§37 — Overpayments of tax

58 cases·2 followed·3 distinguished·1 overruled·52 cited3% support

For credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle for overpayments of tax, see section 6401.

  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-1 General rules for the credit for the elderly
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-1(a) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-1(b) Limitation on the amount of the credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-1(c) Married couples must file joint returns.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-1(d) Nonresident aliens ineligible.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-2 Credit for individuals age 65 or over
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-2(a) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-2(b) Computation of credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-2(c) Examples.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3 Credit for individuals under age 65 who have public retirement system income
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(a) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(b) Election by certain married taxpayers.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(c) Computation of credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(d) Retirement income—(1) General rule—(i) For individuals 65 or over.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(e) Earned income—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(f) Computation of credit under section 37(e) in the case of joint returns—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(g) Examples.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.37-3(i) §1.37-3(i)

58 Citing Cases

37-54-403 (2017); N.D. Cent. Code sec. 43-23.3-18 (2017), but state laws are not federal rules of evidence. Our Court has itself found that an expert’s valuation opinion that does not comport with USPAP is still admissible, although it may or may not be helpful. See Epco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1731, 1735 (1999). We have “declin

Plentywood Drug, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2021-45 · 2021

37-54-403 (2017); N.D. Cent. Code sec. 43-23.3-18 (2017), but state laws are not federal rules of evidence. Our Court has itself found that an expert’s valuation opinion that does not comport with USPAP is still admissible, although it may or may not be helpful. See Epco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1731, 1735 (1999). We have “declin

37-54-403 (2017); N.D. Cent. Code sec. 43-23.3-18 (2017), but state laws are not federal rules of evidence. Our Court has itself found that an expert’s valuation opinion that does not comport with USPAP is still admissible, although it may or may not be helpful. See Epco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1731, 1735 (1999). We have “declin

e form shall govern in determining a deductible loss." (Emphasis added.) See also Du Pont v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 544, 545 (3d Cir. 1941) (noting that a "controlled or sympathetic vendee" can "divest a sale ofits fundamental incident offinality"), § 37 B.T.A. 1198 (1938), and aff'g Raskob v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1283 (1938). Like the taxpayer in Du Pont, the Cuthbertsons "attempt to give verisimilitude to their transactions by reliance upon their own protestations and upon their constructio

or at least until NAT recorded the easement deed, which might never happen). Title insurance and the recording act, N.Y. Real Prop. Law "See N.Y. Real Prop. Law sec. 258, schedules C, D, G (McKinney 2017); 4-37 Warren's Weed New York Real Property, sec. 37.04 (2017). ¹5New York State law allows parties to contract around a buyer's default entitlement to marketable title by contracting for delivery ofinsurable title, rather than marketable title. See, e.g., O'Mara v. Town ofWappinger, 879 N.E.2d

111, 115 (1933); see also United States v.

111, 115 (1933); see also United States v.

Jesse M. & Lura L. Lewis, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2005-205 · 2005

, 975 (9th Cir. 2002); see Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1991) (fraudulent failure to disclose requires a plaintiff unaware of the concealed fact who would not have acted had he known of the fact); 37 C.J.S., Fraud, sec. 37 (1997) (“one can secure no redress for a representation which he knew to be false or for failure to disclose facts which he knew to exist”). Petitioners do not deny that, when they agreed to settle their cases, they had learned of the previou

Jesse M. & Lura L. Lewis, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2005-205 · 2005

, 975 (9th Cir. 2002); see Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1991) (fraudulent failure to disclose requires a plaintiff unaware of the concealed fact who would not have acted had he known of the fact); 37 C.J.S., Fraud, sec. 37 (1997) (“one can secure no redress for a representation which he knew to be false or for failure to disclose facts which he knew to exist”). Petitioners do not deny that, when they agreed to settle their cases, they had learned of the previou

1999). Decedent’s life interest included the power to consume all of Mrs. Reichardt’s - 21 - interest in the property. There are no deeds transferring the Cameron and San Patricio Counties property to the trust and partnership. Thus, the only way interests in those properties could reach the partnership is for decedent to have

rests in the Cameron, San Patricio, Nueces, and Kleberg Counties property were Mrs. Reichardt’s separate property. Under her will, a life interest in that property vested in decedent under Texas law when Mrs. Reichardt died. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann, sec. 37 (West Supp. 1999). Decedent’s life interest included the power to consume all of Mrs. Reichardt’s interest in the property. There are no deeds transferring the Cameron and San Patricio Counties property to the trust and the partnership. Thus,

Margaret M. Merker, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-277 · 1997

ed on disability. Sec. 105(d) was repealed by sec. 122(b) of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, 97 Stat. 87, and replaced with a credit for the permanently and totally disabled for years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983, provided in sec. 37. Sec. 37 was subsequently renumbered as sec. 22. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, sec. 471(c)(1), 98 Stat. 484, 826. Respondent has conceded that petitioner is entitled to a credit under sec. 22 for the years in issue. See supra

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Woodford v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 991 · 1979
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