§286

where an equitable and legal estate become united in a single person, i.e., where the sole beneficiary is also the sole trustee, the two interests merge and the trust terminates. Nellis v. Rickard, 66 P. 32, 33 (Cal. 1901); 60 Cal. Jur. 3d, Trusts, sec. 286. The estate alleges: “Because Samuel left his property to Trust A where Leona had an immediate and unrestricted right of withdrawal, there was no restriction on Leona’s current interest - 21 - in the property to support the granting of a sep

where an equitable and legal estate become united in a single person, i.e., where the sole beneficiary is also the sole trustee, the two interests merge and the trust terminates. Nellis v. Rickard, 66 P. 32, 33 (Cal. 1901); 60 Cal. Jur. 3d, Trusts, sec. 286. The estate alleges: “Because Samuel left his property to Trust A where Leona had an immediate and unrestricted right of withdrawal, there was no restriction on Leona’s current interest in the property to support the granting of a separate p

ecial relationship between them, and the nature of the testimony that the witness might be expected to give. McClanahan - 13 - v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 925-926 (5th Cir. 1956); Gaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-531; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 286(a), at 199-200 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). According to petitioner’s account, Mr. Judy’s inheritance was the source of the amounts in controversy, and only petitioner and Mr. Judy knew that the inheritance money was secreted in an ammunition b

viz., Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Robinson, J., concurring); Savard v. Marine Contracting Inc., 471 F.2d 536, 542 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Stader, 90 Bankr. 29, 32 n.8 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988); and 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 286, at 200 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Judge Robinson began his concurring opinion in the Burgess case with a discussion of the adverse inference rule and his assumption that the missing witness in that case was amenable to subpoena. However, that J