§202

280E impose exactions for violations ofcriminal laws, which is inapposite to Congress' remedial goal to deter noncompliance in other provisions ofthe Code in their effort to protect the revenue.

3833(2)) to individuals receiving benefits under section 202 or 223 ofthe Social Security Act)". Under sec. 1402(a) as amended, payments made under 16 U.S.C. sec. 3833(2) to individuals who were receiving benefits under sec. 202 or sec. 223 of the Social Security Act (SSA) are excluded from the calculátion ofnet earnings from self-employment. Tit. 16 U.S.C. sec. 3833(2) (2012) refers to payments received from the USDA under the CRP. See supra p. 5. The amendment applies to CRP payments made afte

3833(2)) to individuals receiving benefits under section 202 or 223 of the Social Security Act)”.

law, the factual circumstances in which the general rule was applied are not as prevalent under current law. In any event, the facts and circumstances of this case are distinguishable from prior cases applying the general rule. - 17 - Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1997).11 Additionally, an interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of a writing is preferred to one that leaves portions of the writing meaningless. Rink v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 31

gues that this interpretation is inconsistent with the other terms of the agreement. An agreement should be interpreted as a whole, and any writings which are part of the same transaction should be interpreted together. 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1981). "An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless." Rink V. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 319 (19

argues that this interpretation is inconsistent with the other terms of the agreement. An agreement should be interpreted as a whole and any writings that are part of the same transaction should be interpreted together. 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1981). "An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless." Rink v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 319 (1

gues that this interpretation is inconsistent with the other terms of the agreement. An agreement should be interpreted as a whole, and any writings which are part of the same transaction should be interpreted together. 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1981). "An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless." Rink V. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 319 (19

gues that this interpretation is inconsistent with the other terms of the agreement. An agreement should be interpreted as a whole, and any writings which are part of the same transaction should be interpreted together. 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1981). "An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless." Rink V. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 319 (19

argues that this interpretation is inconsistent with the other terms of the agreement. An agreement should be interpreted as a whole and any writings that are part of the same transaction should be interpreted together. 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202 (1981). "An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless." Rink v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. 100 T.C. 319 (1

. 50 (2023). 4 See Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 (2004) (“[N]either an unreasoned statement in the manual nor allegedly longstanding agency practice can trump a formal regulation . . . .”). 40 of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202, 84 Stat. 1236, 1249 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 812). Many marijuana businesses have tried to argue their way out of section 280E, but all have been unsuccessful. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 1

Investors Prime relied on section 202(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.

3765, 3807, 3832. As a result, petitioner did not claim biodiesel credits on its quarterly Forms 720 for any of the calendar quarters of 2010. The biodiesel mixture credit was subsequently retroactively extended through 2011 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission’s policy “not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings,” and “a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent state

ve adopted a writing as a final expression of their agreement, interpretation is directed to the meaning of that writing in the light of the circumstances.” Analog Devices, Inc. v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. at 446 (quoting 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202, cmt. b (1981)). Intent is inferred from the four corners of the agreement where the contract is unambiguous; extrinsic evidence may be used to discern intent where the contract has ambiguities. Rink v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 319, 325 (1993),

ment already decided not to pursue a civil-forfeiture action against it. - 3 - FINDINGS OF FACT I. California Medical-Marijuana Law Under federal law marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, sec. 202, 84 Stat. at 1249 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. sec. 812 (2012)). This means that under federal law the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession ofmarijuana--even medical marijuana recommended by a physician--is prohibited.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

Section 261, however, provides that "[i]n computing taxable income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect ofthe items specified in this part." "[T]his part" includes section 280E, Expenditures in Connection With the Illegal Sale ofDrugs.

ment already decided not to pursue a civil-forfeiture action against it. - 3 - FINDINGS OF FACT I. California Medical-Marijuana Law Under federal law marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, sec. 202, 84 Stat. at 1249 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. sec. 812 (2012)). This means that under federal law the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession ofmarijuana--even medical marijuana recommended by a physician--is prohibited.

ment already decided not to pursue a civil-forfeiture action against it. - 3 - FINDINGS OF FACT I. California Medical-Marijuana Law Under federal law marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, sec. 202, 84 Stat. at 1249 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. sec. 812 (2012)). This means that under federal law the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession ofmarijuana--even medical marijuana recommended by a physician--is prohibited.

at 1724, 1742. The Judicial Conference is the supervising ethics authority for Tax Court Judges and employees." From 2006 to 2015 several provisions were enacted which further distance the Tax Court from any association with the executive branch and bolster the Tax Court's "quintessentiallyjudicial" powers and design. Freytag v.

