§2 — Definitions and special rules

Finally, petitioner argues that Larotonda is no longer good law because the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub.

404, which was superseded by Rev.

404, amplified, modified, and superseded by Rev.

Held, further, P has provided no compelling argument to overrule our precedent holding that I.R.C.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

404, modified and superseded by Rev.

680, 681 (noting that the two-yearrule applies "without regard to any change in status ofthe method as permissible or impermissible"), superseded by Rev.

In particular, they observe that Shepter was legislatively overruled, and they attempt to distinguish Bunting and Necaise on the ground that those cases did not involve inclusions ofgift tax under section 2035(b).

209(a) effectively overruled the holding in Rand v.

708, 708, superseded by Rev.

404, 406, amplified, modified, and superseded by Rev.

he taxpayer for the administrative or management activities ofany trade or business ofthe taxpayer ifthere is no other fixed location ofsuch trade or business where the taxpayer conducts substantial administrative or management activities ofsuch trade or business." Congress added this definition to overrule the rigid standard established in Soliman." Section 280A(c)(2) allows a deduction for space allocated in the residence and used on a regular basis as a storage unit for inventory or product s

404, has been superseded by Rev.

90-23, supra, was superseded by- Rev.

Additionally, the 50-percent allowance for meals unde r section 274(n) is superseded by a more g nerous 70 percent allowance for 2004 under section 274(n)( )(B) for individuals subject to "the hours of service limitations of the Department o f Transportation" .

Given the plain meaning of the relevant text and the historical setting laid out in detail in this Opinion, including caselaw, legislation, legislative history, and regulations, the Secretary’s adoption of a timely filing requirement and his attempted sub silentio overruling of contrary judicial and administrative precedents is unreasonable under Natl.

The Court found STJs were distinguishable from special masters that were hired by Article III courts on a “temporary, 35 episodic basis, whose positions [were] not established by law, and whose duties and functions [were] not delineated in a statute.” Id.

12 Unlike in Estate of Anenberg, however, here the Commissioner also determined deficiencies against the holders of the remainder interests, Linda and Peter. The Commissioner argues that “[w]ith regard to Linda and Peter, there is no [QTIP] tax fiction at work.” Resp’t’s Mem. 72.

Petitioner contends that his divorce instrument is distinguished from instruments in other Tax Court cases involving alimony deductions in California because his divorce instrument was not made pursuant to section 2030 of the California Family Code.

Unlike interpretative rules, legislative rules have the force and effect of law. Id. at 96. The Sixth Circuit recently addressed respondent’s first argument, finding Notice 2007-83, entitled “Abusive Trust Arrangements Utilizing Cash Value Life Insurance Policies Purportedly to Provide Welfare Benefits,” to be a legislative rule requiring the IRS to comply with notice-and-comment requirements under the APA.

rcut the theory and reasoning underlying” those precedents, so that “[t]he cases are now clearly irreconcilable”, and that “efficient and harmonious judicial administration here would seem to require this Court to review the Supreme Court’s Boechler opinion and issue a new precedent on the section 6213(a) filing deadline.” We now undertake such a review, and we conclude that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Boechler does not apply to the 90-day deadline of section 6213(a).

These procedures “distinguished between payments made in satisfaction of a tax liability and ‘deposits in the nature of a cash bond.’” Rev. Proc. 84-58, sec. 2.03, 1984-2 C.B.

Surely any taxpayerwould find it repugnant if 3¹Unlike the statutes establishing the Tax Court, statutes establishing independent agencies in the executive branch typically require that appointments to their policymaking (i.e., quasi-legislative) governing bodies be balanced between the two major political parties. See, e.g., statutes establishing the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. sec. 41 (2012); the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42 U.S.C.

Krilich, 470 F.2d 341, 350 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[Section 7605] does not apply to third-party investigations, but rather to the records ofthe taxpayer[.]"); Curtis v.

The operation ofthe net gift agreement can be distinguished from the operation ofthe New York statutes. The net gift agreement provided an enforcement mechanism to recoup the section 2035(b) estate tax incurred out of the property transferred.

- 6 - distinguish between transportation for business and personal purposes, nor does it indicate the distance to each destination or specify the point oforigin for each trip. Mr. Snellman testified that he "assembled" the mileage log after receiving the notice ofdeficiency. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Snellman maintained contemporaneous records related to his vehicle expenses and, ifso, the whereabouts ofthose records or why he found it necessary to reconstruct them in 2012.

Respondentrelies on the historic limitations on ourjurisdiction over interest and the use ofthe terms "suspension" and "shall" in section 6404(g) rather than "abatement" and "may" in sections such as 6404(e) in arguing that section 6404(h) - 12 - does not apply to petitioners' claims under section 6404(g).

Unlike TUFTA's first fraud provision, which applies only to fraudulenttransfers with regard to existing creditors, TUFTA's second and third fraud provisions apply to present and future creditors. Osherowv. Nelson Hensley & Consol. Fund. Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Pace), 456 B.R. 253, 266 (Bankr.

Unlike an Article III court, '?the Tax Court, being a court oflimited e jurisdictiong* *;*:[döes] not have equitable powerto expand itsjurisdiction'. Buchine v. Commissionern20 F.3d1173r178 (5th Cir.

2000-43, sec. 3, Q&A-6, 2000-2 C.B. at 406. However, Rev. Proc. 2000-43, supra, by its terms applies to communications between an attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel and an Appeals officer only in nondocketed cases; i.e., those cases where the taxpayer has not yet filed a petition with the Tax Court. Id. sec. 2, sec. 3, Q&A-11, 2000-2 C.B. at 404, 406-407. As the instant case is a docketed case, Rev. Proc. 2000-43, supra, does not apply directly to communications of Ms.

Unlike sec . 2013, sec .

And, unlike with the car expenses, the Commissioner didn't I give anything away. We agree with the Commissioner. 3. Travel Claimed RA's NOD P claimed P claimed R argued on return report adjust. at trial in brief at trial $6,418 0 ($6,418) $8,959 $5,494 0 Pace traveled extensively in 2001, spending thousands of dollars on airfare, hotels, and incidentals.

- 12 - death.5 Petitioner argues that, under this provision of the regulation, the trust did not come into being until the date of decedent’s death, and therefore no prior violation of the CRAT requirements could disqualify the trust. Petitioner’s position overlooks that this provision of the regulation is inapplicable to the trust involved here--an irrevocable trust established and funded by decedent during her lifetime.

3 (1972). In most cases, the OMT is imposed on the mine operator. Id. sec. 2(2). The mine operator is the party that has the right to produce and sell minerals from the mine. Id. sec. 1(g). The OMT does not apply to holders of royalties.

Therefore, petitioner ostensibly qualifies for child tax credits for the years in issue.5 5In the light ofthe modest amount ofincome that petitioner earned in 2014, it is unclear whether she will receive any child tax credit for that year.

Therefore, petitioner ostensibly qualifies for child tax credits for the years in issue.5 5In the light ofthe modest amount ofincome that petitioner earned in 2014, it is unclear whether she will receive any child tax credit for that year.

Moreover, it is unclear whether Aldridge might have reimbursed Ms.

But before engaging in the "ordinary and necessary" inquiry, taxpayers must pass the section 183 test.¹ I Because we decide this issue on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide whetherthe burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner under section (continued...) - 3 - [*3] Section 183(a) generally disallows any deduction attributable to an activity "not engaged in for profit," and is aimed at disallowing the deduction ofthe expenses ofa hobby that a taxpayermight try to use t

But before engaging in the "ordinary and necessary" inquiry, taxpayers must pass the section 183 test.¹ I Because we decide this issue on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide whetherthe burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner under section (continued...) - 3 - [*3] Section 183(a) generally disallows any deduction attributable to an activity "not engaged in for profit," and is aimed at disallowing the deduction ofthe expenses ofa hobby that a taxpayermight try to use t

But before engaging in the "ordinary and necessary" inquiry, taxpayers must pass the section 183 test.¹ I Because we decide this issue on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide whetherthe burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner under section (continued...) - 3 - [*3] Section 183(a) generally disallows any deduction attributable to an activity "not engaged in for profit," and is aimed at disallowing the deduction ofthe expenses ofa hobby that a taxpayermight try to use t

Section 2.3 ofthe operating agreement for CST states that "the General Manager shall be entitled to such Guaranteed Payment as is approved by the members." It is unclear whether Mr.

Because we conclude that petitioner is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(c) and petitioner raised no other issues in his petition, we need not decide whether the Appeals Office otherwise erred in sustaining the filing ofthe NFTL.

Furthermore, we disagree with the premise that an “arbitrary shifting of profits” among related businesses can result only from the voluntary setting of intercompany prices.

also argues that its position is supported by caselaw allegedly holding, in the estate’s words, that “a secondary or remote possibility that an estate might have personal liability for the amount of the mortgage was not enough to establish it as a claim against the estate under section 2053(a)(3).” We disagree with the estate’s contention that “a practical approach is mandated” in resolving the question at issue.

Commissioner, supra, was incorrectly decided.14 Respondent argues that Rev.

After concessions by the parties,2 the issues remaining for decision are the following: (1) whether the estate timely elected to use an alternate valuation date pursuant to section 2032 to value decedent’s gross estate; (2) whether the estate may exclude $200,000 from the value of property located at 90 and 90-A Industrial Park Road, Hingham, Massachusetts (Hingham Property), for a qualified conservation easement contribution; (3) whether the fair market value of the Hingham Pr

at 468–69 (applying section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch.

Section 3.21 allows the partnership to “cut and remove trees in accordance with the Forest Management Plan approved by Holder in accordance with Section 2.3.” Section 3.25.2 provides that NALT must be satisfied, as evidenced by its prior written approval of [the partnership’s] exercise of a Reserved Right, that any use or activity done in the exercise of the Reserved Right will meet the requirements and conditions for such Reserved Rights and will have no material adverse effec

13 Petitioner argued only that the use restriction could have been amended pursuant to section 2 of Article VII (Amendments by Declarant).

Article III, section 2 provides that upon the death of Sandra, the “trustee” of the Sandra E.

Section 2.2 provides that the remaining $55,000 represents “settlement of Ms.

Since the value ofthese units was unknown (because it was based on the FMV ofstock held by the FLP), 4, if a subsequent audit by the Commissioner led to a revaluation ofthe units then some ofthose units that had already been transferred to trusts had to be retransferred to the charitable donee in accordance with the trust provisions, 4 at 1019.

Deciding this in petitioner's favor would not change the result here because, as we hold below, petitioners' real estate loss deductions are disallowed by section 469.

Since the value ofthese units was unknown (because it was based on the FMV ofstock held by the FLP), 4, if a subsequent audit by the Commissioner led to a revaluation ofthe units then some ofthose units that had already been transferred to trusts had to be retransferred to the charitable donee in accordance with the trust provisions, 4 at 1019.

holly owned by the Tribe * * * may be converted into a division ofthe Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation * * * as authorized by Article VIII, Section E ofthe Federal Charter issued on December 29, 2004 for * * * [BLREDCo] by the Secretary ofthe United States Department of Interior pursuant to 25 U.S.C.

holly owned by the Tribe * * * may be converted into a division ofthe Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation * * * as authorized by Article VIII, Section E ofthe Federal Charter issued on December 29, 2004 for * * * [BLREDCo] by the Secretary ofthe United States Department of Interior pursuant to 25 U.S.C.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to deduct $5,222 for taxes and license expenses for the 2013 tax year.

2 provides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commis- sion, is punishable as a principal." The information alleged that petitioner, from 1998 through 2010, had criminally aided and abetted Winston in evading payment ofWinsto

The unrelated remaining issue for our consideration is whether bonus payments to Tractech executives were deductible for tax year 2005 pursuant to section 162(a) or should have been capitalized pursuant to section 263.

Therefore, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to the claimed Schedule E expense deductions for 9103 Brehm Road for the taxable years 2007 and 2008.

Consequently, we hold that Kilpatrick is not entitled to a deduction for automobile expenses for 2009 in excess ofthe $398 allowed by the IRS in the notice ofdeficiency.

Section 2.2 provided: The aggregate purchase price (the "Purchase Price") for the Shares [i.e., the common stock ofAlpha] is $16,500,000 million in cash paid by Buyer, subject to adjustment pursuant to Section 2.6 ofthis Agreement and any payments provided for in Section 9.2 ofthis Agreement.

Accordingly, we hold that Barnes is not entitled to deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for car and truck expenses beyond the amounts the IRS conceded in the stipulation offacts, i.e., $3,465 for 2008 and $3,277 for 2009.

When SCC sold its remaining assets in September 2001, it would have continued to be insolvent pursuant to section 242.02(2) ofthe Wisconsin Statutes.

When SCC sold its remaining assets in September 2001, it would have continued to be insolvent pursuant to section 242.02(2) ofthe Wisconsin Statutes.

When SCC sold its remaining assets in September 2001, it would have continued to be insolvent pursuant to section 242.02(2) ofthe Wisconsin Statutes.

We hold that Crawford is not entitled to any deductions for car-and-truck expenses for 2009.

We hold that he is not.

We hold that that estate is required under section 2044 to include in the value ofthat gross estate $607,927.51, the value on the applicable valuation date ofonly certain ofthe as- sets that that trust held on the date ofMr.

We hold that the interest expense is not deductible.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioners failed to meet the criteria to exclude foreign earned income pursuant to section 911(a) for the years in issue.

Crescent Holdings is classified as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes 2 Pursuant to section 2.2(a) ofthe Formation Agreement Duke Ventures contributed 100% ofits interest in Crescent Resources to Crescent Holdings in exchange for 100% ofthe member interest in Crescent Holdings.

We hold that petitioner's commuting expenses were nondeductible.

Section 162 provides a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses.

An attachment to the Form 3115 stated thaty, pursuant to section 2.01 of an appendix to Rev.

- 8 - incurred in carrying on a trade or business engaged in for profit pursuant to section 183; (2) the timeshare units were dwelling units used.by petitioners or other owners as residences pursuant to section 280A; or (3) the timeshare activity losses were passive losses pursuant to section 469.

We hold that she does not.

DJB and GSW held exclusive rights to the financing, construction management, and indemnity services of Barone and Watkins pursuant to section 2.2 of their respective employment agreements.

Respondent also.contends that if we hold that petitioners are entitled to litigation and administrative costs, petitioners are not entit:led to the amount claimed.

Tucker's cross motion for summary judgment asking that we hold'that the supplementalnotice reflected an abuse of discretion by the Office of Appeals .

Stiverne]) and Manager agrees to accept as full compensation for the services he shall render pursuant to section 2, a total of Thirty-three and one-third .percent (33 1/3%), of all boxing compensation .

Thus, we hold that Madsen may deduct only 75- percent of the special daily rates for transportation workers on all of her first and last days of travel away from home in 2004 and 2005.

In support of that argument, respondent asserts: (1) Pursuant to section 2 of the assumption agreement petitioner assumed from Castanet all of Castanet's obligations under, inter alia, section 5 of the SPA (i.e., the stock purchase agreement) and (2) pursuant to section 5 of the SPA Castanet obligated itself to be responsible for, inter alia, any tax attributable to the s

Accordingly, we hold that - 1 6 petitioner is not entitled to a deduction for utilities expenses beyond.

170, 191 (2008) (applying section 2703 to disregar d restrictions in a partnership agreement) .

We hold that she is not .

3 - In 2003 and 2004, the Bank held debt instruments which, pursuant to section 265(b)(3)(B), were qualified tax-exempt obligations (QTEOs) .

3 On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is barred under section 6015(g)(2) from raising the issue of section 2Petitioner did admit that he spoke with one female employee of respondent concerning the tax liabilities for the years in issue .

The issues remaining for decisionlfor petitioner's taxable year 2006 are : SERVED MAR 18 2009 c - 2 - (1) Is petitioner entitled to head of household filin g status under section 2(b)?1 We hold that he is not .

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is therefore not entitled to an additional child tax credit for taxable year 2005 on the basis of BJ and CJ as qualifying children .

Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are not entitled to any additional fees beyond the'amount allowed by respondent in the notice of deficiency.

We hold that he is not .

We hold, therefore, that the Hurfords cwere'not entitled to any discounts because of the FLPs when they calculated the amount of the monthly annuity payments, and so no discounts apply when detërmining the amount now includable in the estate .

We hold that the TEPCO and WEF coal supply contracts created servitudes obligating Santa Fe and successive owners of the Lee Ranch mine to mine and supply coal to the buyer/utility and that those servitudes are real property interests under New Mexico law.

We hold that petitioner may.

Under the Agreement, which sets forth a nonexclusive list of 10 “Services”, PPI agreed to provide “Day to day management of employees leased by EAPR pursuant to Section 2 [of the Agreement].” Section 2 of the Agreement, entitled “Lease of Employees”, provides in pertinent part as follows: All employees leased by PPI hereunder shall be located in the Premises leased by EAPR from PPI and shall be under the general supervision of EAPR.

For the above reasons, we hold that the FMV of the Stewart property in July 1995 was $435,000, and, therefore, petitioners did not sustain a loss on the subsequent sale of the Stewart property on December 27, 1996, for $435,000.

COPYRIGHT NOTICES; TRADEMARKS (a) COMPANY will cause to appear on the container and labels of each copy of Product, the copyright and patent notices for the Product that appear on the applicable release of the Product as provided to COMPANY pursuant to Section 2 hereof * * * (b) COMPANY shall market the Product only under the Product name(s) for such Product as specified * * * and COMPANY agrees to use the appropriate trademark symbol * * * and clearly indicate MS’ ownership of its - 12 - trade

Accordingly, we hold that an individual well-category determination must be obtained in order to qualify for the section 29 tax credit attributable to tight formation gas.

