§32 — Earned income
237 cases·67 followed·9 distinguished·3 questioned·2 criticized·1 limited·3 overruled·152 cited—28% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §32
In the case of an eligible individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle for the taxable year an amount equal to the credit percentage of so much of the taxpayer’s earned income for the taxable year as does not exceed the earned income amount.
The amount of the credit allowable to a taxpayer under paragraph (1) for any taxable year shall not exceed the excess (if any) of—
the credit percentage of the earned income amount, over
the phaseout percentage of so much of the adjusted gross income (or, if greater, the earned income) of the taxpayer for the taxable year as exceeds the phaseout amount.
For purposes of subsection (a)—
The credit percentage and the phaseout percentage shall be determined as follows:
| In the case of an eligible individual with: | The credit percentage is: | Thephaseoutpercentageis: |
|---|---|---|
| 1 qualifying child | 34 | 15.98 |
| 2 qualifying children | 40 | 21.06 |
| 3 or more qualifying children | 45 | 21.06 |
| No qualifying children | 7.65 | 7.65 |
Subject to subparagraph (B), the earned income amount and the phaseout amount shall be determined as follows:
| In the case of an eligible individual with: | The earned income amount is: | Thephaseoutamount is: |
|---|---|---|
| 1 qualifying child | $6,330 | $11,610 |
| 2 or more qualifying children | $8,890 | $11,610 |
| No qualifying children | $4,220 | $5,280 |
In the case of a joint return filed by an eligible individual and such individual’s spouse, the phaseout amount determined under subparagraph (A) shall be increased by $5,000.
For purposes of this section—
The term “eligible individual” means—
any individual who has a qualifying child for the taxable year, or
any other individual who does not have a qualifying child for the taxable year, if—
such individual’s principal place of abode is in the United States for more than one-half of such taxable year,
such individual (or, if the individual is married, either the individual or the individual’s spouse) has attained age 25 but not attained age 65 before the close of the taxable year, and
such individual is not a dependent for whom a deduction is allowable under section 151 to another taxpayer for any taxable year beginning in the same calendar year as such taxable year.
If an individual is the qualifying child of a taxpayer for any taxable year of such taxpayer beginning in a calendar year, such individual shall not be treated as an eligible individual for any taxable year of such individual beginning in such calendar year.
The term “eligible individual” does not include any individual who claims the benefits of section 911 (relating to citizens or residents living abroad) for the taxable year.
The term “eligible individual” shall not include any individual who is a nonresident alien individual for any portion of the taxable year unless such individual is treated for such taxable year as a resident of the United States for purposes of this chapter by reason of an election under subsection (g) or (h) of section 6013.
No credit shall be allowed under this section to an eligible individual who does not include on the return of tax for the taxable year—
such individual’s taxpayer identification number, and
if the individual is married, the taxpayer identification number of such individual’s spouse.
The term “earned income” means—
wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation, but only if such amounts are includible in gross income for the taxable year, plus
the amount of the taxpayer’s net earnings from self-employment for the taxable year (within the meaning of section 1402(a)), but such net earnings shall be determined with regard to the deduction allowed to the taxpayer by section 164(f).
For purposes of subparagraph (A)—
the earned income of an individual shall be computed without regard to any community property laws,
no amount received as a pension or annuity shall be taken into account,
no amount to which section 871(a) applies (relating to income of nonresident alien individuals not connected with United States business) shall be taken into account,
no amount received for services provided by an individual while the individual is an inmate at a penal institution shall be taken into account,
no amount described in subparagraph (A) received for service performed in work activities as defined in paragraph (4) or (7) of section 407(d) of the Social Security Act to which the taxpayer is assigned under any State program under part A of title IV of such Act shall be taken into account, but only to the extent such amount is subsidized under such State program, and
a taxpayer may elect to treat amounts excluded from gross income by reason of section 112 as earned income.
The term “qualifying child” means a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c), determined without regard to paragraph (1)(D) thereof and section 152(e)).
The term “qualifying child” shall not include an individual who is married as of the close of the taxpayer’s taxable year unless the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under section 151 for such taxable year with respect to such individual (or would be so entitled but for section 152(e)).
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the requirements of section 152(c)(1)(B) shall be met only if the principal place of abode is in the United States.
A qualifying child shall not be taken into account under subsection (b) unless the taxpayer includes the name, age, and TIN of the qualifying child on the return of tax for the taxable year.
The Secretary may prescribe other methods for providing the information described in clause (i).
For purposes of paragraphs (1)(A)(ii)(I) and (3)(C), the principal place of abode of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be treated as in the United States during any period during which such member is stationed outside the United States while serving on extended active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term “extended active duty” means any period of active duty pursuant to a call or order to such duty for a period in excess of 90 days or for an indefinite period.
In the case of an individual who is married, this section shall apply only if a joint return is filed for the taxable year under section 6013.
For purposes of this section—
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), marital status shall be determined under section 7703(a).
An individual shall not be treated as married if such individual—
is married (as determined under section 7703(a)) and does not file a joint return for the taxable year,
resides with a qualifying child of the individual for more than one-half of such taxable year, and
during the last 6 months of such taxable year, does not have the same principal place of abode as the individual’s spouse, or
has a decree, instrument, or agreement (other than a decree of divorce) described in section 121(d)(3)(C) with respect to the individual’s spouse and is not a member of the same household with the individual’s spouse by the end of the taxable year.
Except in the case of a taxable year closed by reason of the death of the taxpayer, no credit shall be allowable under this section in the case of a taxable year covering a period of less than 12 months.
The amount of the credit allowed by this section shall be determined under tables prescribed by the Secretary.
The tables prescribed under paragraph (1) shall reflect the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) and shall have income brackets of not greater than $50 each—
for earned income between $0 and the amount of earned income at which the credit is phased out under subsection (b), and
for adjusted gross income between the dollar amount at which the phaseout begins under subsection (b) and the amount of adjusted gross income at which the credit is phased out under subsection (b).
