§36 — First-time homebuyer credit

§ 1.36B-4(a)(1). The repayment limitation does not apply because petitioners’ household income is greater than 400% of the federal poverty line amount.

36 (H.B. 789). The Mississippi Supreme Court has indicated that as a matter ofstatutory construction, absent express intent to the contrary, it is presumed that legislation will have prospective applicability only. See Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 483 (Miss. 1966). Consequently, because the petition in this case was filed in 2011, Miss. Code Ann. sec. 79-4-14.21(f) is inapplicable.

36(c)(6) expands the scope ofthe FTHBC by making it available to individuals who have owned and lived in the same residence for at least five consecutive years during the eight years before purchasing a new principal residence. According to respondent, it is likely that petitioner husband would have qualified for the FTHBC under sec. 36(c)(6). However, para. (6) was not enacted until 2009 and does not apply for the 2008 tax year.

Here, "attach" - 60 - doesn't mean "fasten"--unlike what seems to be the case with current section 36(d)(4).

Although petitioner contends that he satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2), we need not decide whether the burden ofproofshifts to respondent - 5 - [*5] with respect to factual issues under section 7491(a)(1) because our conclusions herein are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence: See Estate of Bongard v.

Ratcliffe's residence is not before the Court in this case, and we express no opinion with regard to that issue.

Because we hold that petitioner is not entitled to the FTHBC, we need not decide this issue.

We hold that the Abregos are liable for the tax subject to limitations; and 2.

On his return he claimed a credit pursuant to section 36B.¹ Section 36B provides a refundable credit for a portion ofpremiums paid by a taxpayer under a qualified health plan and was enacted as part ofthe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.

For the reasons explained herein, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit.

Riverside Finance paid $19,758.47 by check to the "Schlise Trust" out ofthese proceeds.5 The Schlise Family Trust transferred the deed to petitioner in November 2008.6 On her Federal income tax return for taxable year 2008, petitioner claimed a first-time homebuyer credit of$2,609 pursuant to section 36(a).

We hold that they are not.

e (continued...) SERVED DEC 3 0 2013 - 2 - [*2] conceded that his State tax refund of$1,106 is taxable and should be included in his 2008 taxable income.2 After petitioner's concession, the only issue that we must decide is whether petitioner is entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit (FTHBC), pursuant to section 36, of$7,500 for his 2008 tax year.

We hold that he is not.

- 3.- On his Federal income tax return for 2009, petitioner claimed an $8,000 credit pursuant to section 36 for the purchase ofthe Santa.Fe residence.

he Court on respondent's motion for summaryjudgment pursuant to Rule 121.1 The issue we must decide is whether petitioner and his wife are entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit on theirjoint 2009 return where individually petitioner would have been entitled to the first- time homebuyer credit pursuant to section 36(c)(1) and his wife would have been entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit pursuant to the exception provided in section 36(c)(6) for longtime residents ofthe same principal

The issue we must decide is whether petitioners are entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit for 2008 pursuant to section 36.

The first issue is whether petitioners are entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit provided in section 36.1 We hold that they are not.

36 requires a prospective· analysis, asking whether a taxpayer will occupy a house as a principal residence.

OPINION Generally, section 36(a) and (b) allows a credit of up to $8,000 to a first-time homebuyer of a principal residence in the United States.' Pursuant to section 36(g) the FTHBC for the purchase of a principal residence in 2009 may be claimed on either the taxpayer's 2008 or 2009 Federal income tax return.

We hold that she is not.

36B; McGuire v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 254, 260 (2017). At the end of the year a taxpayer who received an APTC is required to reconcile the amount of the PTC already received with the entitlement amount. See sec. 36B(f)(2). A taxpayer reconciles these amounts by completing Form 8962 and filing it with his or her tax return. If the APTC is more

Under section 36A(a), an eligible individual taxpayer is allowed a credit against tax equal to the lesser of: (1) 6.2% ofthe taxpayer's earned income, or (2) $400. The credit--called the making work pay credit--starts to phase out when a taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income is more than $75,000.1° Sec. 36A(b). Under sections 36A(d)(2) and 32(c)(2), earned income means wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. Earned income does not include pension or annuity income. Sec. 32(c)

