§1843

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, a divorce or separation instrument executed after December 31, 1984, need not expressly provide for the termination of payments upon the death of the payee spouse in order for such payments to be treated as alimony, provided that such termination is implied under State law. Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421, 422. Thus, we m

1843(b), 100 Stat. at 2853. Respondent argues that petitioner's payment of$45,000 to Ms. Filippini does not meet the requirements ofsection 71(b) and therefore he cannot deduct it as alimony. In the notice ofdeficiency respondent noted that a lump-sum payment under Florida law creates a vested right in the payee which would not end upon the pa

1843(b), 100 Stat. at 2853; see also Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-183; IRS Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421. Under the 1986 amendment, payments received under a written agreement--such as the separation agreement between petitioner and her ex- husband--generally are also to be treated as taxable

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, apparently “to mitigate the effects - 14 - of sloppy lawyering” by allowing “state law to ‘save’ alimony arrangements that meet all requirements of § 71(b)(1) except the explicit statement of termination upon death”. Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-183. Accordingly, whi

r spouse’s death. In 1986, Congress removed the requirement from section 71(b)(1)(D) that a divorce or separation agreement specifically state that liability terminates upon the death of the payee spouse. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853. Thus, payments now qualify as alimony as long as termination would occur automatically under State law. See Human v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-106. Since the settlement agreement does not expressly address petitioner’

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, the portions of these temporary regulations that we rely upon herein were not affected by those provisions and continue to be effective. - 16 - the corresponding payments which otherwise qualified as alimony under section 71 are deductible as alimony. See H. Rept. 98-432, supra at 1496; see also Cunningham v. Commissi

1843(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2853. But even after the 1986 amendment, whether an obligation to make payments survives the death of the payee spouse “may be determined by the terms of the applicable instrument, or if the instrument is silent on the matter, by looking to State law.” Kean v. Commissioner, T.C.

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853. In Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-183, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that by the 1984 revision, “Congress specifically intended to eliminate the subjective inquiries into intent and the nature of payments that had plagued the courts in favor of a

ent fails to include such a statement, none of the payments, whether made before or after the death of the payee spouse, will qualify as alimony or separate maintenance payments. - 30 - December 31, 1986. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2853. Thus, payments qualify so long as termination would occur under State law. See Notice 87- 9, 1987-1 C.B. 421, 422; Human v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998- 106. In the instant case, the June 1 letters are silent as t

1843(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2853. But even after the 1986 amendment, if an obligation to make payments survives the death of the payee spouse under either the terms of the divorce decree or State law, then such payments will not be considered alimony. Thus, the 1986 amendment injected State law into t

ent fails to include such a statement, none of the payments, whether made before or after the death of the payee spouse, will qualify as alimony or separate maintenance payments. - 30 - December 31, 1986. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2853. Thus, payments qualify so long as termination would occur under State law. See Notice 87- 9, 1987-1 C.B. 421, 422; Human v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998- 106. In the instant case, the June 1 letters are silent as t

forth in the divorce or separation agreement. In 1986, however, Congress removed the requirement that the termination- at-death provision be specifically set forth in the divorce or separation agreement. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99- 514, sec. 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853. Thus, payments now qualify as long as termination would occur automatically under State law. In section 71(b)(1)(D), Congress recognized that payments would operate to support and maintain the payee only if they related

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853. As a result of the TRA, if the other statutory requirements are met, even without language in the instrument a payment may be alimony if State law terminates the payor's liability at the death of the payee spouse. See Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474. If Congress had intended that State law could fix the

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, retroactive to the effective date of DEFRA, TRA 86 sec. 1881, 100 Stat. 2914. See also Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421, 422. Hence, the divorce or separation instrument need not expressly state that the payment obligations terminate upon the death of the payee spouse if, for example, termination would occur by operation o

1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, retroactive to the effective date of DEFRA, TRA 86 sec. 1881, 100 Stat. 2914. See also Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421, 422. Hence, the divorce or separation instrument need not expressly state that the payment obligations terminate upon the death of the payee spouse if, for example, termination would occur by operation o