No credit shall be allowed under subsection (a) for the taxable year if the aggregate amount of disqualified income of the taxpayer for the taxable year exceeds $10,000.
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “disqualified income” means—
interest or dividends to the extent includible in gross income for the taxable year,
interest received or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt from tax imposed by this chapter,
the excess (if any) of—
gross income from rents or royalties not derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business, over
the sum of—
the deductions (other than interest) which are clearly and directly allocable to such gross income, plus
interest deductions properly allocable to such gross income,
the capital gain net income (as defined in section 1222) of the taxpayer for such taxable year, and
the excess (if any) of—
the aggregate income from all passive activities for the taxable year (determined without regard to any amount included in earned income under subsection (c)(2) or described in a preceding subparagraph), over
the aggregate losses from all passive activities for the taxable year (as so determined).
For purposes of subparagraph (E), the term “passive activity” has the meaning given such term by section 469.
In the case of any taxable year beginning after 2015 (2021 in the case of the dollar amount in subsection (i)(1)), each of the dollar amounts in subsections (b)(2) and (i)(1) shall be increased by an amount equal to—
such dollar amount, multiplied by
the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable year begins, determined by substituting in subparagraph (A)(ii) thereof—
in the case of amounts in subsection (b)(2)(A), “calendar year 1995” for “calendar year 2016”,
in the case of the $5,000 amount in subsection (b)(2)(B), “calendar year 2008” for “calendar year 2016”, and
in the case of the $10,000 amount in subsection (i)(1), “calendar year 2020” for “calendar year 2016”.
If any dollar amount in subsection (b)(2)(A) (after being increased under subparagraph (B) thereof), after being increased under paragraph (1), is not a multiple of $10, such dollar amount shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of $10.
If the dollar amount in subsection (i)(1), after being increased under paragraph (1), is not a multiple of $50, such amount shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.
No credit shall be allowed under this section for any taxable year in the disallowance period.
For purposes of paragraph (1), the disallowance period is—
the period of 10 taxable years after the most recent taxable year for which there was a final determination that the taxpayer’s claim of credit under this section was due to fraud, and
the period of 2 taxable years after the most recent taxable year for which there was a final determination that the taxpayer’s claim of credit under this section was due to reckless or intentional disregard of rules and regulations (but not due to fraud).
In the case of a taxpayer who is denied credit under this section for any taxable year as a result of the deficiency procedures under subchapter B of chapter 63, no credit shall be allowed under this section for any subsequent taxable year unless the taxpayer provides such information as the Secretary may require to demonstrate eligibility for such credit.
For purposes of—
the United States Housing Act of 1937,
title V of the Housing Act of 1949,
section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
sections 221(d)(3), 235, and 236 of the National Housing Act, and
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008,
any refund made to an individual (or the spouse of an individual) by reason of this section shall not be treated as income (and shall not be taken into account in determining resources for the month of its receipt and the following month).
Solely for purposes of subsections (c)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(D), a taxpayer identification number means a social security number issued to an individual by the Social Security Administration (other than a social security number issued pursuant to clause (II) (or that portion of clause (III) that relates to clause (II)) of section 205(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Social Security Act) on or before the due date for filing the return for the taxable year.
In the case of any taxable year beginning after
December 31, 2020
, and before
January 1, 2022
—
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii)(II) shall be applied by substituting “the applicable minimum age” for “age 25”.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “applicable minimum age” means—
except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, age 19,
in the case of a specified student (other than a qualified former foster youth or a qualified homeless youth), age 24, and
in the case of a qualified former foster youth or a qualified homeless youth, age 18.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “specified student” means, with respect to any taxable year, an individual who is an eligible student (as defined in section 25A(b)(3)) during at least 5 calendar months during the taxable year.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “qualified former foster youth” means an individual who—
on or after the date that such individual attained age 14, was in foster care provided under the supervision or administration of an entity administering (or eligible to administer) a plan under part B or part E of title IV of the Social Security Act (without regard to whether Federal assistance was provided with respect to such child under such part E), and
provides (in such manner as the Secretary may provide) consent for entities which administer a plan under part B or part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to disclose to the Secretary information related to the status of such individual as a qualified former foster youth.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “qualified homeless youth” means, with respect to any taxable year, an individual who certifies, in a manner as provided by the Secretary, that such individual is either an unaccompanied youth who is a homeless child or youth, or is unaccompanied, at risk of homelessness, and self-supporting.
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii)(II) shall be applied without regard to the phrase “but not attained age 65”.
The table contained in subsection (b)(1) shall be applied by substituting “15.3” for “7.65” each place it appears therein.
The table contained in subsection (b)(2)(A) shall be applied—
by substituting “$9,820” for “$4,220”, and
by substituting “$11,610” for “$5,280”.
Subsection (j) shall not apply to any dollar amount specified in this paragraph.
Treasury Regulations
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2 Earned income credit for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1978
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2(a) §1.32-2(a)
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2(b) Limitations.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2(c) Definitions.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2(d) §1.32-2(d)
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-2(e) Coordination of credit with advance payments—(1) Recapture of excess advance payments.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3 Eligibility requirements after denial of the earned income credit
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(a) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(b) Denial of the EIC as a result of the deficiency procedures.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(c) Demonstration of eligibility.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(d) Failure to demonstrate eligibility.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(e) Special rule where one spouse denied EIC.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.32-3(f) Effective date.
237 Citing Cases
Finally, and most importantly, are we really prepared to interpret a ruling that, it seems by stealth, overrules a - 38 - regulation without asking for the Commissioner’s position and without deciding for ourselves whether the regulation is valid?
