§102 — Gifts and inheritances

The Supreme Court in Duberstein was careful to distinguish a common law gift from a section 102 gift.

2510.3-101(a)(2) that petitioners' IRAs cannot be considered to own any ofElsara's assets given Elsara's status as an "operating company".° We decline petitioners' invitation to disregard or distinguish M. Congress included provisions on prohibited transactions in both title 26 and title 29, and President Carter gave the Department ofLabor primary authorityto interpret both sets ofthose provisions. See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, sec. 102, 3 C.F.R.

- Petiltionery may have meantato ácite as support for his contention section 102 (a) , which excludes from- gross income the value of property acquired by Égift However, fori reasons discessed below, section 102 (a) is inapplicable .

10 We disagree with petitioner with respect to all three of its arguments and conclude the grant proceeds are included in its income for 2007.4 A.

Duberstein draws an important distinction--a gift made out ofgenerosity or charity is not taxable under section 102, but one made out ofgratitude, particularly gratitude stemming from a prior economic or commercial relationship, is taxable.

Section 102 provides that gross income does not include amounts acquired by gift.

Section 102 provides that gross income does not include amounts acquired by gift.

For purposes of this section, the term “gift” means any item excludable from gross income of the recipient under section 102 which is not excludable from his gross income under any other provision of this chapter * * * Section 102, in turn, reads as follows: SEC.

The original value component was excluded from income under section 102, as interpreted in Lyeth v.

Subchapter J Income Attribution Rules The income attribution rules of subchapter J give effect to the distinction made by section 102 between gifts and inheritances of property, which are excluded from a recipient's gross income, sec.

$100 check, we find that petitioner has shown that it was a nontaxable gift. A "Christmas gift" notation in the memo line ofthat check corroborates petitioner's statement. We are satisfied that this deposit was a nontaxable gift to petitioner under section 102. 5Had the revenue agent characterized the checks as "other income", for example, this would not affect the Schedule C income shown in the bank deposits analysis. Because respondent neglected to attach this information to the bank deposits

The legislative history ofsection 102 indicates that a gift maybe made by an employerto an employee ifit is exclusively for personal reasons, ifit is entirely unrelated to the employmentrelationship, and ifit reflects no anticipation of business benefit.

If the gift is made solely for personal reasons (such as a birthday or wedding present) and is in no way related to the employment relationship, and no anticipation of business benefit exists, then the gift may qualify for section 102 exclusion treatment.

Section 102(c)(1), however, denies section 102 exclusion treatment for “any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” The legislative history indicates that a gift made by an employer to an employee exclusively for personal reasons (such as a birthday present), if it is entirely unrelated to the employment relationship and reflects no anticipa

o our view as espoused in those Memorandum Opinions for the reasons stated therein. Petitioner's primary argument is that she received her proceeds under a cause of action arising from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the CRA of 1991), Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-1073, and that the CRA of 1991 provides tort type damages that compensate for personal injury. Petitioner argues that the CRA of 1991 governs her case because Judge Lynch signed State Farm's offer to the class after the

Haring were excludable from income under section 102, Kroner I, T.C.

r the annual payment of “net income” is generally required to pay out only the “current” portion of the return— such as interest, dividends, and rent—as opposed to sale proceeds or unrealized appreciation. See, e.g., Uniform Principal and Income Act § 102(4) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2008) (providing a default definition of “income” for trust instruments, viz, “money or property that a fiduciary receives as current return from a principal asset”).). These assumptions are necessarily blunt and therefore c

That's quite the spread, but Congress enacted section 102 to leave gifts offthe table.

