§17

159 cases·11 followed·12 distinguished·1 criticized·10 overruled·125 cited7% support

Statute text not available for this section.

159 Citing Cases

Solicitor Opinions are "binding, when signed, on all other Departmental offices and officials and * * * may be overruled or modified only by the Solicitor, the - 43 - Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary." M Ofcourse, these opinions are not binding on us, but we find them persuasive insight into how DOI interprets the statutes it is tasked with executing.

Solicitor Opinions are "binding, when signed, on all other Departmental offices and officials and * * * may be overruled or modified only by the Solicitor, the - 43 - Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary." M Ofcourse, these opinions are not binding on us, but we find them persuasive insight into how DOI interprets the statutes it is tasked with executing.

OVERRULED Upen G. & Avanti D. Patel, Petitioner 138 T.C. No. 23 · 2012

2012), we held that the public benefit standard applied in Scharfhas been superseded by the quid pro quo standard establishedby the Supreme Court in United States v.

Petitioner argues that because its DPAD was computed as part ofan EAG, section 1.199-7(c)(2), Income Tax Regs., allows petitioner to have NOLs and to carry them back and forward in accordance with - 50 - section 172.33 Respondent argues that only a member ofan EAG which is allocated some or all ofthe EAG's DPAD may take the DPAD into account in its own NOL computation. The regulation does not apply, respondent argues, to an EAG as a whole.

DIST. John Crimi, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-51 · 2013

170(f)(8)(B); Schrimsher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-71, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329, 1330 (2011). We have held that the doctrine ofsubstantial compliance does not apply to excuse a failure to comply with the requirements of section 170(f)(8)(B) because they are more than merelyprocedural requirements but rather go to the heart ofthe statute's purpose.

DIST. Uniband, Inc., Petitioner 140 T.C. No. 13 · 2013

tion 17 corporation may be primarily commercial * * * [and] federal cases involving tribal sovereign immunityjustify a parallel treatment for federal income "(...continued) Even so, since the regulation effectively established the position in the ruling, and since we hold that Uniband is materially distinguishable from a section 17 corporation, the same analysis suffices for both its pre- and post-regulation years.

section 523(a)(1)(C).17 See Grothues v. IRS, 226 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 2000) (taxpayer estopped from challenging 11 U.S.C. section 17Petitioners make the point that Mr. Bussell was not convicted of tax evasion or any other crime, and therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to the Estate of John Bussell.

FOLLOWED John DiTullio, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2025-120 · 2025

As discussed below, we hold that petitioner remained liable to make the payment in the event of his ex- wife’s death.

Patel v. Commissioner 138 T.C. 395 · 2012

used as a residence.” Pardoe & Graham Real Estate, Inc. v. Schulz Homes Corp., 525 S.E.2d 284, 286 (Va. 2000) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1480 (7th ed. 1999), and 1 Raleigh Colston Minor & Frederick Deane Goodwin Ribble, The Law of Real Property sec. 17 (2d ed. 1928)). “The term “hereditament,’ in general, signifies any interest in real property that may be inherited by an owner’s heirs.” Pardoe, 525 S.E.2d at 286 (citing 1 Minor & Ribble, supra sec. 17, and Caroline N. Brown, 4 Corbin on Co

Susan Crimi, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-51 · 2013

t is acceptable for filing with the coùnty recording officer). See N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 40:55D-50a. Once preliminary approval is obtained, final approval ofthe subdivision plan should be a relati ely simple procedure. See 36 N.J. Prac. Land Use Law, sec. 17.13 (3d ed. 2012) (available on Westlaw). Applying the foregoing to these cases, we are persuaded that approvals could be secured or the subject property with a price tag. The completeness review letter deta led about 65 defects with the Irond

John C. Crimi, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-51 · 2013

t is acceptable for filing with the coùnty recording officer). See N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 40:55D-50a. Once preliminary approval is obtained, final approval ofthe subdivision plan should be a relati ely simple procedure. See 36 N.J. Prac. Land Use Law, sec. 17.13 (3d ed. 2012) (available on Westlaw). Applying the foregoing to these cases, we are persuaded that approvals could be secured or the subject property with a price tag. The completeness review letter deta led about 65 defects with the Irond