6 We now interpret the term "individual" within section 36. We must look to the entire statute as a whole. See Fla. Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 73, 79 (2004), aff'd, 404 F.3d ,1291 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Huffman v. . Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'g in part, rev'g inpart T.C. Memo. 1991-144. The tax credit under section 36 references individuals only. It does not mention corporations. Section 36 contemplates various statuses of individuals (e.g., mar

are asked to decide whether an individual may claim the tax credit for a principal residence purchased through an S corporation. Respondent argues that petitioners did not purchase the property and that an S corporation is not an “individual” under section 36. Therefore, neither may claim the tax credit. We agree. We begin with the burden of proof. The taxpayer generally bears the burden of proving the Commissioner’s determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a). The burden of proof may shift to th

Section 36 provides first-time homebuyers a credit for part of the purchase price of their qualifying principal residence. Subsection (d)(4) specifies that “[n]o credit * * * shall be allowed to any taxpayer for any taxable year” if “the taxpayer fails to attach to the return of tax for such taxable year a properly executed copy of the settlement s

36-607 (reissue 1988). To prove a conveyance of property constitutes a fraudulent conveyance under Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 36-607, the Commissioner must prove with clear and convincing evidence that there was an intent on David’s part to hinder, delay, or defraud the IRS. See Castellano v. Bitkower, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Neb. 1984). As discussed i

nt, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Neb. 1992). 4 Secs. 36-602, 36-603, 36-604, and 36-607 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. secs. 36-602, 36-603, 36- 604, and 36-607 (reissue 1988)) (as in effect at the time of the transfer) provide: Sec. 36-602 Insolvency; how determined. (1) A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his or her assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his or her probable liability on his or her existing debts as they become

o exclude a portion ofthe 2013 Social Security benefits received during 2014 from his gross income. P's amended return showed $1,250 of excess advance payments ofthe PTC. Respondent determined that P's excess PTC was the entire $4,460 because, under I.R.C. sec. 36B, all ofP's Social Security benefits received during 2014 (including those relating to 2013) must be included in computing whether P was entitled to the PTC. The inclusion ofall Social Security benefits would result in P's having MAGI

36B(f)(2). - 7 - [*7] taxpayerwith income greater than 400% ofthe Federal poverty line is not eligible for the credit, and the full amount ofthe advance premium assistance tax credit received during the year must be included as a tax liability with the tax return.¹5 During 2014 the Federal poverty line was $11,670 for a one-per

DINGS OF FACT AND OPINION DEAN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of$7,500 in petitioners' 2008 Federal income tax and an accuracy-relatedpenalty of$1,500 SERVED MAY 15 2014 C - 2 - [*2] under section 6662(a).¹ The issues for decision are whether petitioners are entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit for 2008 pursuantto section 36 and are liable for the accuracy-relatedpenalty under section 6662(a).

effect for the year in issue. Respondent determined a deficiency of $7,500 with respect to petitioners' 2008jointly filed Federal income tax return. The issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled to the first-time homebuyercredit under section 36. Background Some ofthe facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference. At the time their petition was filed, petitioners resided in Oklahoma in a principal residènce with an Arkansas

aph (6) operates to expand the scope of the first-time homebuyer credit by treating an individual who has owned and resided in the same residence for the five-consecutive-year period as if that individual were a first-time homebuyer for purposes of section 36. By its terms, it provides an exception to the definition of first-time homebuyer pursuant to section 36(c), a definition that is provided in paragraph (1). In other words, the exception pursuant to paragraph (6) expands the definition of w

--- MAJORITY --- HAINES, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 2008 Federal income tax of $7,500. The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to the first-time homebuyer tax credit (FTHBC) for 2008 pursuant to section 36. FINDINGS OF FACT Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, together with the attached exhibits, is incorporated herein by this reference. At the time petitioner filed his petition, he resided in Texa

119, 213 (2010), section 36B allows a credit to subsidize the cost of health insurance purchased through a health insurance exchange by taxpayers meeting certain statutory requirements.

Code § 36-22- 17 (1995) (amended 2019). The sheriff’s obligation to adequately feed prisoners remained, however, whether or not the amounts provided by the state were sufficient, and the sheriff would be responsible to cover any shortfall in funds. III. Maynor v. Morgan County In 2001, before petitioner’s election as sheriff, a class of pretrial detaine

Code § 36-2-14, which places responsibility for determining the cause and manner of death on the Coroner; and failure to provide appropriate accommodations to Lynnette. Count 5 alleged that all defendants engaged in a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which encompassed violations of state and federal CHINS laws, basic constitutional requirements, the C

The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner was entitled to a premium tax credit (PTC) and, if she was not, whether she is required to repay Advanced Premium Tax Credit (APTC) payments of the PTC under section 36B.1 We resolve this issue in favor of respondent.