102-71.20); £ BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 185-186 (2004) (declining to extend W_. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. at 36, and holding that sand and gravel were not considered "valuable minerals" pursuant to the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919). Simply put, the opinion ofthe Court fails to address the requisite legal and factu

. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (broadly construing gross income as "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion"). That's a big net, but Congress cut a small hole in it with section 102. Section 102(a) excludes from gross income "the value ofproperty acquired by gift." We note, however, that section 102(a) has its own limitation--the exclusion doesn't apply to "any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the b

at 527-529 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. sec. 2452 (2012)), and is governed by 22 C.F.R. ch. I, subch. G, pt. 62. Since the Department ofState regulations governing the EVP were substantially modified effective January 5, 2015, Public Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 60,294 (Oct. 6, 2014), we look to the regulations as they existed in 20

at 527-529 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. sec. 2452 (2012)), and is governed by 22 C.F.R. ch. I, subch. G, pt. 62. Since the Department ofState regulations governing the EVP were substantially modified effective January 5, 2015, Public Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 60,294 (Oct. 6, 2014), we look to the regulations as they existed in 20

at 527-529 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. sec. 2452 (2012)), and is governed by 22 C.F.R. ch. I, subch. G, pt. 62. Since the Department ofState regulations governing the EVP were substantially modified effective January 5, 2015, Public Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 60,294 (Oct. 6, 2014), we look to the regulations as they existed in 20

However, section 274(b)(1) provides that no deduction is allowed under section 162 for the expense ofa "gift" to an individual to the extent that the expense, when added to prior expenses for gifts to the same individual during the tax year, exceeds $25.

102.3 (2016) (stating that certain agencies "shall not meet on holidays * * * or on snow "See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6-B, sec. 1273.4 (2016) (providing that employ- ees are to be on administrative leave during a state ofemergency); 4 sec. 1299.1 (defining "administrative leave" as an excused absence from duty without loss of pay and without char

Marsh was a gift and so not income under section 102.5 To be a gift, the transfer must proceed from a "detached and disinterested generosity * * * out ofaffection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." Commissioner v.

102(e)(4), 98 Stat. at 624, and a major change in the T xpayer ReliefAct of 1997 (TRA 1997), Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. 1003(a)(1), 111 Stat. at 909-910. Before TRA 1997, section 1234A applied only to (1) personal property ofa type that is actively traded that is (or would be on acquisition) a ca ital asset in the hands ofthe taxpayer, except fo

In Colella the North Easton Savings Bank exercised its right ofsetoffagainst a debtor'sjoint bank account, of which the plaintiffs were co-depositors. After the North Easton Savings Bank took the entire balance ofthe account by setoff, the nondebtor co-depositor plaintiffs brought an action againstthe bank alleging, inter alia, the tort o

at 166, and a $500 threshold for review was added as part ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 74, sec. 7122(b), 68A Stat. at 849. . The threshold in section 7122(b) for compromised liabilities requiring General Counsel review was more recently raised to $50,000 froni $500 in 1996.' See Taxphyer Bill ofRights 2, Pub. L. No. 1

knowledge on briefthat they failed to report Schedule C gross receipts.for 2006 and 2007 in the respective amounts of$11,620 and $99,090 but claim additional amounts which respondent attributed to them are excludable from gross income as gifts under section 102. We will sustain respondent's determinations. 1°Petitioners do not allege, andthe record does not establish, thatthe burden ofproofas to factual matters should shiftto respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 13 - Taxpayers must keep sufficient r

Petitioner argues that the Covance payment is not includable in gross income because it is (1) excluded under section 104 as c mpensation received on account ofphysical illness or physical sickness, and (2) excluded under section 102 as property received by gift.

In Colella the North Easton Savings Bank exercised its right of setoff against a debtor’s joint bank account, of which the plaintiffs were co-depositors. After the North Easton Savings Bank took the entire balance of the account by setoff, the nondebtor co-depositor plaintiffs brought an action against the bank alleging, inter alia, the t

is added.] Third, in "Title IV--Tax Technical Corrections", the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (2004 Act), Pub. L. 108-311, sec. 403(b) (4), 118 Stat. 1187, specified "clerical changes" to the NOL and ATNOL provisions set forth in 2002 Act section 102. H. Conf. Rept. 108-696, at 90 (2004). The 2004 Act replaced the word "carryforwards" in section 56(d) (1) (A) (ii) (I) with the word "carryovers", amended section 56(d) (1) (A) (ii) (I) by substituting "from taxable years" in place of "fo