Uniband, Inc. v. Commissioner 140 T.C. 230 · 2013

236 The section 17 corporation . 237 The tax returns . 239 Indian employment credit . 240 OPINION . 241 I.Federal income tax exemption issue . 241 A. Indian tribes are not subject to Federal income tax. 241 1. TMBCI has no inherent immunity from Federal taxes. 241 2. No treaty exempts TMBCI from Federal income tax. 242 a. An exemption must be “definitely e

Norman L. & Catherine J. Forste, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2003-103 · 2003

17For purposes of determining whether the underlying causes of action involve tort or tort type rights, we look to State law. Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1999); Bland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-98. To that end, California recognizes tort causes of action for both intentional infliction of emotional distress, se

convert portions of the debt into common stock of the company, and [the] number of shares issued upon conversion was determined using a conversion price that was the lower of (i) a fixed price or (ii) a discount to an average market price computed over a specific period preceding the installment date.” In support of that finding, petitioners cite section 17(i) of the debenture.

17 Petitioner’s strengthened financial ability to disperse significant sums of cash by the years at issue is evidenced by: (1) petitioner’s 2010 yearend stockholder equity value increasing nearly sixfold by 2016 and its 2010 cash balance increasing nearly fifteenfold by 2016; (2) the actual outlay of cash to Mr. Hood in the form of purported b

ded herein in paragraph 11, and except as to personal subject matter jurisdiction, which Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the final judgment in the form attached hereto (the “Final Judgment”) and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things: a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C.

Section 17.2 ofthe Easement Deed, captioned "Liberal Con- struction," states that "this Easement shall be liberally construed in favor ofthe grant * * * to qualify as a qualified conservation contribution." We conclude that section 9.1 ofthe Easement Deed embodies a "condition subsequent" saving clause because it purports to countermand the plain t

ten consent ofboth spouses."); id. sec. 46:3-17.5 ("Upon the death ofeither spouse, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to have owned the whole ofall rights under the original instrument of purchase, conveyance, or transfer from its inception."); 4 sec. 17B:24-6(a) (West 2006) ("Ifa policy ofinsurance * * * is affected by any person on his own life * * * in favor ofa person other than himself, * * * then the lawful beneficiary * * * shall be entitled to its proceeds and avails against the credi

ort.47 Even more disconcerting is that, in 46(...continued) However, TPZ zoning is extremely restrictive and would permit only a mobile home or caretaker single family residence on High Meadows. See Cal. Gov. Code sec. 51282.5; El Dorado County Code sec. 17.44.050. 47Mr. Harrison apparently saw Mr. Clark's criticism (or was at least provided with information as to some ofMr. Clark's concerns) because, in his subsequent work product, he eliminated the two comparable sales that Mr. Clark had criti

In the light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address respondent's alternative contention thë.t petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements of section 17C (f) (11).

The Charter Bus Rental Section 170(a) (1) allows a deduction for a charitable contribution as defined in section 17·0 (c) if verified under applicable regulations.

Thomas F. & Kathryn H. Chambers, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2011-114 · 2011

17-8-101 to -117 (2009). In addition, Arkansas and Florida have recognized the common law corporation sole. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Linn, 432 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1968); Reid v. Barry, 112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927). 'Utah Code Ann. sec. 16-7-16 (LexisNexis 2009) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a corporation sole

Hal Hollingsworth, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2010-262 · 2010

17.0(f) (8) (B). A written acknowledgment is contemporaneous if it is obtained by the taxpayer on or before the earlier of: (1) The date the taxpayer files the original return for the taxable year of the contribution or (2) the due date (including extensions) for filing the original return for the year. Sec. 170(f) (8) (C); sec. 1.170A-13(f) (

The items at issue giving rise to the understatement in this case are as follows : (1) disallowance of a deduction claimed under section 17:9 for a Cadillac Escalade which petitioner knew was purchased and placed in service in 2002 ; (2) disallowance of business expenses which were deducted twice ; (3) disallowance .of unsubstantiated advance costs claimed to have been paid on behalf of clients ; and (4) an unreported capital gain from the sale of real property titled in the

179(d) for the definition of the term "section 17 .9 property" .

David A. Hughes, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2008-249 · 2008

Oft Schedule C he deducted, among other things, $6,410 for exp nses elated to pension and profit- sharing plans and $2,888 for depre iation and section 17 9 expenses .