As a result, petitioners maintain: "Feldman is distinguishable as a matter oflaw and has no application here." An additional reason offered by petitioners in support oftheir position that the Indiana Supreme Court would use the equitable collapsing doctrine is that that court would want to avoid the conflict that petitioners claim would be created if respondent's equitable doctrines were used between (1) Ind. Code Ann. sec. 32-18-2-20, which incorporates equitable principles into the Indiana UFT
As a result, petitioners maintain: "Feldman is distinguishable as a matter oflaw and has no application here." An additional reason offered by petitioners in support oftheir position that the Indiana Supreme Court would use the equitable collapsing doctrine is that that court would want to avoid the conflict that petitioners claim would be created if respondent's equitable doctrines were used between (1) Ind. Code Ann. sec. 32-18-2-20, which incorporates equitable principles into the Indiana UFT
As a result, petitioners maintain: "Feldman is distinguishable as a matter oflaw and has no application here." An additional reason offered by petitioners in support oftheir position that the Indiana Supreme Court would use the equitable collapsing doctrine is that that court would want to avoid the conflict that petitioners claim would be created if respondent's equitable doctrines were used between (1) Ind. Code Ann. sec. 32-18-2-20, which incorporates equitable principles into the Indiana UFT
[Emphasis supplied.] In arguing that section 32(i) does not apply, petitioner focused his argument on whether his real estate rental property activity constituted a trade or business.
We need not decide whether petitioner’s lack of knowledge of his 7Individuals without qualifying children may be eligible for the EIC if their earned income is no greater than the phaseout amount the Code permits.
Therefore, we need not decide whether it was so untimely as to be invalid .
He had previously worked as a seamster for 15 years; however, it is unclear whether petitioner was employed or only collecting disability benefits during the year at issue.
We disagree with petitioner’s characterization.
Ide]4: P was an inmate during the time he was confined to the State hospital.
Furthermore, the Court has already decided above for the year in issue that petitioner is not eligible to claim the EITC pursuant to section 32(a)(1).
Therefore, to the extent respondent seeks to use Notice 2014-7, supra, to deprive petitioners ofa benefit bestowed by Congress, we hold he may not do so.
h respect to any return or claim for refund who fails to comply with due diligence requirements imposed by the Secretaryby regulations with respect to determining eligibility for, - 10 - or the amount of, the credit allowable by * * * section 32 shall pay a penalty of $500 for each such failure."3 Section 32 provides for the earned income credit.4 Section 1.6695-2(b), Income Tax Regs., prescribes due diligence requirements that a tax return preparer must satisfy to avoid a penalty under section
We hold that he is not.
Earned Income Credit Section 32 provides a refundable earned income credit to certain low- income individuals.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioners received $4,117 in taxable income resulting from stock transactions in their TD Ameritrade account.
In view ofthe foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to an earned income credit.
For purposes ofthe earned income credit, section 32 requires that the taxpayer have a qualifying child or children for the taxable year.
We hold that the amounts received by petitioners, as substantiated by the record and discussed infra, constitute earned income within the meaning ofsection 32.
ccordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to dependency exemption deductions for her 'granddaughter and great- granddaughter for 2007.
We hold that she does not.
Therefore, we hold that Mr .
We hold that she is not .
or his minor child pursuant to sectio n SERVED May 13 2009 151(c)' ;,(2) whether petitioner is entitled to a child tax credi t pursuant to-section 24(a) ; (3) whether petitioner is entitled to head-6.f-household filing status ; and (4) whether petitioner i s entitled to an earned income tax credit pursuant to section 32 .
We hold that he is not .
Thus , petitioner is not entitled to claim an EIC for having qualifying children pursuant to section 32(c) .
Consequently, pursuant to section 2(b)(3)(B), we hold that petitioner is not entitled to head-of-household filing status .
Earned Income Credit Section 32 provides that certain individuals may be entitled to an earned income credit if they satisfy certain requirements .
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to the claimed $5,301 deduction for taxable year 2002 .
whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income credit for taxable year 2003 pursuant to section 32; and 4.
- 6 - Finally, section 32 requires that a married individual must file a joint return with the individual's spouse for the year for which the credit is claimed.
Upon the basis of the record, we hold that Christopher does not satisfy the requirements for a qualifying child with respect 1This amount was obtained from the 2002 earned income credit tables prescribed pursuant to sec.
Section 32 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 5 However, this expression of congressional intent supports respondent’s statutory interpretation only by circular reasoning, or “begging the question”.
According to the tables prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to section 32(f), the lowest income amount at which the earned income credit is no longer available in this situation is $10,380 for taxable year 2000.
Pursuant to section 32(c)(3)(A)(ii), the qualifying child must have the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year.
However, based upon the total expenses for the household in 1997 and 1998, it is clear that petitioner did not provide more than half of the cost of maintaining the household.4 Therefore, on the basis of the record, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to file her 1997 and 1998 Federal income tax returns as head of household.
Therefore, we hold that petitioner is - 5 - not entitled to a section 151 dependency exemption deduction for the 1996 tax year.
We hold that petitioner does not qualify as a head of household for 1998.
Therefore, on the basis of the record, we hold that petitioner is entitled to file her 1995 and 1996 Federal income tax returns as head of household.
Section 32 provides that an eligible individual is allowed a credit calculated as a percentage of the individual’s earned income.
Earned Income Credit Section 32 provides for an earned income credit.
Earned Income Credit Section 32 provides for an earned income credit.
We hold that petitioner is entitled to the earned income credit for 1996.
The phrase “same principal place of abode” is not defined in section 32 or the regulations under that section.
filed with the Tax Court during that period, the restriction upon such a levy continues until the Court’s decision becomes final. A levy must be distinguished from an offset of an overpayment or refundable credit, such as the earned income credit of section 32. See, e.g., Belloff v. Commissioner, 996 F.2d 607, 615-616 (2d Cir. 1993) (comparing discussion of “levy” in United States v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720 (1985), with “setoff” in United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 23
ied the relationship, residency, and age tests (discussed supra), as well as the section 32(c)(3)(A)(iv) “identification test”. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA), Pub. L. 101-508, sec. 11111(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-408 (amending sec. 32). The identification test required a taxpayer to include on his or her income tax return the name, age, and taxpayer identification number of each qualifying child with respect to whom he or she claimed the earned income credit. See sec. 32(c)
Section 32 provides for an earned income credit. In order to be entitled to an earned income credit, the taxpayer must satisfy a number of requirements. One of the requirements is that the taxpayer have earned income. See sec. 32(a)(1). Without earned income, there is no earned income credit.5 3 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Co
Respondent on brief admits that section 32 consists of four elements.
over the tax imposed by subtitle A (determined without regard to such credits).” Section 24(d) provides for the ACTC, and section 32 provides for the Earned Income Credit.
