§27 — Taxes of foreign countries and possessions of the United States

27 (1982)). (cid:16)042 Collateral estoppel does not apply to the circumstances here.

6015 (a determination providing a sufficient basis for us to deny the motion), we need not decide whether the issue was actually litigated.

Of relevance here, section 27 provides a credit for “[t]he amount of taxes imposed by foreign countries * * * against the tax imposed by this chapter to the extent provided in section 901.” Section 901 provides a foreign tax credit against regular tax.

3To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, we hold that petitioners are not entitled to deductions beyond thos e respondent already permitted .

Contracts §§ 27 and 28 (1991); and then citing 1 Williston on Contracts § 3:5 (4th ed.

The opinion of the Court appropriately concludes that because section 280E addresses taxable income, and not income for purposes of an OIC, “rejecting the [OIC] solely on the basis of an understanding that section 27 280E required that result would have been an error.” See op.

The passive activity credit is the amount by which the sum of credits from all passive activities allowable for the taxable year under subpart B (other than section 27) or subpart D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Code exceeds the regular tax liability of the taxpayer for the year allocable to all passive activities.

Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273, 285 (1988) (defining the test for an essential issue as “whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier as necessary to the first judgment” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. L. Inst. 1982)). Finally, the controlling facts and applicable laws have not changed. Thus, collateral estoppel applies to 8 The Court revisited the issue of collateral estoppel on remand and again held that the taxpayer was estopped from a

Code §27-8-10, et g_q.), which authorizes the creation ofconservation easements for - 6 - [*6] purposes including those set forth in the recitals herein, and the conservation purposes ofthis Conservation Easement, including such purposes as are defined in Section 170(h)(4)(A) ofthe Internal Revenue Code. The parties recognize the Conservation Values, a

27-10-7 (West 2012) (requiring apportionment oftax "among all persons interested in the estate"); id. sec. 27-10-5(d) (defining "person interested in the estate" to mean "any person * * * entitled to receive, or who has received, from a decedent while alive or by reason ofthe death ofa decedent any property or interest therein included in the

It provides: As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest ofa holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations, the purposes ofwhich include one or more ofthe following: (a) retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space aspect

27:65 (emphasis added). The statute defines a riverboat, in part, as a vessel that "[c]arries a valid Certificate ofInspection (COI) from the United States Coast Guard for the carriage ofa minimum ofsix hundred passengers and crew." Id. sec. 27:44(23)(b). Thus, while Louisiana and other states on the Mississippi that allow riverboat gambling h

27:361(A) and (B) (West 2011). Louisiana also made sizable annual appropriations for special "stallion awards" and "breeder awards" which were paid to the owners ofthe sires and dams of Louisiana-bredthoroughbred horses that finished first, second, or third in certain stake, handicap, or allowance races. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 4:165(A); see

interest on certain home mortgages); sec. 25A (hope and lifetime learning credits); sec. 25B (elective deferrals and IRA contributions by certain individuals); sec. 25C (nonbusiness energy property); sec. 25D (residential energy efficient property); sec. 27 (taxes offoreign countries and possessions ofthe United States; possession tax credit); sec. 30 (credit for qualified electric vehicles); sec. 30A (Puerto Rico economic activity credit); sec. 30B (alternative motor vehicle credit); sec. 30C (

claims travel and me'al expense deductions on the Schedules A of his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns. Travel expenses, including meals and lodging away from home, are subj et to the specific and more stringent substantiation requirements ofsec. 27 . See sec. 274(d). To deduct these expenses, the taxpayer must substanti e by adequate records or sufficient evidence to corroborate the taxpayer's own testimony: (1) the amount ofthe expense; (2) the time and place ofthe fravel or meal expen

interest on certain home mortgages); sec. 25A (hope and lifetime learning credits); sec. 25B (elective deferrals and IRA contributions by certain individuals); sec. 25C (nonbusiness energy property); sec. 25D (residential energy efficient property); sec. 27 (taxes of foreign countries and possessions of the United States; possession tax credit); sec. 30 (credit for qualified electric vehicles); sec. 30A (Puerto Rico economic activity credit); sec. 30B (alternative motor vehicle credit); sec. 30C

27 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979). Some even hold that, for purposes ofcollateral estoppel, "the availability ofjudicial review is a crucial factor in determining preclusive effect." Wehrli v. Cnty; ofOrange, 175 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1999). A small tax case under section 7463(b) invo

ed and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to thejudgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.". 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue offact or law necessary to its judgment, that décision may preclude relitigation ofthe issue in a suit on a "Altfiough the

27 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Montana v.

ed and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to thejudgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.". 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue offact or law necessary to its judgment, that décision may preclude relitigation ofthe issue in a suit on a "Altfiough the

ted and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979). Some even hold that, for purposes of collateral estoppel, “the availability of judicial review is a crucial factor in determining preclusive effect.” We

ted and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different c

But such quandary is one reason why the heightened subutantiation requirements of section 27.4 (d) exist.

