§109 — Improvements by lessee on lessor’s property

Respondent asserts that the 1985 agreement is purely a services agreement and that section 109 is inapplicable.

Petitioners argue that section 109 specifically removes the expenditures at issue from the definition of gross income, and that GRC's expenditures are thereby not income to petitioners.

Section 108(a)(1)(E) provides that gross income does not include amounts which would be includible as COD income if"the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness".

463 - 5 - (1997). In cases involving failure to report income, the Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal in this case would ordinarily lie, see sec. 7482(b)(1)(A), has held that the Commissioner must establish "some evidentiary foundation" linking the taxpayerto an alleged income-producing activity before the presump

109(b), 75 Stat. at 534-535 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(15)(J) (2006)). J-1 visa status in and ofitselfsupports one element ofArticle 18: that the individual be "temporarilypresent" in the country. It also may support a finding that an individual with such a visa is "studying" or "doing research". Petitioner, for example, is

463 (1997). The income is recognized for the year in which the debt is canceled. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 511, 520 (1975). Petitioner argues that although the cancellation ofdebt generally creates reportable income her canceled debt is excludable. Some "accessions to wealth that would ordinarily constitute income may be exclud

1, - 8 - 1986, under subsection (m) of section 167”.1 Section 167(m)(1), in pertinent part, provided for depreciation “based on the class life prescribed by the Secretary which reasonably reflects the anticipated useful life of that class of property to the industry or other group.” Section 167(m) (which was added to the Internal Revenue Code by section 109 of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub.

ness requirement.” The same statutory language has been in the predecessors of section 936 since the initial enactment--section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 271. The same statutory language was in the WHTC provisions--sec. 109, I.R.C. 1939. Essentially the same argument was presented to, and rejected by, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d at 526-527. In our recent opinion in MedChem (P.R.), Inc. v. Commiss

ness requirement.” The same statutory language has been in the predecessors of section 936 since the initial enactment--section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 271. The same statutory language was in the WHTC provisions--sec. 109, I.R.C. 1939. Essentially the same argument was presented to, and rejected by, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d at 526-527. In our recent opinion in MedChem (P.R.), Inc. v. Commiss

derived not only from the terms of the lease but from the surrounding circumstances. This is recognized by the respondent in his published ruling I.T. 4009, 1950-1 C.B. 13. - 18 - To the same effect, see sec. 1.61-8(c), Income Tax Regs;12 see also sec. 109. The parties have stipulated that this exception applies to allow petitioners rent expense deductions of $3,123 for 1995 and $15,616 for 1996, for otherwise capital expenditures. This is founded on the parties’ stipulation that “$18,739.00 of

Section 167(m)(l), in pertinent part, provided for depreciation “based on the class life prescribed by the Secretary which reasonably reflects the anticipated useful life of that class of property to the industry or other group.” Section 167(m) (which was added to the Internal Revenue Code by section 109 of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub.

ss requirement.” The same statutory language has been in the predecessors of section 936 since the initial enactment — section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 271. The same statutory language was in the WHTC provisions — sec. 109, I.R.C. 1939. Essentially the same argument was presented to, and rejected by, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d at 526-527. In our recent opinion in MedChem (P.R.), Inc. v. Commiss

Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938); Bardes v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1134 (1962); Spera v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-225; Weigel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-485. In this case, however, we have determined that the improvements on the land were made to property that was not leased to Holland America; i.e., the land

Ins. Code sec. 700 (West 1993) provides: §700. Admittance required; penalties; compliance; hearings; issuance of certificate (a) A person shall not transact any class of insurance business in this state without first being admitted for that class. Admission is secured by procuring a certificate of authority from the commissioner.

86). In 1980, Congress enacted the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Pub. L. 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835, which amended the separation pay recoupment statute, replacing the 75-percent recoupment with total recoupment. See Pub. L. 96-513, Title I, sec. 109(c), 94 Stat. 2870, 2871 (1980) (effective Sept. 15, 1981) (codified at 10 U.S.C. sec. 1174(h)(2)). No alternative provision was established to relieve the imbalance of recouping taxable separation pay with nontaxable disability compensation,