§4 — Repealed. Pub. L. 94–455, title V, § 501(b)(1), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1558]

447, superseded by Rev.

447, superseded by Rev.

39.45-1 (1953)), which related to section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, continued to be effective as to section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 until section 39.45-1 of Regulations 118 was superseded by new regulations.111 It took time for the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations relating to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

447, superseded by Rev.

For starters, petitioner cites no authority for the prop- osition (and we know of none) that the IRS can unilaterally overrule a taxpayer’s designation of a remittance as a “deposit.” The statute specifically provides that a - 22 - [*22] taxpayer “may make a cash deposit,” sec.

501, 502, superseded by Rev.

296, 298,7 modified and superseded by Rev.

296, 298,7 modified and superseded by Rev.

Held, further, R's objections to Ps' proffered expert testimony are overruled; the expert testimonywill be admitted into evidence.

447, has been superseded by Rev.

It has been superseded by Revenue Procedure 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B.

447, have been superseded by Rev.

447, was superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

at 448, lists threshold conditions which must be 3This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev.

at 448-449, lists nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability 2This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

We note, however, that this revenue procedure has been superseded by Rev.

2000-15, supra, has been superseded by Rev.

447.1 We have upheld 1 This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev.

From 1958 until the date that it was superseded by section 475, section 1.471-5, Income Tax Regs., specifically authorized dealers in securities to value securities inventories at (1) cost, (2) market, or (3) lower of cost or market, so long as the method employed by the dealer for tax purposes was also “the basis upon which his accounts are kept”.

at 737, 751, was modified and superseded by Rev.

Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, which explains that Revenue Procedures 93-27 and 2001-43 will become obsolete upon the finalization of these proposed regulations, but that until then taxpayers are permitted to rely upon Revenue Procedure 93-27. 11 Revenue Procedure 93-27 does not apply: (1) if the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from partnership assets, such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net lease; (2) if with

In determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to relief under section 6015(f), the Court applies a de novo standard and scope of review.4 Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Petitioner generally bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See Porter, 132 T.C. at 210; see also Rule 142(a)(1). 4 Because petitioner filed his Petition before July 1, 2019, section 6015(e)(7) does not apply to this case.

We find the facts in Hale to be distinguishable from the facts before us and, consistently with Rev. Proc. 2013-43, sec.

Brooks's income is 17% ofthe total tax--i.e., 17% × $8,558 = $1,455. Thus, we assume that for approximately $1,455 ofthejoint liability, Mr. Brooks satisfies all seven ofthe IRS's threshold conditions, and we continue with the analysis. 2. Section 4.02: Streamlined determination Section 4.02 ofRev. Proc. 2013-34 sets forth the conditions under which the IRS will make streamlined equitable reliefdeterminations. Both parties agree this section does not apply, so analysis ofthis section is unnecess

Moreover, the section 475 mark to market accounting method does not apply to residential properties, and petitioners did not provide any evidence relating to the value ofPPI's unsold property as of2009.

Moreover, the section 475 mark to market accounting method does not apply to residential properties, and petitioners did not provide any evidence relating to the value ofPPI's unsold property as of2009.

Moreover, the section 475 mark to market accounting method does not apply to residential properties, and petitioners did not provide any evidence relating to the value ofPPI's unsold property as of2009.

Moreover, the section 475 mark to market accounting method does not apply to residential properties, and petitioners did not provide any evidence relating to the value ofPPI's unsold property as of2009.

Moreover, the section 475 mark to market accounting method does not apply to residential properties, and petitioners did not provide any evidence relating to the value ofPPI's unsold property as of2009.

This 10-or-more-employerplan exception is found in section 419A(f)(6). The exception ofsection 419A(f)(6) does not apply to a plan which maintains experience-rating arrangements with respect to individual employers.

Section 409(n), therefore, does not apply to our analysis ofwhether the Plan met the definition ofan ESOP for 2002 because it is not "applicable" to petitioner or to the Plan.

In performing its analysis, the Court did not distinguish between Fortrend and the Fortrend acquisition vehicles. Moreover, the Court found transferee-of-transferee liability even though the IRS did not become a creditor ofthe Fortrend acquisition entities until after the stock sale--i.e., upon the later-occurring "initial transfer" ofcash from the acquired corporations to the Fortrend acquisition entities. This is because under UFTA sec. 4, a creditor's claim can arise either "before or after t

Unlike some other components ofthe general business credit, there is nothing in section 45A which makes the determination ofthe amount ofthe credit permissive." Thus, contrary to Uniband's assertions, the determination ofthe credit amount under section 45A--and consequently, the deduction limitation under section 280C-- occurs independently ofwhether the general business credit is curre

"Unlike Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(i), 2003-2 C.B.

Because I disagree with the attempt in the opinion ofthe Court to distinguish Petaluma II, which I believe we should follow under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.

4.02, does not apply.

Because a member of an Iowa L .L .C ., unlike a limited partner, was not prohibited by State law from participating in the partnership's business and more closely resembled a general partner, we concluded that a member of an Iowa L .L .C . came within the general partner exception of section 1 .469-5T(e)(3)--(ii), Temporary Income Tax 13 - Regs ., sura .

alysis for IRS employees to use in deciding whether to grant relief : Section 4 .01 (discussed below) lists seven threshold conditions that must be met for any relief to be granted; section 4 .02, not applicable here, lists circumstances in which relief will ordinarily be granted as to liabilities (unlike those at issue here) that were reported on a return ; and section 4 .03 (discussed below) sets out eight non- -19- exclusive factors to be considered in determining whether equitable relief sh

943 F .2d 22 (8th Cir . 1991) . However, the presumption .of correctness does not apply and the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner when he fails to make a determination and issues a "`naked' assessment without any foundation whatsoever" .

14 - In computing the claimed credits, petitioner, claimed $56,247,556 and $145,435,822 as additional QREs under section 41(b) for 1994 and 1995, respectively (claimed QREs) . The amount of claimed QREs for 1995-isfthe full-year amount although petitioner acknowledges that section 41 does not apply to any amount paid or incurred after June 30, 1995, and before January 1, 1996, and petitioner will disregard such.

