§113 — Repealed. Pub. L. 101–508, title XI, § 11801(a)(7), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–520]
427 cases·48 followed·24 distinguished·2 questioned·11 criticized·2 limited·4 overruled·336 cited—11% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §113
[§ 113. Repealed. Pub. L. 101–508, title XI, § 11801(a)(7), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–520] Section, act Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 35, related to mustering-out payments for members of Armed Forces. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries Savings ProvisionFor provisions that nothing in repeal by Pub. L. 101–508 be construed to affect treatment of certain transactions occurring, property acquired, or items of income, loss, deduction, or credit taken into account prior to Nov. 5, 1990, for purposes of determining liability for tax for periods ending after Nov. 5, 1990, see section 11821(b) of Pub. L. 101–508, set out as a note under section 45K of this title.
Treasury Regulations
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.113-1 Mustering-out payments for members of the Armed Forces
427 Citing Cases
N.Y. 18, 24; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602, 605-606; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N.Y. 521, 524; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159-160; Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 121. 131, 132; Story on Conflict of Laws [7th ed.], § 113; 2 Beale. Conflict of Laws, pp. 669-670; 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 856.) See also Matter of Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 51 N.Y.2d 289, 292-293 (1980) (applying the place of celebration rule to common-law marriages and
113.058 (West 2017); Ga. Code Ann. sec. 53-12-203 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 5807.02 (West 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 60, sec. 175.24(E) (2017); Unif. Trust Code sec. 702(a) (Unif. Law Comm'n 2016). Since the MTAs are explicitly labeled "trust agreements," we find the requirement ofcollateral to be a neutral factor here. - 57 - • Whether r
The Supreme Court rejected the IRS' position, concluding that the assets transferred to petitioner by the community groups represented "contributions to capital" within the meaning of § 113(a)(8)(B) and required no reduction in the depreciation basis of the properties acquired.
113.058 (West 2017); Ga. Code Ann. sec. 53-12-203 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 5807.02 (West 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 60, sec. 175.24(E) (2017); Unif. Trust Code sec. 702(a) (Unif. Law Comm'n 2016). Since the MTAs are explicitly labeled "trust agreements," we find the requirement ofcollateral to be a neutral factor here. - 57 - • Whether r
t by the regulation on which petitioner seeks to rely but instead on the economic realities attendant to the redemption of Square Leg's interest. -43- [*43] in which taxpayerbought securities and "immediately sold * * * [them] back to the seller"), § 113 T.C. 214 (1999); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2001) (reaching same result on similar facts, when purchase and sale occurred "within hours" ofeach other). All else being equal, investments ofshorter duration may
113.029(b)(1) (2014).27 Consequently, Mrs. Melasky's discretion to distribute is limited under Texas law, which looks to the meaning of "health, education, support, or maintenance" as defined under section 2041(b)(1)(A) or 2514(c)(1). Sections 20.2041-1(c)(2), Estate Tax Regs., and 25.2514-1(c)(2), Gift Tax Regs., provide that "the words 'supp
254 (1999). Still other Courts ofAppeals adhere to the view that a lack ofeconomic substance is sufficient to invalidate a transaction regardless ofthe taxpayer's subjective motivation. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). And still other Courts ofAppeals treat the objective and subjectiv
152 (1999); see also Barnum v.
113(7)(a)(1) (defining "[i]nsider" to include "a relative ofthe debtor"); (2) petitioner continued to exercise full control over the - 28 - [*28] properties, such as by collecting rent on and paying expenses for the properties, after the transfers; (3) petitioner did notdisclose the transfer ofthe properties for less than full consideration o
113 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 384 (2008); Revised Unif. Ltd. Pship. Act sec. 404 (1976), 6B U.L.A. 263 (2008). A careful reading of the regulation also supports this reasoning. That regulation doesn’t say that an election must cover all a partner’s partnership interests; it says that “the election shall apply to all partnership items for the partnersh
2d 238, 243 (N.Y. 1949).176 A guarantor’s obligation matures “when there is a default on the separate and independent contract or agreement.” Columbia Hosp. v. Hraska, 338 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (Civ. Ct. 1972); see 63 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Guaranty & Suretyship sec. 113 (1987). Although it appears that New MGM failed to make proper payment on the loans and advances under the working capital agreement, there is no indication that Credit Lyonnais ever demanded payment or treated New MGM’s failure as a default
113(a)(14), 48 Stat. 706. - 20 - subtitle, adjusted (for the period before March 1, 1913) as provided in section 1016, is less than the fair market value of the property as of March 1, 1913, then the basis for determining gain shall be such fair market value. * * *[11] Since section 167(g)12 requires the same basis used for determining gain t
113(a)(14), 48 Stat. 706. The regulations indicate that sec. 1053 and related Code sections provide a dual-basis rule similar to DEFRA sec. 177(d)(2) with respect to property held as of Mar. 1, 1913. The basis for determining gain is the cost or other basis, adjusted as provided in sec. 1016 and other applicable provisions of ch. 1 of the Code
ication that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In re Schnitz, 52 Bankr. 951, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Newton v. Wimsatt, 791 S.W. 2d 823, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); cf. 1 Restatement, supra sec. 76; Bogert, supra sec. 113, at 323-329. Thus, only the person who has title or interest in property can make it the subject matter of a trust. Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941); Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880, 881 (7th Cir. 1937), affg. 32 B.T.
ication that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In re Schnitz, 52 Bankr. 951, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Newton v. Wimsatt, 791 S.W. 2d 823, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); cf. 1 Restatement, supra sec. 76; Bogert, supra sec. 113, at 323-329. Thus, only the person who has title or interest in property can make it the subject matter of a trust. Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941); Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880, 881 (7th Cir. 1937), affg. 32 B.T.
ication that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In re Schnitz, 52 Bankr. 951, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Newton v. Wimsatt, 791 S.W. 2d 823, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); cf. 1 Restatement, supra sec. 76; Bogert, supra sec. 113, at 323-329. Thus, only the person who has title or interest in property can make it the subject matter of a trust. Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941); Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880, 881 (7th Cir. 1937), affg. 32 B.T.
of an attorney is revoked and the attorney-client relationship is terminated when the client dies. Doty v. Dexter (1886), 61 Mich. 348, 28 N.W. 123; Courser v. Jackson (1909), 159 Mich. 119, 123 N.W. 604. See generally, 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 113, p.945. Wright v. Estate of Treichel, 36 Mich. App. at 36, 193 N.W.2d at 395 (1971); see also Henritzy v. General Electric Co., 182 Mich. App. 1, 451 N.W.2d 558 (1990). For purposes of this discussion, this Court assumes that Mr. Young's author