2.] As of the date of these motions, Mr. de St. Aubin's executors' accounts had not been settled. Therefore, the 1987 provision is controlling, although the amendment to the statute was made more than 20 years after the execution of Mr. de St. Aubin's will. See In re Allister, 545 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sur. Ct. 1989) (applying EPTL section 11-2.1(k),

For its part, Treasury Regulation § 20.2010-2(a)(7)(i) pins the meaning of “complete and properly prepared” to (1) compliance with “the instructions issued for the estate tax return (Instructions for Form 706)” and (2) satisfaction of “the requirements of [Treasury Regulation] §§ 20.6018-2, 20.6018-3, and 20.6018-4.” Both parties focus on the former requirement. Form 706 includes various schedules related to different types of property: real estate (Schedule A); stock and bonds (Schedule B); mor

The definition of “compensation” in section 2 of the Classification Act of 1923 was restricted to amounts paid to federal government employees.

Similarly, respondent’s determination does not expressly address the allowability of any marital deduction inasmuch as it treats the transfer in question as an indirect (continued...) -22- [*22] respondent’s recharacterization of the purported interspousal transfer of the LLC member interests as an indirect gift from petitioner to the Dynasty Trust. Pursuant to its terms, however, section 2523(a) applies in the first instance only if the donor “transfers * * * an interest in property” to his or

This scenario is -66- distinguishable because the collection-review hearing with the Office ofAppeals under section 6330 is not a precondition to assessment. The hearing takes place after assessment. By contrast the final administrative determination regarding a timely protest ofthe trust-fund-recoverypenalty is a precondition for assessing that penalty, according to the Eleventh Circuit opinion. Romano-Murphyv. Commissioner, 816 F.3d at 718. R.R. Concrete Crosstie Corp., a case discussed in th

Weaver's Schedules C for 2012 and - 20 - 2013 because ofpetitioners' failure to substantiate those deductions in the manner required by section 274(d). ii. Meals and Entertainment Petitioners include in their proposed findings offact the observation that "[1]awful for profit business's like * * * [Mr. Weaver's] are allowed to deduct 100% ofthe expenses paid for food for its employees". We assume that petitioners intended that observation as an argument oflaw rather than a proposed finding offac

O'Brien, 35 F.3d 573, 1994 WL 470265, at *3 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished). They do so because at sentencing, "the amount ofthe tax loss may be uncertain." U.S.S.G. sec. 2T1.1, app. n.l. In such circumstances, "the court will simply make a reasonable estimate based on the available facts." Ibid. Under the Guidelines, the yardstick for measuring the tax loss is typically not understated taxable income, but underreported gross income "unless a more accurate determination ofthe tax loss can be made.

O'Brien, 35 F.3d 573, 1994 WL 470265, at *3 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished). They do so because at sentencing, "the amount ofthe tax loss may be uncertain." U.S.S.G. sec. 2T1.1, app. n.l. In such circumstances, "the court will simply make a reasonable estimate based on the available facts." Ibid. Under the Guidelines, the yardstick for measuring the tax loss is typically not understated taxable income, but underreported gross income "unless a more accurate determination ofthe tax loss can be made.

235, 242 (1996). Section 6512(b)(3) provides that "[n]o such credit or refund shall be allowed or made ofany portion ofthe tax unless the Tax Court determines as part ofits decision that such portion was paid" within one ofthree specified time periods. The parties agree that the time period relevant here is set forth in section 6512(b)(3)(B).2 Subparagraph (B) refers to tax paid "within the period which would be ap- plicable under section 6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), ifon the date ofthe mailing ofth

We have held that the bona fide sale exception in section 2036(a) is satisfied in the context ofa family limited partnership where the record establishes the existence ofa legitimate and significant nontax reason for creating the family limited partnership, and the transferors received partnership interests proportionate to the value ofthe property transferred. See, e.g., Estate ofStone v. Commissioner, * * * [T.C. Memo. 2003-309]. The objective evidence must indicate that the nontax reason was

Therefore, we find that the transferwas not merely an attempt to change the form in which decedent held the - 23 - [*23] property and that the full and adequate consideration prong is satisfied.2 Estate ofStone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-48, slip op. at 18. B. Section 2036(a) Conclusion We have found that decedent's transfer ofproperty to the PFLLC was a bona fide transfer and that decedent received full and adequate consideration from the PFLLC as a result ofthe transfer. Because deceden

Therefore, we find that the transferwas not merely an attempt to change the form in which decedent held the - 23 - [*23] property and that the full and adequate consideration prong is satisfied.2 Estate ofStone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-48, slip op. at 18. B. Section 2036(a) Conclusion We have found that decedent's transfer ofproperty to the PFLLC was a bona fide transfer and that decedent received full and adequate consideration from the PFLLC as a result ofthe transfer. Because deceden

Richards estimates that her trip to New Orleans cost approximately $2,100. In general, ifa taxpayer establishes that an expense is deductible but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, we may estimate the amount, bearing heavily against the taxpayerwhose inexactitude is ofhis own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930) (Cohan rule). In order for the Court to form an estimate, the taxpayermust present sufficient evidence to provide some basis upon which an estima

- 44 - [*44] While we believe that Longino did use his vehicles for some business travel, he failed to substantiate the amount ofhis business mileage as required by section 274(d). Consequently, we find that he is not entitled to deduct any amount for car- and-truck expenses. 2. Expenses for Business Use ofHome On Schedule C ofhis original and amended returns, Longino claimed deductions for $2,307 in expenses attributable to the business use ofhis homes. At trial, Longino claimed he operated his

Additionally, unlike unrecognized gain, excluded discharge ofindebtedness income may affect the tax liability ofS corporation shareholders. Section 108(b)(1) specifies that the amount ofdischarge ofindebtedness income excluded from gross income is applied to reduce the tax attributes ofthe taxpayer. Unrecognized gain, however, does not reduce the tax attributes ofthe taxpayer. Therefore unrecognized gain does not affect the tax liability ofS corporation shareholders. Because neither Farley nor G

- 3 - [*3] Russell Ball Jr Sec 2,207,131 2,208,729 First 9/9/1967 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

- 3 - [*3] Russell Ball Jr Sec 2,207,131 2,208,729 First 9/9/1967 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

- 3 - [*3] Russell Ball Jr Sec 2,207,131 2,208,729 First 9/9/1967 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

- 3 - [*3] Russell Ball Jr Sec 2,207,131 2,208,729 First 9/9/1967 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

Car and Truck Expenses Under section 162(a) an employee or selfremployed taxpayer may deduct the cost of operating an automobile to the extent it is used in a trade or business. However, under section 262, no portion of the cost of operating an automobile that,is attributable to personal use is deductible. A passenger vehicle is listed property under section 280F(d) (4) and subject to strict substantiation under section 274(d). The rule in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), does

is i come and includible in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 20 2, Mr . Bangs advances several arguments . We first address Mr . Bangs' argument that the monthly payments at issue constitute alimony under section 71 and are deductible under section 2 5 (a) . Ms . Platt and respondent take the position that those p yments are not alimony under that section .12 In advancing their respective positions whether the monthly payments at issue constitute alimony unde r section 71, Mr . Bangs and

f any nature or for any reason or the violation of any law or regulation, any such liability or violation being hereby expressly denied, including, but not limited to, any violation of or liability under any of the statutes and claims referred to in Section 2 . 7 . Parties Benefited and Bound; Real Party in Interest . This Agreement is binding upon and inures to the benefit of the Company and Mr . Phelps and their respective heirs, representa- tives, successors, beneficiaries, and assigns . Mr.

gross income as a tax-exempt veterans’ benefit. Because the parties are in agreement that: (1) petitioner 2 The Veterans’ Administration was redesignated the Department of Veterans Affairs by the Department of Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. L. 100-527, sec. 2, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988). We shall use the initials “VA” to refer both to the Veterans’ Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs, the referent being determined by context. 3 We assume that Congress’s failure to amend sec. 139(a)(3)

As most pertinent to the matters at issue here, the settlement agreement provided in part: 2.0 PAYMENTS In consideration of the release set forth above, the Defendants agree to pay to the individuals named below ("Payees") the sums outlined in this Section 2 below: 2.1 Payments due from Defendants on or before October 1, 1991 as follows: 2 Although the parties stipulated that the plaintiffs signed the agreement on Sept.

EPTL section 2-1.8 (McKinney 2003). N.Y. EPTL section 2-1.8 does not support petitioner’s position either. N.Y. EPTL section 2-1.8 applies to apportion - 48 - the estate tax “except in a case where a testator otherwise directs in his will”. N.Y. EPTL sec. 2-1.8(a). Decedent provided for the payment of estate taxes in the fifth article of the 1993 will.

Article Two, section 2.1, of the 1993 will provides: I give all the residue of my estate, to the Trustee under my Declaration of Trust dated the same date as this Will or if my said Declaration of Trust is not in existence or is not effective at the time of my death, to be held in trust on the same terms and conditions specified therein as it existed at the tim

- 3 - Petitioners assert they are entitled to deduct the following medical expenses that were not claimed on the returns for the years in issue: Expense 1996 1997 1998 Attendant care services 1$15,834 $17,616 $15,474 Van cost -0- -0- 13,214 Gasoline 865 835 750 Child attendant care 1,324 1,366 1,399 Back-up generator -0- -0- 840 Pool maintenance 1,200 1,200 1,200 YMCA tuition 1,569 1,558 1,234 1 All amounts have been rounded to a whole dollar figure. Petitioners resided in Hollywood, Florida, at

- 3 - Petitioners assert they are entitled to deduct the following medical expenses that were not claimed on the returns for the years in issue: Expense 1996 1997 1998 Attendant care services 1$15,834 $17,616 $15,474 Van cost -0- -0- 13,214 Gasoline 865 835 750 Child attendant care 1,324 1,366 1,399 Back-up generator -0- -0- 840 Pool maintenance 1,200 1,200 1,200 YMCA tuition 1,569 1,558 1,234 1 All amounts have been rounded to a whole dollar figure. Petitioners resided in Hollywood, Florida, at

After the threshold limitations under section 2 We note that petitioner Lillian E.

The regulations, unlike their predecessors, did not reference any specific items of the liability page of the annual statement that would generally constitute a reserve for Federal income tax purposes. Much litigation flowed from the Commissioner’s definition of the word “reserves” as set forth in the 1934 regulations, and courts held that some of the items which would have qualified under the prior regulations no longer qualified under the new definition. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc

We find all of those cases to be distinguishable and petitioner's reliance on them to be misplaced. In the interest of brevity, we shall discuss only the Hutzler Bros. Co. case. Because of the number and diversity of the goods of the taxpayer involved in Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer, a department store retailer, devised a LIFO inventory method that reduced the goods to their lowest common denominator, viz, a dollar figure. That method, which is now known as the dollar-v

On May 15, 1995, petitioner entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of violating section 2 At the Bullfrog, a boilermaker is a shot of whiskey with a beer chaser on the side.

ablished to prevent high income taxpayers from using large amounts of deductions and credits to reduce their taxable income to a lower tax bracket than that of taxpayers who have more modest taxable income. 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 2A.01, at 1 (1990). The AMT applies to the extent that taxpayers' tentative minimum tax exceeds the taxpayers' regular income tax. Sec. 55(a). - 14 - In the instant case, petitioner argues that the AMT does not apply because the $37,767 bonus re

91. See S. Rept. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News (U.S.C.C.A.N.) 1530. With respect to then proposed new section 811(f)(5), which in substance is identical to current section 2041(b)(2), the Senate report stated: The House bill provided that the failure to exercise a future power whic

Section 2 .06 of the partnership agreement sets forth the purposes of Black LP as follows : Section 2 .06 . Purposes . The purposes of the. Partnership are the following : (a) To consolidate the management of certain properties owned directly and indirectly by the family of Samuel'P . Black, Jr . ; to promote efficient and economical management, of

Section 2 .06 of the partnership agreement sets forth the purposes of Black LP as follows : Section 2 .06 . Purposes . The purposes of the. Partnership are the following : (a) To consolidate the management of certain properties owned directly and indirectly by the family of Samuel'P . Black, Jr . ; to promote efficient and economical management, of

1669, 1677-1683 effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1982. There are no differences between former section 1374(c)(2) and the current section 1366(d)(1)(B), that affect this analysis. - 24 - indebted to the shareholder. Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439, 441-446 (5th Cir. 1990); Estate of Leavitt v. Commiss

Section 2.01 of the agreement describes the purchased assets, which include goodwill. Goodwill is defined to include “[a]ll goodwill associated with 32 [*32] the Business, including any personal goodwill of Chet, the sole member of Dukes Group, as it relates to the Purchased Assets and the Business.” Section 2.07 requires that the parties engage S

Section 7201 criminalizes any willful attempt "to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title [viz., title 26, U.S. Code] or the payment thereof." Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 2 provides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commis- sion, is punishable as a princip

ome-tax liability. An individual taxpayerwho does not file jointly and has "earned income" ofmore than $36,052 is not entitled to any amount ofEITC unless the taxpayerhas at least two "qualifying children". Sec. 32(b)(2), (j)(1); Rev. Proc. 2011-12, sec. 2.04(1), 2011-2 I.R.B. 297, 299. The term "earned income" includes wages, salaries, and other employee compensation to the extent such amounts are includible in gross income for the taxable year. Sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). Abdi reported that he earned

Child Tax Credit Section 2,4(a) allows a tax credit for each "qualifying child" of a taxpayer .

After June 30, 2018, any holder of shares of Voting Preferred Stock shall be entitled, at its option, to require the corporation to redeem, out of funds legally available therefor, in the manner provided in Section 4(g)(iii)(C) of this Article V, the shares of the Preferred Stock held by it, at a redemption price per share equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the date of redemption payable in cash. * * * * * * * (i) Voting Rights. (i) Voting Power. Except as otherwise provided in Section

Yeager pursuant to section 2.226 of the Texas Family Code.

2.05, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 688. Petitioners' automobile was not retired from service prior to the years in issue. Thus, pursuant to section 280F(a), the automobile would have been fully depreciated well before petitioners filed their 1994 return, on which they deducted the $1,475. Sec. 280F(a)(2) (B)(iv); sec. 1.167(a)-10(a), Income Tax Regs. Acco

Yeager pursuant to section 2.226 of the Texas Family Code.

Yeager pursuant to section 2.226 of the Texas Family Code.

Yeager pursuant to section 2.226 of the Texas Family Code.

Although petitioner was married in 1997, he will not be treated as married for purposes of section 2 because, as discussed above with respect to section 152(e)(1)(A), there has been no argument or facts produced that indicate that petitioner and Ms.

Under the Agreement, which sets forth a nonexclusive list of 10 “Services”, PPI agreed to provide “Day to day management of employees leased by EAPR pursuant to Section 2 [of the Agreement].” Section 2 of the Agreement, entitled “Lease of Employees”, provides in pertinent part as follows: All employees leased by PPI hereunder shall be located in the Premises leased by EAPR from PPI and shall be under the general supervision of EAPR.

The parties agree that in lieu of any purchase price adjustments pursuant to Section 2.3 of the Stock Purchase Agreement the purchase price of Nine Million Dollars ($9,000,000.00) will be increased to $9,325,000.00, and will not be further adjusted.

were members of the same controlled group within the meaning of section 2 7 (b) (3) .

Hence, for the purposes of section 7703(b) and section 2, we will treat petitioner as married during the tax year of 1997.

n the nature of a worker's compensation act. We hold that they are not. 2. Whether the $7,101 is excluded from income for 1992 on the grounds that Pawtucket and respondent violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, sec. 2, 104 Stat. 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 (1994)). We hold that it is not. 3. Whether including the $7,101 in petitioner's income is unfair discrimination. We hold that it is not. The parties submitted this case fully stipulated.

For deductions arising from business travel, meals, entertainment, and use of listed property defined in section 2 This case was decided without considering the changes in burden of proof arising out of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section 2 references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2-7(a) to disclaim any claim and interest to the following property interest, to-wit: Twenty-five percent (25%) interest of Decedent, EMERSON WINKLER, in E & E PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois partnership. The undersigned has received no benefits in connection with the disclaimed asset. This disclaimer is irrevocable and is binding upon the disclaiman

2-7(a) to disclaim any claim and interest to the following property interest, to-wit: Twenty-five percent (25%) interest of Decedent, EMERSON WINKLER, in E & E PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois partnership. The undersigned has received no benefits in connection with the disclaimed asset. This disclaimer is irrevocable and is binding upon the disclaiman

Case law interpreting these terms supports this view. The Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. case, 680 F.2d at 581., held that, within the meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act, the term "board of trade" was to be broadly interpreted to include "an association of persons engaged in the business of selling commodities". The term "board of trade"

112, §§ 2, 6 (2025); McMurdo v. Getter, 10 N.E.2d 139, 141–42 (Mass. 1937); 243 Mass. Code Regs. 2.07(22) (2025). 4 [*4] B. Marital Abuse Since they were married in 1998, and through the years in issue, Mr. Ehsan subjected Dr. Zaheen to various forms of abuse. Mr. Ehsan generally had a short temper and on occasion broke plates and glasses in front of th

The NPA equally contained a mandatory prepayment term as follows: Section 2.5.1 Quarterly Payments.