The term "qualifying child", for purposes ofsection 32, means a qualifying child 3This remains true even without regard to sec.
The.term "qualifying child", for.purposes of section 32, means a qualifying child as defined in section 152(c) without a regard to section 152(c) (1) (D) and (e).
Therefore , petitioner is not entitled to claim these children as qualifying children for purposes of the earned income credit under section 32 ( a) (1) .
s were consolidated for trial, briefing and opinion . After concessions, the issue for decision is whether petitioner's nephew and niece were his qualifying children for purposes of the earned income tax credit (EITC) provided by SERVED SEP 15 2009 section 32 . Except as otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years'in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure . 4 FINDINGS OF FACT f }''" "'"''Some of th
Section 32 indexes the ceilings such that for 2006, the upper limitation ("completed phaseout amount") of earned income 2In future years petitioner might avoid the issue of whether T .A.N . was his qualifying child by attaching to his Federal income tax return a properly completed Form 8332 which Ms . Angwafo has signed . - 13 - for individuals wi
However, in the case of a married individual, section 32(d) provides that section 32 applies only if the individual filed a joint return.
whether petitioner is entitled to a section 32 earned income credit for taxable year 2003 .
There is no provision in section 32 that excludes - 4 - gambling income from modified adjusted gross income or allows the deduction of gambling losses in arriving at modified adjusted gross income.
Section 32 generally provides that an eligible individual may qualify for an earned income credit. A taxpayer who has a “qualifying child” may be an eligible individual for the earned income credit. Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i). - 3 - A “qualifying child” is an individual who satisfies a relationship test, a residency test, an age test, and for whom the ta
Under section 32, an eligible taxpayer is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the taxpayer’s earned income, subject to certain limitations. Sec. 32(a)(1). Taxpayers who have qualifying children are allowed a larger credit and are entitled to a credit at higher income levels than are individuals without qualifying children. Sec. 32(a),
The relevant parts of section 32 provide that an individual is eligible for the earned income credit if the individual has a qualified child or qualified children who satisfy the relationship and residency tests.
r. 1949). Factual determinations are required in order to decide whether a taxpayer is entitled to: (1) Head-of-household filing status, see sec. 2(b); (2) a dependency exemption deduction, see secs. 151 and 152; or (3) an earned income credit, see sec. 32. We have held that whenever the resolution of adjustments requires factual determinations, the Commissioner is not obliged to concede those adjustments until the Commissioner has received, and has had a reasonable period of time to verify, ade
In his petition, petitioner alleged "my ex-wife filed for the year of 1995 and I do not remember signing a 1040 for that tax season, so I cannot attest to its correctness, nor should I be held accountable if it is incorrect as to her income." At trial, petitioner filed a trial memorandum in which he stated that his former spouse, Carol L. Fuhr Hamblin (Mrs. Hamblin), falsely reported on their joint return income from a trade or business activity conducted by her in the amount of $5,670, and the
Earned Income Credit The relevant parts of section 32 provide that an individual is eligible for the earned income credit if the individual has a - 8 - “qualifying child”.
Respondent reasoned that, because petitioner had no earned income within the meaning of section 32 during 1999, petitioner failed to state a claim for relief.
dingly, petitioner is not considered as unmarried pursuant to section 7703(b), and his filing status is necessarily married filing separately. Respondent’s determination on this issue is sustained. - 7 - Issue 2. Earned Income Credit We turn now to section 32. That section provides for an earned income credit. However, in order to be entitled to an earned income credit, the taxpayer must satisfy a number of requirements. One of the requirements is that the taxpayer, if married, must file a joint
Petitioner's entitlement to section 32 earned income credit for 1995 and 1996, however, is not conditioned on petitioner's entitlement to dependency exemption deductions under section 151.
Section 32(d) provides that an individual who is married must file a joint return with her spouse for the taxable year in order for section 32 to apply.
d the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impu
ed the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was - 3 - received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or li
ed the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like imp
trial memorandum that his adjustment for "recapture of the earned income credit [is] computational" based on the Court's holdings on the other issues in this case. Respondent misstates the law applicable to this case. Petitioner's entitlement to the sec. 32 earned income credit for 1995 is not conditioned on petitioner's entitlement to dependency exemption deductions under sec. 151 or head of household filing status under sec. 2(b). The statutory language which previously linked those issues was
Section 32(d) provides that an individual who is married, within the meaning of section 7703, must file a joint return with his spouse for the taxable year in order for section 32 to apply.
ed the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was - 3 - received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or li
Section 32 provides for an earned income credit for an "eligible individual". Section 32(d) provides, however, that a married individual (within the meaning of section 7703) is only eligible for an earned income credit if a joint return is filed for the taxable year. Section 7703 provides, in pertinent part: SEC. 7703. DETERMINATION OF MARITAL STAT
)(A). Thus, petitioner has not established that he maintained a household for a qualified individual. Respondent is sustained on this issue. The final issue in this case is whether petitioner is entitled to the earned income credit as provided under section 32. Section 32(a) permits an "eligible individual" to claim an earned income credit against the individual's income tax liability. An eligible individual is defined in section 32(c)(1)(A) as either (1) an individual who has a qualifying child
Earned Income Credit Section 32 provides an earned income credit for certain "eligible individuals".
