir.
Sarmiento v. United States 678 F.3d 147 · Cir.
Windsor v. United States 699 F.3d 169 · Cir.
E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump · Cir.
Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust 335 F.3d 243 · Cir.
Gualandi v. Adams 385 F.3d 236 · Cir.
Internal Revenue Service v. White 487 F.3d 199 · Cir.
Peaje Invs. LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) 899 F.3d 1 · Cir.
Feldman v. Commissioner 779 F.3d 448 · Cir.
In Re LATAM Airlines Group S.A. · Cir.
VanDerStok v. Garland 86 F.4th 179 · Cir.

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