§339

339.6 We agree with the Commissioner--and now even the Perkinses--that this Act doesn't apply to the Perkinses and does not excuse them from paying tax on the income they earned selling gravel. The Perkinses realized this during the audit and raised some new arguments based on the Nation's treaties with the Federal Government. The first ofthes

ssioner, 88 T.C. 38, 51 (1987). The burden ofpersuasion will be satisfied ifthe petitioner shows that, on the basis ofthe evidence, the fact is more probable than not. Merkel v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 463, 476 (1997) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence, sec. 339, at 439 (4th ed. 1992)), gfCd, 192 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1999). Although Eddleman Properties bears the burden ofproof,2 my view ofthe facts would be the 2Eddleman Properties filed discovery motions seeking to ascertain the theories the IRS woul

t prove that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In other words, the taxpayer must show that, on the basis of the evidence, the fact is more probable than not. Merkel v. Combissioner, 109 T.C. 463, 476 (1997) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidenc sec. 339, at 439 (4th ed. 1992)), affd. 192 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1999). B. The Workers Whose Classifications Aré at Issue Were Employees. Whether an employment relationship exists is a factual question. Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 386 (1994), a

affer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985), affg. in part and remanding Mandina v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-34, which means that the proponent must prove that the fact is more probable than not, see, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, sec. 339, at 439 (4th ed. 1992). Therefore, a taxpayer claiming the benefit of the insolvency exclusion must prove (1) with respect to any obligation claimed to be a liability, that, as of the calculation date, it is more probable than not that he wil

affer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985), affg. in part and remanding Mandina v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-34, which means that the proponent must prove that the fact is more probable than not, see, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, sec. 339, at 439 (4th ed. 1992). Therefore, a taxpayer claiming the benefit of the insolvency exclusion must prove (1) with respect to any obligation claimed to be a liability, that, as of the calculation date, it is more probable than not that he wil

affer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985), affg. in part and remanding Mandina v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-34, which means that the proponent must prove that the fact is more probable than not, see, e.g., 2 McCormick on Evidence, sec. 339, at 439 (4th ed. 1992). Therefore, a taxpayer claiming the benefit of the insolvency exclusion must prove (1) with respect to any obligation claimed to be a liability, that, as of the calculation date, it is more probable than not that he wil