Advance Premium Tax Credit Section 36B allows a PTC to subsidize the cost of health insurance purchased through a health insurance exchange by taxpayers meeting certain statutory requirements.

§ 36C-4-405.1(a) (2006); cf. Finley v. Brown, No. 17 CVS 2812, 2017 WL 3841645, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2017) (permitting suit by “one of five directors of the Foundation’s board of directors”). 60 [*60] general public does so on a substantial and regular basis. Approximately one-third of golf rounds played are by non-members, i.e., member

at 213, enacted section 36B, which allows a refundable tax credit, known as the PTC.5 The PTC assists eligible taxpayers with the costs of their premiums for health insurance purchased through an Exchange.

869, 991 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 1141(a)). 43 [*43] as to whether Continuing Life’s accounting of the Deferred Fees clearly reflected income. The voluminous law in this area directs us to the text of the Code and regulations, to the purpose of distinctions between tax and financial accounting, to the exercise of common-law reasoning b

Petitioners did not claim a premium assistance tax credit (PTC) under section 36B in the space provided for that purpose on line 69 of the return.

119, 213, 906 (2010), section 36B allows a PTC to subsidize the cost of health insurance purchased through a health insurance exchange by taxpayers meeting certain statutory requirements.

(HHI), (6) “Premium Tax Credit” (PTC), (7) “Social Security Disability Insurance” (SSDI), (8) “Social Security Retirement” (SSR), (9) “Adjusted Gross Income” (AGI), (10) “Federal Poverty Line” (FPL). 3MAGI is specifically defined for the purposes of sec. 36B. Sec. 36B(d)(2)(B). - 3 - (HHI) exceeded allowable limits for the Premium Tax Credit (PTC); that she had excess APTC of $1,275; that she was not entitled to the net PTC of $327 claimed on her return; and that she had a resulting total defici

Statutory and Regulatory Framework: Section 36B Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub.

It provides that ifan "overstatement ofthe credit for income tax withheld" appears on a tax return, then the amount ofthe over- statement "may be assessed by the Secretary in the same manner as in the case ofa mathematical or clerical error." M Adjustments for mathematical and clerical errors typically are assessed

The issues for decision are whether advance payments ofpremium assistance tax credits (APTC) were made on behalf ofpetitioner under section 36B, Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a SERVED Nov 18 2019 - 2 - [*2] Qualified Health Plan, and whetherpetitioner is entitled to deduct a $2,798 alleged casualty loss under section 165.¹ FINDINGS OF FACT Some ofthe facts have been stipulated and are so found.

36B(c)(1); sec. 1.36B-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Household income is the sum ofthe taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) plus the MAGI of family members: (1) for whom the taxpayer properly claims deductions for personal exemptions and (2) who were required to file a Federal income tax return under section 1. Sec. 36B(d)(2). 5After is

The issue for decision is whetherpetitioners' tax liability was increased by their receipt ofexcess advance premium tax credit (APTC) payments under SERVED Mar 04 2019 - 2 - [*2] section 36B.¹ Respondent has moved for summaryjudgment under Rule 121, contending that there are no disputed issues ofmaterial fact and that he is entitled tojudgment as a matter oflaw.

The Premium Tax Credit Section 36B allows a PTC to subsidize the cost ofhealth insurance purchased through a health insurance exchange by taxpayers meeting certain statutory requirements.

GS OF FACT AND OPINION PUGH, Judge: In a notice ofdeficiency dated August 1, 2017, respondent determined a $15,270 deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax and a $3,054 SERVED Sep 19 2019 - 2 - [*2] penalty under section 6662(a) for 2015.¹ The issue for decision is whether petitioners qualify for the premium assistance tax credit (PTC) under section 36B.2 FINDINGS OF FACT Some ofthe facts have been stipulated and are so found.

SLine 46 ofthe 2014 Form 1040 states: "Excess advance premium tax credit (continued...) - 4 - [*4] By notice ofdeficiency respondent disallowed petitioners' $6,090 APTC, giving rise to a deficiency ofthat same amount in petitioners' 2014 income tax liability.6 OPINION Section 36B allows a premium assistance tax credit (PTC) to subsidize the cost ofhealth insurance purchased through a health insurance exchange by taxpayers meetmg certam statutory requirements.