Section 32 provides for an earned income credit for certain "eligible individuals". Section 32(d) provides, however, that a married individual (within the meaning of section 7703) is only eligible for the earned income credit if a joint return is filed for the taxable year. Petitioner, a married individual within the meaning of section 7703, did no
Pursuant to section 32, certain low-income individuals with a child residing in the taxpayer's household may qualify for the earned income credit.
EITC Credit For tax year 2016 the maximum allowed adjusted gross income (AGI) to claim any amount of the EITC under section 32 for a taxpayer filing as head of household with three or more qualifying children was $47,955.
Respondent does not argue that petitioners are liable for section 6662(a) penalties under section 32 [*32] 6662(b)(3).
The Joint Committee staff can speak with some authority in 2016 on the reasons Congress repealed section 32 [*32] 704(e)(1) the previous year.16 It has little or no authority to explain why Congress first enacted that statutory rule 65 years earlier.17 Moreover, the Joint Committee staff recognized that, before 2016,18 an argument could have been made that section 704(e)(1) “provides an alternative test as to whether the holder of a capital i
At all times relevant to this case, section 32 imposed the following identification number requirement with respect to individuals otherwise eligible to claim the EITC: Sec.
The definition of “qualifying child” for purposes of section 32 is the same requirement as provided in section 152(c).
Again, a qualifying child for purposes ofsection 32 is generally defined as an individual who is the taxpayer's "qualifying child" as defined in section 152(c).
Again, a qualifying child for purposes ofsection 32 is generally defined as an individual who is the taxpayer's "qualifying child" as defined in section 152(c).
The definition of "qualifying child" for the purposes ofsection 32 is the same requirement as provided in section 152(c).
t would be quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities oftax law by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting from - 22 - the form oftransaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they might have chosen, whichever is less."), § 32 T.C. 1297 (1959). Nothing in the record suggests that Waterfront's form did not respect its substance. To the contrary, the record shows that in May 2012 Waterfront was purposefully organized as a nonprofit corporation, upon an attorney's advice,
curacy-Related Penalties Respondent determined that for each tax year at issue petitioners are liable for a 20% accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a). Under section 7491(c), respondent bears the burden ofproduction with respect to the section 32Mr. MacCuish testified vaguely that the concept behind his methodology is illustrated by the example of"people that are flipping houses to make a profit", who might insist on a discount in buying damaged property in order to make a profit.
Again, a qualifying child for purposes ofsection 32 is generally defined as an individual who is the taxpayer's "qualifying child" as defined in section 152(c).
ments to petitioner in 2010 and again in 2011. Standard filed with respondent and issued to petitioner a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for 2011 reporting the $43,868 in LTD payments it made to petitioner during that year as wages. See generally sec. 32.1, Temporary Employment Tax Regs., 47 Fed. Reg. 29225 (July 6, 1982) (as amended by T.D. 7867, 48 Fed. Reg. 793 (Jan. 7, 1983), and T.D. 9233, 70 Fed. Reg. 74199 (Dec. 15, 2015)). Petitioner disagreed with Standard's position that her disabili
lected on the time logs petitioner attached to his opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss is significantly less than $2,500, and surmise that petitioner's refund claims relate not to tax withheld on this income but to a refundable credit under sec. 32, commonly known as the earned income tax credit. Under sec. 32(c)(2)(B)(iv), however, income earned while a taxpayer is incarcerated is not taken into account for purposes ofthis credit, which likely constituted the basis ofthe Commissioner's
6 Section 32 borrows the definition of"qualifying child" from section 152(c), but changes it in ways that aren't relevant to this opinion. See sec. 32(c)(3). - 13 - [*13] Ifa taxpayer is entitled to a dependency exemption for a "qualifying child" who is not yet 17 years old, then she also gets a child tax credit for that child. See sec. 24(a), (c).
The earned income credit, as provided in section 32, permits a larger percentage credit for a taxpayerwith one or more "qualifying" children.
e view that the caption transforms a narrow closing agreement to a broad, sweeping one. - 33 - broaden the scope ofthe closing agreement beyond what the parties intended.28 S_e_e 17A C.J.S., Contracts, sec. 399 (2011); c£ 11 Williston on Contracts, sec. 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) ("Even absent a true conflict, specific words will limit the meaning ofgeneral words ifit appears from the whole agreement that the parties' purpose was directed solely toward the matter to which the specific words or clause
mined an addition to tax rather than an accuracy-relatedpenalty, and that was respondent's position at trial. 3Respondent also made computational adjustments to petitioner's self- employment tax for each year, sec. 36A credits for 2009 and 2010, and sec. 32 credits for 2010 and 2011. - 3 - [*3] FINDINGS OF FACT Some ofthe facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition was file
As pertinent here, section 24(c)(1) provides that, for purposes ofsection 24, "qualifying child" means an individual under age 17 who is a qualifying child ofthe taxpayer as defined in section 152(c).
Saenz and DS as qualifying children for purposes ofthe section 32 earned income tax credit and claim DS as a qualifying child forpurposes ofthe section 24 additional child tax credit depends on whetherMrs.
at 556-557, also included a provision exempting charitable organizations from tax, but the income tax system provided for in the Act was declared unconstitutional. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 3°During the years at issue (and currently), sec. 170(a) allowed a deduction, subject to certain limitations an
604 (1959); sec. 1.166-5(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. 3°Litwin v. United States, 983 F.2d 997, 999 (10th Cir. 1993). 3¹Secs. 166(d)(1)(B), 1211(b), 1212(b); sec. 1.166-5(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. 32Sec. 166(a). 33Sec. 1211(b). - 23 - [*23] As an initial matter, Mr. Espaillat and Ms. Lizardo do not argue and the record does not support that they
at 556-557, also included a provision exempting charitable organizations from tax, but the income tax system provided for in the Act was declared unconstitutional. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 3°During the years at issue (and currently), sec. 170(a) allowed a deduction, subject to certain limitations an
ld tax credit, commonly referred to as the additional child tax credit, is refundable and is computed (as relevant here) under paragraph (1)(B)(i) as the amount equal to "15 percent ofso much ofthe -6- taxpayer's earned income (within the meaning ofsection 32) which is taken into account in computing taxable income for the taxable year as exceeds $10,000".4 A taxpayer claiming an EIC must establish that he or she had earned income and the amount ofthat income.
