§131 — Certain foster care payments

78 cases·7 followed·10 distinguished·1 questioned·1 criticized·2 overruled·57 cited9% support

(a)General rule

Gross income shall not include amounts received by a foster care provider during the taxable year as qualified foster care payments.

(b)Qualified foster care payment defined

For purposes of this section—

(1)In general

The term “qualified foster care payment” means any payment made pursuant to a foster care program of a State or political subdivision thereof—

(A)

which is paid by—

(i)

a State or political subdivision thereof, or

(ii)

a qualified foster care placement agency, and

(B)

which is—

(i)

paid to the foster care provider for caring for a qualified foster individual in the foster care provider’s home, or

(ii)

a difficulty of care payment.

(2)Qualified foster individual

The term “qualified foster individual” means any individual who is living in a foster family home in which such individual was placed by—

(A)

an agency of a State or political subdivision thereof, or

(B)

a qualified foster care placement agency.

(3)Qualified foster care placement agency

The term “qualified foster care placement agency” means any placement agency which is licensed or certified by—

(A)

a State or political subdivision thereof, or

(B)

an entity designated by a State or political subdivision thereof,

for the foster care program of such State or political subdivision to make foster care payments to providers of foster care.

(4)Limitation based on number of individuals over the age of 18

In the case of any foster home in which there is a qualified foster care individual who has attained age 19, foster care payments (other than difficulty of care payments) for any period to which such payments relate shall not be excludable from gross income under subsection (a) to the extent such payments are made for more than 5 such qualified foster individuals.

(c)Difficulty of care payments

For purposes of this section—

(1)Difficulty of care payments

The term “difficulty of care payments” means payments to individuals which are not described in subsection (b)(1)(B)(i), and which—

(A)

are compensation for providing the additional care of a qualified foster individual which is—

(i)

required by reason of a physical, mental, or emotional handicap of such individual with respect to which the State has determined that there is a need for additional compensation, and

(ii)

provided in the home of the foster care provider, and

(B)

are designated by the payor as compensation described in subparagraph (A).

(2)Limitation based on number of individuals

In the case of any foster home, difficulty of care payments for any period to which such payments relate shall not be excludable from gross income under subsection (a) to the extent such payments are made for more than—

(A)

10 qualified foster individuals who have not attained age 19, and

(B)

5 qualified foster individuals not described in subparagraph (A).

78 Citing Cases

We hold that they may not; (2) whether petitioners are entitled to unreimbursed employee business expenses in an amount greater than that allowed or conceded by respondent.

Stromme v. Commissioner 138 T.C. 213 · 2012

Section 131 The Strommes claim eligibility under the section 131 exclusion from income of qualified foster care payments. Under that section, petitioners may exclude the 2005 and 2006 payments if they were: • made pursuant to a foster care program of a State; • paid by a State or political subdivision thereof, or a qualified agency; and • paid to a

Michael L. Conn, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2011-166 · 2011

17 - Section 131-1 a) eprovides: SEC. 13:.1(a). General Rule.--If a determination (as defined :.n section 1313) is described in one or more of the paragraphs off section 1312 and, on the date of the deternination, correction of the effect of the error referråd to in the applicable paragraph of section 1312 is prevented by the operation of any law or rul

Pavel & Ana Dobra, Petitioner 111 T.C. No. 19 · 1998

o petitioners for care provided at the properties: Location 1992 1993 Morris Street property $30,629 $21,257 117th Avenue property 28,556 27,443 Alder Street property 8,899 21,218 134th Avenue property 14,092 10,216 Petitioners took the position that all these payments were excludable under section 131(a), and they did not report any of the payments on their returns. In the notice of deficiency, respondent did not contest (and is not here contesting) the application of section 131 to the payment

Dobra v. Commissioner 111 T.C. 339 · 1998

In the notice of deficiency, respondent did not contest (and is not here contesting) the application of section 131 to the payments received from the State of Oregon for care provided at the Morris Street property, which is petitioners’ “personal family residence”.