Commissioner, 149 T.C. __, __ (slip op. at 8-11) (Aug. 28, 2017) (discussing eligibility requirements). At the end ofthe year a taxpayerwho received an APTC is required to reconcile the amount ofthe PTC already received with the entitlement amount. S_e_e sec. 36B(f)(2). This reconciliation is done on Form 8962 filed with the ta

Petitioner's Concessions Beyond the undisputed items ofincome set forth above, the parties agree that petitioner's entitlement to the now-defunct section 36A "making work pay" credit for 2010 is computational.

The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to a premium tax credit (PTC) under section 36B for the year in issue.

Pursuant SERVED Oct 04 2018 - 2 - to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.¹ Respondent seeks repayment from petitioners ofadvance payments made on their behalfofthe premium assistance credit under section 36B, Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a Qualified Health Plan, made for 2014.

Shortlybefore trial, respondent conceded the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a). 3Unless otherwise indicated, our findings offact pertain to the year 2015. For clarity, we sometimes refer in our findings to the year 2015. - 3 - [*3] During 2015, petitioners' relatives paid petitioners at least $150 but no more than $300 pu

For 2010, however, respondent rebated to them $544 on account ofa section 36A making- work-pay credit.

905 (1961); see also - 14 - [*14] sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. To meet its burden ofproof for the deductions at issue petitioner must prove the representative market prices for its sales to members ofthe controlled group. Petitioner contends that we should adopt the weighted averages ofthe prices ofits own sales to nonco

at 213, enacted section 36B, which allows a refundable tax credit, known as the PTC.6 The PTC assists eligible taxpayers with the costs oftheir premiums for health insurance purchased through an Exchange.

ll Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. 2Petitioners conceded that they received $77 ofinterest income in 2010. The other adjustments in the notice ofdeficiency to itemized deductions, the sec. 36A making work pay credit, and the child tax credit for 2009 and 2010 are computational. The adjustments will be resolved by the Court's resolution ofthe sole issue for 2009 and 2010 and will not be discussed further. 3During 2009 and 2010 petit

36-5-121, subsection (m) ofthat section provides that nothing in the section "shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree ofan agreement between the parties as to support and maintenance ofa party." The Court ofAppeals ofTennessee has held: "The alimony statutes are not applicable where the parties

Courts assess the ability to repay by whether there was "a reasonable expectation ofrepayment in light ofthe economic realities ofthe situation." Fisher v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 910. - 23 - [*23] On theirjoint tax returns for the tax years in issue petitioners reported combined wage income of$132,000 each year and rental in

at 991.6 2. Tax Reform Act of 1969 In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (1969 Act), Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, Congress "transformed" the Tax Court, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. at 890-891, through two amendments to section 7441. First, Congress amended section 7441 to designate the Tax Court as an Article I court. As a resul

The issue for decision is whether advance payments ofpremium assistance tax credits were made on behalfofpetitioners' dependent son under section 36B, Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a Qualified Health SERVED Sep 25 2017 - 2 - [*2] Plan.

36-709(c) (West 1999)). Although the Court of Appeals concluded in Stanko that the Nebraska UFCA¹72 and caselaw thereunder ¹7°(...continued) Weintraut, and Ms. Fankhauser. See infra note 179. ¹7¹The UFTA that Nebraska adopted in 1989 did not apply retroactivelyto conveyances made before its enactment. See Stanko v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d 1082,

eficiency indicate that respondent determined an addition to tax rather than an accuracy-relatedpenalty, and that was respondent's position at trial. 3Respondent also made computational adjustments to petitioner's self- employment tax for each year, sec. 36A credits for 2009 and 2010, and sec. 32 credits for 2010 and 2011. - 3 - [*3] FINDINGS OF FACT Some ofthe facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this refe

Effective for Limitation Years beginning on or after January 1, 1995, the Defined Benefit Dollar Limitation applicable at an age prior to age 62 is determined as the lesser ofthe actuarial equivalent ofthe Defined Benefit Dollar Limitation for age 62 computed using the interest rate and mortality table (or other tabular factor) specified in Section 36 ofthe Adoption Agreement [that is, a 5% interest rate and the G.E.