87-834, section 17, 76 Stat . 1045-. Before the 19,62 Act, non-tax-exempt cooperatives were taxed as corporations . See Ravenscroft, "The Proposed Limitation on the Patronage Dividend Deduction", 12 Tax L . Rev . 151, 152 (1957) . However, under administrative practices, judicially affirmed, they could exclude from gross income the amounts allocated to pat

87-834, section 17, 76 Stat. 1045. Before the 1962 Act, non-tax-exempt cooperatives were taxed as corporations. See Ravenscroft, “The Proposed Limitation on the Patronage Dividend Deduction”, 12 Tax L. Rev. 151, 152 (1957). However, under administrative practices, judicially affirmed, they could exclude from gross income the amounts allocated to patrons as

The recourse notes signed by LCL were not personally guaranteed by LCL’s members, and applicable State (Wyoming) law provides that the members of a limited liability company are not personally liable for the debts, obligations, or liabilities of the company.

This Agreement may be amended by the Manager at any time in its sole discretion, provided that (a) any amendment to Section 9(d), Section 11, the first sentence of Section 13, Section 14, the proviso to the first sentence of Section 15, Section 17, Section 18, Section 20, Section 24, this Section 29 or Section 34 hereof shall not be effective without the Initial Member’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and (b) any amendment which materially and adversely a

Michael K. Berry, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2005-91 · 2005

17:247 (2004 ed.). Accordingly, even if petitioner had not been awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of the children, he would be entitled to immediate custody upon Carmen’s death. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 9:2-5 (West 2002) (upon the death of the custodial parent, the care and custody of the children “shall not revert to the surv

17-15-113 (LexisNexis 2005). The agreements of LCL also contain no provisions obligating its members to pay LCL’s debts, obligations, or expenses. Because LCL’s members did -54- not assume personal liability for the notes, the members are not at risk under section 465(b)(1)(B) and (2)(A) with respect to LCL’s recourse obligations. Cf. Emersha

Tribune Co. v. Commissioner 125 T.C. 110 · 2005

This Agreement may be amended by the Manager at any time in its sole discretion, provided that (a) any amendment to Section 9(d), Section 11, the first sentence of Section 13, Section 14, the proviso to the first sentence of Section 15, Section 17, Section 18, Section 20, Section 24, this Section 29 or Section 34 hereof shall not be effective without the Initial Member’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and (b) any amendment which materially and adversely a

Neal Swanson, Petitioner 121 T.C. No. 7 · 2003

However, the debtor argues that literally a return was filed (by the government) and that the statutory language of § 523(a)(1)(B) which eliminated the specific reference in § 17(a) of the former Bankruptcy Act which specified nondischargeability: “in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law” (emphasis supplied) calls for a different interpretation than under the former law.

rty. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163- 164 (1990) (habeas corpus proceedings); Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1184-1185 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir. 1999)); 4 Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice sec. 17.25[2], at 17-105 (3d ed. 1997). Normally, a next friend will be a family member such as spouse, parent, or - 8 - sibling. T.W. & M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1997); Eiges v. Commissioner, supra at 67. As previously discussed, t

17-16-627(b) (Michie 1999). Authorized restrictions include those that (1) serve a reasonable purpose and (2) are not against public policy. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. sec. 17-16-627(c)(iii) (Michie 1999); Hunter Ranch Inc. v. Hunter, 153 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 1998), 1998 W.L. 380556 (unpublished opinion). Respondent equates this requirement with the b

Jean D. True, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2001-167 · 2001

17-16-627(b) (Michie 1999). Authorized restrictions include those that (1) serve a reasonable purpose and (2) are not against public policy. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. sec. 17-16-627(c)(iii) (Michie 1999); Hunter Ranch Inc. v. Hunter, 153 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 1998), 1998 W.L. 380556 (unpublished opinion). Respondent equates this requirement with the b

Steven H. Toushin, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1999-171 · 1999

d to report income. [Citations omitted.] 12 Although the term "cash" is often intended to include purchases made with checks, the cash method, as defined by the government, does not include checks as a type of cash. * * * See also 1 Fink, Tax Fraud, sec. 17.03[7], at 17-30 (1998). Utilizing this method, respondent determined that petitioner had unreported income of $59,411, $57,656, and $43,857 in 1980, 1981, and 1982, respectively. B. Petitioner's Cash On Hand as of January 1, 1980 Petitioner d

