§1981

§ 1981, permits victims of race-based employment discrimination to obtain a jury trial at which ‘both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages’ may be awarded.” The court went on to say unlike title VII actions such actions were tortlike. - 15 - With the enactment of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983,

§ 1981, permits victims of race-based employment discrimination to obtain a jury trial at which ‘both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages’ may be awarded.” The court went on to say unlike title VII actions such actions were tortlike. - 15 - With the enactment of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983,

section 1981; and that he had been discriminated against in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In his complaint, he prayed for the following relief:- Backpay; back benefits; compensatory and punitive damages from Fulton County; compensatory and punitive damages from,his former supervisor; liquidated damages; the recovery of lega

§1981 [sic], Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. sec., [sic] the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 [sic], the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, or any other Federal, state or local statute, regulation

ner sought was (1) a finding of discrimination, (2) a job performance evaluation of exceptional with a cash performance award, and (3) compensatory damages of $300,000 for discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 1981, 105 Stat. 1071. Petitioner's informal complaint did not seek any relief for physical injury or sickness or any corrective relief relating to the September 24, 1994, incident when petitioner injured her back at work. The EEOC counselor was

See also Commissioner v.

1981a(b) (1994); Phillips v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-336. Petitioner and Mr. Jenkins' testimony established that Brevard County made the payment to settle petitioner's potential ADA claim for wrongful termination. Petitioner failed, however, to establish that any portion of the payment was.for nonpecuniary damages. See Getty v. Commissio

In consideration of * * * [the lump-sum payment], I intend to give up any rights I may have under these or any other laws with respect to my employment and termination of employment at * * * [AT&T] and acknowledge that * * * [AT&T] * * * [has] not (a) discriminated against me, (b) breached any express or implied contract with me,

Pertinent sections of the release read as follows: In exchange for the sums and benefits which you will receive pursuant to the terms of the * * * [ITO-II Program], J. Ray Phillips[2] (hereinafter "you") agrees to release * * * [IBM] from all claims, demands, actions or liabilities you may have against IBM of whatever kind, incl

Section 1981; any and all claims under the Americans - 6 - with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.; any and all rights or claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 621, et seq.; any and all claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq.; any and all cla

See Phillips v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-336, in which we elaborated on these provisions including the possible application to emotional distress arising from termination of employment. We think the record herein is far from adequate to provide a sufficient basis for denying respondent's motion, but we need not rest our dec

1981 permits victims of race-based employment discrimination to obtain a jury trial at which “both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages may be awarded.” The Court similarly has observed that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, whose fair housing provisions allow for jury