§1491 — [§§1491, 1492. Repealed. Pub. L. 105–34, title XI, §1131(a), Aug. 5, 1997, 111 Stat. 978 ] Section 1491, acts Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 365 ; Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. 94–455, title X, §1015(a), 90 Stat. 1617 ; Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95–600, title VII, §701(u)(14)(A), 92 Stat. 2919 ; Aug. 20, 1996, Pub. L. 104–188, title I, §1907(b)(1), 110 Stat. 1916 , imposed tax on transfers to avoid income tax.

§ 1491(a).9 To implement the foregoing, Decisions will be entered in accordance with respondent’s com- putations. 9 If in a subsequent refund action petitioners are denied relief under section 1341, an equitable recoupment claim may then become available (so long as they meet the relevant requirements). See Estate of Stein, 37 T.C. at 956 n.10 (stating that “District Courts have permitted equitable recoupment” if section 1341 does not apply).

We express no opinion on the correctness of this determination.

7623 has been confined to contractual claims brought under 'the Tucker Act,(28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a).9 To implement the foregoing, Decisions will be entered in accordance with respondent’s com- putations. 9 If in a subsequent refund action petitioners are denied relief under section 1341, an equitable recoupment claim may then become available (so long as they meet the relevant requirements). See Estate of Stein, 37 T.C. at 956 n.10 (sta

§ 1491(a).9 To implement the foregoing, Decisions will be entered in accordance with respondent’s com- putations. 9 If in a subsequent refund action petitioners are denied relief under section 1341, an equitable recoupment claim may then become available (so long as they meet the relevant requirements). See Estate of Stein, 37 T.C. at 956 n.10 (sta

- 25 - [*25] ride petitioner’s unambiguous designation of the remittance as a “deposit” and respondent’s repeated references to it as such.5 Petitioner likewise errs in relying on the parties’ below-the-line stipulation that “interest will be credited or paid * * * on any overpayment in tax due to petitioner.” The parties also stipul

1491(a)(1) (2018) (conferring jurisdiction on U.S. Court ofFederal Claims over claims against the federal government under federal statutes). The trust-fund-recoverypenalty can be contested through this refund-suit procedure. For example, ifthe Office ofAppeals considers and rejects a person's protest in response to a Letter 1153, the person c

r initiated two separate actions requesting relief from her 1995 Federal income tax liability pursuant to section 6015 (innocent 2The fourth case pertained to respondent's collection efforts for petitioner and Mr. Angle's excise tax liability under sec. 1491 for 1995. On August 13, 2012, petitioner filed a petition in this Court seeking review ofrespondent's collection activities, which was assigned docket No. 20240-12L. On September 12, 2013, the Court entered a stipulated decision setting fort

r initiated two separate actions requesting relief from her 1995 Federal income tax liability pursuant to section 6015 (innocent 2The fourth case pertained to respondent's collection efforts for petitioner and Mr. Angle's excise tax liability under sec. 1491 for 1995. On August 13, 2012, petitioner filed a petition in this Court seeking review ofrespondent's collection activities, which was assigned docket No. 20240-12L. On September 12, 2013, the Court entered a stipulated decision setting fort

e Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and.Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure. 2The fourth case pertained to respondent's collection efforts for petitioner and Mr. Angle's excise tax liabilityunder sec. 1491 for 1995. On August 13, 2012, petitioner filed a petition in this Court seeking review ofrespondent's collection activities, which was assigned docketNo. 20240-12L. On September 12, 2013, the Court entered a stipulated decision setting forth

e Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and.Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure. 2The fourth case pertained to respondent's collection efforts for petitioner and Mr. Angle's excise tax liabilityunder sec. 1491 for 1995. On August 13, 2012, petitioner filed a petition in this Court seeking review ofrespondent's collection activities, which was assigned docketNo. 20240-12L. On September 12, 2013, the Court entered a stipulated decision setting forth