17.50 (Vernon 1989), against Lindsey. - 7 - Subsequently, the fourth amended petition alleged that “plaintiffs”--that is, both petitioner and CRI--suffered mental anguish, torment, and heartache. Lindsey filed a motion to strike the fourth amended petition because it was filed 22 days late under the trial court's docket control order. The tri

Salvatore J. & Shirley E. D'Amico, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1999-374 · 1999

17 of the settlement agreement, Mr. D’Amico agreed, as a further material inducement to the Company to enter into the settlement agreement, to indemnify and hold the Company and its affiliates harmless from and against any and all loss, cost, damages, or expenses that they incurred arising out of a breach of the settlement agreement or the fac

Hill Rd., Grand Blanc 154,000 329,000 Vacant Land S/E 1/4 of section 17, Porter Rd., Grand Blanc $45,000 Holly Rd., Holly Township 190,000 Section 11, Hill Rd.--West of NBD Bank, Grand Blanc 45,000 S/E corner of Reid Rd.

Cash Available for Distribution, as defined in Section 17, when distributed from time to time, shall be distributed to the Partners as follows: 5.1.1.

Donald L. & Mary K. Chiappetti, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-183 · 1996

tached to, that contract.) The covenant not to compete contained in section 7 of the purchase contract was valid and enforceable. The purchase contract contained the following language with respect to an option to repurchase (option to repurchase): Section 17. Option to Repurchase. Seller, not being entirely sure that he wants to retire from the practice of dentistry, shall have the option of repur- chasing the assets described in Section 1, for an amount equal to $135,000 minus any liens or enc

17- 402 (1992 Supp.). However, the Delaware limited partnership provisions permit the limited partnership to continue after a 9Ne note that on Mar. 2, 1987, after Churchill and Excelsior lost their corporate charters, the Secretary promulgated regulations which provided that a TMP's designation terminates upon "The liquidation or dissolution o

17- 402 (1992 Supp.). However, the Delaware limited partnership provisions permit the limited partnership to continue after a ÑNe note that on Mar. 2, 1987, after Churchill and Excelsior lost their corporate charters, the Secretary promulgated regulations which provided that a TMP's designation terminates upon "The liquidation or dissolution o