Manager shall be entitled to receive from Owner repayment of the outstanding balance (unpaid principal and accrued interest) of all Operating Loans, if any, existing as of the termination date after application of the funds described in Section 2.3(b)(i); provided that such Operating Loan balances shall be paid solely from Adjusted Net Revenues (excluding from the definition of “Adjusted Net Revenues” for this purpose the reference to amounts paid pursuant to Section 5.2(b)(viii)) from time to t

at 504. As a general rule, 95 [*95] “a taxpayer must obtain the consent of the Commissioner to change a method of accounting for [F]ederal income tax purposes.” Ibid.; see § 446(e). But in Revenue Procedure 99-17 the Commissioner granted what is commonly called “blanket consent” to taxpayers wishing to adopt mark-to-market acco

Section 2.1.2 of the 2014 option agreement defined Date.0 as August 29, 2014, and defined Date.1 through Date.120 as the first date of each of the respective subsequent 120 full calendar quarters starting after August 29, 2014. It would seemingly follow that Date.1 is October 1, 2014, and that Date.120 is July 1, 2044. However, section 2.1.1 of the

We refer to the first crime as “theft,” and the second as “theft by deception.” 2. Petitioners’ allegations Petitioners allege that in 2008 Messrs. Tatum and Olson misappropriated $2 million of the $2,500,000 paid to VT Enterprises in exchange for 25 shares in Carib Gaming. They contend that “none of those monies were used as represented to

in connection with the assumption and/or assignment of the Assigned Contracts.” Section 2.4(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement specified, in relevant part: [Infotelecom] shall pay and discharge and be responsible for all Cure Costs, including those relating to AT&T and its affiliates but specifically excluding any Cure Costs payable in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Verizon ICAs (the “Verizon Cure”), and

2011-12 § 2.05(1), 2.05(3), 2.07(1), 2011-2 I.R.B. 297. Thus, for 2011, couples entitled to make a joint return who were both over the age of 65 were required to file a return if their combined gross income exceeded $21,300. See § 6012(a)(1)(A)(iv). For 2011, the Fraziers’ gross income was $645,080,70 which exceeds the filing threshold of $21,300. Thus, th

The Canada-U.S. Income Tax Treaty is one such treaty, duly enacted by the authority vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. “The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008). Further, as the opinion of the Court exp

The claim is property of the corporation. Id. (“Claims or causes of action that constitute property of the corporation do not belong to its shareholders individually; nor do corporate claims become the property of the shareholder who acts as plaintiff in a derivative action . . . [I]n virtually all instances, any judgment recover

ayer specifically designates the payments to a particular tax year. See Estate of Adell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-89, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1466 (citing Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-26, § 2.02, 2002-1 C.B. 746, 746 (stating that if no designation is made, the payments will be allocated by the IRS to periods in the order of priority that it deems will serve its best interest). Petitioner does not contend that she designated her payme

§ 2 for tax years 2000 through 2004. On May 4, 2007, following a two-week trial, a jury found petitioners guilty on all five counts charged in the indictment. Mr. Aldridge served nine years in prison, and Ms. Aldridge served five years and three months in prison. II. Petitioners’ Background Mr. Aldridge graduated from high school in 1975, after whi

§ 2A:34-23(h) (West 2018),17 that she had a substantial equitable interest in the couple’s marital property and that any transfer to her would have to exceed her “actual and equitable interest” in the couple’s marital property before it could be a fraud on Mr. Cotroneo’s creditors. We disagree for several reasons. First and foremost, whatever equit

For example, building codes may require 6 air changes per hour in a laboratory and 20 air changes per hour in an 3 This Opinion will use the term “employee” in the colloquial sense and not as defined in section 3401(c).

sey. In the 2005 Agreement, YA Global “constitute[d] and appoint[ed]” Yorkville Advisors “as the Partnership’s Agent and attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to buy, sell, or otherwise deal with the [Partnership’s] account.” 2005 Agreement § 2. The agreement further states that the “power of attorney” granted to Yorkville Advisors “is coupled with an interest and is irrevocable.” Id. Section 3 of the 2005 Agreement provided: “The Partnership shall promptly advise the Investment Manager

blished a simplified reporting regime for taxpayers who held interests in Canadian retirement plans. The notice coordinated certain reporting rules with the requirements for making a deferral election under Revenue Procedure 2002-23. Notice 2003-75, § 2.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 1204. Before Notice 2003-75, taxpayers who made the deferral election had to comply with Revenue Procedure 2002-23, were subject to section 6048 reporting requirements, and had to file Form 3520, Annual Return to Report Transac

at 343, and a capital interest is, in turn, an interest that would “give the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership’s assets were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the partnership,” id. § 2.01. This theoretical liquidation is to occur “at the time of receipt

at person was not a bona fide USVI resident? The IRS issued interim guidance addressing this question in 2007, after Mr. Tanner filed his USVI returns and after the IRS received the cover-over requests for the years in issue. I.R.S. Notice 2007-19, §§ 2 and 3, 2007-1 C.B. 689, 689–90, provided that an individual who took the position on a USVI return that he was a bona fide USVI resident and had gross income greater than $75,000 could trigger section 6501(a) only by also filing a U.S. Form 1040

On July 21, 2014, the group manager reviewed the case, signed civil penalty approval forms approving the assertion of the section 2 On July 1, 2019, the Office of Appeals was renamed the Independent Office of Appeals.

3.3.6 Any such maintenance or alterations shall be conducted in accordance with a reasonable interpretation of the standards for golf course maintenance set out in Section 2.3 herein [requiring Duplin Land to follow the “best environmental practices then prevailing in the golf industry”].

Kleinberger, Limited Liability Companies § 2:83 Westlaw (database updated June 2023) (“The transfer of the interest in a disregarded entity is not treated as a transfer of the interest for federal tax purposes, but rather as a transfer of the assets of the disregarded entity.”).

This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that the transaction described in section 2 of this notice is a tax avoidance transaction .

2015-13, § 2.06(1), 2015-5 I.R.B.

539, 540 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360c). Class I medical devices are subject to the fewest regulatory controls, and class III medical devices are subject to the most stringent controls. Class III medical devices must comply with certain controls and go through a premarket approval (PMA) process. The PMA process is lengthy and

Kazmi described his job title as “bookkeeper” and his duties as “to take care of payroll.” In section 2, block 1 of the form, he indicated that he did not determine financial policy for Urgent Care, that he did not authorize payments of bills or creditors, and that he did not authorize payroll.

2015-40, § 2.01(2), 2015-35 I.R.B.

2All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. - 3 - [*3] 1.41-4A(d)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. We agree and will accordingly grant respondent’s motion. Background Th

The indictment charged that petitioner and his wife “did willfully attempt to evade and defeat the income tax due and owing * * * by failing to make an income tax return” for 2004-2006. The alleged overt acts included purchasing and selling property in the names of nominees and trusts, creating false warranty deeds to facilitate the transfe

2All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. - 3 - [*3] 1.41-4A(d)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. We agree and will accordingly grant respondent’s motion. Background Th

Generally, - 20 - [*20] the Commissioner will reject an offer based on doubt as to collectibility when the taxpayer’s RCP exceeds the amount he proposes to pay, absent a showing of special circumstances. See id. sec. 4.02(2); see also Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 486. We judge the settlement officer’s determination on the ground

$21,980 for 2010 and 2011, respectively, on Schedules C; (5) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct office expenses of $46,717 and $53,420 for 2010 and 2011, respectively, on Schedules C; (6) whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax under section 2 At trial petitioner moved for summary judgment that res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel bar respondent from asserting these deficiencies, additions to tax, and penalties.

2All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. - 3 - [*3] 1.41-4A(d)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. We agree and will accordingly grant respondent’s motion. Background Th

le relative to the taxpayer’s HHI as a percentage of the FPL. See sec. 36B(b)(3)(A). Ms. Heston’s HHI as a percentage of the FPL was 316%. The applicable percentage for a taxpayer whose HHI was 316% of the FPL for 2017 was 9.69%. Rev. Proc. 2016-24, sec. 2, 2016-18 I.R.B. 677, 677. The Court can then calculate that Ms. Heston’s contribution amount was $303.12.10 This amount is more than the $126.06 of monthly premium that Ms. Heston actually paid. In turn the Court can calculate the excess, if a

2All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. - 3 - [*3] 1.41-4A(d)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. We agree and will accordingly grant respondent’s motion. Background Th

chemes in the light of section 165 and its accompanying regulations. The latter provides “an optional safe harbor under which qualified investors * * * may treat a loss as a theft loss deduction when certain conditions are met.” Rev. Proc. 2009-20, sec. 2.04, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 749. This revenue procedure applies at the entity level. The safe harbor is made available to a “qualified investor” who experiences a “qualified loss”. Id. sec. 5.01, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750-751. A qualified loss is 7We not

2All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar. - 3 - [*3] 1.41-4A(d)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. We agree and will accordingly grant respondent’s motion. Background Th

, Rita A. Cavanagh & Sean M. Akins, Litigation ofFederal Civil Tax Controversies, para. 3.01, at 3-2 (2d ed. 2016) ("No tax may be collected by the - 12 - [*12] Service until after it has been assessed."); 1 Laurence F. Casey, Federal Tax Practice, sec. 2.01, at 2-3 to 2-4 (Supp. 2019). The authority ofthe IRS to assess is subject to statutory restrictions designed to protect taxpayers. Under section 6501(a), the IRS cannot assess tax more than three years after the return was filed.2 Under sect

defines the "Payment" as the sum of$23 million. 4Mr. Choudry no longer held an interest in any ofthe NCA entities. -9- [*9] Section 2.g., "Enforcement ofPayment," provides that ifCommonfund does not timely make the Payment, NCA may direct Commonfund to dismiss its appeal and may enforce the Amended Judgment up to $23 million. Section

* * * * * * * ARTICLE II Allocation of Purchase Price and Terms of Payment Section 2.1 Purchase Price and Allocation The purchase price to be paid by the Purchaser to the Seller for the sale and transfer ofthe Assets to the Purchaser in accordance with the provisions ofthis Agreement is the sum ofEight Hundred Ninety One Thousand Ninety Four Dollars and Four Cents ($891,094.04) and shall be allocated as follows: a.

decision to accept or reject an OIC, along with the terms ofthe compromise, is in the Secretary's discretion. See 4 para. (c)(1). The Commissioner has created guidelines for settlement officers to follow in evaluating an OIC. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 2.02, 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Generally, an OIC based on doubt as to collectibility "will be considered ¹sIn his petition Dr. Elkins claims that the settlement officer failed to verify the IRS' compliance with sec. 6404(g). He did not renew that a

defines the "Payment" as the sum of$23 million. 4Mr. Choudry no longer held an interest in any ofthe NCA entities. -9- [*9] Section 2.g., "Enforcement ofPayment," provides that ifCommonfund does not timely make the Payment, NCA may direct Commonfund to dismiss its appeal and may enforce the Amended Judgment up to $23 million. Section

defines the "Payment" as the sum of$23 million. 4Mr. Choudry no longer held an interest in any ofthe NCA entities. -9- [*9] Section 2.g., "Enforcement ofPayment," provides that ifCommonfund does not timely make the Payment, NCA may direct Commonfund to dismiss its appeal and may enforce the Amended Judgment up to $23 million. Section

2.01, 1999-2 C.B. 109, 109. However, such a request to appeal an issue is not a right. The request may be denied, and there is no right to appeal such a denial. Il sec. 2.09, 1999-2 C.B. at 110. We need not reach the question ofwhether approval would be required iffast track settlement or early referral were granted, because those facts are no

at 298 (citing section 1.482- 1(a)(3), Income Tax Regs.). - 224 - However, Rev. Proc. 99-32 added a new procedural requirement that did not appear in Rev. Proc. 65-17. A taxpayer seeking to avail itselfofdividend offset treatment for a taxpayer-initiated section 482 adjustment was directed to "file a statement with its Federal

schemes in the light ofsection 165 and its accompanying regulations. The latter provides "an optional safe harbor under which qualified investors * * * may treat a loss as a theft loss deduction when certain conditions are met." Rev. Proc. 2009- 20, sec. 2.04, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 749. The safe harbor is made available to a "qualified investor" who experiences a "qualified loss". Id. sec. 5.01, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750-751. A qualified loss is defined to include a loss "from a specified fraudulent arr

intervenor a notice ofdeficiency for 2010 determining a deficiency of$7,588 and an accuracy-related penalty of$1,518. The notice ofdeficiency determined unreported taxable retirement income of$24,917 attributable to intervenor. 4 Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 2.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 397, states that ajoint return signed by an individual under duress is not a valid return as to that individual. Petitioner does not contend that she was under duress when she signed the returns for the years at issue.

defines the "Payment" as the sum of$23 million. 4Mr. Choudry no longer held an interest in any ofthe NCA entities. -9- [*9] Section 2.g., "Enforcement ofPayment," provides that ifCommonfund does not timely make the Payment, NCA may direct Commonfund to dismiss its appeal and may enforce the Amended Judgment up to $23 million. Section

The taxpayer in Tucker argued that the Appeals personnel involved in his case were officers who were not appointed in compliance with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 ofthe Constitution (commonly referred to as the Appointments Clause).

2.01, 1999-2 C.B. 109, 109. However, such a request to appeal an issue is not a right. The request may be denied, and there is no right to appeal such a denial. Il sec. 2.09, 1999-2 C.B. at 110. We need not reach the question ofwhether approval would be required iffast track settlement or early referral were granted, because those facts are no

schemes in the light ofsection 165 and its accompanying regulations. The latter provides "an optional safe harbor under which qualified investors * * * may treat a loss as a theft loss deduction when certain conditions are met." Rev. Proc. 2009- 20, sec. 2.04, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 749. The safe harbor is made available to a "qualified investor" who experiences a "qualified loss". Id. sec. 5.01, 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750-751. A qualified loss is defined to include a loss "from a specified fraudulent arr

The IRS priority tax claims of$671,318.55 shall be allowed in full and paid in accordance with the terms of§§ 2.2 and 5.2 ofthe Confirmed Ohana Cabo LLC's Chapter 11 Plan ofReorganization As Amended ("Plan").

2When the parties filed their remand motion, the Court had not yet addres- sed whether it had authorityto remand a whistleblowercase to the Office. In 2019 we held for the first time that in appropriate circumstances we have such authority. Whistleblower 769-16W v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. __ (Apr. 11, 2019). - 5 - [*5] 7623(b)(1). In docket No

2When the parties filed their remand motion, the Court had not yet addres- sed whether it had authorityto remand a whistleblowercase to the Office. In 2019 we held for the first time that in appropriate circumstances we have such authority. Whistleblower 769-16W v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. __ (Apr. 11, 2019). - 5 - [*5] 7623(b)(1). In docket No

he standard mileage rate. The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rate annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883. For 2012 the rate was 55.5 cents per mile. See Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, 260. For 2013 the rate was 56.5 cents per mile. See Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673, 673. -6- 2Petitioners attached Form 4562, Depreciation and Amortization, to their 2012 return which shows how the $7,465 deprec

and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions. S_e_e sec. 63(b). Gross income includes pension income. See sec. 61(a)(11). For 2013, the standard deduction for an individual with single filing status was $6,100, s_ee sec. 63(c); Rev. Proc. 2013-15, sec. 2.07(1), 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 448, and the exemption amount was $3,900, see sec. 151; Rev. Proc. 2013-15, sec. 2.11(1), 2013-5 I.R.B. at 448. In general, every U.S. resident whose gross income for the taxable year equals or exceeds the exemption am

e Basilica.6 4The standard mileage rate is 14 cents for purposes ofcomputing the sec. 170(a) deduction for mileage in connection with a charitable contribution. See sec. 170(i); Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 5.01, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 885; Notice 2012- 1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, 260. 5We takejudicial notice that the distance from petitioner's home in Maryland to the Basilica is 33 miles (one way). See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 6At trial before another Judge, the Court reserved ruling on the admission o

Article 3, section 2 ofthe U.S.-Russia Treaty provides that any term not defined in the treaty shall "have the meaning which it has under the laws ofthat State concerning the taxes to which this Convention applies." The Internal Revenue Code provides no definition of"grant" or "allowance", however.

section 7122(d) the Secretary has developed guidelines and procedures to evaluate the adequacy ofan offer-in- compromise, including regulations, the IRM, and other publications used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 2.02, 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The IRM informs a settlement officer that the COIC unit determines whether an offer-in-compromise is processable. Ifthe COIC rejects an offer-in-compromise as not being processable, a taxpayermay appeal the decision t

be honest", "to be cooperative", "to provide accurate information and documents on time", "to keep records", and "to pay taxes on time". NTA 2007 report at 488-489. -21- publish a TBOR along the lines proposed by Ms. Olson. H.R. 5716, 110th Cong., sec. 2 (2008); H.R. 5047, 111th Cong., sec. 101 (2010); S. 3215, 111th Cong., sec. 101 (2010); H.R. 6050, 112th Cong., sec. 101 (2012); S. 3355, 112th Cong., sec. 101 (2012). Each ofthose bills stated that the proposed TBOR would "not create or confer

016). Pursuant to the authority granted in section 7122(d), the Secretary has developed guidelines and procedures to evaluate the adequacy ofan OIC, including regulations, the IRM, and other publications used by the IRS. See also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 2.02, 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The IRM informs a settlement officer that the Centralized Offer in Compromise (COIC) unit determines whether an OIC is processable. IRM pt. 8.22.7.10.1.1(1) (Sept. 23, 2014). The Holtsville COIC Unit determined that p

Principal Officers must be nominated and confirmed by the Senate, and in the case ofinferior Officers "Congress may by Law vest" their appointment "as they [in Congress] think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts ofLaw, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2; see id. cl. 1; Tucker v. Commissioner

iles petitioner claims to have driven. The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of56.5 cents per mile for 2013 is set forth in Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673, 673. In the notice and as relevant, respondent: (1) disallowed Schedule C expense deductions for car and truck, rent or lease ofother business property, and rent or lease ofvehicles, machinery, and equipment; (2) disallowe

tioners' underpayment was due to a substantial understatement ofincome tax. S_e_e sec. 6662(a), (b)(2). A taxpayer may be liable for a 20% accuracy-related penalty on the portion ofan underpayment ofincome tax attributable to a 9See Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673, 673. - 16 - substantial understatement ofincome tax. Id. The Commissioner bears the burden ofproduction with respect to a section 6662 accuracy-relatedpenalty in any court proceeding with respect to the liability ofany indi

A: All 18 revenue procedures specifically discuss in section 2 in the background that the Commissioner is given right to weigh substantiation requirements in certain circumstances including for travel, and the I.R.S.