36-709(c) (West 1999)). Although the Court of Appeals concluded in Stanko that the Nebraska UFCA¹72 and caselaw thereunder ¹7°(...continued) Weintraut, and Ms. Fankhauser. See infra note 179. ¹7¹The UFTA that Nebraska adopted in 1989 did not apply retroactivelyto conveyances made before its enactment. See Stanko v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d 1082,

36-709(c) (West 1999)). Although the Court of Appeals concluded in Stanko that the Nebraska UFCA¹72 and caselaw thereunder ¹7°(...continued) Weintraut, and Ms. Fankhauser. See infra note 179. ¹7¹The UFTA that Nebraska adopted in 1989 did not apply retroactivelyto conveyances made before its enactment. See Stanko v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d 1082,

Ifavoidance ofa transfer is established, a creditor, subject to certain limitations, may recoverjudgment for the value ofthe asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. E sec. 36-709(b). The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee ofthe asset or the person for w

Ifavoidance ofa transfer is established, a creditor, subject to certain limitations, may recoverjudgment for the value ofthe asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. E sec. 36-709(b). The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee ofthe asset or the person for w

Ifavoidance ofa transfer is established, a creditor, subject to certain limitations, may recoverjudgment for the value ofthe asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. E sec. 36-709(b). The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee ofthe asset or the person for w

Ifavoidance ofa transfer is established, a creditor, subject to certain limitations, may recoverjudgment for the value ofthe asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. E sec. 36-709(b). The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee ofthe asset or the person for w

anges which may destroy the character ofsuch action." Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 76-747 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (alteration in original) (fn. refs. omitted) (quoting 6 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 36-109 (1976 rev.)). An unconditional gift ofthe residue's principal may qualify as a permanent setting aside ofthe income as well as principal. Bowers v. Slocum, 20 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1927); see Middleton v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 801, 803 (E

If avoidance of a transfer is established, a creditor, subject to certain limitations, may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less. Id. sec. 36-709(b). The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee of the asset or the perso

uage and structure, while subject to canons ofconstruction and well- established methodologies, is hardly an exact science. Compare, e.g., Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018, __ F.3d _, 2014 WL 3579745, at *13-*17 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2014) (having found sec. 36B unambiguous, concluding that weight of legislative history, including overall congressional policy goals, did not override statute's plain meaning, which was that tax credits were unavailable to participants in health insurance exchanges est

The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitledto a section 36 first- time homebuyer credit (credit) as claimed on his 2008 Federal income tax return (return), or whether the credit is limited to the amount respondent allowed.

Petitioner claimed a $400 making work pay credit under section 36A(a) and reported $2,967 in Federal income tax withholding on line 61, Federal income tax withheld from Forms W-2 and 1099.

incipal residence, such individual shall be treated as a first-time homebuyer for purposes ofthis section with respect to the purchase ofsuch subsequent residence. We first consider whetherpetitionerwas a "first-time homebuyer" within the meaning ofsection 36. According to respondent, she was not. Respondentpoints to her ownership interest in the trailer that she used while working in California. According to respondent, the trailer was her "principal residence" during the three-yearperiod endin

ED Aug 26 2013 -2- [*2] Rule 1611 and their motions to vacate the decisions under Rule 162 in Morales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-341 (Morales I). In Morales I, we held that petitioners were not entitled to a first-time homebuyer credit under section 36 (credit). We further held petitioners liable for an accuracy-related penalty (penalty). See sec. 6662(a). Petitioners ask that we vacate our decisions and reconsider our opinion as it relates to the penalty.2 For the reasons that follow, we

In his motion respondent moves for a summary adjudication in his favor on the substantive issue presented by this case; namely, whether petitioner is entitled to a first-time homebuyer credit (FTHBC) under section 36 for 2009.

ED Aug 26 2013 -2- [*2] Rule 1611 and their motions to vacate the decisions under Rule 162 in Morales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-341 (Morales I). In Morales I, we held that petitioners were not entitled to a first-time homebuyer credit under section 36 (credit). We further held petitioners liable for an accuracy-related penalty (penalty). See sec. 6662(a). Petitioners ask that we vacate our decisions and reconsider our opinion as it relates to the penalty.2 For the reasons that follow, we

In support oftheir position, petitioners rely on section 36(c)(1) (quoted above) which defines the term "first-time homebuyer" for purposes ofsection 36, certain statements appearing in the Web site for HUD which deflide the term "first-time homebuyer" for HUD and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) purposes, and certain statements in an article appearing in the so-called Home Guides section of - 6 - the San Francisco Chronicle (San Francisco Chronicle article) which restate the defini

OURT FRANCIS T. FOSTER AND MAUREEN P. FOSTER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 16696-10. Filed January 30, 2012. Ps sold their house on June 6, 2007, and purchased another house on July 28, 2009. Ps, pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 36, claimed a first- time homebuyer credit relating to their new house. Held: Ps owned a present interest in a principal residence within three years prior to the date ofpurchase ofthe n w house and, thus, are not eligible for a first-tim