Big Sandy Rancheria Enters. v. Rob Bonta 1 F.4th 710 · Cir.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd. 297 F.3d 127 · Cir.
Securities And Exchange Commission v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd. 297 F.3d 127 · Cir.
Pitman Farms v. Kuehl Poultry, LLC 48 F.4th 866 · Cir.
Department of Texas v. Texas Lottery Commission 698 F.3d 239 · Cir.
Alphonso v. Commissioner 708 F.3d 344 · Cir.
Lastarmco, Inc. v. Commissioner 79 T.C. 810 · 1982
Proesel v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 992 · 1981
Graham v. Commissioner 75 T.C. 389 · 1980
In Re: Michael Calabrese, Jr. v. 689 F.3d 312 · Cir.
Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner 123 T.C. 135 · 2004
Moody v. Commissioner 95 T.C. 655 · 1990
Tanner v. Commissioner 64 T.C. 415 · 1975
Godart v. Commissioner 51 T.C. 937 · 1969
Hamar v. Commissioner 42 T.C. 867 · 1964
Estate of Gale v. Commissioner 35 T.C. 215 · 1960
United States v. Graham 598 F.3d 930 · Cir.
United States v. Amico · Cir.
Malouf v. SEC. & Exch. Comm'n 933 F.3d 1248 · Cir.
Richard George Barry, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2010-57 · 2010
Carmelo Montalbano, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2007-349 · 2007
Swanson v. Commissioner 121 T.C. 111 · 2003
O'Neal v. Commissioner 102 T.C. 666 · 1994
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner 96 T.C. 226 · 1991
Estate of Watson v. Commissioner 94 T.C. 262 · 1990
Gantner v. Commissioner 91 T.C. 713 · 1988
Viehweg v. Commissioner 90 T.C. 1248 · 1988
Herman v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 120 · 1985
Schuster v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 764 · 1985
Boyer v. Commissioner 79 T.C. 143 · 1982
Pastore v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 759 · 1982
Blakey v. Commissioner 78 T.C. 963 · 1982
Loewen v. Commissioner 76 T.C. 90 · 1981
Stemkowski v. Commissioner 76 T.C. 252 · 1981
Perrett v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 111 · 1980
Sharpe v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 19 · 1977
Izen v. Commissioner 64 T.C. 919 · 1975
Estate of Horvath v. Commissioner 59 T.C. 551 · 1973
Mysse v. Commissioner 57 T.C. 680 · 1972
King v. Commissioner 51 T.C. 851 · 1969
Kaplan v. Commissioner 43 T.C. 580 · 1965
Counts v. Commissioner 42 T.C. 755 · 1964
Estate of Kinney v. Commissioner 39 T.C. 728 · 1963
Estate of Rice v. Commissioner 41 T.C. 344 · 1963
Dalton v. Commissioner 34 T.C. 879 · 1960
Estate of Doyle v. Commissioner 32 T.C. 1209 · 1959
Estate of Dula v. Commissioner 23 T.C. 646 · 1955
Evans v. Commissioner 19 T.C. 1102 · 1953
Estate of Butler v. Commissioner 18 T.C. 914 · 1952
Drexel Biddle v. Commissioner 11 T.C. 868 · 1948
Estate of Igoe v. Commissioner 6 T.C. 639 · 1946
Shelley v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 62 · 1943
Taylor v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 267 · 1943
Floyd v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 744 · 1943
Occidental Petroleum v. Wells Fargo 117 F.4th 628 · Cir.
Mid-New York Environ. v. Dragon Springs · Cir.
Sirius Solutions v. CIR · Cir.
United States v. Gary Mikulich 732 F.3d 692 · Cir.
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Nicholson 536 F.3d 730 · Cir.
Nathel v. Commissioner 615 F.3d 83 · Cir.
United States v. Tamika Riley 621 F.3d 312 · Cir.
United States v. Meserve 271 F.3d 314 · Cir.
United States v. Griffin 524 F.3d 71 · Cir.
United States v. Rossahn Black 739 F.3d 931 · Cir.
United States v. Gregory Boyd 773 F.3d 637 · Cir.
Knudsen v. Commissioner 793 F.3d 1030 · Cir.
Catholic Health Care System v. Burwell 796 F.3d 207 · Cir.
United States v. Cristobal · Cir.
United States v. Frontone 383 F.3d 646 · Cir.
Freedom Religion v. Nicholson, R. James · Cir.
In Re Pillowtex · Cir.
In Re: Schaefer Salt · Cir.
Joseph P. McGraw v. CIR · Cir.
Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist · Cir.
Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist · Cir.
Maimonides Medical Center v. United States · Cir.
United States v. Marinello · Cir.
United States v. Hansen 929 F.3d 1238 · Cir.
Steven Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP · Cir.
Steven Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP 943 F.3d 328 · Cir.
Gonnella v. Securities and Exchange Commission 954 F.3d 536 · Cir.
United States v. Rabhan 540 F.3d 344 · Cir.
United States v. E.R.R. 35 F.4th 405 · Cir.
Garrett Kajmowicz v. Matthew Whitaker 42 F.4th 138 · Cir.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co. 285 F.3d 415 · Cir.
Chao v. Hall Holding Company, Inc. 285 F.3d 415 · Cir.
United States v. Luis Cristobal 293 F.3d 134 · Cir.
In Re: Pillowtex, Inc. Duke Energy Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corporation 349 F.3d 711 · Cir.
Ernst v. Roberts 379 F.3d 373 · Cir.
United States of America, Creditor-Appellant v. John F. Frontone and Kathleen M. Frontone, Debtors-Appellees 383 F.3d 656 · Cir.
Joseph P. McGraw v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 384 F.3d 965 · Cir.
City Wide Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner 709 F.3d 102 · Cir.
United States v. Marinello 839 F.3d 209 · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. The Estate of John Pukke · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. Peter Baker · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. John Usher · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. Global Property Alliance, Inc. · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. Andris Pukke · Cir.
Federal Trade Commission v. Andris Pukke 53 F.4th 80 · Cir.

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