A: All 18 revenue procedures specifically discuss in section 2 in the background that the Commissioner is given right to weigh substantiation requirements in certain circumstances including for travel, and the I.R.S.

nd place ofbusiness or employment are 6The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 55.5 cents per mile for 2012 is set forth in Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, 260. The standard mileage rate of56.5 cents per mile for 2013 is set forth in Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673, 673. - 9 - nondeductible personal expenses. Secs. 162(a), 262(a); Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d

nts per mile for purposes of computing the amount ofa sec. 170(a) charitable contribution deduction for miles a taxpayer drives in connection with a charitable organization. See Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 5.01, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 885; Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673, 673. - 13 - allow a deduction to that extent. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). But for certain kinds ofbusiness expenses section 274(d) overrides the Cohan rule, and these expenses, ifotherwise a

Section 2.2(a) ofthe supplement to the trust agreements states that no interest in the subtrust may be transferred except as provided in section 2.2(b) and transfers not in compliance - 7 - [*7] with section 2.2(b) shall be considered null and void. Section 2.2(b) provides that interests in the subtrusts and the subtrusts' assets may be transferre

Section 2.2(a) ofthe supplement to the trust agreements states that no interest in the subtrust may be transferred except as provided in section 2.2(b) and transfers not in compliance - 7 - [*7] with section 2.2(b) shall be considered null and void. Section 2.2(b) provides that interests in the subtrusts and the subtrusts' assets may be transferre

Section 2.2(a) ofthe supplement to the trust agreements states that no interest in the subtrust may be transferred except as provided in section 2.2(b) and transfers not in compliance - 7 - [*7] with section 2.2(b) shall be considered null and void. Section 2.2(b) provides that interests in the subtrusts and the subtrusts' assets may be transferre

Section 2.2(a) ofthe supplement to the trust agreements states that no interest in the subtrust may be transferred except as provided in section 2.2(b) and transfers not in compliance - 7 - [*7] with section 2.2(b) shall be considered null and void. Section 2.2(b) provides that interests in the subtrusts and the subtrusts' assets may be transferre

2.401(a) (West 2006), there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support the proposition that the relationship between petitioner and Ms. Hassan was a legal and valid common law marriage at anytime relevant to these proceedings. In short, while petitioner and Ms. Hassan once lived in Texas, there is no evidence that they agreed to be mar

Section 2 ofNotice 2006-101 states: [I]n order to be treated as a qualified foreign corporation under the treaty test, a foreign corporation must be eligible for benefits ofone ofthe U.S. income tax treaties listed in the Appendix. Accordingly, the foreign corporation must be a resident within the meaning ofsuch term under the relevant treaty and m

respond to this order. 3 The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rate annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883. For 2012 the rate was 55.5 cents per mile. See Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260. - 4 - [*4] OPINION I. Burden ofProof As a general rule, the Commissioner's determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that the determinations are erroneous. Rule

An official comment to Uniform Commercial Code section 2-511 notes that "the taking ofa seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper and, ifdue diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way." (Emphasis added.) The implication is that there must be instances where the manner ofcashing lacks due diligence or was unreasonable.

djustment Other--misc. material for renovation 6,311 Disallowed in full¹ Total 39,520 ¹As previously indicated, petitioners conceded this adjustment. 4The standard business mileage rate of56.5 cents per mile for 2013 is set forth in Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-50 I.R.B., 673, 673. The Court notes that 32,218 miles × 56.5 cents per mile = $18,203, but petitioners reported car and truck expenses totaling $18,453. As previously indicated, petitioners conceded that they overstated their mileage on

Section 2.2(a) ofthe supplement to the trust agreements states that no interest in the subtrust may be transferred except as provided in section 2.2(b) and transfers not in compliance - 7 - [*7] with section 2.2(b) shall be considered null and void. Section 2.2(b) provides that interests in the subtrusts and the subtrusts' assets may be transferre

2.401(a) (West 2006), there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support the proposition that the relationship between petitioner and Ms. Hassan was a legal and valid common law marriage at anytime relevant to these proceedings. In short, while petitioner and Ms. Hassan once lived in Texas, there is no evidence that they agreed to be mar

the credit is phased out at a much lower income level. See sec. 32(a) and (b). The EITC is completely phased out for a taxpayer who does not have a qualifying child and whose earned income equals or exceeds $14,340 for 2013. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, sec. 2.05, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 446-447. - 11 - Since petitioner's earned income for 2013, $25,886, exceeds this amount, he is not eligible for the EITC. See id. V. Head ofHousehold Section 1(b) prescribes a relatively favorable tax schedule for a taxp

2.04, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 397. No one factor is determinative, and "[t]he degree ofimportance ofeach factor varies depending on the requesting -12- spouse's facts and circumstances." R sec. 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. The factors "are the requesting spouse's: (1) marital status; (2) economic hardship if reliefis not granted; (3) knowledge o

- 37 - [*37] assignment ofan insurance policy as not fraudulent). These cases demonstrate the principles codified in the uniform fraudulent transfer laws but do not set forth a specific analysis used to determine whether to disregard the form of a transaction. Respondent also cites Tennessee tax cases that considered equitable principles t

tion, and earnings from 3 The earned income tax credit is completely phased out for a taxpayerwho does not have a qualifying child and whose earned income equals or exceeds $14,340 and $14,590 for 2013 and 2014, respectively. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, sec. 2.05, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 446; Rev. Proc. 2013-35, sec. 3.06, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 540. - 10 - self-employmentthat is includable in gross income for the taxable year. M sec. 32(c)(2). We have already held that neither G.G.B.H. nor K.J. was a quali

2.401(a) (West 2006); Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993). All three elements must coexist to establish a valid common law marriage. Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App. 1991). On the record before us there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. Sahadi and Mr. Athas were not "common law" married in

ompliance with income tax laws; and (7) mental and physical health."¹4 The most critical inquiry for this case is whether Dr. Ryke either knew or had reason to know that the liabilities shown on the returns would not be paid. We "Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 2.04, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 397. ¹²Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400-403. ¹³Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2). ¹4Boyle v. Commissioner, at *12-*13. - 9 - [*9] find that Dr. Ryke had both knowledge that at least some part ofthe t

at 8. - 23 - tax penalty on single persons". Bittker & Lokken, supra, para. 111.5.5. In response Congress enacted a new rate schedule in 1969 applicable to single individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads ofhouseholds) but did not apply the new rate schedule to married taxpayers filing separately. Tax Reform Act of 1969

standard mileage rate in lieu ofactual costs ofusing their vehicles for business, as prescribed by Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 4.02, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 884. See sec. 1.274-5(g)(1), Income Tax Regs. At the standard mileage rate for 2012, Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, petitioners would be entitled to a deduction of$46,207 ifthey could establish that those miles were driven for business. Petitioners have offered no explanation for the discrepancybetween this amount and the amount reported

uaranty is contingent upon the primary obligor's failure to pay the debt. Mylander v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-191, at *19 (citing Perry v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159, 163 (1966), affd, 392 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968), and 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty, sec. 2 (2010)). The guarantor ofa contingent liability generally does not recognize income upon discharge ofa debt. Landreth v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 803, 812-813 (1968). Such a discharge creates no previously untaxed accretion in assets that would r

prescribed by sec. 274(n). Petitioners claimed 4,000 and 6,338 business miles for Mr. Martinez and Mrs. Martinez, respectively, using the standard mileage rate. The standard mileage rate of55.5 cents per mile for 2012 is set forth in Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, 260. - 6 - child tax credit of$2,000. On their Schedule A petitioners claimed deductions including the following: Expense Amount Unreimbursed employee business $24,515 Gifts to charity: Cash or check 3,646 Other than by cash

- 37 - [*37] assignment ofan insurance policy as not fraudulent). These cases demonstrate the principles codified in the uniform fraudulent transfer laws but do not set forth a specific analysis used to determine whether to disregard the form of a transaction. Respondent also cites Tennessee tax cases that considered equitable principles t

435, 436. A U.S. shareholder, with respect to any foreign corporation, is a U.S. person who owns under section 958(a), or is considered as owning under section 958(b), 10% or more ofthe total combined voting power ofall classes ofstock entitled to vote ofthe foreign corporation. Sec. 951(b). Section 6046 requires information rep

- 37 - [*37] assignment ofan insurance policy as not fraudulent). These cases demonstrate the principles codified in the uniform fraudulent transfer laws but do not set forth a specific analysis used to determine whether to disregard the form of a transaction. Respondent also cites Tennessee tax cases that considered equitable principles t

o. 100-647, title VI, subtitle J, sec. 6236(f), 102 Stat. at 3740. The Court's analysis will accordingly be focused on Congress' intent in adding section 6343(a)(1)(D). The first version ofsection 6343(a)(1)(D) was introduced in S. 2400, 98th Cong., sec. 2 (1984). The bill's purpose was "[t]o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to safeguard taxpayer's rights"; section 2(e) (Individual Provision) ofthe bill proposed to amend section 6343(a) to include: "(...continued) at 1138 (adding subsec.

- 37 - [*37] assignment ofan insurance policy as not fraudulent). These cases demonstrate the principles codified in the uniform fraudulent transfer laws but do not set forth a specific analysis used to determine whether to disregard the form of a transaction. Respondent also cites Tennessee tax cases that considered equitable principles t

Section 2 ofthe agreement, captioned "Grant ofExclusive Rights," pro- vided that the licensors granted to Mutual "[t]he exclusive rights to utilize the Technology only to develop Products that Mutual, United, and Hygrosol, acting in good faith will unanimously select." Mutual was also granted the exclusive right, within the United States, "to produ

fthe requirement to substantiate the amount ofeach business use (i.e., the business mileage) or the time and business purpose ofeach use. Sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate for 2012 was 55.5 cents per mile. Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, 260. Consequently, substantiation ofmiles and business purpose is a prerequisite to claiming a deduction. This prerequisite applies regardless of whether petitioner meant to claim his actual automobile expenses for 2012 or

Pursuant to a plea agreement signed March 14, 2007, Mr. Howell pleaded guilty to both counts ofthe indictment. CID Special Agents Robert Miranda and Steven Ashcroft were assigned primary responsibility for the later CID investigation ofMr. Howell and Mr. Robins. During the investigation, the special agents ordered and examined the original

4.03, further states that the election eliminates "the collateral effects ofsecondary adjustments, such as those described in section 2 [regarding deemed dividend treatment]." C.

the Closing Date (the "Effective Time"). ARTICLE II. REPRESENTATIONSAND WARRANTIES OF THE SELLERS As an inducement to enter into this Agreement, the Sellers herebyjointly and severally represent and warrant to the Purchaser as follows: * * * * * * * Section 2.10. Retained Assets. Immediately following the Closing hereunder, the Company's assets will consist only of(i) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (ii) $11,955.46 which shall be in the bank account #0099990437 with Fifth Third Bank

2.05, 2000-2 C.B. at 308. The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished propert

Constitution, which extends the "judicial power" to various enumerated types of"Cases" and "Controversies". See Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. at 6 n.9. - 52 - [*52] liability. A lien-notice filing can cause injury to a taxpayer even after the underlying liability has been paid. See William T. Plumb, Jr., "The Creatio

2.05, 2000-2 C.B. at 308. The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished propert

Both agreements state: Section 2.4 Quality a.

2.05, 2000-2 C.B. at 308. The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished propert

s miles he claims to have driven.4 4The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 50 cents per mile for 2010 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930, 930. - 10 - Petitioner contends that the tolls were paid through the use ofa Sunpass account. According to petitioner, the tolls expense includes only tolls paid for travel between the office and the Miami areajobsites.

Article 3 ofthe Janssen approval was entitled "Consent to Sublicense" and read, in part: "(a) Janssen consents to a sublicense by Mylan to Forest ofthe rights and licenses granted in Section 2.1 ofthe [2001 agreement]." In 2006 Mylan received a $75 million upfront payment as a part ofthe consideration due under the 2006 agreement.

pay Federal or State estate tax with respect to any property required to be included in the gross taxable estate, the amount oftax is to be equitably apportioned among the persons interested in the gross taxable estate. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law sec. 2-1.8(a) (McKinney 2012). The amount oftax is apportioned among the persons benefited in the proportion that the value ofthe property or interest received by each such person benefited bears to the total value ofthe property and interest receive

manner which would assist them with overcoming financial and substance abuse issues, to - 4 - [*4] live more fulfilling lives, and to provide benefits to those individuals who had assisted and befriended Mrs. Hersh during her lifetime. Article II, sec. 2.2, ofthe Hersh revocable trust agreement establishes limitations on petitioner's discretion in his capacity as trustee as follows: 2.2 Distribution Restrictions. Grantor has established this Trust Agreement with the intention ofproviding * * *

penses incurred in connection with the exploration for, or development of, oil or gas within the United States". National Energy Security Act of 1997, H.R. 1648, 105th Cong., sec. 4 (1997); Domestic Oil and Gas Preservation Act, S. 770, 105th Cong., sec. 2 (1997)." The deduction would have been allowed for the year the expense was paid or incurred. H.R. 1648, 105th Cong., sec. 4; S. 770, 105th Cong., sec. 2. This is a difference from section 167(h), which generally requires "We observethatbefore

Article 3 ofthe Janssen approval was entitled "Consent to Sublicense" and read, in part: "(a) Janssen consents to a sublicense by Mylan to Forest ofthe rights and licenses granted in Section 2.1 ofthe [2001 agreement]." In 2006 Mylan received a $75 million upfront payment as a part ofthe consideration due under the 2006 agreement.

the Closing Date (the "Effective Time"). ARTICLE II. REPRESENTATIONSAND WARRANTIES OF THE SELLERS As an inducement to enter into this Agreement, the Sellers herebyjointly and severally represent and warrant to the Purchaser as follows: * * * * * * * Section 2.10. Retained Assets. Immediately following the Closing hereunder, the Company's assets will consist only of(i) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (ii) $11,955.46 which shall be in the bank account #0099990437 with Fifth Third Bank

the Closing Date (the "Effective Time"). ARTICLE II. REPRESENTATIONSAND WARRANTIES OF THE SELLERS As an inducement to enter into this Agreement, the Sellers herebyjointly and severally represent and warrant to the Purchaser as follows: * * * * * * * Section 2.10. Retained Assets. Immediately following the Closing hereunder, the Company's assets will consist only of(i) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (ii) $11,955.46 which shall be in the bank account #0099990437 with Fifth Third Bank

sec 2.401(a) (West 2006); Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993). All three elements must coexist to establish a valid common law marriage. Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App. 1991). While Mrs. Saenz and Mr. Nieto did reside together during 2011, we fmd that they were not married for this year. As ofAugust 2011 Mrs. Saen

he Record At the close ofthe trial the Court left the record open for 60 days to permit the parties to exchange and possibly stipulate additional records that might allow 3(...continued) 50 cents per mile for 2010 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930, 930. -8- petitioners to substantiate the deductions in dispute. Petitioners failedto exchange any additional documents with respondent, and the record was closed. Discussion As a general rule, the Commissioner's determi

Because neither message provides the listener with this basic information, the messages present "positions unsupported by facts", id. sec. 3.03 (factor 1), and are "not aimed at developing an understanding on the part ofthe intended audience * * * because * * * [they do] not consider * * * [the audience's] background or training in the s

2The letter from the Department ofthe Army predated the NFTL by approximately 11 months and did not establish whyMr. Bateman's security clearance was denied. -5- [*5] 6323(j)(1)(A), (C). In short, respondent's determination not to withdrawthe NFTL was not arbitrary or capricious. See Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. at 23. Contentions we hav

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida on October 15, 2008, wherein he pleaded guilty to one count ofviolating section 7206(2) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 2 by aiding and assisting in the preparation ofmaterially false and fraudulent tax returns. The remaining 38 counts were dismissed pu

justed gross income in excess of$13,660 for tax year 2011. Since Ms. Cowan reported adjusted gross income of$13,920 on her 2011 return, the EITC would be completely phased out in her case, in the absence ofa qualifying child. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, sec. 2.04(1), 2011-2 I.R.B. 297, 299. -14- [*14] status, it would have to be by virtue ofMarquis's being a "qualifying relative". However, ifthe taxpayer's dependent qualifies as such because of section 152(d)(2)(H), the taxpayer is not a head ofhous

l to medical care". Sec. 213(d)(1)(A) and (B). Transportation primarily for and essential to medical care is deductible at a set mileage rate. The standard mileage rate for medical transportation was 16.5 cents per mile for 2010. Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01(3), 2009-51 I.R.B. 930. A taxpayer is generally required to keep sufficient records to enable the Secretary to determine the taxpayer's correct income tax liability. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. To substantiate medical and