524(a) (1) (2006) provides that a chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge "voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 27 * * *.of this title,- whether or not discharge of such debt is waived".

* * * 1T - Analysis ExpensesSubject(cid:127)to the Section 27 .4(d)Y Standard .

gated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or different claim.” 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982). It stems from the understandable policy that a dispute once resolved should stay resolved. It promotes judicial economy and, if justice consists in part of reaching the same result in similar cases, it is also an instrument of justice

gated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or different claim.” 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982). It stems from the understandable policy that a dispute once resolved should stay resolved. It promotes judicial economy and, if justice consists in part of reaching the same result in similar cases, it is also an instrument of justice

r might have, such as, importantly, a right of subrogation against a revitalized New MGM.178 Cf. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 89 (1956); In re Enron Corp., 307 Bankr. 372, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, sec. 27 (1996). Petitioner suggests that the Credit Lyonnais group’s subjective judgment that MGM Group Holdings would have value was reasonable and well-founded. Petitioner contends that the Court should not, with the benefit of hindsight, substitute

State Law Section 27 of the trust agreement, “Applicable Law”, provides that all questions concerning construction, validity, and administration of the trust shall be determined in accordance with Arkansas law.

Former section 59(a)(1) defined "alternative minimum tax foreign tax credit" as the foreign tax credit allowed by section 27 with certain 7 The term “regular tax” means “the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in sec.

Former section 59(a)(1) defined "alternative minimum tax foreign tax credit" as the foreign tax credit allowed by section 27, with certain adjustments that we need not detail here, and former section 59(a)(2)(A), the predecessor of the - 9 - provision at issue in this case, limited the credit to 90 percent of the precredit tentative minimum tax liability.

Commissioner, supra at 284-286, we abandoned the Evergreens approach and adopted the rationale of Comment j, Restatement, Judgments 2d, section 27 (1982), which focuses not on whether the facts to be precluded from being relitigated were evidentiary or ultimate, but on whether the parties recognized the issue as important and necessary to the first judgment.39 39The Restatement reads as follows: (continued...) - 85 - C.

Commissioner, supra at 284-286, we abandoned the Evergreens approach and adopted the rationale of Comment j, Restatement, Judgments 2d, section 27 (1982), which focuses not on whether the facts to be precluded from being relitigated were evidentiary or ultimate, but on whether the parties recognized the issue as important and necessary to the first judgment.39 39The Restatement reads as follows: (continued...) - 85 - C.

tax is $121,863. Ninety percent of $121,863 is $109,676. Therefore, petitioner’s AMT, the 2 The term “regular tax” means “the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in section 26(b)) reduced by the foreign tax credit allowable under section 27(a)”. Sec. 55(c)(1). - 5 - tentative minimum tax minus the foreign tax credit, is $12,186. Because he had no additional regular tax due, petitioner would owe $12,186 for 1992. In his challenge of the deficiency determined by respondent, peti

However, that foreign tax credit is limited by section 59(a)(2)(A).3 The 2 The term "regular tax" means "the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in section 26(b)) reduced by the foreign tax credit allowable under section 27(a)".

litigating an identical issue and of promoting judicial economy by preventing unnecessary or redundant litigation." Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273, 282 (1988). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is defined in 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982), as follows: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the partie

year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. The term “regular tax” means “the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in section 26(b)) reduced by the foreign tax credit allowable under section 27(a)”. Sec. 55(c)(1). The rationale underlying the foreign tax credit limitation was explained in a Senate report as follows: “A further change that the committee believes is necessary relates to the use of foreign tax credits by U.S. taxpay

e of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action * * *." Id. at 235 (quoting 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982)). We need not differentiate between the two concepts here since all of the issues were before the bankruptcy court.7 7 The meaning and scope of the doctrine of res judicata has been described by the Supreme Court as follows: The general

issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action * * Id. at 235 (quoting 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982)). We need not differentiate between the two concepts here since all of the issues were before the bankruptcy court. In this case, under 11 U.S.C. sec. 505(a), the bankruptcy court determined the liability of petitioner for the Federal

(c) Regular Tax.-- (1) In general.--For purposes of this section, the term "regular tax" means the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in section 26(b)) reduced by the foreign tax credit allowable under section 27(a) and the section 936 credit allowable under section 27(b).

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is defined in 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, section 27 (1982), as follows: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Collateral estoppel may be applied in civil trials

ted and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982); see also Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273 (1988). 7 21 U.S.C. sec. 881(a)(7) (1995) provides for the forfeiture to the United States of the following: All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leaseho

ted and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. [X Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982).] A violation of the Hobbs Act is a substantive offense, separable from a Hobbs Act conspiracy. United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530, 534-535 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 733