§1346 — Repealed. Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, § 1901(a)(148), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1788]

The treaty regarding Antarctica is still in effect, and therefore Antarctica remains a sovereignless region.3 Petitioner nevertheless contends that Martin has been overruled and superseded by the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v.

Unlike the statutes conferring tax refundjurisdiction (28 U.S.C. secs. 1346(a)(1) and 1491(a)(1)), the statute that confers "innocent spouse"jurisdiction on the Tax Court--section 6015(e)(1)(A)--provides: In addition to any otherremedyprovided by law, the individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall havejurisdiction) to determine the appropriate reliefava

§§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1998 ed. and Supp. II), applies to tortious acts or omissions occurring in Antarctica, a sovereignless region without civil tort law of its own.” The plaintiff, Mrs. Smith, brought a wrongful-death action against the United States under the FTCA for the death of her husband, Mr. Smith. At the time of his deat

§ 1346 outlines when the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have jurisdiction over a claim against the United States, including tax refund suits, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), and TEFRA partnership-level proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(e). In turn, 28 U.S.C. § 2402 limits the availability of jury trials in actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1346: “[A]ny action against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury, except that any action . . . under section 1

§ 1346(a)(1) (2018), which is not this Court, see Weber v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 348, 366–67 (2012). See generally Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C. at 130 n.5 (listing the five jurisdictional prerequisites for tax refund suits). 6 [*6] to any such amount. See, e.g., Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d at 1132 (finding a deficiency notice valid

In neither case would judicial review be exercised under the APA. 16 Petitioner contends that supervisory approval constitutes “final agency action” because it is “specific and discrete and therefore review- able under the APA.” As petitioner observes, a party challenging agency action “must . . . identify specific and discrete gover

15 [*15] § 1346(a) (2018), or the U.S.

15 [*15] § 1346(a) (2018), or the U.S.

15 [*15] § 1346(a) (2018), or the U.S.

1346(a)(1) (2018); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1958); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932). As evidenced by its July 2018 order the District Court did not find any jurisdictional defects and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Coggin’s claim for innocent spouse relief under section 6015. Although the District Court dismissed

1346(a) (2018), or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, see id. sec. 1491(a). - 25 - [*25] ride petitioner’s unambiguous designation of the remittance as a “deposit” and respondent’s repeated references to it as such.5 Petitioner likewise errs in relying on the parties’ below-the-line stipulation that “interest will be credited or paid * * * on

1346(a)(1) (2018) (conferringjurisdiction on U.S. District Court over suits for refunds offederal -39- taxes or federal tax penalties); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1491(a)(1) (2018) (conferring jurisdiction on U.S. Court ofFederal Claims over claims against the federal government under federal statutes). The trust-fund-recoverypenalty can be contested thr

Alternatively, ifthe IRS commences collection action against him, he can seek review in this Court following a CDP hearing. M sec. 6330(d)(1); Gardner v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. __ (Aug. 26, 2015); Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 54, 58 (2008). - 12 - [*12] II. Interlocutory Appeal Section 7482(a)(2)(A) permits this Court to ce

Alternatively, ifthe IRS commences collection action against him, he can seek review in this Court following a CDP hearing. M sec. 6330(d)(1); Gardner v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. __ (Aug. 26, 2015); Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 54, 58 (2008). - 12 - [*12] II. Interlocutory Appeal Section 7482(a)(2)(A) permits this Court to ce

Alternatively, ifthe IRS commences collection action against him, he can seek review in this Court following a CDP hearing. M sec. 6330(d)(1); Gardner v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. __ (Aug. 26, 2015); Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 54, 58 (2008). - 12 - [*12] II. Interlocutory Appeal Section 7482(a)(2)(A) permits this Court to ce

596, 602 (1990), "unless a claim for refund ofa tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless ofwhether the tax is alleged to have been 'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or 'wrongfully collected,' §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court." - 20 - from various quarters, we find this explanation insufficientto establish thattheir motions were filed within a reasonable time as required by paragraph (c).'° For the foregoing reasons, we will

596, 602 (1990), "unless a claim for refund ofa tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless ofwhether the tax is alleged to have been 'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or 'wrongfully collected,' §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court." - 20 - from various quarters, we find this explanation insufficientto establish thattheir motions were filed within a reasonable time as required by paragraph (c).'° For the foregoing reasons, we will

1346 ("The district courts shall have originaljurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court ofFederal _ 9 _ Claims, of* * * [a]ny other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount".). In sum, we conclude that section 7623(b)(5)(B) is not ajurisdictional requirement.3 D. Whether Section 7623(b) Is a

596, 602 (1990), “unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been ‘erroneously,’ ‘illegally,’ or ‘wrongfully collected,’ §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court.” As explained supra note 9, the passage of time can prove fatal to relief even if taxes were erroneously collected.