1491(a)(1) (2006)) or in Federal District Court (under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(a)(2) (2006)). - 76 - payments.39 This due process argument stumbles at the starting block, fortwo related reasons. First, these allegations concern supposed defects in priorjudicial proceedings, which were (or could have been) reviewed on appeal fromthose proceedings

1491.30(f) (2003).1° Both GOCO and the Gunnison ioTit. 7 C.F.R. sec. 1491.30(e) (2012) provides the current reimbursement requirement. - 21 - County Land Preservation Board impose similar requirements on easements funded by their grants. Colorado Open (ands, and·through it petitioners, was essentially in a "take it or leave it" situation. IfC

1491(a)(1) (2006)) or in Federal District Court (under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(a)(2) (2006)). - 76 - payments.39 This due process argument stumbles at the starting block, fortwo related reasons. First, these allegations concern supposed defects in priorjudicial proceedings, which were (or could have been) reviewed on appeal fromthose proceedings

1491(a) (1) (2006). In contrast, consistent with section 6601(e), the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to redetermine statutory interest if a taxpayer had properly invoked the Court's overpayment jurisdiction pursuant to section 6512(b) (2). See Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 548, 554-555 (1991). In 1988 the enactment of section 7481(c) in the

1491(a)(1) (2006). In contrast, consistent with section 6601(e), the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to redetermine statutory interest if a taxpayer had properly invoked the Court’s overpayment jurisdiction pursuant to section 6512(b)(2). See Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 548, 554-555 (1991). In 1988 the enactment of section 7481(c) in the T

Respondent determined “that due to the transfer of appreciated stock of HouTex Metals, Inc., in 1996, a 35% excise tax is applicable on the value of the stock transferred reduced by the present value of the annuity received that is associated with this transfer for the 1996 taxable year in accordance with Internal Revenue Code Section 1491.” We do not have jurisdiction over the excise tax imposed by sec.

Respondent determined “that due to the transfer of appreciated stock of HouTex Metals, Inc., in 1996, a 35% excise tax is applicable on the value of the stock transferred reduced by the present value of the annuity received that is associated with this transfer for the 1996 taxable year in accordance with Internal Revenue Code Section 1491.” We do not have jurisdiction over the excise tax imposed by sec.

§ 1491 (1970), judicial review may not be predicated on the Administrative Procedure Act.”), affd. 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975); Poirier v. Commissioner, 299 F. Supp. 465, 466 (D.C. La. 1969) (rejecting taxpayer’s claim that review to restrain enforcement of IRS summons is governed by APA sections 703 and 704 because sections 7602 and 7604 and Reis

§ 1491 (1970), judicial review may not be predicated on the Administrative Procedure Act.”), affd. 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975); Poirier v. Commissioner, 299 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. La. 1969) (rejecting taxpayer’s claim that review to restrain enforcement of irs summons is governed by APA sections 703 and 704 because sections 7602 and 7604 and Reis

Petitioner therefore received his discharge of indebtedness income from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, an instrumentality of the United States. See An Act to provide for the appointment of a commissioner of Indian affairs, and for other purposes, July 9, 1832, ch. 174, 4 Stat. 564 (1846), R.S. sec. 462,

Petitioner therefore received his discharge of indebtedness income from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, an instrumentality of the United States. See An Act to provide for the appointment of a commissioner of Indian affairs, and for other purposes, July 9, 1832, ch. 174, 4 Stat. 564 (1846), R.S. sec. 462,

1491 (1994), and the District Court in United States (continued...) - 95 - barred any affirmative recovery by the defendant. The District Court agreed with the defendant and allowed an affirmative recovery to the extent of $10,000. However, it denied other, permissive counterclaims sought to be brought by the logger's surety, but only on the

1491 (1994), and the District Court in United States v. Timber Access Indus. Co., 54 F.R.D. 36 (D. Or. 1971), left open the possibility that the defendant logger could recover the balance of its counterclaim in the Court of Claims (as it was then called), 54 F.R.D. at 38-39. The District Court held that allowing the $10,000 recovery in the Dis