4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448,12 that the Commissioner 11 Our holding herein is consistent with APA provisions relating to judicial determinations made in connection with agency actions. Tit. 5 U.S.C. sec. 554 (2000) (“Adjudications”) does not apply to matters subject to trial of the law and the facts de novo, such as our redetermination of a deficiency.

e subject expenses in excess of those deemed to be substantiated under the Revenue Procedures.)13 Accordingly, under section 6.05 of the Revenue Procedures, the full amount of the per diem payments is treated as being for food and beverages and thus subject to the 50-percent limitation of section 274(n). D. Petitioner’s Contentions Petitioner argues that because Beech Trucking leased its drivers from ATS, the section 274(n) limitation is inapplicable to Beech Trucking.

We need not decide which party has the better reading of the statutory text standing alone, because the plain text of Notice 2006-52 resolves the issue in petitioners’ favor and respondent continues to stand by the Notice.

Petitioner could not recall signing the tax return for 2013 or 2014, and it is unclear whether she knew that intervenor had filed those returns with the IRS in the latter half of 2017.

Because our disposition "would be the same regardless ofwhich party had the burden of - 15 - [*15] proof," we need not decide where that burden lies.

And finally we are skeptical as to the bona fides ofthe alleged note giving rise to the lien against the house set forth in petitioner's father-in-law's deed of trust.

We need not decide this dispute to decide the sec.

(It is unclear whether this is the same section 401(k) account from which she paid the restitution.) (cid:16)042A Morgan Stanley Brokerage account in the name ofFrancel's wife.

Because there is no record ofthe filed 1999 tax return, it is unclear whether the seventh condition, that the tax liability be attributable to the nonrequesting spouse, was met.

Ifpetitioner is referring to liability with respect to the 2015 return filed in 2016, we are skeptical that an agreement entered into under the circumstances here should favor relief.

- 23 - [*23] participation."¹² We have serious doubts about our ability to do that, see Estate ofShapiro v.

Whether the calculation ofpetitioner's interest in the Ventana property is arbitrary we need not decide at this time.

6015(f) and therefore need not decide whether petitioner brought her claim for relief within-2 years of the first collection gctivity.

Because the Court finds that this factor favors respondent on other grounds, the Court need not decide whether that circumstance would also weigh against relief .

We need not decide whether any of the additional requirements have been met.

(CCH) 1531, 1537 (2008), but we do not agree, and we do not read Notice 2012-8, supra, as proposing, that a nonrequesting spouse's alcohol_or drug addiction, by itself, constitutes abuse under sec.

We disagree with petitioner's argument.

We do not agree with the IRS that the character of this income proves that the General Partner L.L.C.s were investors and were not in a trade or business.

The posit, however, "that while the decision to suspend civil acti ity in itself may not be a ministerial duty, actions prior to and subsequent to the making of the actual decision may be defined as ministerial ." We disagree with their argument as applied o the circumstances of this case .

We disagree with the preceding disjunctive analysis.

In response MDIA filed a Petition with this Court, and on June 21, 2017, the Court entered a stipulated decision for taxable years 2000 through 2011, according to which MDIA was liable for deficiencies totaling $2,731,335 pursuant to section 4971(a).

2013-34 provides a three-step analysis for Internal Revenue Service (IRS) personnel to follow in evaluating requests for relief.

Revenue Procedure 2013-34 provides that economic hardship exists “if satisfaction of the tax liability .

The values upon the Recording Date of this Deed shall be those values used to calculate the deduction for federal income tax purposes allowable by reason of this grant pursuant to Section 4 [*4] 170(h) of the Code.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to a passthrough deduction for the amount allocable to him as a limited partner of the Palm Beach Entities’ 2008 deductible theft losses.

Conclusion On the basis ofthe foregoing facts and circumstances, we hold that the equities weigh in petitioner's favor.

108, 150 (2017) ("The Commissioner has broad discretion in applying section 482, and we will uphold his determination unless the taxpayer shows it to be arbi- trary, capricious, or unreasonable."), M, 934 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.

We hold that the amount is $3,350.

Because we hold that petitioner does not satisfy the reason to know condition, we do not need to evaluate whether making the payments toward the tax liability would result in economic hardship for her under Rev.

- 13 - Conclusion In view ofthe foregoing, and on the basis ofour review ofall ofthe facts and circumstances, we hold that it would be inequitable to hold petitioner liable for the unpaid Federal income tax for 2008.

Consequently, we hold that Mrs.

Ifwe sustain respondent's determination to cancel APA I and APA II for tax years 2005 and 2006, respectively, and we hold for respondent on the section 482 adjustments, we will need to consider whether petitioner is liable for penalties pursuant to section 6662(e) and (h).

22This document is one ofmany preserved pursuant to 44 U.S.C.

On their modified Form 656-L, petitioners offered to pay $3 million and hand wrote "pursuant to section 4 Terms - 4b".

We hold that he is liable for the self- employment tax on his IMF earnings for 2007.

As a result ofthat examination, the IRS proposed under its authoritypursuant to section 482 to increase the intercompany royalty to 6% beginning with the 2001 tax year.

6662(a) 2008 $9,040 $1,808 2009 7,844 1,569 The issues for decision are whether petitioner: (1) for 2008, is entitled to various deductions claimed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, in excess ofthe amounts respondent allowed; (2) for both years in issue and pursuant to section 475(f), is entitled to ordinary loss treatment with respect to sales of stocks and securities; and (3) is liable for a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty for either year in issue.

We hold he is not; 2.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner does not satisfy the seventh threshold condition ofRev.

We hold similarlythat under Rev.

Consequently, we hold that we do not havejurisdiction over respondent's determination as to SH's employment status.

thereon; and (2) "[t]hereafter, any remaining amount shall be distributed to the Members in proportion to their then current Percentage Interests at the time ofsuch distribution." Appendix A ofthe Holdings Agreement defines prioritycapital contributions as any capital contribution made by a member pursuant to section 4.02.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to relieffromjoint and several liability for the taxable year 2008 pursuant to section 6015(f).

We hold that the term "indebtedness" as it is used in section 965(b)(3) means the condition ofowing money or being indebted.

ner's OPIS transaction lacked economic substance; (4) even ifthe OPIS transaction functioned for tax purposes in the manner petitioner intended, the claimed losses - 37 - are artificial and not deductible under section 165; and (5) any allowable loss is limited by the at-risk rules ofsection 465." We hold that petitioner's OPIS transaction lacked economic substance.

Accordingly, on the basis ofour review ofall the facts and circumstances, we hold that petitioner is entitled to relieffromjoint and several liability under section 6015(f) for 2005.5 5 Even ifpetitioner had failed to satisfy all three ofthe conjunctive safe harbor requirements provided by Rev.

Conseqùently, we hold that : petitioner is not entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f).

Accordingly, we hold that C&G Consultants' 1989 gross receipts or sales are increased by $159,323.

Pursuant to section 4.4, of the NTC joint venture agreement, 30 percent of the profits from the NTC joint venture were allocated to WCI and 70 percent to WB Partners.

We hold that it was proper for her to do so.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f) for the unpaid portion of the couple's 200 tax¢liability.

I "Because we hold that petitioner is liable for the tax due on the unreported taxable retirement income under sec.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 (a) on that portion of the deficiency attributable to: (1) Mr.

Thus we hold that the reduction required in the Federal Travel Regulations for free meals also results in a l - 37 - reduction in the special daily.rates for ransportation workers.

Seller hereunder, the Buyer shall satisfy such obligation by making a payment to the Seller in an amount equal to the Seller Loss plus, to the extent not previously paid, the costs and expenses to be borne by Buyer pursuant to Section 4.8(b).

We further held that petitioner’s claim for additional deductions for repairs was an attempt to make an impermissible change in its method of accounting for which petitioner had failed to secure the consent of the Secretary as required by section 446(e).

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner knew or should have known that the tax returns for 1997 through 1999 reported unpaid liabilities and that Mr .

Therefore, we hold that petitioners may deduct meal and incidental expenses of $445 in 2001, $240 in 2002, and $180 in 2003 .

Accordingly, we hold that respondent abused his discretion in denying petitioner equitable relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f).

Therefore, under these facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying equitable relief to petitioner under section 6015(f).

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f) and that respondent’s failure to grant that relief was an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, under these facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying equitable relief to petitioner under section 6015(f).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right of Acquirors to exercise the option granted pursuant to Section 1(a) shall be subject to the Company’s [MergerSub’s] right or obligation, as the case may be, to redeem the Voting Preferred Stock pursuant to Section 4(g)(i) of Article V of the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company upon the occurrence of an event specified therein and the Company’s obligation to redeem the Voting Preferred Stock of a holder of Voting Preferred Stock at the op

As a result, we hold that Mrs.

We hold that respondent correctly determined that collection by levy should proceed.

We hold that petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or (c) for her 1988 and 1989 tax liabilities.

If relief is not available pursuant to section 4.02, the Commissioner may nevertheless grant relief pursuant to the general provisions of Rev.

30 Deficiency 1996 $12,482 1997 8,369 1998 355 The issue for decision is whether petitioner qualified for the Indian employment credit (IEC) pursuant to section 45A for its fiscal years ended April 30, 1996 (TY 1996), April 30, 1997 (TY 1997), and April 30, 1998 (TY 1998).2 Background The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122.

We hold that petitioners have failed to introduce credible evidence to substantiate the actual items contributed and their fair market values.4 See sec.

Pursuant to section 4.01 of the partnership agreement, petitioners subsequently assigned a portion of their general partnership interests in KFLP to each of their children.

The cost bases of the Atrium Assets placed in service during the - 25 - years in issue, as adjusted pursuant to section 48(q) for the investment tax credits claimed with respect to such assets, were as follows: .

Petitioner contends that its costs should be amortized over a period no shorter than 60 months pursuant to section 4.01(2) of Rev.

Pursuant to section 4.901-2(f) (3) (ii), Temporary Income Tax .

ion was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 291-292; Farmer v. Commissioner, supra; Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, supra. The Commissioner promulgated a list of factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448-449, that the Commissioner considers in determining whether to grant equitable relief under section 6015(f).5 First, the Commissioner will not grant relief unless seven threshold conditions have been met: (1) The taxpayer

s for relief under that subsection. The applicable provision is found in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447.4 We have upheld the procedures in reviewing a determination. Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, provides seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the 4 This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, which is effective either for requests for relief filed on or after Nov. 1, 2003, or f

es agree that relief from the 1996 underpayment is not available to petitioner under section 6015(b) or (c), thereby satisfying section 6015(f)(2). As contemplated by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, to be used in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under that section.4 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 3Sec. 6015 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: SEC. 6015. RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON J

d March 27, 2002, denying equitable relief under section 6015(f) based upon the 2-year time limit, respondent nevertheless requested that his Appeals Office review petitioner’s request under the nonexhaustive list of factors of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448-449. On November 19, 2003, respondent’s Appeals Office recommended not granting equitable relief under section 6015(f) after concluding the following: The fact that she indicates that she is divorced and the income was d

at 4. Those taxpayers had no knowledge of who was the rightful owner of the cash. Id. Here, petitioner knew that she and Linc Energy were the only two parties that had a claim to the disputed shares. This was not a case of discovered property where the potential owners were unknown to the finder. Rather petitioner’s employer transferred the stock to her under the terms of the Performance Rights Plan and the additional allocation. And as discussed supra Opinion Part II.C, we found that the stock

See Rule 142(a); Porter, 132 T.C. at 210. The Commissioner has specified in Rev. Proc. 2013-34 the procedures governing equitable relief. Although we are not bound by Rev. Proc. 2013-34, and our determination ultimately rests on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances, we will analyze petitioner wife’s request under the guidelines set forth therein to ascertain whether she satisfies the requirements for relief. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438–39 (2011); Johnson v. Commiss

citizen or resident, but met the other requirements, will still be afforded relief consistent with Revenue Procedure 2014-55 for the tax years included in their submission if they submit the tax returns through the streamlined program. See Internal Revenue Service, Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures for U.S. Taxpayers Residing Outside the United States Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, Q&A-3, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/ international-taxpayers/streamlined-filing-compliance-proce

2019-35, at *37–40 (reviewing the taxpayer’s innocent spouse claim under section 6015(e)(1) where the taxpayer raised the claim at a CDP hearing, the notice of determination discussed that claim, and the taxpayer’s petition assigned error to the denial of innocent spouse relief). In resolving section 6015(f) cases brought under section 6015(e)(1), we employ a de novo standard and scope of review.12 Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Petitioner generally bears the burden of proving

Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980, 993-994 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010- 134; Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. The IRS has outlined procedures for determining whether a requesting spouse qualifies for equitable relief under section 6015(f) in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-400. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the IRS’ denial of section 6015(f) relief in cases such as this one, the Court is not bound by them; the Court’s determinatio

2020-149, at *18. We therefore address whether petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f). I. Standard and Scope of Review In determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f), we apply a de novo standard and scope of review.3 Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Petitioner generally bears the burden of proving that she is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See id.; see also Rule 142(a)(1). 3 Because petitioner filed he

See Rule 142(a). B. Section 6015(f) Section 6015(f) provides that “equitable relief” may be afforded to a tax- payer if “relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c).” “Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary” such relief may be available if, “taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either).” Sec. 6015(f)(1); see sec. 1.6015-4(a), Income Tax Regs. Th

641, 648 (1989). Petitioner has failed to do so. Before we reach the merits ofrespondent's determination to disqualify the plan, we must address petitioner's contention that respondent "erred in issuing its revocation letter because the statute oflimitations has run with respect to one or more ofthe plan years at issue." Petitioner's limitations contention is misplaced. Section 6501(a) limits only the assessment and collection oftax; it does not limit respondent's broad authority to audit retire

2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399, lists seven threshold conditions that must be met for a requesting spouse to be eligible for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Among these is the requirement that the income from which the tax liability arises be attributable (in full or in part) to the nonrequesting spouse. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. This requirement is subject to five exceptions, including one for abuse.3 See id. Specifically, the exception f

469(d)(1).¹° A passive activity is any trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate or any rental real estate activity regardless ofmaterial participation. Sec. 469(a)(1), (c)(1) and (2). Ifa taxpayer can prove that she is a qualifying taxpayer in a real property trade or business (i.e., a real estate professional), her rental real estate activities will not be considered per se passive activities. Sec. 469(c)(7)(A). Thus, the activities are treated as nonpassive, and

Moreover, he stated that he did not consider section 1.469-4, Income Tax Regs. We find him credible. There is no ¹5Revenue Procedure 2010-13, sec. 4.02, 2010-4 I.R.B. 329, 330, requires taxpayers to file a written statement that the taxpayer is grouping two or more trade or business activities into a single activity for taxable years beginning after January 25, 2010. Although Rev. Proc. 2010-13, supra, was not in effect for the years in issue, Rev. Proc. 2010-13, section 4.06, 2010-4 I.R.B. at 3

petitioner's suggestion, respondent admits that, "[i]n normal course, there exists a unity ofinterest between a single-member entity and the assets owned by such entity."9 But he argues that Red Sea's split ofHoldings into the TOYS interest and the SMI gave rise to "'a multiple ownership structure' unlike where one party owned 100 percent." It is true that Red Sea did divide the Holdings membership interest into a present (TOYS) interest and a future (SMI) interest; it is also true that, applyin

The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished property for Federal income tax purposes. Id. sec. 4, 2000-2 C.B. at 309. C. Application ofCaselaw Principles Bartell Drug undertook the transaction involving the Lynnwood property before

The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished property for Federal income tax purposes. Id. sec. 4, 2000-2 C.B. at 309. C. Application ofCaselaw Principles Bartell Drug undertook the transaction involving the Lynnwood property before

The procedure then imposed time limits paralleling those for deferred exchanges (45 and 180 days) and enumerated - 40 - specific contractual provisions and/or relationships that would not be considered fatal to treatment ofthe "exchange accommodation titleholder" as the owner ofthe replacement or relinquished property for Federal income tax purposes. Id. sec. 4, 2000-2 C.B. at 309. C. Application ofCaselaw Principles Bartell Drug undertook the transaction involving the Lynnwood property before

467(d)(2); sec. 1.467-1(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Both 13arties agree that the lease in this case qualifies as a section 467 rental agreement.¹³ a. Alläcation The accrual methods applicable to a section 467 rental agreement are set forth in secti n 467(b), which provides in part: EC. 467(b). Accrual ofRental Payments.-- (1) Allocation follows agreement.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the determination ofthe amount ofthe rent nder any section 467 rental agreement which accrues during gny tax

II - 14 - Petitioners place great weight on our report in Givens v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1145. In Givens, a Los Angeles County deputy sheriffwas injured in the course ofhis duties and was on disability leave for more than a year. The Los Angeles County Code set forth a workmen's compensation system that incorporated Cal. Lab. Code sec. 4850 for those eligible and provided additional compensation after expiration ofthe first year ofdisability. Specifically, it provided that the deputy would rece

2013-34, sec. 4.01, for relieffromjoint and several liability in respect ofthe tax deficiency attributable to petitioner's unreported income from his IRA distributions. It is thus petitioner's burden to establish that he meets an exception to this threshold requirement. S_ee Rule 142(a). Petitioner appears to rely on the fraud exception in arguing that intervenor filed their 2009joint return without his signature, knowledge, or consent. We disagree. We have already concluded that the 2009joint r

Pursuantto section 7520 and its 'In support ofthat statement, respondent states: "See n, Pierre at 43 (Halpern, dissenting) citing 18 C.J.S., Corporations, at § 4 (2007) and Smart v.

- 14 - [*14] income." Respondent concedes that the Social Security income is entirely attributable to Mr. Buchanan. Thus, petitioner meets the seven threshold conditions for equitable reliefunder Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra, and Notice 2012- 8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309. The second step ofRev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 298, provides three conditions that ifmet will ordinarily qualify a requesting spouse for reliefunder section 6015(f) with respect to an underpayment ofa properly reported li

477.9 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra, lists factors the Commissioner uses in deciding whetherto grant section 6015(f) relief. The Court may consider these guidelines but is not bound by them. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra, provides a three-step analysis to follow in evaluating a request for relief. The first step includes seven threshold conditions that must be met to request equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that petitioner meets the threshold requirements ofNotice 2012-8, 2012-

Our finding was, however, based on the test in section 4 .03(1)(a), 2000-1 C .B .

Respondent's Determination of Petitioner's Income for Years 2002-0 5 As a general rule, the Commissioner's determinations in the notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving error .3 Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helverina, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . The Commissioner has the burden of producing evidence appropriate to impose a relevant penalty , 2William J. Loosemore, Jr ., was the owner of Safe-Way Pilot Car Service . 3Sec . 7491(a)(1) (which shifts the bu

As previously discussed, members of L .L .P .s and L .L .C .s, unlike limited partners in State law limited partnerships, are not barred by State law from materially participating in the entities' business . Accordingly, .it cannot be presumed that they do not materially participate . Rather, it is necessary to examine the-facts and circumstances to ascertain the nature and .extent of their participation . That -factual inquiry is appropriately made, we believe, pursuant to the general tests for

The parties stipulated that during years 2002-05 petitioner .received payments from Servco Oil, the Servco Oil Section 4 .01'(k) plan, Standard Oil of Connecticut, William J .

Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 125-126. In this case, both of the parties rely on Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, and both parties address the factors enumerated therein. 1. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, Sec. 4.01 Before the Commissioner will consider a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015(f), the taxpayer must satisfy the following seven threshold conditions listed in Rev. Proc. 2000- 15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448: (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint re

In Carlton, the taxpayer, the executor of an estate, maintained that the retroactive amendment of a Federal estate tax provision (section 4With respect to petitioner’s contention that he made his investment in Aldus Green in 1984, respondent states on brief: “We note that petitioner offered no evidence that his investment in AGC [Aldus Green] actually was made two years before the enactment of sec.

without published opinion 614 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1979). Second, section 72(t)(1) imposes an additional tax on distributions from a “qualified retirement plan” equal to 10 percent of the portion of such amount that is includable in gross income unless the distribution comes within one of several statutory exceptions. For purposes of the 10-percent additional tax, a qualified retirement plan includes both a 401(k) plan and an individual retirement account or individual retirement annuity (collecti

4.02(1), 1984-2 C.B. at 502. - 4 - of deficiency disallowing that credit. The Holloways consented to an assessment of the math error change, and their deposit was used to pay it 90 days after the Commissioner sent them the notice of deficiency. See Rev. Proc. 84-58, sec. 4.02(3), 1984-2 C.B. 501, 502. The Holloways responded by timely filing

ined that Lois Etkin had reason to know when she signed the 2000 income tax return that the tax liability would not be paid. As a result of this determination and Lois Etkin’s failure to meet some of the requirements set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, respondent denied Lois Etkin’s claim for relief under section 6015(f). OPINION Sections 6320 and 6330 provide for Tax Court review of the Commissioner’s administrative determinations to proceed with liens and levies.

Thus, a -51- partnership or S corporation could aggregate all of its leased section 1245 property, while other taxpayers treated each of their properties in that category as a separate activity. As amended by DEFRA, section 465(c)(2) generally requires, except as provided in section 465(c)(2)(B), that partnerships and S corporations separate equipment leasing activities (and the other activities listed in section 465(c)(1)) on a property-by-property basis, as do other taxpayers. If petitioners’

of this section, or the applicable mortality table, with respect to a distribution form described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section, for distributions with annuity starting dates occurring after a specified date that is after the amendment is adopted, does not violate the requirements of section 411(d)(6) if the amendment is adopted on or before the last day of the last plan year ending before January 1, 2000. [Emphasis added.] As discussed below, petitioner's argument is unpersuasive. Accordi

preliminary determination letter has been issued as of that date. - 8 - Before the Commissioner will consider a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015(f), the taxpayer must satisfy seven threshold conditions listed in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfies these conditions. A. Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Section 4.02 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02(1), 2000-1 C.B. at 448, provides that equitable relief will ordinarily be granted a

ined that Lois Etkin had reason to know when she signed the 2000 income tax return that the tax liability would not be paid. As a result of this determination and Lois Etkin’s failure to meet some of the requirements set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, respondent denied Lois Etkin’s claim for relief under section 6015(f). OPINION Sections 6320 and 6330 provide for Tax Court review of the Commissioner’s administrative determinations to proceed with liens and levies.

(a), 111 Stat. 788, 809. The report of the Committee on the Budget refers only to tax-free withdrawals from IRAs for higher education expenses. - 7 - See H. Rept. 105-148, at 288-289 (1997), 1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 1) 319, 610-611; see also Notice 97-60, sec. 4, 1997-2 C.B. 310, 317-318. Both section 401(k) plans and individual retirement plans are subject to the general requirements of section 72(t). See secs. 72(t)(1), 401(a), (k)(1), 4974(c)(1), (4), (5). However, classification as a section 401(k)

Section 4.2 of LCL’s operating agreement stated that “No Member shall be liable as such for the liabilities of the Company.” On March 28, 2001, the LCL operating agreement was amended and restated in its entirety (revised LCL operating agreement), effective retroactively to January 1, 2000. The revised LCL operating agreement is construed under Wyo

447. This Court has upheld the use of those procedures in reviewing a negative determination. See Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). If the threshold conditions are satisfied, relief will ordinarily be granted under circumstances described in section 4.02 of Rev. Proc.

vidual qualifies for relief under sec. 6015(f). The revenue procedure takes into account factors such as marital status, economic hardship, and significant benefit in determining whether relief will be granted under sec. 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. We note that Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296 (Aug. 11, 2003), superseded Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra. Rev. Proc, 2003-61, sec. 6, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. The new revenue procedure, however, is effective for requests fo

___ (2004). Petitioner contends that he should be relieved from joint liability under section 6015(f), and thus he should not be required to repay the refund for 1999. We disagree. 2. Factors Listed in Rev. Proc. 2000-15 The Commissioner announced a list of factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448,6 that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether to grant equitable relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1), lists the following two facts, whic

137, 147-152 (2003); Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125-126. Moreover, petitioner has not objected to the use of the guidelines contained in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, and she has addressed the factors in her posttrial briefs. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the 14On Aug. 11, 2003, the Commissioner issued Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, which supersedes Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2001-1 C.B. 447. The new reven

Section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). If the threshold conditions are satisfied, relief may be granted under section 4.02 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, which applies to relief from liability that is re

idelines to decide whether she qualifies for equitable relief. Under these guidelines, a taxpayer such as petitioner must meet seven threshold conditions before the Commissioner will consider her request for equitable relief. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent concedes that petitioner has met these conditions. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists the circumstances in which the Commissioner will ordinarily grant equitable relief as to unpaid liab

Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003); Jonson v. Commiséioner, supra at 125-126. Moreover, petitioner has not objected to the use of these guidelines, and she has addressed the factors in her posttrial briefs. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.BL at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfïed before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfies the seven threshold conditions. Rev

s cited above, the legal presumption that the spouses are living in community does not apply in the instant case because, as we concluded, supra, petitioners’ marriage contract was properly recorded during the years in issue. See 16 Spaht & Hargrave sec. 4.7. Further, we are not deciding the character of the funds petitioners deposited into their joint accounts, but rather, we are deciding whether petitioners’ asserted indiscriminate commingling of separate funds with other separate funds invali

Although Rev. Proc. 96-58 is applicable to whether a taxpayer has disclosed sufficient facts to be entitled to reduce the amount of the - 40 - understatement, it “does not apply with respect to any other penalty provision (including the negligence or disregard provisions of the §6662 accuracy-related penalty).” We agree with resp

457, 460 (describing alternative LIFO method for automobile dealers); see also 1 Schneider, Federal Income Taxation of Inventories, sec. 14.02[3][b], at 14- 96 (1996). 7 In arriving at the actual cost of its ending inventory in its new car and new truck pools each year, Investments uses the actual invoice cost of each vehicle in

4 (adding former Cal. Civil Code sec. 4811(d)). The new California statutory provision effectively skirted the holding of In re Marriage of Ames, supra, by providing that a court need not make a separate order for child support when the parties use the family support technique.10 10 That aspect of the 1981 legislation now appears in sec. 3586

cted by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent agrees that those threshold conditions are satisfied in

28 (2002), followed. Held, further, Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994- 2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, Ps may only deduct 50 percent of the per diem allowance paid to the drivers. Held, further, sec. 4.02(5) of Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, is not invalid. Held, further, Ps have not substantiated the actual travel expenses incurred by the drivers pursuant to sec.

28 (2002), followed. Held, further, Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994- 2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, Ps may only deduct 50 percent of the per diem allowance paid to the drivers. Held, further, sec. 4.02(5) of Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, is not invalid. Held, further, Ps have not substantiated the actual travel expenses incurred by the drivers pursuant to sec.

artnership Interests sale and the Corporations sale in the consent decree and in the promissory note, discussed, infra. 5 A tax matters person served a role under the so-called partnership audit procedures made applicable to subch. S corporations by sec. 4 of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1691, 1697, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982. This was repealed by sec. 1307(c)(1) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-

28 (2002), followed. Held, further, Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994- 2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, Ps may only deduct 50 percent of the per diem allowance paid to the drivers. Held, further, sec. 4.02(5) of Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, is not invalid. Held, further, Ps have not substantiated the actual travel expenses incurred by the drivers pursuant to sec.

28 (2002), followed. Held, further, Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994- 2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, Ps may only deduct 50 percent of the per diem allowance paid to the drivers. Held, further, sec. 4.02(5) of Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, is not invalid. Held, further, Ps have not substantiated the actual travel expenses incurred by the drivers pursuant to sec.

28 (2002), followed. Held, further, Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994- 2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, Ps may only deduct 50 percent of the per diem allowance paid to the drivers. Held, further, sec. 4.02(5) of Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825, Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686, and Rev. Proc. 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 427, is not invalid. Held, further, Ps have not substantiated the actual travel expenses incurred by the drivers pursuant to sec.

- are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. This Court has upheld the use of these procedures in reviewing a negative determination. See Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). If the threshold conditions are satisfied, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4

es are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. This Court has upheld the use of these procedures in reviewing a negative determination. See Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfies the seven threshold co

Section 4.03 of the Partnership Agreement governed the maintenance of the partners' capital accounts. The capital accounts would be increased by the amount of the partners' contributions, adjusted for allocations of partnership income, gain, expenses, and loss, and reduced by the fair market value of distributed property. Upon the occurrence of Rev

960, 976-977. Furthermore, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would interpret the amended statute as it did in James, because petitioner, as in James, has not shown what portion of his traveling expenses are attributable to the increased cost associated with travel. 7 employment had no connect

Section 4.01 of Revenue:Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satfisfied before the IRS will consider a request for relief under section 6015 (f) . Respondent concedes that those threshold conditions are -satisfied in the instant case. Where, as here, the requesting spouse - 27 - sátisfies the thkeshold cond

The parties have not found any statute, regulation, IRS ruling, or caselaw that specifically characterizes the income earned from being a trustee on a board of trustees ofa community savings bank as income from self-employment or as income from being an employee.° For the following reasons, we follow section 4Respondent fails to cite a single case where we have applied sec.

Whether Petitioner Failed To Use an Independent/Qualified Appraiser To Perform Valuations ofthe Securities Held by the Trust Section 401(a)(28)(C) provides that all valuations ofsecurities that are not readily tradable on an established securities market must be performed by an "independent appraiser" and that the standards for appraisers are similar to those set forth in the regulations promulgated under section 170(a)(1). Without going into all ofthe standards that are set forth in the statute

Shurtz and Reverend Shurtz each held a 1- percent general partnership interest in Doulos L .P . Mrs . Shurtz also held an 87 .6-percent limited partnership interest in Doulos L.P . ; the remaining 10 .4 percent was divided among limited partnership interests held by Mrs . Shurtz's children and trusts for her grandchildren . Doulos L .P. maintained a capital account for each partner and issued Schedules K-1 (Form 1065), Partner's Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc . Doulos L .P . filed For

continued) (iv) to Interest Holders in proportion to their respective Capital Accounts and then to the Interest Holders in accordance with Section 4 .4 [relat- ing to the distribution of MFV's assets upon its liqui- dation and dissolution] .

r are too indefinite to form an enforceable settlement agreement. Indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract. 1 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, sec. 4.1, at 525 (1993). A contract whose terms are so indefinite, uncertain, and incomplete that the reasonable intentions of the contracting parties cannot be fairly and reasonably distilled from them is not enforceable. Nelson Bros., Inc. v. Commi

We continue to adhere to that view.6 The majority cites a number of cases decided under the abuse of discretion standard, stating that "[i]n none of these types of cases have we held * * * that we are limited to the administrative record." Majority op. p. 26 (emphasis added). In three of the types of cases to which the majority alludes (involving section 482 reallocations, section 4 6 "clear reflection of income" determinations, and waivers of the former section 6659 addition to tax), the inappl

d in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. This Court has upheld the use of these procedures in reviewing a negative determination. See, e.g., Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125-126. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before respondent will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent conceded that petitioner has met those seven threshold conditions. If the th

Section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before respondent will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). The threshold conditions are as follows: (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable year for which relief is sought; (2) Relief is not availab

Section 4.01 of the revenue procedure lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that petitioner meets all of the threshold conditions. Where, as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold conditions, section 4.02(1) of the re

of Impact Research Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as IRC) and Research Impact Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as RIC).2 For IRC, respondent 2This method of resolving disputes regarding subchapter S items was enacted by sec. 4 of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1691, 1697, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982. It was repealed by sec. 1307(c)(1) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-18

of Impact Research Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as IRC) and Research Impact Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as RIC).2 For IRC, respondent 2This method of resolving disputes regarding subchapter S items was enacted by sec. 4 of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1691, 1697, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982. It was repealed by sec. 1307(c)(1) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-18

ontrol of the business and affairs of the corporation. * * * He shall have the general powers and duties of management usually vested in the office of President of a corporation”. 7Article III of the bylaws of Chicken Bar provided in pertinent part: Section 4. SECRETARY (a) The Secretary shall keep or cause to be kept at the principal office or such other place as the Board of Directors may order, a book of minutes of all meetings of directors and shareholders showing the time and place of the m

4.03, 1996-1 C.B. at 688. Petitioner’s actual expenses consisted solely of incidental expenses; while at work, his employer furnished him with lodging and meals at no charge. We must decide whether petitioner may deduct the claimed amount. We hold he may not. We hold that petitioner’s use of the M&IE rates is limited to the incidental expense

4(b)(4), 1992-1 C.B. 738, provides that, for purposes of reducing the understatement of income tax under sec. 6662(d), additional disclosure of facts relating to an issue involving reasonable compensation is unnecessary, if the Form 1120, Schedule E, Compensation of Officers, has been properly completed. Petitioner included a properly complete

intiff for the sum of $886,026.00. Despite the demand to pay Plaintiff, the Defendants have failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay Plaintiff. 8. Plaintiff is in possession of the checks with endorsement supplied by Plaintiff pursuant to section 4.205 Tex. Bus. Comm. Code and were delivered by R.H. Bradshaw to Plaintiff. Plain- tiff took the checks for value, in good faith, and without notice that they were overdue or had been dishonored or of any defense against the claim to them on

ioneer, and Pioneer accepted these payments and included them in income on its Federal income tax returns. We think that any indefiniteness in the terms of the agreement was cured by the parties’ subsequent performance. See 1 Williston on Contracts, sec. 4:29 (4th ed. 1990). Finally, the fact that Mr. Speer was not president of Pioneer when he signed the License Agreement does not negate the - 22 - License Agreement. Mr. Speer provided services to Pioneer during the years in issue and was compen

On November 17, 1988, Thor and the Buyer entered into an agreement whereby the Buyer approved, pursuant to section 4.18 of the SPA, the dividend declaration set forth in the November 14, 10 1988, minutes of the S&B board meeting, and the Buyer waived any rights or causes of action that the Buyer may have had under the SPA stemming from the dividend declaration.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

Discussion Rule 260 sets forth procedures whereby a taxpayer may seek “to enforce an overpayment determined by the Court under Code section 4 [*4] 6512(b)(1).” See Rule 260(a)(1).

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

Without limiting the generality of the 7 [*7] foregoing, but subject to the limitations set forth in Section 4 below, Manager shall do, and shall have the right to do, the following, in each case in accordance with usual and customary arena industry practices consistent with those of other major sports and entertainment facilities of similar age, size and facilities: (a) enter into agreements for purchasing, booking, promotion, coordination, and s

2003-71, § 4.02(3)(a), 2003-2 C.B.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2017-34, § 4.01(1), 4.02, 2017-26 I.R.B.

Petitioners argue that section 953(d)(2)(A) provides that the section 953(d) election, once made, applies for subsequent taxable years unless revoked with the consent of the Secretary.

2013-34, § 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B.

9 [*9] proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.” Section 4, titled “Distributions,” generally provided that the general partner had absolute discretion to distribute cash “to the Partners in proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.” Section 13, titled “Dissolution and Winding Up,” provided that the partnership would dissolve and wind up upon (among other things) “[t]he affirmative vot

2013-34, § 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

2009-20, § 4.03, 2009-14 I.R.B.

397, provides a three-step analysis—section 4.01, 4.02, and 4.03—for evaluating whether a requesting spouse qualifies for equitable relief pursuant to section 6015(f).

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

at 491, provides, inter alia, an automatic six-month extension from the due date of the return to make an election when the Code prescribes (as it does in the case of section 1042(c)(6)) that the election be made by the due date of the return or the due date of the return including extensions. Rev. Proc. 92-85, § 4.02, states th

Revenue Procedure 2010-51, § 4.01, 2010-51 I.R.B.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

SBC Portfolio relied on section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, ch.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2006-9, § 4.09(1), 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, 284. In the APA request, Bloomberg stated that it had a 24% market share of the credit and financial information industry segment of the information services industry. Bloomberg defined BPS as “an electronic information service that combines news, market data, analytics, email and order routing into a single interactiv

§ 3711(g)(1), (4); see also 31 U.S.C.

to amend the trust from time to time in any manner required for the sole purpose of ensuring that the trust qualifies and continues to qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust within the meaning of § 664(d)(1) of the Code. Rev. Proc. 2003-57, § 4, 2003-2 C.B. at 258; Rev. Proc. 2003-59, § 4, 2003-2 C.B. at 270. The Estate notes that this sample provision in the Revenue Procedures does not specify a time limit for amending the trust, nor does it require judicial intervention. However, the

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

Notice 2014-21, § 4 Q&A-1, 2014-16 I.R.B.

tion 6015(f). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relief from joint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399–403. Although the Court is not bound by the eligibility guidelines set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, the Court considers those factors when reviewing a taxpayer’s claim for relief under section 6015(f). See Pullins 5 v. Co

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

subject to, inter alia, the following condition: The deed of the subject properties shall be restricted with the following clause: “Only those facilities that qualify as assisted living facilities per ULDC [Unified Land Development Code], Chapter 4, Section 4.03.18 and Appendix A may be constructed, operated, and maintained on these properties.” 13 [*13] Appendix A to the cited provision of the Henry County Code of Ordinances, Unified Land Development Code defines “assisted living facility” as a

2011-47, § 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B.

2013-34, § 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2011-47, § 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B.

Provision Regarding Retirement Plans With respect to the retirement plans, section 4.6(c) of the MSA provided: Waiver of Pension and Retirement Rights.

, § 1, 2011-42 I.R.B. at 520. This amount is deemed substantiated for purposes of section 274(d) provided the taxpayer can substantiate the time, place, and business purpose of travel. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(b)(2), (c); Rev. Proc. 2011-47, § 4, 2011-42 I.R.B. at 522–23. Petitioner submitted a log estimating her claimed meals and incidental expenses using the federal standard per diem rate for Los Angeles. The record demonstrates that petitioner established the time, place, and business

Meals Revenue Procedure 2011-47, section 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B.