We ascertain from the mileage summary that petitioner claimed the standard mileage rate with respect to 1,280 miles reported for days traveled after September 25, 2010. The standard mileage rate for 2010 is 50 cents per mile. See Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930, 930. See generally sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. (stating that the Commissioner may establish a procedure for 7While respondent questions the accuracy ofthe reported mileage, we find nothing in the record from wh

ue Code of 1954". Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3. Congress made significant amendments in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, and redesignated the Internal Revenue Code as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", il sec. 2, 100 Stat. at 2095. Congress has made other - 7 - [*7] changes in the intervening years. In each case the changes were made by statutes passed by Congress and signed by the President as required under the Constitution. See, g, Urban v. Commiss

Because neither message provides the listener with this basic information, the messages present "positions unsupported by facts", id. sec. 3.03 (factor 1), and are "not aimed at developing an understanding on the part ofthe intended audience * * * because * * * [they do] not consider * * * [the audience's] background or training in the s

Washington law, "apparent authority exists where words or conduct by the principal are reasonably interpreted by a third party as conferring authority upon the agent." State v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 1278, 1284 (Wash. 2002) (citing Restatement, Agency 3d, sec. 2.03 (2000)); see also Udall v. T.D. Escrow Servs., Inc., 154 P.3d 882, 888 (Wash. 2007) ("An agent has apparent authority when a third party reasonably believes the agent has authority to act on behalfofthe principal and that beliefis traceable

nd the taxpayerbears the burden of 5The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 50 cents per mile for 2010 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930, 930. -8- proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).6 Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayergenerally bears the burden ofproving entitle

endency exemption deduction forML. 5The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 50 cents per mile for 2010 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930, 930. - 7 - At the conclusion ofthe trial the Court left the record open for a briefperiod to permit petitioner to produce additional documentation substantiating his vehicle expenses. The parties were unable, however, t

Section 2.01(a) provided that all who were employees on January 1, 2001 were participants in the ESOP. Moreover, IRC § 409(b) and Section 3.4 of the ESOP plan document both required allocation ofthe acquired Employer Stock as ofthe December 31 ofthe ESOP's 2001 plan year. The Employer failed to provide records ofstock allocation or participant acco

Section 2: Evidence thattaxpayer did comply voluntarily and paid all taxes due for these periods as soon as monies were available to do so. Section 3: Evidence that collection activityhas continued to persist after request for collection due process hearing. 1) Filing ofFederal Tax Lien on 09/21/2010 (Appeal Letter stated that appeal was timely and

at 854. Before the enactment ofsection 1038, - 8 - reacquisition ofreal property was treated as a taxable exchange under section 453. S. Rept. No. 88-1361, at 5 (1964), 1964-2 C.B. 828, 831. If, as in this case, the initial sale ofthe propertywas reported as an installment sale, gain or loss on reacquisition ofthe property was tre

sent such evidence, these entities could not qualify under this Opinion as instrumentalities ofa foreign 2°See S. 506, 111th Cong., sec. 309 (2009); H.R. 2136, 110th Cong., sec. 309 (2007); S. 681, 110th Cong., sec. 309 (2007); S. 1890, 109th Cong., sec. 2 (2005); S. 936, 108th Cong., sec. 2 (2003). -41- government for purposes ofsection 162(f). And we see little relevance in the fact that Congress has not amended section 162(f) to cover amounts paid to non- governmental entities. Our holding is

Section 2.2 ofthe second amended operating agreement stated that Virginia Conservation "in accordance with a separate agreement between the parties, has made an additional capital contribution to the Company [Route 231] in an amount equal to * * * $0.53 for each $1.00 of Virginia Credits allocated to" Virginia Conservation. Section 3.5 ofthe second

2C:35-13 (West 2005). It appears thatthe criminal prosecution ofintervenor on the charge ofthird- degree theft by deceptionwas postponed after intervenor's application for admission to the statewide Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) was accepted. See generally, ä sec. 2C:43-12 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014). The PTI is a program underwhich certain

performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business". Sec. 1.469-9(b)(4), Income Tax Regs. We reject the IRS's argument. A trust is an arrangement whereby trustees manage assets for the trust's beneficiaries. 1 Restatement, Trusts 3d, sec. 2 (2003) (a trust "is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, * * * subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of" others); see also sec. 301.7701-4(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs. ("In

ii). For a taxpayerto qualify, in part, for the earned income tax credit without any qualifying children for 2011, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income must have been less than $13,660 ifnot filing jointly. Sec. 32(b)(2), (j)(1); Rev. Proc. 2011-12, sec. 2.04, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297, 299. Petitioner's adjusted gross income for 2011 exceeded that amount, and he is not entitled to the earned income tax credit. We have considered the other arguments ofthe parties, and they are not material to our conclu

Income Tax Regs., grants the Commissioner the authority to establish a method under which a taxpayermay use mileage rates to substantiate, for purposes ofsec. 274(d), the expense ofusing a vehicle for business purposes. See also Rev. Proc. 2008-72, sec. 2.01, 2008-50 I.R.B. 1286, 1286. Ifthe taxpayer elects to use the standard mileage rate, he or she is still required to show the business mileage, the time and place, and the business purpose ofthe travel. See Nicely v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2

ion to make a payment under the guaranty was contingent upon the primary obligor's (i.e., the Ledbetters') failure to pay the debt.¹³ See Perry v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159, 163 (1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968); 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty, sec. 2 (2010) ("A guaranty creates a secondary obligation under which the guarantor promises to be responsible for the debt ofanother. The guarantor is only secondarily liable in the event the debtor does not perform the primary obligation."). The gua

eliefis available only from an understatement or a deficiency and not from an underpayment ofincome tax reported on ajoint return. Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980, 983-984 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2010- - 10 - 134; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 2.04, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 397.4 In the instant case, petitioner's liability did not arise from an understatement oftax or a deficiency but rather from an underpayment oftax that was reported on the 2007 return. Accordingly, reliefunder section 60

With regard to the plea agreement's estoppel effect, section 2.A, entitled "The Plea", provides that the Office ofthe United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri agrees that no further federal prosecution will be brought in this District relative to the defendant's participation in the BETONSPORTS ORGANIZATION, as described in the Third Superseding Indictment, ofwhich the Office ofthe

Section 1041(b)(2) provides that in the case ofany transfer ofproperty described in section 1041(a), the transferee's basis in the transferred property is the same as the transferor's adjusted basis.3 Section 2Petitioner asserts that he also made several capital improvements to propertyA which increased his basis in the property by additional amounts.

eage expense incurred for routine 2The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. S_ee sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 55 cents per mile for 2009 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2008-72, sec. 2.01, 2008-2 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1286, 1286. 3Petitioners did no claim a deduction for mileage related to petitioner's Conference travel; petiti ner was reimbursed by the Conference for that travel. 4Petitioner's monthly travel and expense reports sat

3, generallyrequiring a taxpayerto submit a $150 application fee before IRS acceptance and processing ofan offer-in-compromise unless the taxpayermeets the Low Income Certification guidelines. T.D. 9086, 2003-2 C.B. 817; see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 2.03, 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. sThe purported copies ofthe Forms 941 enclosed with the letter are not a part ofthe record. 6The record does not showthe terms ofpetitioner's proposed offer. - 5 - [*5] On April 7, 2004, Mr. Mesis sent respondent a le

2006),2 we generally can't consider a section 2 But see Keller v.

2 (2000), for filing false individual and corporate income tax returns for tax years 1995 through 1999. In a superseding indictment filed on March 2, 2005, Mrs. Laciny was charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. sec. 371 (2000), filing false - 5 - [*5] individual income tax returns for tax years 1998 and 1999, filing false corporate income ta

at 1488. The compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder means that "[g]overnmentmay substantially burden a person's exercise ofreligion only ifit demonstrates that application ofthe burden to the person is in furtherance ofa compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means offurthering that -

we find as follows with respectto each expense. 1. Auto and Travel Petitioners are not entitled to an additional deduction for auto and travel expenses because they have failed properly to substantiate the expenses to which the deduction relates.4 4Sec. 2~/4(d) imposes strict substantiation requirements with respect to deductions for travel, meals, entertainment, and "listed property" expenses. Sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). "Listed property" in

According to the - 16 - Restatement, the parties to an e ployment agreement are free to define the term "for cause" as they believe appr priate to the particular employment setting. Id The employment law definition f"for cause" can thus cover termination for a wide range ofreasons. The history ofa regulation may be helpful in res

file, "the tax loss shall be treated as equal to 20% ofthe gross income (25% ifthe taxpayer is a corporation) less any tax withheldor otherwisepaid, unless a more accurate determination ofthe tax loss can be made." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual sec. 2T1.l(c)(2) (2002)(emphasis added). Ifthere is any figure to be adjusted in this equation, therefore, it would be the "gross income" rather than the provable withheld taxes. We recognize that the computation ofthe tax losses in the Dixons' crimin

00-1 C.B. 447. 4Petitioner seeks relieffrom an underpayment ofincome tax, not a proposed or assessed deficiency ofincome tax. Therefore, he is not eligible for reliefunder sec. 6015(b) or (c). See sec. 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. I. Section 4.01: Threshold Conditions Under the Commissioner's published guidance, the requesting spouse must first satisfy certain threshold conditions in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298. Respon

2.01, 2008-2 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1286; Rev. Proc. 2009-54, sec. 2.01, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930. 4Although the record is not entirely clear on the point, by process of elimination we are able to deduce that the portion ofthe deductions for unreimbursed employee business expenses that respondent allowed for each year in issue consists ofvehicle expenses. -

at 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. sec. 1709 (2006)). FHA was established primarily for the purpose ofinsuring mortgage lenders against default by borrovvers. Id. sec. 1709(b)(9). Before FHA can insure a single-family home mortgage, the loan must meet certain eligibility requirements (continued...) - 11 - for PIC to make a

621 [Section 2] paragraph b ofthe Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct of 1967 as stated below; - 11 - [*11] SEC 621 [Section 2] (a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that (1). In the face ofrising productivity and affluence older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain emploýment and especially to . . regain employmentwhen

text. An APA is an agreement between the Commissioner and a taxpayer in which the parties set forth, in advance ofcontrolled transactions, the best transfer pricing method within the meaning ofsection 482 and related regulations. Rev. Proc. 2004-40, sec. 2.04(1), 2004-2 C.B. at 51. Congress enacted section 482 to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the avoidance oftaxes with respect to such transactions. Sec. 482; sec. 1.482-1(a)(1)

. Mr. Thompson testified that both 4The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rates annually. See sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The standard mileage rate of 55 cents per mile for 2009 is set forth in Rev. Proc. 2008-72, sec. 2.01, 2008-50 I.R.B. 1286. 5Petitioners first claimed that they were entitled to a deduction for the business use oftheir home shortly before trial. Respondent did not object to petitioners' testimony related to that issue at trial, and we there

at 298. The 9Sec. 1.482-1(g)(3), Income Tax Regs., provides that "[a]ppropriate adjustments must be made to conform a taxpayer's accounts to reflect allocations made under section 482. Such adjustments may include the treatment ofan allocated amount as a dividend or a capital contribution (as appropriate), or, in appropriate cas

2.05, 1990-1 C.B. at 472, which states: The Service has determined that a benefit'may be so inconsequential or insubstantial that the full amount ofa contribution is deductible under section 170 ofthe Code. Under the followingguidelines, charities offering certain small items or other benefits oftoken value may treat the benefits as having ins

2Although Federal law governs the taxation ofproperty interests, the property interests ofdivorcing parties are determined by State law. Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 844-845 (6th Cir. 1996), af__g T.C. Memo. 1995- 183; see also Gilbert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-92, aff'd sub nom. Hawley v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Ci

2.04, 1987-2 C.B. at 675. Rev. Proc. 87-56, sec. 5.02 reiterates that residential rental propertyhas a recoveryperiod of27.5 years. AmeriSouth relies on two classifications within Rev. Proc. 87-56 for its claimed tangible personal property; asset class 00.3 (land improvements, depreciable oier 15 years) and asset class 57.0 (distributive trade

2, ofrespondent's delegation ofauthority to respondent's Appeals Office (and to respondent's settlement officer within the Appeals Office) to conduct the CDP hearing and to issue the notice ofdetermination. Petitioner's constitutional argument was addressed and rejected in Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 114 (2010), appeal filed (D.C.

ad of Household Filing Status Mr. Davila claimed head of household fili g status; respondent determined that his filing status was single for 2009. Section 1(b) imposes a tax rate schedule for a individual who is a "head of household" as defined in section 2 ( ) . An individual qualifies as a head of household if, inter ali , he maintains as his home a household which constitutes the principal place of abode of a "qualifying child" as defined in section 152 (c) or a dependent" under section 151.

dez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329-331 (2000); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 287-292 (2000). Equitable reliefmay, however, be available under section 6015(f) for an underpayment oftax. Sec. 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. A. Section 6015(b) Petitioner seeks to avoid liability for the 1997 and 1998 understatements under subsection (b).2 The Commissionermay relieve a taxpayer fromjoint and several liability for tax ifthe requesting spous

e document makes no mention of. a "trust" is significant in determining whether a trust was intended. See Denver Chapter No. 145, Order of Ahepa v. Mile Hi City Chapter No. 360, 171 Colo. 541, 469 P.2d 740 (1970). Moreover, 1 Restatement, Trusts 3d, sec. 2 (2003), defines a charitable trust in pertinent part as a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship". We do not find any . clear, explicit, definite, unequivocal, an

1.2) Notably, however, the Virginia statute (consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code) provides that while a contract for the sale ofa structure to be severed by the seller is one for goods, "until severance a purported present sale * * * [ofthe structure] which is not effective as a transfer 2The Virginia Supreme Court ofAppe

Sa'd "a lump sum ofone hundred sixty thousand dollars" and in section 2 that all bank accounts in either party's name or under his or her control would be retained by that party.

) or (c).3 3 Petitioner seeks relieffrom an underpayment ofincome tax, not a - proposed or assessed deficiency ofincome tax. Therefore, she is not eligible for reliefunder sec. 6015(b) or (c). See sec. 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. - 6 - In deciding whether a taxpayer is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(f), we have held that the applicable standard ofreview is de novo. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). The spouse requesting r

Specifically and as pertinent herein, section 274(d) provides that no deduction is allowable with respect to listed property, such as passenger automobiles, unless the eduction is substantiated in accordance with the strict substantiation requirement ofsection 274(d) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.5 Thus, under section 2'14(d), no automobile-related deduction, including depreciation, is allowable on the basis of' any approximation or the unsupported testiinony ofthe taxpayer.

e document makes no mention of. a "trust" is significant in determining whether a trust was intended. See Denver Chapter No. 145, Order of Ahepa v. Mile Hi City Chapter No. 360, 171 Colo. 541, 469 P.2d 740 (1970). Moreover, 1 Restatement, Trusts 3d, sec. 2 (2003), defines a charitable trust in pertinent part as a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship". We do not find any . clear, explicit, definite, unequivocal, an

2.05, 1990-1 C.B. at 472, which states: The Service has determined that a benefit'may be so inconsequential or insubstantial that the full amount ofa contribution is deductible under section 170 ofthe Code. Under the followingguidelines, charities offering certain small items or other benefits oftoken value may treat the benefits as having ins

2 50 (West 2004) . Therþfore, without an agreement to the' contrary, petitioner is enti|tled to one-half of the salary and" assets accumulated by her and Mr. - Allivato during their -' 11 - marriage, which the INS could levy uponstoesatisfy her separate liability: In California married individuals- can-changerthe character of property ownedsb

For the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, petitioner's mileage log does not satisfy the adequate records requirement of section 274(d), petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to corroborate the mileage log, and petitioner's testimony was not detailed or specific enough to satisfy the requirements of section 2 4(d) and section 1.274-5T(c) (3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.

Section 2 (b) .in pertinent part ,defines a head of, household .as an individual taxpayer who: (1) Is unmarried as of the close of the taxable year and is not -a survivings spouse; and , (2) maintains ass his home a household that constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal place; of abode,; as a member of such household, o

Respondent bears the burden of proving that the trust is liable under Massachusetts law as sa transferee. See. sec. 6902(a). Furthermore, because fraud is never presumed, creditors attacking a conveyance as fraudulent have the burden of establishing fraud. .Mullins v. Riopel, 76 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 1948); Rioux v. Cronin, 109 N.E. 898 (Mass.

September 15, 2008, respondent sent notices of transferee liability to petitioners, each notice identifying Woodside Ranch as the transferor with an unpaid Federal income tax liability of approximately $594,000 plus additions to tax, penalties, and "Sec. 2.11 of the SPA provided that All Taxes due and payable by the Company on or prior to the Closing Date, including without limitation those which are called for by the Tax Returns, or heretofore claimed to be due by any taxing authority from the

to provisions set forth in section 6015(c) Petitioner is not eligible for relief underesection - 6015 (b) or (c) because she had an underpayment of tax on as joint return, not a deficiency or an understatement of tax. See Rev. - 9 - Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2..04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. Therefore, her only avenue for relief is under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, sets forth threshold requirements before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under sec

* ** * And theeconfinement of gambling-loss deductions to the amount of gambling gains, a provision brought into the income tax law as § 2.3(g) of the Revenue Act of 1934 * * * and.carried forward into § 165(d) of the 1954 Code; :closed the door on,suspected abusese* * -* but served partially to differentiate genuine gambling losses from many other types of -adverse financial consequences sustained during the tax year.

cane Wilma disaster area on or after October 23, 2005, and which are attributable to Hurricane Wilma." Sec. 1400S(b). The entire State of 'Florida is included in both the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Wilma disaster areas. See Rev. Proc. 2006- 32, sec. 2, 2006-2 C.B. 61-62. - -13 - resulting from Hurricane Agnes was a casua·lty) ; see also sec. 1. 165 4 (b) -(3 ) Example (.2 ) , Income Tax Regs . Key West suffered damages because-of the 2005 hurricane season. However, petitioner has failed to

m ADF to the C corporations each represented: (1) A distribution from the recipient C corporation to the petitioner whose Roth IRA owned that C corporation and (2) a subsequent contribution by that petitioner to his or her Roth IRA.2 Respondent determined that the amounts deemed contributed to the Roth IRAs were excess contributions subject to the section 2Respondent has sináe amended his charabterization of the Transaction, as discussed infra.