The Advance Earned Income Credit Before it was repealed, effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2010, section 3507 permitted employees to convert the earned income credit provided by section 32 into increased wages by filing a Form W-5, Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Certificate, with their employers.
32-2101(49) (2012) (West). Thus, according to respondent, in Arizona, Colorado, and California the subject ofa real estate contract is the real estate being transferred. But in California, the legislature has also defined real property to include "[t]hat which is incidental or appurtenant to land". Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658(3) (West 2007). The C
Earned Income Credit Taxpayers are afforded a refundable creditunder section 32 against income tax whentheir earned income is below a statutorylevel; however, section 32(d) denies this credit to married individuals who file separate returns.
32-2101(49) (2012) (West). Thus, according to respondent, in Arizona, Colorado, and California the subject ofa real estate contract is the real estate being transferred. But in California, the legislature has also defined real property to include "[t]hat which is incidental or appurtenant to land". Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658(3) (West 2007). The C
32-2101(49) (2012) (West). Thus, according to respondent, in Arizona, Colorado, and California the subject ofa real estate contract is the real estate being transferred. But in California, the legislature has also defined real property to include "[t]hat which is incidental or appurtenant to land". Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658(3) (West 2007). The C
32-2101(49) (2012) (West). Thus, according to respondent, in Arizona, Colorado, and California the subject of a real estate contract is the real estate being transferred. But in California, the legislature has also defined real property to include “[t]hat which is incidental or appurtenant to land”. Cal. Civ. Code sec. 658(3) (West 2007). The
Child Tax Credit A taxpayer may claim a child tax credit for each "qualifying child" ofthe taxpayer (as defined in section 152) who has not yet reached age 17.
151(c). - 24 - [*24] that declaration is attached to the noncustodial parent's return.39 A "'custodial parent' means the parent having custody for the greater portion ofthe calendar year."4° This declaration is commonly made on a Form 8332. Mr. Thunstedt testified that because his ex-wife was the custodial spouse under the marital
32(c)(2)(A) The term "qualifying child", for purposes<ofsection 32,,means a qualifying child as defined in section 152(c) withoutregard to section 152(c)(1)(D) arid (E) Sec.
ons by the principal that the agent will act on behalfofthe principal, (2) the - 15 - agent's acceptance ofsuch undertaking,,and (3) an understanding by both parties that the principal is to be in control ofsuch undertaking. See 2A C.J.S., Agency, sec. 32 (2003). The TIA does not establish an agency relationship, or support he existence ofsuch a relationship between the United States and the Virgin Isladds or their respective tax departrñents (i.e., the IRS and the .BIR). To the contra ; the TIA
Davila claimed an earned income tax credit under section 32 on the basis of his having two qualifying children.
actions by the principal that the agent will act on behalf of the principal, (2) the agent’s acceptance of such undertaking, and (3) an understanding by both parties that the principal is to be in control of such undertaking. See 2A C.J.S., Agency, sec. 32 (2003). The TIA does not establish an agency relationship, or support the existence of such a relationship, between the United States and the Virgin Islands or their respective tax departments (i.e., the IRS and the BIR). To the contrary, the
However, section 32(d) provides that a married individual is entitled to the credit only if a joint return is filed.
Earned Income Credit In the case of an "eligible individual", section 32 (a) allows an EIC against the individual's income tax liability.
and J.Lë are not petitioner's qualifying children for purposes of the EITC under section 32 (a))(1) .
additional portion referred to as the "additional child tax credit" is refundable and is computed as relevant here under section 24 (d) (1) (:B) (i), as the amount equal to "15 percent of so much of the taxpayer'.s earned income (within the meaning of section 32) which is taken into account in computing taxable income for the taxable year as exceeds $10,000.·"3 See, e.g., H.' Conf.
or self-employment tax. As a result, petitioner is deemed to have conceded this issue. See Rules 142(a), 149(b); Burris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-49. Respondent's determinations with respect to petitioners' claimed earned income credits under sec. 32 and personal exemption deductions under sec. 151 are automatic adjustments that will be resolved by our decision of the primary issue (i.e. whether petitioners had unreported income), and computations shall be made under Rule 155. - 3 - Petit
f Chicago, the Democratic Organization of Cook County, and others, which alleged 2The notice of deficie cy also made adjustments to Ms. Ruffin's child tax credit and additi nal child tax credit under section 24 and her earned income tax credit under section 32. The IRS's motiön for summary judgme'nt shows that these are computational adj stments that follow necessarily from the inclusion of the settlesent proceeds in income, and Ms. Ruffin does not dispute this showing. - 3 that the defendants h
32 (after a public hearing). Id. n.6. It states with respect to condemnation: “Thus if a conservation easement restricts the development of real property that is needed for a school, hospital, or publicly aided housing, eminent domain may be exercised.” Id. sec. 34A.07[2]. It notes that the method of valuation of the interest represented by th
24(d) (referring to section 32 for the definition of earned income) .
Child-Tax Credit A taxpayer may claim a child tax credit for each qualifying child of the taxpayer as defined in section 152(c)6 Sec .
Under section 32(c) (3) (A), a qualifying child is defined the same as "a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c) * * * )." Petitioner's daughter is not treated as his qualifying child for 2006 pursuant to section 152(c) (4).
