§1988

§ 1988 .") ; Ricks V . Xerox Corp ., No . 93-2545 (D . Kan . Sept . 29, 1995) . A court has "discretion. to tailor the sanction to the : violation ." Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed . Agents Employees or Officers , 855 F .2d at 1092 . What constitutes . reasonable attorneys' fees "must be considered in tandem with the rule's goals of dete

1988 (2000), a fee-shifting prevailing party statute designed to encourage private enforcement of civil rights laws). Thus, pro se litigants, even those who are attorneys, generally are not entitled to an award because there is no attorney-client relationship. “An ‘attorney’ is essentially an agent for another. Without the ‘other’ there can be

1988 (2000), a fee-shifting statute designed to encourage private enforcement of civil rights laws). II. Entitlement to Relief Under Section 7430 A. Respondent’s Position Respondent contends that petitioners are not entitled to any relief under section 7430 because (1) they have failed to demonstrate that they “paid or incurred” the claimed fe

1988 (2000), under which a court "may allow the prevailing party * * * a reasonable attorney's fee"); cf. .Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (fee award under CRAFAA is not limited to the amo nt the prevailing party owes his attorney pursuant to contingen fee agreement) . For purposes of section 7430, fees are "incurred" when there

1988 (2000), under which a court “may allow the prevailing party * * * a reasonable attorney’s fee”); cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (fee award under CRAFAA is not limited to the amount the prevailing party owes his attorney pursuant to contingent fee agreement). For purposes of section 7430, fees are “incurred” when there i

1988 (2000), at least two Courts of Appeals, involving litigants represented by attorneys, have awarded costs beyond those specifically enumerated by the statutory language, and we have found none that limits awardable costs to only those specifically enumerated. See Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 1983) (“with the exception

1988 (2000), at least two Courts of Appeals, involving litigants represented by attorneys, have awarded costs beyond those specifically enumerated by the statutory language, and we have found none that limits awardable costs to only those specifically enumerated. See Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 1983) (“with the exception

ns on the following: 1.1 [Title VII of] The Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 USC Sec. 2000 e-16(c); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 USC Sec. 621, et seq.; The Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Act of 1976, as amended, 42 USC Sec. 1988; 39 USC Sec. 409, and application thereof by the courts, permitting judicial review of final decisions of the U.S. Postal Service; - 5 - Petitioner's complaint requested, in relevant part, the following relief: (4) Equitable relief to make