At trial, petitioner testified that he withdrewthe funds from his IRA after he lost hisjob and became homeless in 2008. With help from a friend, he was able to move to Austin, Texas, in 2008 and bought a home "a year-and-a-half" after arriving there. Petitioner testified that the broker handling his NFS account had mentioned a 10% penalty

--- MAJORITY --- Foley, Judge: After concessions, the issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled to a section 36 first-time homebuyer credit relating to 2008.

the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure . Respondent determined a deficiency of $7,500 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2008. The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to the first-time homebuyer credit as - - provided in section 36. Background Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in New York when the petition was filed. Petitioner' s mot

l not be treated as precedent for any other case. Respondent determined a deficiency of $8,000 in petitioner's 2008 Federal income tax. The issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to the $8,000 first-time homebuyer credit (FTHBC) under section 36 for 2008. Background Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. At the time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in Wisconsin. Before September 2009 petitioner spent a number of years as a U.S. expatriate citizen living

§ 36-5- 101(C)(Supp . 2004) (now 36-5-121(d)(2)) ; Bratton v . Bratton, 136 S .W.3d 595, 605 (enn . 2004) ; Perry v . Perry , 114 S .W .3d 465, 4 7 (Tern . 2003) ; Crabtree v . Crabtree, 16 S .W.3d 356, enn . 2000) . This statutory preference doe ntirely displace the other forms of spousal s when the facts of the case warrant long-term o open-ended

36-5- ' That is true because ( 1) those payments were received under an MDA, ( 2) the MDA did not designate the payments as not includable in gross income under sec . 71 and not allowable as a deduction under sec . 215, and (3) petitioner and Dr . Perkins were not members of the same household when the payments at issue were made . 5 See Tenn

36-5-101(a)(2)(B) (2003). Alimony in solido is an award of a definite sum of money to be paid in a lump sum or as installments over a definite period of time. It is not subject to modification and does not terminate upon the death of either party. Burlew v. Burlew, supra at 471. Rehabilitative alimony is awarded when it is feasible for the eco

36-5-101(d)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2004); see also Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), revd. on other grounds at Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. 2001); Gotten v. Gotten, 748 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). - 6 - It is unsurprising, then, that the parties in this case fight their battle as one of classification--

36.302(b)(2) (2002); emphasis added.] In order to comply with the above general ADA prohibition of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, places of public accommodation such as petitioner’s optometric practice are required to make reasonable modifications to their facilities and procedures that are necessary in order to provide

36.303, Appendix B (2000). “A public accommodation can choose among various alternatives as long as the result is effective communication.” Id. The final regulations implementing the ADA include examples of auxiliary aids and services required to be furnished to ensure effective communication. 28 C.F.R. sec. 36.303(b). With respect to - 9 - i

36.303(b) (2000); see also Fan v. Commissioner, supra. Absent in these regulations is any mention of x-ray machines, much less dental x-ray machines. Petitioner contends that his purchase of the panoramic and Wehmer x-ray machines and rare earth cassette enabled his dental services business to comply with applicable requirements of the ADA and

64-101, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 77, confirmed that the longstanding practice of excluding dower from a widow’s gross income under the 1939 Code and earlier revenue acts would be continued under the 1954 Code. 6 Merten's Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 36.81 at 390 (1949) (“Amounts received as dower by a widow are not taxable” under the 1939 Code). There is no evidence in the legislative history of the 1954 Code that Congress intended to reverse the exclusion when it enacted subchapter J.19 Tha

36 (...continued) (c) Definition of tangible personal property. If property is tangible personal property it may qualify as section 38 property irrespective of whether it is used as an integral part of an activity (or constitutes a research or storage facility used in connection with such activity) specified in paragraph (a) of this section. L

36 (...continued) (c) Definition of tangible personal property. If property is tangible personal property it may qualify as section 38 property irrespective of whether it is used as an integral part of an activity (or constitutes a research or storage facility used in connection with such activity) specified in paragraph (a) of this section. L

section 36- 2-13-5(a)(7) (Burns 1989).2 Included in this statutory obligation is the sheriff's duty to feed the county prisoners, which a county sheriff is required to do at his or her expense. In return for feeding the county prisoners, a county sheriff is entitled to receive a meal allowance from the county at a rate not to exceed a statutory max

36-2-13-5(a)(7) (Bums 1989). Included in this statutory obligation is the sheriffs duty to feed the county prisoners, which a county sheriff is required to do at his or her expense. In return for feeding the county prisoners, a county sheriff is entitled to receive a meal allowance from the county at a rate not to exceed a statutory maximum am