Section 32 (a)(1) allows an eligible individual an earned income credit against the individual's income tax liability . Section 32 (a)(2) limits the credit allowed through a phaseout, and section 32(b) prescribes different percentages and amounts used to calculate the credit . The limitation amount is based on the taxpayer' s earned income and whe
Amounts of Employment Taxes i 1, 1 In .the petition, petitioner argues that the amount(cid:127)o f 11 employment taxes due and owing on the $14,845,019 of unreported j cash wages should be offset by the earned income credits to which !temporary laborers paid in cash wouldl~have been entitled unde r EI' - 27 - section 32 had they claimed those credi s .
Amounts of Employment Taxes In the petition, petitioner argues that the amount of employment taxes due and owing on the $14,845,019 of unreported cash wages should be offset by the earned income credits to which temporary laborers paid in cash would have been entitled under section 32 had they claimed those credits.
A qualifying child for purposes of the child tax credit is a child : (a) For whom the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for a dependency exemption under section 151 ; (b) who is under the age of 17 ; and (c) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer as set forth in section 32 ( c)(3)(B) .
Section 32.(c)°(1) (A) provides that,: for purposes of qualifying for the earned income credit, an "eligible individual" is an = individual who has a qualifying: child for the taxable year .' A "qualifying child" is defined as an individual's child, stepchild, sibling-, step-sibling., a des.cendant,of-any of these,- or an eligible fos
Section 32 allows an eligible individual to claim an earned income credit against his or her income for the taxable year, and . the amount of the credit is calculated as a percentage of the - 4 - taxpayer's earned income .; The issue is whether petitioner is entitled. to the credit based-upon .having qualifying children as defined in section 32(c)
Section 32 (a)(1) allows an eligible individual an earned income credit against the individual ' s income tax liability. Section 32(a)(2) limits the credit allowed through a phaseout, and section 32(b) prescribes different percentages and amounts
Earned Income Credit Section 32 allows an earned income credit .
year, and who bears a relationship to the taxpayer as prescribed by section 32 (c) (3) (B) .
the taxpayer . Petitioner satisfies that requisite ; consequently, he qualifies for head-of-household filing status for the year at issue . See sec . 2(b)(1)(A)(i) . The third issue is petitioner's claim to the earned income credit of $2,815 under section 32 . Section 32(a)(1) allows an eligible individual an earned income credit against the individual's income tax liability . Section 32(a)(2) limits the credit allowed, and section 32(b) prescribes different percentages and amounts used to calc
Section 32 (a)(1) allows an eligible individual an earned income credit against the individual ' s income tax liability . - 8 - Section 32(a)(2) limits the credit allowed . Section 32(b) prescribes different credit and "phaseout" percentages used to calculate the credit based on whether the eligible individual has no qualifying children, one quali
n 74301 and Rule 231.2 Respondent determined a deficiency in individual income tax against petitioner in the amount of $2,890 for 2002. The determined deficiency arose from petitioner’s claim of a refundable earned income credit in that amount under section 32. 1 Unless indicated otherwise, all references to secs. 7430 and 7453 are to those sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for proceedings commenced at the time the petition in the instant case was filed; all other sectio
90 (1966).] As to the addition of section 882(d), the Senate committee report stated: As a general rule, the bill provides that income of a nonresident alien or foreign corporation will be subject to the flat 30-percent (or lower treaty) rate if it is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.
During this period Great Plains would be entitled to the possession, rents, use, and benefit of the plant. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-24-11 (1974). * * * [United States v. Great Plains Gasification Associates, supra at 195.] The Court of Appeals did not question ANR’s standing to pursue the litigation as a partner of the partnership. P
produce the unintended result of allowing Peter Wuol to obtain earned income credits in an amount in excess of the maximum amount allowed for those individuals filing joint returns. A joint return must be filed by a married individual in order for sec. 32 to apply. Sec. 32(d). Thus, Peter Wuol and Jekow Wuol should have filed joint income tax returns rather than returns filed under head of household filing status for their 2000, 2001, and 2002 taxable years, as well as for Peter Wuol’s 2003 tax
This rule has also been extended to apply to credits against tax, such as the foreign tax credit, other than the credit provided by section 32 for tax withheld at the source or the credit provided by section 39 for certain users of gasoline and lubricating oil.
Since petitioner failed to satisfy the residency requirement of section 32, neither of petitioner’s children is considered a qualifying child.
tate of California, Department of Social Services, In-Home Supportive Services program (IHSS), to care for petitioners’ disabled son constitute gross income under section 61, and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to the earned income credit under section 32. Some of the facts were stipulated. Those facts, with the exhibits annexed thereto, are so found and made part hereof. Petitioners’ legal residence at the time the petition was filed was Fresno, California. Petitioners have a mentally disa
The decedent acquired the right to exclusive possession of the condominium by contract, the parties’ Agreement regarding use and payment of expenses * * * (hereinafter “the Agreement”). Generally, all co- tenants are obligated to contribute to the expenses and upkeep of the property and a tenant who pays more than his pro-rata shar
The relevant parts of section 32 provide that an individual is eligible for the earned income tax credit if the individual has a qualifying child.
were shared by members of the household. We conclude, based on the entire record, that petitioner cared for his nieces as his own children, and thus, the children are qualifying children for purposes of computation of the earned income credit under section 32. We find for petitioner on this issue. 4. Child Tax Credits We next consider the child tax credits. A taxpayer may be entitled to a credit against tax with respect to each “qualifying child”. Sec. 24(a). The plain language of section 24 es
Because petitioner has failed to meet the relationship test under section 32, it is not necessary to analyze the remaining factors of section 32.
As relevant here, section 6401(b) provides that if the amount “allowable” as refundable credits, such as the wage withholding credit under section 31 and the EIC under section 32, exceeds the “tax imposed”, the excess “shall be considered an overpayment.” It is undisputed that for the year at issue, petitioners have an allowable section 31 wage withholding credit of $225 3 Pursuant to sec.