In order for the Court to determine whether the taxpayer provided over one-half of the cost of maintaining the household, the taxpayer must prove the total cost of maintaining the household. See Rosen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-40. Costs of maintaining a household include "property taxes, mortgage interest, rent, utility charg

2.07, 2004-1 C.B. at 786. Respondent denied petitioner's request to change its accounting method in May 2004 and gave petitioner the option sto withdraw its application and receive a refund of the user fee. Respondent invited petitioner to explain its reasons for not withdrawing its request, if petitioner chose not to withdraw and use the prov

of NEA's constitution provided that, with respect to amending the NEA constitution and bylaws, "The text of the proposed amendment shall be printed in an official publication sent to all members at least sixty (60) days prior to its consideration." Section 2-3(c)of NEA's bylaws provided that "[a]ll members shall be eligible to receive * * * reports and publications of the Association in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Association." NEA's standing rule 9C, sections 1(b) and 2(

2.03, 1982-2 C.B. 759, 760 (emphasis added). The Foundation's inclusion in Publication 78 may constitute substantial authority that the organization to which petitioners made a donation in 1998 satisfied section 170(c) (a point that respondent does not dispute), but • petitioners would still be required to show that their charitable contributi

September 15, 2008, respondent sent notices of transferee liability to petitioners, each notice identifying Woodside Ranch as the transferor with an unpaid Federal income tax liability of approximately $594,000 plus additions to tax, penalties, and "Sec. 2.11 of the SPA provided that All Taxes due and payable by the Company on or prior to the Closing Date, including without limitation those which are called for by the Tax Returns, or heretofore claimed to be due by any taxing authority from the

September 15, 2008, respondent sent notices of transferee liability to petitioners, each notice identifying Woodside Ranch as the transferor with an unpaid Federal income tax liability of approximately $594,000 plus additions to tax, penalties, and "Sec. 2.11 of the SPA provided that All Taxes due and payable by the Company on or prior to the Closing Date, including without limitation those which are called for by the Tax Returns, or heretofore claimed to be due by any taxing authority from the

September 15, 2008, respondent sent notices of transferee liability to petitioners, each notice identifying Woodside Ranch as the transferor with an unpaid Federal income tax liability of approximately $594,000 plus additions to tax, penalties, and "Sec. 2.11 of the SPA provided that All Taxes due and payable by the Company on or prior to the Closing Date, including without limitation those which are called for by the Tax Returns, or heretofore claimed to be due by any taxing authority from the

September 15, 2008, respondent sent notices of transferee liability to petitioners, each notice identifying Woodside Ranch as the transferor with an unpaid Federal income tax liability of approximately $594,000 plus additions to tax, penalties, and "Sec. 2.11 of the SPA provided that All Taxes due and payable by the Company on or prior to the Closing Date, including without limitation those which are called for by the Tax Returns, or heretofore claimed to be due by any taxing authority from the

The parties have resolved all issues other than whether $16,933 petitioner received from her employer was excludable from gross income under section 2 104(a)(2) .

The term "qualifying child" means a qualifying child of the taxpayer as defined in section 152(c) or (e) who has not attained age 17.

Furthermore, to substantiate : medical and dental expenses under section 2.13, the taxpayer must furnish the name and address of each person to whom payment was made and the amount anddat e of each payment .

t spouse relief and a refund. Innocent Spouse Relief Mrs. Sommer is not eligible for relief under section 6015(b) or (c) because she had an underpayment of tax on a joint return, not a deficiency or an understatement of tax. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. Therefore, her only I avenue for relief is under sectidn 6015(f). As directed by section 6015(f) and section 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs., the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines for determining whether a I spouse qua

penalty under section 2_ - 6662(a) .1 The estate has conceded the entire deficiency.

2, and the employee claimed that withholding as a credit (i.e., a payment)· on his return, id. sec. 3, 57 Stat. 139. If that resulted in an overpayment of tax, then the overpayment was refunded to the employee. Id. sec. 4, 57 S at. 140. The next year Congress- noted that this regime rais d questions about the definition of a "deficiency' (i.e.

Villafane's return, as prepared by the return preparer, claimed medical expense deductions under section 2.13 that Ms .

As relevant herein,' section 2(b)(l)",provides that' an.

ty in certain circumstances. See sec. 6015(a). Sec. 6015(b) and (c) does not ~apply in cases involving underpayment of tax, as here. Equitable relief may, however, be available under sec. 6015(f). Sec. 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. independent judicial determination of the issues in the case. See, e.g., Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287, 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2005); Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229, 1233-1234 (10th Cir. 2003). The spouse requesting re

ability in certain circumstances. See sec. 6015(a). In cases involving an underpayment of tax, as here, sec. 6015(b) and (c) does not apply but equitable relief may be available under subsec. (f). Sec. 1.6015-4, Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2.04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. -10- Commissioner will consider a request for relief. Id. sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. The parties agree that petitioner has met the preliminary requirements for relief. I. Safe Harbor for Section 6015(f) Relief We

ight exceeds 6,000 pounds and that the minivan is excepted from the definition of passenger automobile . See sec . 280F(d)(5) . Consequently, the amount of petitioners' deduction for Schedule C depreciation and section 179 expenses is not limited by section 2,80F(a) . See supra note 5 . But the-catchall provision of section 280F(d)(4)(A)(ii)-(relating to any other property used as ,a means of transportation) nevertheless applies, and the minivan is listed property . In addition, the minivan is n

The strict substantiation requirements of section 2 7 4(d) d not apply to these expenses, and the Cohan rule may apply; however, petitioners .

2-704(2) (1998). The Commissioner argues that the Roddys held sufficient control over the Restricted Fund to make it the Roddys' property. Many factors support this argument: The Roddys had discretion-- with the Estate's permission as cosigner--to invest the proceeds -27- payment from the Restricted Fund was a direct loss only to the Fourth G

Section 2 (b) .provides the requirements for head of household filing status . In order to qualify as head of a household , petitioner must have been . unmarried at the end of 2006 and maintained a household that was the principal place of abode of at . least one dependent for more than one-half of the taxable year . Sec . 2 (b)(1) . A taxpayer is

Section 7202 and Title 18, United Slates Code , Section 2 Q - 14 - On March 10 , 2003, at the change of plea.

There was however a spousa l support obligation for * * * [petitioner] in 2005 ." V 6 - Discussion Section 2,15(a) provides that an individual is allowed a deduction for alimony or separate maintenance payments (hereinafter collectively referred to as alimony) as defined in section 71(b) .

Section 2(.c) provides that an individual shall be treated as "not married" at the close of the tax year if the individual is so .treated under section 7703(b) . Section 7703(b) provides that an individual who is married. shall not be considered as married if four requirements are satisfied : (i) the individual files a separate .tax return ; (ii) t

6 - jurisdictional question since Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system to cases and controversies), affd .

Section 2'74(d) requires taxpayers to provide adequate records or sufficient other evidence establishing the amount, time, place , .and business purpose of the expense to corroborate the taxpayer's statements . Thus ; even if such an expense would otherwise be deductible under Cohan, section 274 may still prohibit a deduction if the taxpayer does n

The Felts argued that Sharon's lifestyle was not lavish during-this time, but that is the test for innocent-spouse relief under section 6015 and section 66(c) equitable relief, not the test under section 2 66 (c) (4) ,1 11 The regulation, of course, does provide that lack of significant benefit is only one factor to be considered in what is supposed to be an all-the-facts-and-circumstances test .

Additionally, section 2'74(d) requires that expenses related to listed property, which includes passenger automobiles used for transportation, must' be substantiated by providing an adequate record of the items set forth pursuant to section 1 .274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs ., supra .

Petitioner claims that his first t o arguments, the alleged invalidity of the NFTLs, are relevant t our decision because he believes that if an NFTL is a nullity f r purposes of section 2 6323, it does not activate the hearing otice provisions of section 6320(a) .

at 34-35 The i sue presented in Jacobson was whether the difference between face value of each of the bonds -over th e amount that the taxpa erpaid to-each bondholder was a gift to the taxpayer by each ondholder under.-section 22(b)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1938' f r one of the years involved in Jacobson .a under section 2.2(b) ( 3 of the 1939- Code for the remaining two I- W .

Section 72 (t) (2) (B) 'pro ides that the imposition-of the additional tax under sectionl72(t)( 1) shall not apply to : Distributions made to t e employee * * * to the extent such distributions do n t exceed the amount allowable as 'a deduction under section 2,13 to the employee for amounts paid during the taxab e year for medical care (determined without regard to whether the employee itemizes deductions for such Taxable year) .

petitioner is an American national ; a national of the grand republic of the United States ; a Citizen of the United States as the term "Citizen" is used in Article I, Section 2, Clause b of the Constitution of the United States of America ; a Citizen of the compact dejure [sic] state of Ohio , as the term "Citizen" is used in the Constitution compact of the dejure [sic] state of Ohio ; 11 .

rm 433-A requested the following types of information : Section Type of Information Requested 1 Personal 2 Business 3 Employment 4 Other income 5 Banking, investing, cash , credit, and life insurance 6 Financial condition 7 Assets and liabilities 8 Accounts/notes receivable 9 Monthly income and expense analysis - 12 - In response to a question in section 2 of petitioners' Form 433-A, petitioners indicated that they were not self-employed and did not operate a business .

Section 2 of the side agreement, titled "Transition Period", states : During the period between the date hereof and August 14, 2000, Solomon and Prince shall work together to form a plan for smooth transition of production and to ensure an adequate supply of inventory is available for all Mather markets . On August 14, 2000, Solomon shall notify it

Section 2 of the side agreement , titled "Transition Period", states : During the period between the date hereof and August 14, 2000, Solomon and Prince shall work together to form a plan for smooth transition of production and to ensure an adequate supply of inventory is available for all Mather markets . On August 14, 2000, Solomon shall notify i

Section 2 of the side agreement, titled "Transition Period", states : During the period between the date hereof and August 14, 2000, Solomon and Prince shall work together to form a plan for smooth transition of production and to ensure an adequate supply of inventory is available for all Mather markets . On August 14, 2000, Solomon shall notify it

As is relevant here, a taxpayer's marital status is determined under section 7703(b) . See sec . 2 (c) . For the reasons discussed above, we find that Mrs . Buah was married at the end of the years in issue . Therefore, she is not entitled - 12 - to head of household filing status . Respondent's determinations on this issue are sus

2 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005). -13- 7443A(c).3 Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared an initial report that included his recommended findings of fact and opinion (the STJ report). The

As is relevant here, a taxpayer's marital status is determined under section 7703(b) . See sec . 2 (c) . For the reasons discussed above, we find that Mrs . Buah was married at the end of the years in issue . Therefore, she is not entitled - 12 - to head of household filing status . Respondent's determinations on this issue are sus

2.02, 1983-1 C.B. at 745: "Land Improvements," includes "other tangible property" that qualifies under section 1.48-1(d) of the Income Tax Regulations. However, a structure that is essentially an item of machinery or equipment or a structure that houses property used as an integral part of an activity specified in section 48(a)(1)(B)(i) of the

By plea agreement dated July 13, 2000, petitioner agreed to plead guilty to the count for tax evasion, and the U .S . Attorney agreed to bring no further charges against petitioner for related crimes . In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that at the time of the offense petitioner was suffering from "a diminished mental

Albers signed as employer, stated in pertinent part : EMPLOYEE STATUS Gross W-2 wage to employees during 2001 (other than benefits) : 191 BENEFIT TOTALS 1 Medical/Health Insurance Premium (from Section 2)1101 3586.00 7 Medical expenses from 2001 plan year (from Sections 3 and 4) 1101 4630 .001111 TOTAL 8216 .00 READ, SIGN AND DATE To the best of my [Ms .

Section 2 .1(c) states that "The Employer shall transmit to the Plan Administrator written notice of any substantial or unusual change in a Covered Employee's Compensation or status (e .g ., from fulltime to parttime) as it occurs, but in any event no later than 30 days after the change occurs" . Section 3 .1 states that "A Covered Employee's Sever

In section 2 of Form 433-A that petitioner submitted to respondent (peti- tioner’s Form 433-A), petitioner did not respond to a question relating to whether she or Mr. Beatty was self-employed or operated a business, although she indicated in section 3 of that form that she was unemployed. In section 3 of petitioner’s Form 433-A, petitioner did not in

2 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005). -13- 7443A(c).3 Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared an initial report that included his recommended findings of fact and opinion (the STJ report). The

(maximum=36) SECTION 3 - Eligible Employees Employees listed below meet all requirements of Section 2 and are considered current employees as of the date of this agreement .

1(c) states that "The Employer shall transmit to the Plan Administrator written notice of any substantial or unusual change in a Covered Employee's Compensation or status (e .g ., from fulltime to parttime ) as it occurs, but in any event no later than 30 days after the change occurs" . Section 3 .1 states that "A Covered Employee ' s S

2 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005). -13- 7443A(c).3 Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared an initial report that included his recommended findings of fact and opinion (the STJ report). The

2 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005). -13- 7443A(c).3 Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared an initial report that included his recommended findings of fact and opinion (the STJ report). The

2 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005). -13- 7443A(c).3 Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared an initial report that included his recommended findings of fact and opinion (the STJ report). The

However, in the consideration of the section 2 head-of- household issue, the Court has concluded that petitioner failed to establish that she furnished over half of the cost of maintaining the household.

2.04(1)(c) and (d), 1997-2 C.B. 450, 451. - 16 - (33,500/26,250 = 127.62%) Cumulative index: Base-year cost of Dec. 31, yr. 2, inventory: 1st year percentage link 121.25% 2nd year percentage link 127.62% Product: chain percentage, Dec. 31, yr. 2, relative to Jan. 1, yr. 1, base date (121.25% x 127.62%) 154.74% Base-year cost ($33,500/154.74%)

2.01(1), 2001-2 C.B. at 530. The use of the standard mileage rate establishes only the amount deemed expended with respect to the business use of a passenger automobile. Sec. 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs. The taxpayer must still establish the amount (i.e., the business mileage), the time, and the business purpose of each such use. Id. In lie

Mootness, however, "is a jurisdictional question, since article III, section 2 of the Constitution limits jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system to 'cases' and 'controversies.'" Hefti v.

As part of the plea agreement, petitioner admitted to receiving income of at least $645,253 in 1996.2 Petitioner was sentenced to 33 months on the count under section 2 The plea agreement was under seal at .the time of trial and was not considered by the Court.

2.04(1)(c) and (d), 1997-2 C.B. 450, 451. - 16 - (33,500/26,250 = 127.62%) Cumulative index: Base-year cost of Dec. 31, yr. 2, inventory: 1st year percentage link 121.25% 2nd year percentage link 127.62% Product: chain percentage, Dec. 31, yr. 2, relative to Jan. 1, yr. 1, base date (121.25% x 127.62%) 154.74% Base-year cost ($33,500/154.74%)

iles were to be examined by the Internal Revenue Service as part of an audit of the partnership return for Bentley Court II Limited Partnership for 1993; In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7212(a) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. The remaining 21 counts were similar and related to the one quoted above and concerned allegations that Lewis willfully made - 4 - false reports of occupancy beginning in late 1992 through mid- 1997. The indictment was filed on June 16, 19

2, Q&A-11, 2000-2 C.B. at 406. Rev. Proc. 2000-43, supra, contemplates that Appeals may obtain legal advice from the Office of Chief Counsel, subject to certain limitations, including that the advice should not be provided by the same Chief Counsel field attorneys who advised the Internal Revenue Service employee who made the determination tha

At trial, respondent conceded that “the preconditions set forth in section 2 [section 7491(a)(2)] have been met, with the exception of the fact that the taxpayer has not * * * maintained or provided records necessary for the identification of the sale of the stock pertaining to the LIFO/FIFO issue.” That is not a concession by respondent that he bears the burden of proof on all issues except the LIFO/FIFO basis is

2 (1981), did not contain a requirement that the taxpayer exhaust the available administrative remedies before attorney's fees could be awarded). The record is devoid of any indication that petitioner withheld relevant facts. The examining agent's report supports a conclusion that Ms. Lopez was forthcoming and cooperative during the examinatio

Petitioner failed to maintain any records establishing i - 11 - term "head of household" is defined in section 2 (b) as an unmar- ried individual who maintains as his home a household that constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal place of abode for, inter alia, a daughter.