For purposes of this section, the term "gift" means any item excludable from gross income of the recipient under section 102 which is not excludable from his gross income under any other provision of this chapter, but such term does not include-- (A) an item having a cost to the tax- payer not in excess of $4 .00 on which the name of the taxpayer is clearly and perma- nently imprinted and which is one of a numbe r of identical items distributed generally by t

It is true that section 102 excludes from gross income the value of property received as a "gift" .

3522, added section 195 to the Code. In describing the pre-section 195 law, the committee makes the following observation: Expenditures made in acquiring or creating an asset which has a useful life that extends beyond the taxable year normally must be capitalized. These costs ordinarily may be recovered through depreciation or a

3522, added section 195 to the Code. In describing the pre-section 195 law, the committee makes the following observation: Expenditures made in acquiring or creating an asset which has a useful life that extends beyond the taxable year normally must be capitalized. These costs ordinarily may be recovered through depreciation or a

The term “gift” for purposes of this section is defined as “any item excludable from gross income of the recipient under section 102 which is not excludable from his gross income under any other 9 Due to the abbreviations and other simplification used in many of the documents in the record, the precise name of various of the establishments at which claimed expenditures were incurred is unclear.

on tort or tort type rights. Id. at 241. In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, effective November 21, 1991, to permit recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1072. 2 Sec. 7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issue. - 6 - The settlement agreement does not reference whether the damage award was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 1991. Ho

se funds are nontaxable gifts from various unspecified members of the church. Section 102(a) provides that “Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift”. Neither the Code nor the regulations define a gift for the purposes of section 102. In Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-286 (1960), the Supreme Court summarized the case law regarding whether amounts received were gifts within the meaning of section 102 as follows: The mere absence of a legal or moral oblig

Section 102 of the 1978 Plan gives the Secretary of Labor authority with respect to regulations, rulings, opinions, and exemptions under section 4975 * * * EXCEPT for (i) subsections 4975(a), (b), (c)(3), * * * (e)(1), and (e)(7) of the Code; (ii) to the extent necessary for the continued enforcement of subsections 4975(a) and (b) * * *; and (iii)

included in petitioner and his wife's gross income. Petitioner argues that the cash deposits in question relate to family lands seized in the 1940's by the Government of Iran and, as an inheritance to petitioner, should be excluded from income under section 102. Also, petitioner alleges that each - 9 - month beginning in 1986 cash was brought to his home from Iran by foreign students or politicians. Petitioner contends that respondent has not established a sufficient link between petitioner and

In applying Reorganization Plan section 102, Reorganization Plan section 105 provides the following in regard to enforcement by the Secretary of the Treasury: The transfers provided for in Section 102 of this Plan shall not affect the ability of the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to the provisions of Title III of ERISA relating to jurisdiction, administration, and enforcement

102(e) and (f), 100 Stat. 3218, 15 U.S.C. sec. 78o, became effective in July 1987. Before that time, most dealers in Treasury securities were not required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the NASD. The 1986 Act required Government securities brokers and dealers to register with the SEC and the NASD unless an exe

102(e) and (f), 100 Stat. 3218, 15 U.S.C. sec. 78o, became effective in July 1987. Before that time, most dealers in Treasury securities were not required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the NASD. The 1986 Act required Government securities brokers and dealers to register with the SEC and the NASD unless an exe

claims against IBM arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, sec. 2, 104 Stat. 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981a (1994)). Pertinent sections of the release read as follows: In exchange for the sums and benefits which you will receive pursuant to the terms of the * * * [ITO-II Program], J. Ray Phi

elevant information: 1989 1990 1991 Fund value at yearend $50,018 $46,185 $48,015 Policy values - 0 - 46,005 48,026 Surrender value N/A 38,026 40,446 Additional contribution available (4) 1,467 3,866 Date of report 12/27/91 12/27/91 02/12/93 On March 16, 1990, Prime forwarded to Young & Young a copy of the 1989 summary plan description required by section 102 of ERISA.