Benjamin B. & Dorina Micorescu, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-398 · 1998

ussion The parties agree that payments petitioners received directly from residents, or their representatives, are taxable and that payments petitioners received for residents placed in their home directly by the State of Oregon are tax exempt under section 131. The parties disagree about whether payments petitioners received from ElderPlace are exempt from tax under section 131 and the proper allocation of expenses to exempt and nonexempt income under section 265. Section 131 Foster Care Paymen

duals with developmental disabilities. The county paid sums for the care ofthese individuals. Ps reported the amounts on their tax returns but then excluded them from income. Held: Ps cannot exclude the payments received to provide foster care under I.R.C. sec. 131 because they did not live in the house in which they provided lodging for the developmentally disabled adults. ! Sd!LNED NAR f 3 2012 - 2 - Jay B. Kelly, for petitioners. Christina L. Cook, for respondent. COLVIN, ChiefJudge: In 2005

yment pursuant to a State Medicaid waiver program for the care ofPs' disabled adult children. Pursuant to Notice 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445, which classifies such payments as difficulty ofcare foster care payments not includible in gross income under I.R.C. sec. 131, Ps excluded the payment from gross income. Ps also claimed an earned income tax credit and the refundable portion ofa child tax credit. As relevant here, the credits are calculated with respect to "earned income" as defined in I.R.C.

Kingman K. & Lillian L. Babcock, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-89 · 1996

for any unreimbursed out- of-pocket expenses incurred in supporting a foster child." Rev. Rul. 77-280, 1977-2 C.B. 14, 17. There is no question that the foster care reimbursements petitioners received from Monroe County are not taxable income under section 131. In the instant case, petitioners claim their total foster care expenses exceed their reimbursement. As - 10 - mentioned, petitioners are entitled to deduct unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an organi

taxpayer claimed foreign tax credits for taxes - 79 - deemed paid under section 131(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor to section 902, with respect to a dividend from a Canadian corporation of which it owned more than 10 percent.

Mars, Inc. v. Commissioner 88 T.C. 428 · 1987
Foil v. Commissioner 92 T.C. 376 · 1989
Williams v. Commissioner 92 T.C. 920 · 1989
Wilson v. Commissioner 7 T.C. 1469 · 1946
Isenbarger v. Commissioner 12 T.C. 1064 · 1949
Duke v. Commissioner 34 T.C. 772 · 1960
Freudmann v. Commissioner 10 T.C. 775 · 1948
Induni v. Commissioner 98 T.C. 618 · 1992
Lindsey v. Commissioner 98 T.C. 672 · 1992
Cato v. Commissioner 99 T.C. 633 · 1992
Woods v. Commissioner 92 T.C. 776 · 1989
Estate of Ballard v. Commissioner 85 T.C. 300 · 1985
Crow v. Commissioner 85 T.C. 376 · 1985
Filler v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 406 · 1980
Estate of Rubinow v. Commissioner 75 T.C. 486 · 1980
Waxenberg v. Commissioner 62 T.C. 594 · 1974
Dougherty v. Commissioner 60 T.C. 917 · 1973
Carborundum Co. v. Commissioner 58 T.C. 909 · 1972
Andrew v. Commissioner 54 T.C. 239 · 1970
National Lead Co. v. Commissioner 40 T.C. 282 · 1963
Ferrer v. Commissioner 35 T.C. 617 · 1961
Marlor v. Commissioner 27 T.C. 624 · 1956
Crerar v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 702 · 1956
M/V Nonsuco, Inc. v. Commissioner 23 T.C. 361 · 1954
Estate of Lande v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 977 · 1954
Flory Milling Co. v. Commissioner 21 T.C. 432 · 1953
Marsman v. Commissioner 18 T.C. 1 · 1952
Harvey v. Commissioner 10 T.C. 183 · 1948
Texas Co. v. Commissioner 9 T.C. 78 · 1947
Lederman v. Commissioner 6 T.C. 991 · 1946
O. K. Tool Co. v. Commissioner 4 T.C. 539 · 1945
Heffelfinger v. Commissioner 5 T.C. 985 · 1945
Ossorio v. Commissioner 1 T.C. 410 · 1943
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