1346(a)(1) (2006)]·or in the United States Court ofFederal Claims [see id. secs. 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1)]." Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 4 (alterations in original). - 11 - [*11] To the extent Mr. Richards seeks a refund ofthe overpayment applied to pay his child-support debt, we cannot grant him relief. V. Failure to respond The foregoing d

In contrast, the Tax Court's principaljurisdiction is over prepayment "deficiency cases", pursuant to section 6213(a). - 33 - [*33] With regard to the Tax Court's overpaymentjurisdiction, section 6512(b)(1) provides: [I]fthe Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of

1346(a)(1) (2006). The 30-day petitioning period provided in section 6330(d)(1) is thus the exclusive, statutorily prescribed petitioning period for Tax Court review ofa "determination" concerning an "underlying tax liability" as those terms are employed in section 6330. Moreover, petitioner's contention that the adjustments made in the notice

See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960). However, under a doctrine first enunciated in Steele v. United States, 280 F.2d 89, 91 (8th Cir. 1960), a well-established exception to this full-paymentrule exists with respect to "divisible taxes." The employment tax for which an employer is liable under subtitle C is a "divi

1346; Black, 625 F.3d at 388. Thejury found petitioner guilty offraud with respect to the Forum payment and the APC payment. The general verdict, however, did not distinguish between the distinct theories offraud alleged in the superseding information. It was therefore unclear whether thejury found petitioner guilty ofpecuniary fraud, honest s

1346(a)(2) (2006)). - 76 - payments.39 This due process argument stumbles at the starting block, fortwo related reasons. First, these allegations concern supposed defects in priorjudicial proceedings, which were (or could have been) reviewed on appeal fromthose proceedings 4° The Tax Court does not sit as a court ofreview ofthe decisions of o

1346(a)(2) (2006)). - 76 - payments.39 This due process argument stumbles at the starting block, fortwo related reasons. First, these allegations concern supposed defects in priorjudicial proceedings, which were (or could have been) reviewed on appeal fromthose proceedings 4° The Tax Court does not sit as a court ofreview ofthe decisions of o

1346(a) (1) (2006), or with the Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1491(a) (1) (2006). In contrast, consistent with section 6601(e), the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to redetermine statutory interest if a taxpayer had properly invoked the Court's overpayment jurisdiction pursuant to section 6512(b) (2). See Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T

1346(a) (2006) provides: (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: (1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or.collected, or any penalty claimed to have been co

1346(a)(2) (2006), or with the Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1491(a)(1) (2006). In contrast, consistent with section 6601(e), the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to redetermine statutory interest if a taxpayer had properly invoked the Court’s overpayment jurisdiction pursuant to section 6512(b)(2). See Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.

1346(a) (1) (2006). The devil, of course, is in the details, and sections 6221- 6233, as originally enacted, raised many difficult interpretive issues that occupied this Court and others for years after TEFRA was enacted. For example, it became apparent in practice that the litigation procedures as originally enacted did not adequately address

1346(a)(1) (2006). The devil, of course, is in the details, and sections 6221-6233, as originally enacted, raised many difficult interpretive issues that occupied this Court and others for years after TEFRA was enacted. For example, it became apparent in practice that the litigation procedures as originally enacted did not adequately address h

.section 1346(a)(1) or (2), either' as a suit to enforce . a. contract or as a refund; ,suit. . - ~16 - III . The parties have not settled this case, because they failed to reach agreement as to a material term . For a further reason, both motions for entry of decision must be denied : The parties failed to effect a valid settlement agreement . A s

section 1346(a)(1) in the appropriate U .S . District Court) . We are similarly unpersuaded by petitioner's argument that his bankruptcy discharge precluded respondent from collection action . Because respondent's collection action is based, in part, upon respondent's interpretation and application of bankruptcy law, we review this interpretation a

In addition, we would presumably have jurisdiction to redetermine a liability challenge asserted by petitioners in a collection due process hearing . See sec . 6330(d)(1) ; Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T .C . 54, 58 n .4 (2008) ; Callahan v . Commissioner , 130 T .C . 44, 48 (2008) ; D & M Painting Corp . v. United States , 103

In addition, we would presumably have jurisdiction to redetermine a liability challenge asserted by petitioners in a collection due process hearing. See sec. 6330(d)(1); Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 54, 58 n.4 (2008); Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 44, 48 (2008); D & M Painting Corp. v. United States, 103 AFTR 2d 2009-15

1346(a) (2000). In addition, any claim for a refund or credit must be made within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires later. Sec. 6511(a). No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the period of limitations for filing such a claim expires. Sec. 6511(b)

1346(a) (2000). In addition, any claim for a refund or credit must be made within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires later. Sec. 6511(a). No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the period of limitations for filing such a claim expires. Sec. 6511(b)

§ 1346, it feels it is appropriate to dismiss the action without prejudice, subject to the plaintiff’s right to refile pending the outcome of related tax court litigation, now awaiting resolution in excess of six years. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: (1) that defendant’s motion to dismiss is SUSTAINED, (2) that the plaintiff’s complaint is D

1346(a)(2) (1994)($10,000 being the jurisdictional limit on Tucker Act claims in the District Court40). The Government argued that sovereign immunity 40There is no such monetary limitation on contractual claims against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1491 (1994), and the District Court in United States (continu

1402(a) (1994) provides: (a) Any civil action in a district court against the United States under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in (continued...) - 57 - for a corporate plaintiff is the judicial district in which is located its principal place of business or principal office or agency.

1402(al (1994) provides: (a) Any civil action in a district court against the United States under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only: : S (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides; (2) In the case of a civil action by a corporation under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of section 1346, in the judicial district in which is located the principal place of business or principal offi

1346(a)(2) (1994) ($10,000 being the jurisdictional limit on Tucker Act claims in the District Court). The Government argued that sovereign immunity barred any affirmative recovery by the defendant. The District Court agreed with the defendant and allowed an affirmative recovery to the extent of $10,000. However, it denied other, permissive co