In addition, the coexistence of two distinct property interests, the right to a specific copy of a computer program and the copyright underlying that computer program, should not affect the tangible or intangible character of either. In any event, there is no principled distinction between seismic data and a computer program in ter

elevant information: 1989 1990 1991 Fund value at yearend $50,018 $46,185 $48,015 Policy values - 0 - 46,005 48,026 Surrender value N/A 38,026 40,446 Additional contribution available (4) 1,467 3,866 Date of report 12/27/91 12/27/91 02/12/93 On March 16, 1990, Prime forwarded to Young & Young a copy of the 1989 summary plan description required by section 102 of ERISA.

eier, 515 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2167; United States v. Burke, supra at 242. In 1991, Congress amended title VII to permit the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations.8 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-1073. On brief, petitioner contends that the complaint of the class representatives in Kraszewski requested not only declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to title VII of the CRA of 1964 but monetary and compensator

he traditional harms associated with personal injury." Id. at 336. Effective November 21, 1991, Congress amended title VII to permit the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-1073. 8 Four of petitioner's EEO claims allege discriminatory conduct that potentially violates the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the ADEA. Thus, assuming arguendo, the settlement proceeds were received as a result of t

elevant information: 1989 1990 1991 Fund value at yearend $50,018 $46,185 $48,015 Policy values - 0 - 46,005 48,026 Surrender value N/A 38,026 40,446 Additional contribution available (4) 1,467 3,866 Date of report 12/27/91 12/27/91 02/12/93 On March 16, 1990, Prime forwarded to Young & Young a copy of the 1989 summary plan description required by section 102 of ERISA.

ssioner, T.C. Memo. 3 Claim No. 554 was the identification of petitioner's claim against State Farm in the class action suit. 4 As petitioner's claim arose in 1979 and the class action suit was filed in that year, the amendments to title VII made by sec. 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102- 166, 105 Stat. 1072-1074, do not apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). - 11 - 1997-156; Berst v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-137; Martinez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-12

elevant information: 1989 1990 1991 Fund value at yearend $50,018 $46,185 $48,015 Policy values - 0 - 46,005 48,026 Surrender value N/A 38,026 40,446 Additional contribution available (4) 1,467 3,866 Date of report 12/27/91 12/27/91 02/12/93 On March 16, 1990, Prime forwarded to Young & Young a copy of the 1989 summary plan description required by section 102 of ERISA.

under title VII. 4 Claim No. 162 was the identification of petitioner's claim against State Farm in the class action suit. 5 As petitioner's claim arose during 1975 and the class action suit was filed during 1979, the amendments to title VII made by sec. 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072-1074, do not apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). - 10 - We have considered all of petitioners' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.6 As w

ion and remedies that are otherwise available to plaintiffs." As discussed, supra, petitioner's claim was under title VII. 7 As petitioner's claim arose during 1975 and the class action suit was filed during 1979, the amendments to title VII made by sec. 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072-1074, do not apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 8 We note that, insofar as the State Farm payment was attributable to a claim under the Age Discrimination

In addition, the coexistence of two distinct property interests, the right to a specific copy of a computer program and the copyright underlying that computer program, should not affect the tangible or intangible character of either. In any event, there is no principled distinction between seismic data and a computer program in ter

he issues, the nature and objectives of the action, the defenses asserted, the purpose for the legal fees, the background of the litigation and "all facts pertaining to the entire controversy out of which the disputed expenses arose". Morgan's 12See sec. 102 (gross income does not include the value of property received by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance). - 9 - Estate v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1964) (cited in Boagni v. Commissioner, supra at 713); Barr v. Commissioner, T.