Under section 32, an eligible individual is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the individual’s earned income, subject to certain limitations. Sec. 32(a)(1). Any individual with a qualifying child is an eligible individual. Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i). An individual with qualifying children is entitled to a larger credit than is an individua
Under section 32, an eligible individual is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the individual's earned income. Sec. 32(a)(1). Section 32(a)(2) and (b) limits the credit allowed based on whether the eligible individual has no qualifying children, one qualifying child, or two or more qualifying children. Initially, petitioner argues th
Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioner is entitled to the earned income credit under section 32 as an eligible individual with no qualifying children.
r concessions,1 the issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner qualifies for head-of-household filing status and (2) whether petitioner’s daughter is a “qualifying child” with respect to petitioner for purposes of the earned income credit under section 32. Background Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time of filing his petition, petitioner resided in Morgantown,
d Cir. 1949). Factual determinations are required in order to decide whether a taxpayer is entitled to: (1) Head of household filing status, see sec. 2(b); (2) a dependency exemption deduction, see secs. 151 and 152; (3) an earned income credit, see sec. 32; or (4) a child tax credit, see sec. 24. We have held that whenever the resolution of adjustments requires factual determinations, - 13 - the Commissioner is not obliged to concede those adjustments until the Commissioner has received, and ha
Under section 32(d), in the case of an individual who is married (within the meaning of section 7703), the individual may be entitled to an EIC under section 32 only if a joint return is filed for the taxable year under section 6013.
Section 32 (a) provides for an earned income credit in the case of an eligible individual. Section 32(c) (1) (A), in pertinent part, defines an "eligible individual" as an individual who has a qualifying child for the taxable year. Sec. 32 (c) (1) (A) (i) . A qualifying child is one who satisfies a relationship test, a residency test, an age test,
Under section 32, an eligible individual is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the individual’s earned income, subject to certain limitations. Sec. 32(a)(1). Any individual with a qualifying child is an eligible individual. Sec. 32(c)(1). As is relevant here, the definition of a qualifying child for purposes of section 32 includes a
A refund of $3,656 attributable entirely to a section 32 earned income credit is claimed on the return.
Nevertheless, both section 2(b) and section 32 require that petitioner's household be Maddison's principal place of abode for more than one-half of the taxable year.
Awadallah to claim the earned income tax credit under section 32, resulting in a refund of $761 for 1996.
Earned Income Credit The relevant parts of section 32 provide that an individual is eligible for the earned income credit if the individual has a qualifying child.
Under section 32, an eligible individual is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the individual’s earned income, subject to certain limitations. Sec. 32(a)(1). Any individual with a qualifying child is an eligible individual. Sec. 32(c)(1). An individual with qualifying children is entitled to a larger credit than is an individual with
The earned income credit under section 32 will automatically be adjusted for any changes.
Under section 32,1 an eligible individual is allowed a credit which is calculated as a percentage of the individual’s earned income. Sec. 32(a)(1). Any taxpayer with a qualifying child is an eligible individual. Sec. 32(c)(1). Taxpayers with two or more qualifying children are entitled to a larger credit 1We apply sec. 32 as it was in effect in the years
32.7 (2000); 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 608 (1873); 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 364 (1859); The U.S. Constitution and Insular Areas, supra at 39-40, 50-51; U.S. 5We rely on judicial notice and stipulations of the parties for statements describing Johnston Island and Johnston Atoll. 6Johnston Atoll, furthermore, is a national wildlife refuge under the jurisdiction
status for 1994 and 1995. B. The Earned Income Credit The next issue is whether petitioner is entitled to the earned income credit for 1995. A taxpayer who is married must file a joint return with his or her spouse for the taxable year in order for section 32 to apply. See sec. 32(d). Petitioner was married in 1995, but he and Mrs. Chappell did not file a joint return. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to an earned income credit for 1995. C. Unreported Income Respondent contends that petitioner u
32.7 (2000); 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 608 (1873); 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 364 (1859); The U.S. Constitution and Insular Areas, supra at 39-40, 50-51; U.S. 5We rely on judicial notice and stipulations of the parties for statements describing Johnston Island and Johnston Atoll. 6Johnston Atoll, furthermore, is a national wildlife refuge under the jurisdiction
Cotton is entitled to the earned income credit under section 32; (3) whether Mrs.
Cotton is entitled to the earned income credit under section 32; (3) whether Mrs.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether there are deficiencies at issue in these cases within the meaning of section 6211; and (2) whether petitioner had earned income during the years in issue, entitling him to a section 32 earned income credit for each year.
494, 530. DEFRA section 32 is virtually identical to current section 7701(h), which was enacted during 1986 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 201(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2138. The legislative history of DEFRA section 32 specifically refers to: (1) Our decision in Swift Dodge, (2) the decision of th
ed the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was - 3 - received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or li
By those references, we know that, when DEFRA section 32 was enacted, Congress was aware of our holding and the Court of Appeals’ holding in Swift Dodge, as well as the proposed regulations.
iduals at his modest income level. OPINION Section 1401 imposes Social Security and medicare taxes (self-employment tax) on income derived by an individual from a 2 Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to earned income credits pursuant to sec. 32 for the taxable years 1992 and 1993 in the amounts of $1,184 and $1,429, respectively. - 3 - trade or business (self-employment income) in excess of $400 to pay for old-age, survivors and disability insurance, and hospital insurance. Secs. 14
ar at trial and did not sign the stipulation of facts in this case. Respondent orally moved to dismiss her for failure to properly prosecute her case. Respondent's motion will be granted. 2Petitioners' entitlement to the "Earned Income" credit under sec. 32 as well as their liability for the tax on self- employment income under secs. 1401-1403 and their entitlement to the deduction under sec. 164(f) of one-half the amount, if any, of any self-employment tax imposed, is dependent upon our resolut
32-3-101 (1984)). In Tennessee, technical words used in a will drafted by an attorney are to be given their technical meaning, in the absence of a finding of a contrary intent on the part of the testator. Fariss v. Bry-Block Co., 346 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tenn. 1961). In Daugherty v. Daugherty, supra at 653, the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained