§34 — Certain uses of gasoline and special fuels

Unlike the fuel excise tax, these taxes are not creditable under section 34.

10700-04 Year Deficiency 1998 $32,758 1999 21,852 - 3 - The issue in this case is petitioners’ entitlement to an income tax credit under section 34(a)(2) for gasoline excise tax refundable with respect to certain uses under section 6421.1 We hold that petitioners are not entitled to the credit.

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we deny respondent's motion for partial summary judgment, and we hold that petitioner is not barred by the so-called "one claim" rule.of section 6427(i) (1) from obtaining a credit for fuel tax under section 34 (a) (3).

6211(a), but the Commissioner here disallowed the section 34 credits that MLI claimed on its income-tax returns, and we do have jurisdiction to redetermine the deficiency that resulted from that disallowance.

Background on Section 34 Credit Section 34 provides a credit against tax for the amount of excise taxes included in the price of gasoline to the ultimate purchaser of gasoline used on a farm for farming purposes, for other off-highway business use, by local transit systems, and by the operators of intercity, local, or school buses.

The sole issue presented is whether petitioner is barred by the so-called “one claim” rule of section 6427(i)(l) from obtaining a credit under section 34 for amounts of Federal excise taxes paid on fuels.

In our case, the relevant section 34-35-430 of the Alaska Code, i.e., the statute that is applicable here, provides as follows: Sec.

sale of her truck. Finally, we hold that petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related penalty. 1 Petitioner claimed a $2,117 income tax credit for the purchase of a diesel-powered vehicle and for the purchase of gasoline and diesel fuel pursuant to sec. 34. Respondent disallowed the credit in the statutory notice of deficiency. On brief, petitioner conceded that she is not entitled to the fuel tax credit under sec. 34. Petitioner also claimed the earned income credit. Whether petitioner is elig

Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34A.06, at 34A-54 (Michael A.

§ 34- 251a(a) (2017), which provides: A debt, obligation or other liability of a limited liability company is solely the debt, obligation or other liability of the company. A member or manager is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation or other liability of the company solely by rea

34-51-4-9 (LexisNexis 2008) establishes the prejudgment interest rate where an award for tortious conduct has been made "at the simple rate ofinterest determined by the court." However, under that statute, "[t]he rate set by the court may not be less than six percent (6%) per year and not [be] more than ten percent (10%) per year." - 262 - [*

34-51-4-9 (LexisNexis 2008) establishes the prejudgment interest rate where an award for tortious conduct has been made "at the simple rate ofinterest determined by the court." However, under that statute, "[t]he rate set by the court may not be less than six percent (6%) per year and not [be] more than ten percent (10%) per year." - 262 - [*

That part provides that "market value" is: The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

34-51-4-9 (LexisNexis 2008) establishes the prejudgment interest rate where an award for tortious conduct has been made "at the simple rate ofinterest determined by the court." However, under that statute, "[t]he rate set by the court may not be less than six percent (6%) per year and not [be] more than ten percent (10%) per year." - 262 - [*

Such cost is usually far in excess ofthe cost of construction ofa similarly sized modern structure, and may reflect the - 21 - price ofmaterials and workmanship that are no longer readily available. * * * Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, sec. 34A.06, at 34A-54 (M. Wolfed. 2012). The treatise concludes its discussion ofthe appropriateness ofthe reproduction cost approach to valuing historic improvements to land as follows: [T]his method ofvaluation has substantial disadvantages in the

tioners to deduct for tax years 2005, 2006, and 2007. - 10 - In determining the jurisdiction in which the loss occurred, petitioners and respondent agree that Massachusetts is the logical jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, theft is defined as follows: Sec. 34. False Pretences to Constitute Larceny. Whoever, with intent to defraud and by a false pretence, induces another to part with property of any kind or with any of the benefits described in * * * [the preceding sections] shall be guilty of larce

* * * Gouveia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-256, 88 TCM (CCH) 424, 431. An individual signing an affiliate's enrollment form would have every reason to believe that the State affiliate, as the agent, had authority to bind NEA, the principal, to delivering - 34 - the periodicals as the benefit that NEA had promised and according to.the

* * * [Gouveia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-256, 88 TCM (CCH) 424, 431.] An individual signing an affiliate’s enrollment form would have every reason to believe that the State affiliate, as the agent, had authority to bind NEA, the principal, to delivering the periodicals as the benefit that NEA had promised and according to the public

Ulloa submitted to IBM in November 2004 a Form W-4 reporting 20 allowances ;2 and that submission and his prior claim 2Under section 34.02(f) an employee may claim exemptions for himself, his spouse, and his dependents that reduce the amount of (continued .

Section 6664(a) (1) (A) can be said to be "silent" about withholding credits--but only in the same way that it is silent about the fuel credit under section 34, silent about payments designated to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund under section 6096, silent about interest under section 6601, and silent about a host of other provisions in the Code that Congress could have incorporated into the ,"underpayment" definition but did not.

Section 6664(a)(1)(A) can be said to be “silent” about withholding credits — but only in the same way that it is silent about the fuel credit under section 34, silent about payments designated to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund under section 6096, silent about interest under section 6601, and silent about a host of other provisions in the Code that Congress could have incorporated into the “underpayment” definition but did not.

porate veil means, and the regulations echo, that a “court will disregard the corporate entity * * * and treat as identical the corporation and the individual or individuals owning all its stock and assets.” 14 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Business Relationships, sec. 34 (2009). Private letter rulings may be cited to show the practice of the Commissioner. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 n.17 (1981); Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 686-687 (1962); Dover Corp. & Subs. v. Commission

- 5 - nontaxable purposes) ; see also secs .

me in its sole discretion, provided that (a) any amendment to Section 9(d), Section 11, the first sentence of Section 13, Section 14, the proviso to the first sentence of Section 15, Section 17, Section 18, Section 20, Section 24, this Section 29 or Section 34 hereof shall not be effective without the Initial Member’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and (b) any amendment which materially and adversely affects the rights of any Member shall not be effective

me in its sole discretion, provided that (a) any amendment to Section 9(d), Section 11, the first sentence of Section 13, Section 14, the proviso to the first sentence of Section 15, Section 17, Section 18, Section 20, Section 24, this Section 29 or Section 34 hereof shall not be effective without the Initial Member’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and (b) any amendment which materially and adversely affects the rights of any Member shall not be effective

Section 6330 originated in section 34.01 of the Senate version of H.R.

We must decide the extent of Mr. Izen’s authority to act for the trusts on the basis of all the facts and circumstances revealed by the record. Adams v. Commissioner, supra at 369-373; Kraasch v. Commissioner, supra at 626-629. Mr. Norton only became aware of respondent’s examination of the Pago Trust after a brief conversation with petiti

We must decide the extent of Mr. Izen’s authority to act for the trusts on the basis of all the facts and circumstances revealed by the record. Adams v. Commissioner, supra at 369-373; Kraasch v. Commissioner, supra at 626-629. Mr. Norton only became aware of respondent’s examination of the Pago Trust after a brief conversation with petiti

es, including the relationship of the parties, the common business practices, the nature of the subject matter, and the facts of which the agent has notice concerning objects the principal desires to accomplish. See id. (citing Restatement, supra at sec. 34). The extent of an agent’s authority is a factual question to be decided on the basis of all the facts and circumstances revealed by the record. Adams v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 359, 369- 373 (1985); Kraasch v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 623, 627-62

If a tax has been imposed under section 4041 on a sale of diesel fuel, and the fuel is used by the purchaser for a nontaxable purpose, such as an off-highway business use, section 34 allows a credit against income tax for the section 4041 tax imposed on the sale.

nces, including the relationship of the parties, the common business practices, the nature of the subject matter, and the facts of which the agent has notice concerning objects the principal desires to accomplish. See id. (citing Restatement, supra sec. 34). The existence and scope of an agency relationship are questions of fact, unless the relationship is so clear as to be undisputed. See Anetsberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 F. 3d 1226, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994). As the trier of fact, “it i

ode) - 7 - Present Law Under present law, the deficiency procedures allowing taxpayers to litigate issues in the Tax Court relating to the earned income credit (sec. 32) and the credit for the certain payments of the gasoline and special fuels tax (sec. 34) may not apply. Explanation of Provision The bill provides that the Tax Court deficiency procedures apply to the credits allowable under sections 32 and 34, notwithstanding that the credits reduce the net tax to less than zero. The provision a

(4): Present Law Under present law, the deficiency procedures allowing taxpayers to litigate issues in the Tax Court relating to the earned income credit (sec. 32) and the - 5 - credit for the certain payments of the gasoline and special fuels tax (sec. 34) may not apply. Explanation of Provision The bill provides that the Tax Court deficiency procedures apply to the credits allowable under sections 32 and 34, notwithstanding that the credits reduce the net tax to less than zero. The provision a

ic transportation. On Form 4136, petitioner claimed a fuel tax credit relating to 99,000 gallons of gasoline that he allegedly purchased. Petitioner failed, however, to establish a "qualifying purpose". Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to the section 34 credit. Petitioner contends that respondent should not have imposed an accuracy-related penalty. Section 6662 imposes an accuracy- - 4 - related penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment of tax attributabl

- 5 - As relevant to this case, section 34 allows a credit against a tax equal to the sum of the amounts payable to the taxpayer under section 6421 with respect to gasoline used during the taxable year otherwise than as a fuel in a highway vehicle.