In September 1992, Steele and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York agreed that Steele would plead guilty to this information and that the information would be transferred to the District of New Jersey (the resulting case filed as Crim. No. 92-513 (AJL)), so that Steele could be sentenced in one proceeding on his separate

2.04(1)(c) and (d), 1997-2 C.B. 450, 451. - 16 - (33,500/26,250 = 127.62%) Cumulative index: Base-year cost of Dec. 31, yr. 2, inventory: 1st year percentage link 121.25% 2nd year percentage link 127.62% Product: chain percentage, Dec. 31, yr. 2, relative to Jan. 1, yr. 1, base date (121.25% x 127.62%) 154.74% Base-year cost ($33,500/154.74%)

Article III, entitled Division of Property, section 2 of the Agreement stated that, until January 1, 2000, Mr.

has uniformly enforced in connection with requests to change to a method of accounting provided by the final regulations (and, in particular, by section 1.263(a)-4(f)(1), Income Tax Regs., which sets forth the 12-month rule). See Rev. Proc. 2004-23, sec. 2.07, 2004-1 C.B. 785, 786. Under section 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv), "notices" and "announcements" are included in the list of IRS pronouncements - 36 - that constitute "applicable published guidance" for purposes of establishing a rebuttable presumptio

The programs shall consist of those issues chosen for concerted study and action. Sec. 3. Current Agenda and Continuing Responsibilities. These categories of programs are defined as follows: a. The Current Agenda focuses on universal, market priced healthcare, the absence of which in the United States, involves a million people in

has uniformly enforced in connection with requests to change to a method of accounting provided by the final regulations (and, in particular, by section 1.263(a)-4(f)(1), Income Tax Regs., which sets forth the 12-month rule). See Rev. Proc. 2004-23, sec. 2.07, 2004-1 C.B. 785, 786. Under section 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv), “notices” and “announcements” are included in the list of IRS pronouncements - 36 - that constitute “applicable published guidance” for purposes of establishing a rebuttable presumptio

2 of attempted evasion of the payment of tax for 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987; and (5) one count under section 7201 and 18 U.S.C. sec. 2 of attempted evasion of the assessment of tax for 1996. The conspiracy count related to the Bussells’ conspiring with Sherman and Beaudry to form the three corporations to conceal the Bussells’ assets and to ma

Super Rite may cancel this Agreement: (i) upon the failure by the Retailer to make payment to Super Rite in accordance with Section 2 hereof for goods delivered hereunder; (ii) immediately upon the filing of a petition for relief by the Retailer in a voluntary proceeding under applicable federal or state bankruptcy law or like laws for the protection of debtors or upon the application of the Retailer to any court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction for th

87-24, section 2.01, The parties also dispute the factual issue of whether certain communications constituted the transfer of the estate's case to Appeals. However, we are not deciding this factual dispute; rather, we are deciding the legal issue·of shifting the burden of proof based on the assumption that respondent failed to transfer the estate's case t

of this Opinion, citing Langer’s An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, that proceeds after subtraction of operating expenses is a subclass of proceeds and that operating expenses that reduce the proceeds differ from the disqualifying additional payments referred to in - 36 - the regulation.

Zukle), an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manager, informed petitioner that for 1986 and 1987 it was being proposed that he be granted partial relief from joint and several liability under section 2Petitioner was married during 1986 and 1987, but was single for the years 1993 through 1999.

Section 2.4 of the operating agreement, quoted previously, provides that no member or manager of IPO II is obligated for any debts, obligations, or liabilities of IPO II. Moreover, the LLC Act does not establish a statutory obligation on the part of Indeck Overseas to contribute to IPO II to meet IPO II's obligations, either during its operation or

Mootness is a jurisdictional question since Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system to “cases” and “controversies”.

CBM and the Benton estate as compensation under a claim of right without restriction as to disposition. 19 McQueen & Williams, Tax Aspects of Bankruptcy Law and Practice, sec. 18-23 (2d ed. 1995); Newton & Bloom, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Taxation, sec. 2.16 (John Wiley & Sons, 1991); Tatlock, Discharge of Indebtedness, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 540-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-37 (2003). - 40 - Upon a careful review of the record and analyzing factual inferences in a manner most favorable to the

c)(3)(A). For the year in issue, to satisfy the relationship test, a qualifying child must be “a son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either,” “a stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, or” “an eligible foster child of the taxpayer.” Sec. 2 Petitioner conceded that he is liable for unreported income of $7,427. 3 Petitioner did not claim the child as a dependent for purposes of sec. 151. - 3 - 32(c)(3)(B)(i). In pertinent part, section 32(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I) provides that an “eligibl

2-401 (West 1995) (passage of title). For petitioner to purchase and resell the wood, title had to pass from the logger who cut the wood to petitioner and then from petitioner to the mill. See also Tebarco Mech. Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-311. Petitioner’s income tax returns indicate that its product or service was “pulpwood and lo

Assuming arguendo that we had found that the disputed transaction was not a tax shelter within the meaning of section 2°As noted above, the purported redemption of ITC's pre- ferred stock was disclosed in the October 11, 1996 disclosure letter.

§2T1.1(c)(1) (A)." The affidavit goes on to say that "That subsection of the Sentencing Guidelines states that the tax loss 'shall be treated as 28% of the unreported gross income * * * unless a more accurate determination of the tax loss can be made.'" OPINION Respondent bears the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Sec. 7454

t dispute that the petition they filed was timely. Instead, petitioners contend: (1) That Rules 24 and 200, governing appearance and practice of counsel before the Court, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000); (2) that petitioners are not “taxpayers” subject to the jurisdiction of this Court; and (3) that the issues raised in the jurisdiction motion, including petition

2.401(a) (Vernon 1998); Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993). All three elements must coexist to establish a valid common law marriage. Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App. 1991). While they did reside together during 1998, petitioner and Mr. Fullen have never been married to each other. Petitioner testified that s

Section 2.401 of the Texas Family Code provides a three part conjunctive test to determine if a man and a woman are in a valid "common law" marriage. The third part of the "common law" test requires the couple to hold themselves out to others as though they were married. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. sec. 2.401 (Vernon 2002). In McChesney v. Johnson, 79 S.W.

ons or a person liable for the income tax or required to file a Form 1040, by virtue of non-residence in, or lack of income earned within, or effectively connected to, any U.S. territory, Possession and/or enclave deriving authority from Article I, Sec. 2 C1.17 or Article 4, Sec., 3, C1.2 of the Constitution of the United States. The individuals named herein are natural born Citizens of one of the 50 Republic states, under the Constitution and Law. A hearing pursuant to petitioner’s hearing requ

2 Respondent’s recalculation of petitioners’ tax liability reflects that petitioners made only $69,829 in Federal tax payments for 1997. In accordance with the holding in this opinion, respondent shall apply the stipulated tax payment amount of $70,308.20 when preparing the Rule 155 computation. - 4 - 6214(a); Evans Publg., Inc. v. Commission

2.04, 1996-2 C.B. 427, 427; Rev. Proc. 97-59, 1997-2 C.B. 594; Rev. Proc. 98-64, 1998-2 C.B. 825. The M&IE rate depends upon the locality of travel. 41 C.F.R. ch. 301 (1997, 1998, 1999); Rev. Proc. 96-64 sec. 3.02(1), 1996-2 C.B. at 428; Rev. Proc. 97-59 sec. 3.02(1), 1997-2 C.B. at 596; Rev. Proc. 98-64 sec. 3.02(1), 1998-2 C.B. at 827. A sel

Where the parents are divorced and the children are in the custody of one or both parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, section 2 Neither petitioner claimed the two children, Jon and Adam, as dependents on their 1998 and 1999 tax returns.

2.02, 1959-1 C.B. 237. The Treasury Department has prescribed a similar definition for Federal estate tax and gift tax purposes. See sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs. Petitioner argues that FNBC’s valuations of its swaps met the fair market value requirement of section 475 in that they were the fair value of t

2A:34-23 (West 2003); emphasis added.] - 7 - A court order regarding unallocated support payments is modifiable. Farmilette v. Farmilette, 566 A.2d 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989). Moreover, the obligation to pay alimony ends at the recipient’s death, and upon such event, a court order regarding alimony is modifiable. See N.J. Stat. Ann.

Where the parents are divorced and the children are in the custody of one or both parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, section 2 Neither petitioner claimed the two children, Jon and Adam, as dependents on their 1998 and 1999 tax returns.

2A:34-23 (West 2003). Generally, divorce proceedings abate with the death of either party. Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872, 875 (N.J. 1990). Despite the general rule that divorce proceedings abate with the death of either party, “Some New Jersey courts have recognized that in highly unusual circumstances some aspects of statutory equitable distribu

hase price per share for the Shares of any Stockholder sold and purchased pursuant to this Agreement shall be (i) in the case of a bona fide offer by a third party, the price offered by the prospective purchaser named in the Offer to Sell (the “Offer Price”) or (ii) in all other circumstances, the Adjusted Value Per Share determined pursuant to Subsection 2.d.(2) hereof.

ns or a person” liable for the income tax or required to file a Form 1040, by virtue of non- residence in, or lack of income earned within, or effectively connected to, any U.S. Territory, Possession and/or enclave deriving authority from Article I, Sec. 2 Cl. 17 or Article 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution of the United States. The individual or individuals named herein are natural born Citizens of one of the 50 Republic states, under the Constitution and Law. Although the pages of the lette

2A:34-23 (West 2003). Generally, divorce proceedings abate with the death of either party. Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872, 875 (N.J. 1990). Despite the general rule that divorce proceedings abate with the death of either party, “Some New Jersey courts have recognized that in highly unusual circumstances some aspects of statutory equitable distribu

ns or a person” liable for the income tax or required to file a Form 1040, by virtue of non- residence in, or lack of income earned within, or effectively connected to, any U.S. Territory, Possession and/or enclave deriving authority from Article I, Sec. 2 Cl. 17 or Article 4, Sec. 3, Cl.2 of the Constitution of the United States. The individual - 4 - or individuals named herein are natural born Citizens of one of the 50 Republic states, under the Constitution and Law. A hearing pursuant to peti

above even if the gross receipts requirement does not 3 Congress intended to limit application of sec. 1244 to companies which are largely operating companies. The legislative history states in pertinent part: III. GENERAL EXPLANATION * * * * * * * Section 2. Losses on Small-Business Stock * * * * * * * Your committee also has imposed a restriction designed to limit this tax benefit to companies which are largely operating companies. Thus, the corporation, in the 5 years before the taxpayer inc

2.01, 1996-1 C.B. 714, which provides that a “change from not claiming the depreciation or amortization allowable * * * to claiming the depreciation allowable is a change in method of accounting”. The level of deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is based, in part, on the thoroughness in the agency’s considera

Petitioner alleged numerous claims including, but not limited to, claims of procedural and substantive defects in both the assessment of his income tax deficiency for 1996 and the section 2 See also Van Es v.

2 This case is one of numerous cases heard by the Court involving tax returns prepared by Mr. Beltran. - 7 - 6662(a) and (b)(1). Negligence consists of any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and disregard consists of any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c). T

On March 1, 1996, an election was made on behalf of Capital Video with the Internal Revenue Service for Capital Video to be taxed pursuant to subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. On January 10, 1997, Guarino pled guilty to one count of the above indictment against him relating to the conspiracy to obstruct the lawful functions

5In a separate proceeding in the U.S. District Court, after a trial by jury, the jury found Mr. Wilson guilty of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1341 (2000) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2. Pursuant to the judgment imposed against Mr. Wilson in that criminal proceeding, the U.S. District Court ordered Mr. Wilson, inter

f damages other than punitive damages. Fountain-Lowrey Entrs, Inc. v. Williams, 424 So. 2d 581, 585 (Ala. 1982); Skipper v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 334 So. 2d 863, - 10 - 866 (Ala. 1976); 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, sec. 23 (1988); 25 C.J.S., Damages, sec. 2 (1966). A plaintiff may be awarded compensatory damages for claims of breach of contract, conversion, conspiracy, or fraudulent inducement. See, e.g., Estate of Henderson v. Henderson, 804 So. 2d 191, 192 (Ala. 2001); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. L

f damages other than punitive damages. Fountain-Lowrey Entrs, Inc. v. Williams, 424 So. 2d 581, 585 (Ala. 1982); Skipper v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 334 So. 2d 863, - 10 - 866 (Ala. 1976); 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, sec. 23 (1988); 25 C.J.S., Damages, sec. 2 (1966). A plaintiff may be awarded compensatory damages for claims of breach of contract, conversion, conspiracy, or fraudulent inducement. See, e.g., Estate of Henderson v. Henderson, 804 So. 2d 191, 192 (Ala. 2001); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. L

Research and Development Agreement The R & D Agreement obligated IRC to pay to Systems a fixed fee of $875,000 in consideration of Systems’ performance of research activities.10 In this connection, section 2.02 of the R & D Agreement provides as follows: 2.02.

Research and Development Agreement The R & D Agreement obligated IRC to pay to Systems a fixed fee of $875,000 in consideration of Systems’ performance of research activities.10 In this connection, section 2.02 of the R & D Agreement provides as follows: 2.02.

2-105 (McKinney 1962); Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 47-2-105 (1963); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. sec. 2.105 (West 1967). Instead, a present sale of nonexisting property or goods operates as a contractual obligation to buy and sell property at a later date. A contractual right to purchase nonexisting property in the future is not a property interest in

2.01, 1992-1 C.B. 748, 749. Petitioners contend that at no time during construction of the Clubhouse beginning in 1994 and after construction through the transition period would VRI have had the right to recover its Clubhouse construction costs through depreciation. - 17 - Petitioners also contend that the issue of whether VRI’s Clubhouse con

2A:34-2(c) (West 2000). She did not seek divorce on the grounds of separation for a period of at least 18 or more consecutive months, a separate ground for divorce under the New Jersey - 19 - divorce statute. See N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2A:34-2(d) (West 2000). The language of section 6015(c)(3)(A)(i) makes it clear that this eligibility requirem

2 As a result of our conclusions, we need not consider whether petitioner had a basis in the IRA arising from nondeductible contributions made by his father. - 8 - 408(a) and (b). Self-employed persons or sole proprietors are treated as their own employers under a SEP plan. See secs. 401(c)(4), 408(k)(7). The qualifying provisions for a SEP p

ment agreement with SUNY. Petitioners argue this amount is excludable from income under section 104(a)(2) because it was paid to settle Mr. Broedel’s claim against SUNY pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, sec. 2, 104 Stat. 328, for infliction of emotional distress and to avoid litigation of the complaint. Petitioners claim that SUNY had repeatedly harassed Mr. Broedel and damaged his reputation. Petitioners also contend - 9 - that the amount of the set

384 (1950), current version at 48 U.S.C. sec. 1421 (1994); or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), see Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. 94-241, sec. 1005(b), 90 Stat. 263, 278 (1976), current version at 48 U.S.C. se

2.01, 1992-1 C.B. 748, 749. Petitioners contend that at no time during construction of the Clubhouse beginning in 1994 and after construction through the transition period would VRI have had the right to recover its Clubhouse construction costs through depreciation. - 17 - Petitioners also contend that the issue of whether VRI’s Clubhouse con

f the corporation, against judgments, fines * * * penalties, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, actually and necessarily incurred in connection with such action or proceeding, or any appeal therefrom * * * Section 2. The corporation shall advance or promptly reimburse upon request any person entitled to indemnification hereunder for all expenses, including attorneys’ fees, reasonably incurred in defending any action or proceeding in advance of the fina

pproximately $354,756.78 upon which taxable income there was then due and owing to the United States of America an income tax of approximately $161,613.89. In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201, and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. * * * 25. The petitioner on August 22, 1995, entered a plea of guilty to the charge set forth against him in said indictment. * * * 26. On September 6, 1995, the United States District Court entered its judgment pursuant to said plea. * *

384 (1950), current version at 48 U.S.C. sec. 1421 (1994); or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), see Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. 94-241, sec. 1005(b), 90 Stat. 263, 278 (1976), current version at 48 U.S.C. se

The partnership agreements for the housing projects contained the following provisions: Section 2.02 Management of Partnership.

Alaska’s land management policies generally allow development of Alaska’s natural resources on condition that the environment be restored to the maximum reasonable extent upon completion of operations. In 1967, the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) issued regulations relating to plugging and abandonment of oil wells and to

ystem in a uniform, mandatory way and in detecting fraud in regard to dependency exemptions. Accordingly, neither the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488, provides a basis for excepting Ps from the SSN requirement. John W. and Faythe A. Miller, pro se. Elizabeth A. Owen, for respondent. - 2 - OPINION LARO, Judge: This case is before the Court fully stipulated. See Rule 122. Peti

2.05(a)(1) (West 1999). A copy of the deed for the Babcock Road property is not in the record. However, it appears from the settlement documents that TGR I bought the Babcock Road property on December 5, 1991, in TGR I’s name. Petitioners do not dispute this fact. A City of San Antonio statement of property taxes for 1992 states that TGR I was

602, currently codified at 29 U.S.C. secs. 621- 634 (1994), due to jurisdictional limitations of the ADEA.7 6Petitioner argued, in the alternative, that the first element of a defamation claim, i.e., that a statement was communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, may be met through the doctrine of “self-publication”. Lewis v

United States, 783 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1986); White v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-438 (citing Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946)); Nieto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-296; see also Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, par. 4.1.1, at 4-6 and 4-7 (3d ed. 1999). 12However, Mr. Lovejoy may h

602, current version at 29 U.S.C. secs. 621-633a (1994). A portion of the settlement proceeds was deposited in the trust account of P’s attorney, X. In distributing the settlement proceeds, X retained $91,800 in attorney’s fees pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. The remaining amount was paid to P. P excluded the settlement pro

Respondent has failed to properly sign the Notice of Deficiency as required under IRC Section 2(...continued) deductions.