* * commonly depends on their context[.] * * * When the parties have adopted a writing as a final expression oftheir agreement, interpretation is directed to the meaning ofthat writing in the light ofthe circumstances." 2 Restatement, Contracts 2d, sec. 202, cmt. b (1981). B. Analysis ofPetitioner's Rev. Proc. 99-32 Closing Agreement 1. The Four Corners ofthe Agreement In BMC Software I, we held that a closing agreement that established similar accounts receivable "for Federal income tax purpos

202(b)(3)(B), (c)(2), 96 Stat. 421. Where appropriate based on the context in which used, we shall treat references by petitioners to sec. 213(e) as references to current sec. 213(d). - 9 - Commissioner, supra at 819. Relevant factors in evaluating these elements include the motive or purpose of the taxpayer in making the expenditure, the eff

1060, of that act provides that for purposes of determining gain or loss on the exchange of property, the value of any property received equals the cash value of its fair market value.

202(a), 111 Stat. 806, effective for interest payments due and paid on any qualified education loan after December 31, 1997. In addition, sec. 163(h)(2)(F) was added later to clarify the fact that interest allowable as a deduction under sec. 221 is not considered personal interest. See the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Approp

The committee intends that cable television franchises generally do qualify as “supply or service contracts” for purposes of section 202(d)(3) relating to transition rules.

ADA section 202, 42 U.S.C. section 12132, provides:3 3 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101- 336, sec. 203, 104 Stat. 337 (current version at 42 U.S.C. sec. (continued...) - 11 - Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participatio

The committee intends that cable television franchises generally do qualify as “supply or service contracts” for purposes of section 202(d)(3) relating to transition rules.

202(d)(4)(C) and (D), 91 Stat. 150 (employee credit carrybacks); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, sec. 2107(g)(2)(C) and (D), 90 Stat. 1904 (WIN credit carryback attributable to investment tax credit carryback from subsequent year); Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92- 178, sec. 601(d)(3) and (4), 85 Stat. 559 (work incentive credit carryba

an proceeds to redeem the shares of stock that were held by Cruze. - 24 - See Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, par. 5.04[6], at 5-29 (6th ed. 1997); 1 Ginsburg & Levin, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, sec. 202, at 2-15 (1998); 2 Ginsburg & Levin, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, sec. 1302.1.3, at 13-19 (1998). For 1992, the $650,000 in legal and professional fees that petitioner incurred in connection with the redemption of Cruze’s stock constit

202 (1994) (ownership of copyright distinct from ownership of any material object in which work is embodied). A purchaser of a particular tangible manifestation or embodiment of intellectual property acquires only property rights in that manifestation or embodiment and does not acquire any rights to the underlying intellectual property. In thi

rning the asset quality capital of the bank as an entirety. In response to the lack of Federal control over BCCI's operations in the United States, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102- 242, sec. 202, 105 Stat. 2286. This law requires foreign banks to obtain approval from the Federal Reserve Board before conducting business in the United States. It also requires foreign banks to provide Federal regulators access to information regarding

We see no material distinction between the software in the Norwest case and the software loads in issue here. In this case, however, respondent has raised the question of whether petitioner acquired sufficient benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to the software loads to be considered the owner of those loads for purpose

202 (1994) (ownership of copyright distinct from ownership of any material object in which work is embodied). A purchaser of a particular tangible manifestation or embodiment of intellectual property acquires only property rights in that manifestation or embodiment and does not acquire any rights to the underlying intellectual property. In thi

We see no material distinction between the software in the Norwest case and the software loads in issue here. In this case, however, respondent has raised the question of whether petitioner acquired sufficient benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to the software loads to be considered the owner of those loads for purpose

eld of diversity jurisdiction, courts have demonstrated a willingness to look behind the individual residence of the executor when determining the citizenship of parties." The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, sec. 202(a), 102 Stat. 4646, added 28 U.S.C. sec. 1332(c), which provides: (c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title-- * * * * * * * - 53 - (2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a cit