Respondent has failed to properly sign the Notice of Deficiency as required under IRC Section 2(...continued) deductions.

ondent does not dispute that petitioners hold this belief. Petitioners further assert that requiring them to use Social Security numbers to receive tax benefits is a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), and the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), Pub. L. 93-579, sec. 7, 88 Stat. 1900, 5 U.S.C. sec. 552a & note (1994). Section 151(a) provides that in the case of an individual, a deduct

2A-103(j) and (k) (1991). - 8 - Accordingly, we conclude that the average period of use by Hairston of petitioners’ equipment exceeded 30 days. On this score alone, petitioners fail to satisfy the requirements of the first exception described above. Moreover, the evidence does not establish that petitioners in their individual capacities prov

2.05(a)(1) (West 1990). DRD was formed to own rental real property. DRD did not terminate for Federal tax purposes before Trisch acquired that property. See par. II-A, above. Income earned within the scope of a partnership is partnership income. 5 For similar reasons, we conclude that farming was not a DRD activity. - 16 - See Starr v. Commis

2.07, 1992-2 C.B. at 511. During the years at issue, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 92- 98, supra, petitioners reported as income in the year of receipt the difference between the total amount received from the sale of EMA's and the total amount paid to Western General. The remaining proceeds from the .sale of EWA's--i.e., the amounts paid to W

602. Recovery under ADEA is not based upon tort or tort type rights. See Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 334- 336. Thus, any portion of Mr. Reisman’s claim allocated to the Federal claim would be taxable. Second, in the State action, petitioners sought compensatory and punitive damages for a statutory claim of age discrimination

2.07, 1992-2 C.B. at 511. During the years at issue, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 92- 98, supra, petitioners reported as income in the year of receipt the difference between the total amount received from the sale of EWA's and the total amount paid to Western General. The remaining proceeds from the .sale of EWA's--i.e., the amounts paid to W

fering of Read-Rite Common Stock pursuant to a registration statement on Form S-1 (an “Initial Public - 5 - Offering”) which closes within sixty (60) days of the Closing Date, Read-Rite shall issue to Conner that number of shares of Common Stock $.0001 par value of Read-Rite determined by dividing $27,500,000 (subject to adjustment as provided in Section 2.2) by the per share price to the public in the Initial Public Offering.

Additionally, respondent contends in the notice of deficiency that in the event it is held that the assets on which petitioners have claimed the income forecast method of depreciation qualify for that method, a proper election has not been made under section 2.10 of Rev.

ear insurance policies to insure a consumer durablè goods seller's obligations to customers under multiyear warranty contracts sold to them, must be capitalized and prorated or amortized over the life of the insurance policy. See Rev. Proc. • 92-97, sec. 2.07, 1992-2 C.B. at 511. During the years at issue, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 92- 98, supra, petitioners reported as income in the year of receipt the difference between the total amount received from the sale of EWA's and the total amount

2.07, 1992-2 C.B. at 511. During the years at issue, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 92- 98, supra, petitioners reported as income in the year of receipt the difference between the total amount received from the sale of EWA's and the total amount paid to Western General. The remaining proceeds from the sale of EWA's--i.e., the amounts paid to We

Respondent has failed to properly sign the Notice of Deficiency as required under IRC Section 2(...continued) deductions.

If this Agreement terminates by expiration of the term set forth in Article 5 or pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.3 [sic], ABS and participating financial institutions may retain such records as are necessary in order for them to maintain any customer - 8 - relationships established hereunder with any SC member.

As to the manner in which the election is to be effected, section 2, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 42 Fed.

As to the manner in which the election is to be effected, section 2, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 42 Fed.

e TMP does not file a readjustment petition with respect to the FPAA, any notice partner may, within 60 days after the close of the 90-day period in which the TMP may file a petition, file a petition for a readjustment of the partnership items.2 See sec. 2 For partnership tax years ending after Aug. 5, 1997, a person who was a partner in such partnership at any time during such year may participate in such action or file a readjustment petition (within the 60-day period that notice partners may

D’Amico asserted in section 2, entitled “Employee Claim”, that his heart condition was a factor that “made a difference” in the Company’s decision to terminate his employment and further asserted that, as a result of that termination, he suffered a heart attack; and - 5 - (2) the Company denied in section 3, entitled “No Company Wrong- doing”, (a) that Mr.

In his response to respondent's motion, petitioner relies, as he does in his petition, upon Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.

rformance of a ministerial act by an officer or employee of the Commissioner. For abatement to be appropriate, the taxpayer must not have contributed significantly to the error or delay. Congress intended for the Commissioner to abate interest under section 2Sec. 6404(e)(1), as enacted in 1986 and as applicable here, provides: (e) Assessments of Interest Attributable to Errors and Delays by Internal Revenue Service.-- (1) In general.--In the case of any assessment of interest on– (A) any deficie

Section 2.02 of Revenue Procedure 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 688, provides that the election under section 168(f)(1) must be made following the procedures set forth in section 2.10 of the Revenue Procedure. Section 2.10 of Revenue Procedure, 1987-2 C.B. at 689, provides, .10 Time and manner for making elections. Under section 5h.5(a)(2) of the tempora

Section 1371 was enacted in 1982 by section 2 of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub.

Section 2A.11 of article II-A provides as follows: -9- (a) To Retire (or be Retired or in Retirement), an Employee must: (1) withdraw completely from: (A) Covered Employment; (B) work aboard any vessel; and (C) in the case of a port engineer, port electrician or hull inspector, any service in the maritime industry that involves a Licensed Officer’

activities. Because Federal income taxes fund military activities, petitioner believes that her faith prohibits her from paying such taxes. Petitioner contends that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), she is exempt from Federal income taxes. RFRA was enacted in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that n

1669, 1677. - 27 - S. Rept. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1141. We have construed the term "investment", as used in section 1366(d)(1)(B), to mean actual economic outlay of the shareholder in question. Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711, 715 (1994); Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 217 (198

1669, 1677. - 27 - S. Rept. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1141. We have construed the term "investment", as used in section 1366(d)(1)(B), to mean actual economic outlay of the shareholder in question. Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711, 715 (1994); Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 217 (198

which involved, inter alia, valuation of a stock interest in a corporation for which an election to be taxed as an S corporation had been made and which was subject to the transitional rules in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, sec. 2, 96 Stat. 1669, 1683. Consequently, that corporation was required to recognize certain of its net capital gain for the 3 taxable years immediately following the date of that S corporation election. Although we refused to allow a reduction equal

er as the "Peninsula Center for the Performing Arts". Players shall use the Theater only as a performance auditorium and shall not use the theater for sporting events or any use other than as an auditorium for the performing arts, or as provided in section 2.4 herein. 2.4 Availability Of The Theater For Other Civic Uses. Players shall allow and shall have the right to allow other performing arts organizations, civic and community organizations, the City of Redwood City, and the County of San Mat

3389-3394; see also S. Rept. 96-1035, supra at 10, 1980-2 C.B. at 624. Section 108 was "intended to accommodate both bankruptcy policy and tax policy." S. Rept. 96-1035, supra at 10, 1980-2 C.B. at 624. The legislative history illustrates that Congress did not want an insolvent or bankrupt debtor to be "burdened with an immediate t

2 (1997); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 2 (1997). This does not change the fact that they are liable for the tax in accord with the current requirements of the law. Petitioners’ legal arguments regarding whether their wages are taxable income are principally founded on the reasoning that the term or concep

er as the "Peninsula Center for the Performing Arts". Players shall use the Theater only as a performance auditorium and shall not use the theater for sporting events or any use other than as an auditorium for the performing arts, or as provided in section 2.4 herein. 2.4 Availability Of The Theater For Other Civic Uses. Players shall allow and shall have the right to allow other performing arts organizations, civic and community organizations, the City of Redwood City, and the County of San Mat

er as the "Peninsula Center for the Performing Arts". Players shall use the Theater only as a performance auditorium and shall not use the theater for sporting events or any use other than as an auditorium for the performing arts, or as provided in section 2.4 herein. 2.4 Availability Of The Theater For Other Civic Uses. Players shall allow and shall have the right to allow other performing arts organizations, civic and community organizations, the City of Redwood City, and the County of San Mat

1669, 1677-1683, effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982. There are no differences between former sec. 1374(c)(2)and the current sec. 1366(d)(1)(B) that affect this analysis. - 7 - Petitioners argue that we should ignore the form of the loans and rely on the economic substance in deciding whether the loans were actua

As section 2 of the R&D agreement states: The Partnership * * * [Utah I] hereby engages Contractor * * * [U.S. Agri] to conduct the R&D Program and Contractor * * * [U.S. Agri] accepts such engagement hereunder and agrees to use its best efforts to develop a Jojoba plantation in the vicinity of Desert Center, California, at a specific location to be s

894 (Income Affected by Treaty)). In September 1995, petitioner submitted a fourth set of documents to the IRS for each of the years in issue. The documents were entitled "Statement in Lieu of Return" and reported that petitioner received $65,000 per year in Federal Reserve Notes. Among other declarations, petitioner stated that the Fe

ble and potential claims in contract or in tort arising from employment or termination of employment, including any claims against IBM arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, sec. 2, 104 Stat. 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981a (1994)). Pertinent sections of the release read as follows: In exchan

2 It should be noted that, in making the alternative argument, respondent does not rely on the following sentences of sec. 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs.: If, as a result of the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction, the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or economic benefits tha

6 T.C. 988, 997 (1951). For State law purposes, an express private trust arises where a trustee acquires legal title to specific property (the trust property or res) subject to enforceable equitable rights in a beneficiary. 1 Restatement, Trusts 2d, sec. 2 (1959); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, sec. 1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1984). - 46 - The trust res must be sufficiently described or capable of identification that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In

ing agreement provided as follows with respect to the filing of certain tax returns and documents and the examination of those returns by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS): AMAX shall prepare and file the Combined Consoli- dated Returns [defined in section 2 of the tax-sharing agreement as a consolidated Federal income tax return filed by Amax that included petitioners' group] and any other returns, amended returns and other documents or statements required to be filed with the Internal Revenue

962, first enacted the investment tax credit. S. Rept. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 C.B. 703, is the report of the Committee on Finance that accompanied H.R. 10650, which became the Revenue Act of 1962. S. Rept. 1881, supra, 1962-3 C.B. at 722, stated that, except for specified exclusions, “all tangible personal proper

2Petitioners contend that Mr. Self has not been involved in this case since 1987, and that he failed to "formally" withdraw as their counsel of record. 3Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code applicable to the year at issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 4

roperty with a class life of less than 27.5 years. 27 OBRA-1993, sec. 13151, 107 Stat. 448, extended to 39 years the recovery period for nonresidential real property placed in service after May 12, 1993. - 42 - 1983-1 C.B. 745.28 Rev. Proc. 87-56, sec. 2.20, 1987-2 C.B. at 674. Section 168(i)(1)(B) provides that, except in the case of residential rental property or nonresidential real property, respondent may designate a class life for any property which does not have a prescribed class life as

6 T.C. 988, 997 (1951). For State law purposes, an express private trust arises where a trustee acquires legal title to specific property (the trust property or res) subject to enforceable equitable rights in a beneficiary. 1 Restatement, Trusts 2d, sec. 2 (1959); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, sec. 1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1984). - 46 - The trust res must be sufficiently described or capable of identification that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In

That it purports to be a law setting itself above the law contained in the original Constitution as ratified. * * * * * * * 5. That Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states for what purpose a "Direct Tax" may be levied by the Congress and, what the money collected may be used for (ie: to pay the debts of the United States; to provide for

6 T.C. 988, 997 (1951). For State law purposes, an express private trust arises where a trustee acquires legal title to specific property (the trust property or res) subject to enforceable equitable rights in a beneficiary. 1 Restatement, Trusts 2d, sec. 2 (1959); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, sec. 1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1984). - 46 - The trust res must be sufficiently described or capable of identification that its title can pass to the trustee upon actual delivery of the trust corpus. In

The notice includes the following explanation of the adjustment: The fair market value, at the date of decedent's death, of the 56.5 acres located in the northwest 1/4 of the south 1/22 of section 2, Township 28 South, Range 19 East, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, was $791,000.00 instead of $509,529.00 as reported on the estate tax return.

s in this regard. Sodoma v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-275. A third source for the IBM payment might have been Mr. Carey's prior medical problems and the possible application of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101- 336, sec. 2, 104 Stat. 328 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. - 8 - 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981a (1994)). See Phillips v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-336, in

As noted, respondent contends that petitioner's prior criminal conviction under section 7201 collaterally estops him from denying that there is an underpayment of income tax for each of the 1985, 1986, and 1987 taxable years and that part of such underpayment is due to fraud within the meaning of section 2 For 1986 and 1987, sec.

Karen Kopp, Scott Muhn's then fiancée). Mr. Bates has had no connection with 1 A Massachusetts business trust is one in which property is conveyed to trustees and held and managed for the benefit of certificate holders. 12A C.J.S., Business Trusts, sec. 2 (1980). Under Federal tax law, these entities may be treated as corporations rather than trusts. Sec. 301.7701-4(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The parties have stipulated that PFA Enterprises should be disregarded for tax purposes because it lack

2 It should be noted that, in making the alternative argument, respondent does not rely on the following sentences of sec. 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs.: If, as a result of the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction, the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or economic benefits tha

3389. Section 108(e)(1) provides that "there shall be no insolvency exception from the general rule that gross income includes income from the discharge of indebtedness", except as provided in section 108. Thus, section 108, not section 1.61- 12(b), Income Tax Regs., controls in these cases. Respondent would have us treat different

roperty with a class life of less than 27.5 years. 27 OBRA-1993, sec. 13151, 107 Stat. 448, extended to 39 years the recovery period for nonresidential real property placed in service after May 12, 1993. - 42 - 1983-1 C.B. 745.28 Rev. Proc. 87-56, sec. 2.20, 1987-2 C.B. at 674. Section 168(i)(1)(B) provides that, except in the case of residential rental property or nonresidential real property, respondent may designate a class life for any property which does not have a prescribed class life as

136, added sec. 819(b), which required the same adjustment as sec. 819(a) except that the minimum figure was determined by multiplying the foreign life insurance company's total insurance liabilities on U.S. business by 9 percent for tax years beginning before January 1, 1959 and by an annual percentage determined by the Treasury f

2, states: In general, tax accounting requires that payments received for services to be performed in the future must be included in gross income in the taxable year of receipt. However, this treatment varies from financial accounting conventions consistently used by many accrual method taxpayers in the treatment of payments received in one ta

2A:34-25 (1987)3 because she had remarried. 3 N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2A:34-25 (1987) provides: If after the judgment of divorce the wife shall remarry, the court shall not make any order as to the alimony of such wife except that upon application of the former husband, on notice and on proof of the marriage of the former wife after the judgment

he Contracts which is (i) gas that is priced pursuant to the applicable Contract above the replacement cost of gas deliverability estimated by Buyer to be available on its system at the time of this release; (ii) gas that was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce as of November 8, 1978 (within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Natural Gas Policy Act), or if so committed or dedicated gas that qualifies under Sec- tions 102(c), 103(c), or 107(c)(1-4) of the Natural Gas Policy Act; an

Background In general, tax accounting requires that payments received for services to be performed in the future must be included in gross income in the taxable year of receipt. However, this treatment varies from financial accounting conventions consistently used by many accrual method taxpayers in the treatment of payments received in

2; two counts of distribution of marijuana, aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 2; three counts of importation of marijuana, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. secs. 545 and 2; and continuing criminal enterprise in 3 The court bifurcated Charles' jury trial, with the substantive criminal c

2A:34-23.1(j) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). New Jersey courts recognized--even before this amendment--that tax consequences, including Federal tax consequences, should be taken into account in making an equitable distribution. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1983); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 261 (N.J. 1975); Painter v. Painter, 320 A.2d 48

2A:34-23.1(j) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). New Jersey courts recognized--even before this amendment--that tax consequences, including Federal tax consequences, should be taken into account in making an equitable distribution. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1983); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 261 (N.J. 1975); Painter v. Painter, 320 A.2d 48

Contract above the replacement cost of gas deliverability estimated by Buyer to be available on its system at the time of this release; (ii) gas that was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce as of November 8, 1978 (within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Natural Gas Policy Act), or if so committed or dedicated gas that qualifies under Sec- tions 102(c), 103(c), or 107(c)(1-4) of the Natural Gas Policy Act; and (iii) gas deliverability that is in excess of the quantities of gas re

When Whittaker and Berberich signed the R & D Agreement, they both understood that HJI would not undertake for JDP all of the activities specified in section 2 of the R & D Agreement because the offering had not raised sufficient funds.

2A:34-25 (1987)3 because she had remarried. 3 N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2A:34-25 (1987) provides: If after the judgment of divorce the wife shall remarry, the court shall not make any order as to the alimony of such wife except that upon application of the former husband, on notice and on proof of the marriage of the former wife after the judgment

When Whittaker and Berberich signed the R & D Agreement, they both understood that HJI would not undertake for JDP all of the activities specified in section 2 of the R & D Agreement because the offering had not raised sufficient funds.

cle Five provided, or provision satisfactory to the Trustee shall have been made for giving such notice; and (c) Debentures in lieu of or in substitution for which other Debentures shall have been authenticated and delivered pursuant to the terms of Section 2.07. - 9 - * * * * * * * Section 2.08. * * * If the Company [RMECC] or the Guarantor [Metals] shall acquire any of the Debentures (including, without limitation, Debentures delivered to the Company or the Guarantor to effect a conversion pur

and should not be held liable for the deficiencies determined herein. OPINION Petitioner was the sole shareholder of DRPC, a subchapter S corporation, and claimed deductions in 1987 and 1988 under section 1366(a) to reflect losses incurred by DRPC.2 Section 2 Sec. 1366 in part provides: (a) Determination of Shareholder's Tax Liability.-- (1) In General.--In determining the tax under this chapter of a shareholder * * * there shall be taken into account the shareholder's pro rata share of the corp

2 Although not addressed in the notice of deficiency, respondent also disputes the additional expenses claimed on petitioner's revised Schedule C. 5 6001; Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). Moreover, deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer has the burden of establishing that he or she is enti

Goldberg, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1 The Court agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below.