334, 345–48 (2017) (holding that the Tax Court has jurisdiction in a deficiency proceeding to review the Commissioner’s denial of the taxpayer’s request for a hardship waiver of the 60-day rollover requirement under section 4 [*4] 402(c)(3)(B)); Capitol Fed.

Rule 60(c) provides that state law determines the capacity of a fiduciary to litigate in the Tax Court.

§ 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. Another condition is that “[t]he requesting spouse [must have] filed a joint return for the taxable year” for which relief is sought. Id. § 4.01(1). The IRS assessed TFRPs against petitioner and her ex-husband upon determining that they were both responsible for Oasys’s failure to remit payroll taxes to the Governm

2013- 34, § 4.04, 2013-43 I.R.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(3)(a), 2003-2 C.B.

2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B.

y large development effort). As in Mr. Davenport’s case, we conclude that petitioner may not deduct his expenses under section 174. B. Rev. Proc. 2000-50 Petitioner argues that he may deduct the engineer expenses on the basis of Rev. Proc. 2000-50, §§ 4, 5.01, 2000-2 C.B. at 601, which announces that the IRS will not disturb a taxpayer’s immediate deduction of certain costs of developing computer software that the taxpayer has not treated as section 174 research or experimental expenditures. We

§ 4.01, 2010-51 I.R.B. at 884. However, use of the business standard mileage rate method does not relieve a taxpayer from strictly substantiating (1) the mileage for each business use of the vehicle and the total mileage for all use of the vehicle during the taxable year, (2) the date of each business use of the vehicle, and (3) the purpose of each

§ 4.01, 2010-51 I.R.B. at 884. However, use of the business standard mileage rate method does not relieve a taxpayer from strictly substantiating (1) the mileage for each business use of the vehicle and the total mileage for all use of the vehicle during the taxable year, (2) the date of each business use of the vehicle, and (3) the purpose of each

2013-34, § 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B.

For that purpose, foreign corporations, individuals, and some domestic corporations subject to special tax treatment would be nonqualified successors. Id. § 4.07, 2012-31 I.R.B. at 97. Therefore, if a domestic target corporation, after being acquired by a CFC, transferred intangible property in a subsequent outbound reorganization, the targ

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

4.01, 1993-2 C.B. at 344 (emphasis added). But see id. sec. 4.02 (providing exceptions to the rule articulated in section 4.01). Therefore, under present guidance from the Commissioner, whether the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services provided to or for the benefit of the -14- [*14] issuing partnership is a taxable event

alk about cost segregation. A cost-segregation study breaks out the costs of certain assets to justify their depreciation faster than the rate they would be eligible for as a part of real property. Alvin Arnold, Real Estate Professional’s Tax Guide, sec. 4:29 (2020); see also Peco Foods, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-18, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1120, 1122 (2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 840 (11th Cir. 2013). They believed that the positions Pankratz took on his older returns were too conser

alk about cost segregation. A cost-segregation study breaks out the costs of certain assets to justify their depreciation faster than the rate they would be eligible for as a part of real property. Alvin Arnold, Real Estate Professional’s Tax Guide, sec. 4:29 (2020); see also Peco Foods, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-18, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1120, 1122 (2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 840 (11th Cir. 2013). They believed that the positions Pankratz took on his older returns were too conser

missioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441, 1451-52 (1975). And the regulations tells us that the degree of control is relevant to valuation. See sec. 20.2031-2(e), Estate Tax Regs.; sec. 25.2512-2(e) and (f), Gift Tax Regs. As stated in Revenue Ruling 59-60, sec. 4.02(g), 1959-1 C.B. 237, 242, “[t]he size of the block of stock itself is a relevant factor to be considered * * * [and] may justify a higher value for a specific block of stock.” When a court values a block of 100 shares as worth more than 100

leage method includes an allowance for all fixed and variable costs of a vehicle, including depreciation, maintenance and repairs, tires, gasoline, oil, insurance, and other fees. See Campana v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-395; Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 4.02, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 884-885. Under the standard mileage method a taxpayer deducts vehicle expenses in an amount equal to the predetermined rate set by the IRS each year multiplied by the number of business miles driven in the - 18 - year.

of a fraudulent return, and (7) absent certain exceptions, the income tax liability is attributable (in full or in part) to an item of the nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse’s income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. -16- [*16] nonexclusive list of factors that the IRS will consider in determining whether it would be inequitable to hold the spouse jointly and severally liable.10 Respondent concedes that petitioner has met the t

dmin. Regs. Generally, an OIC based on doubt as to collectibility will be accepted if it is unlikely that the tax can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the IRS could obtain through other means. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The Commissioner created guidelines for settlement officers to follow when evaluating OICs. See id. sec. 2.02. Generally, - 20 - [*20] the Commissioner will reject an offer based on doubt as to collectibility when

Gerszberg] the Tax Distribution Amount as contemplated by Section 4.4 of the Operating Agreement as in effect on the date hereof at the time specified therein, provided however, that any taxable income attributable to so-called "boot" under Section 351 of the Code recognized by the Company by reason of the Company's contribution of certain assets and liabilities of the Company to CMI in exchange for CMI s

pt. 5.8.4.3.1 (Apr. 30, 2015). The IRS generally will not accept an OIC that is less than the RCP without proof of special circumstances. Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 486 (2011), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. An OIC made for the sake of effective tax administration requires the IRS to predict whether collection in full would create economic hardship for the taxpayer. See sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i), (iii), Proced. & Admin.

Gerszberg] the Tax Distribution Amount as contemplated by Section 4.4 of the Operating Agreement as in effect on the date hereof at the time specified therein, provided however, that any taxable income attributable to so-called "boot" under Section 351 of the Code recognized by the Company by reason of the Company's contribution of certain assets and liabilities of the Company to CMI in exchange for CMI s

ning inequity for purposes of section 6015(f). Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 316; Garavaglia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-228, aff’d, 521 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2013); Crouse v. - 32 - Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-97. In Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 400-403, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, the Commissioner provided a list of nonexclusive factors to take into account when determining whether to grant equitable relief under section 6015(

Specifically, the UCLA/GE settlement agreement provides: In consideration for the release granted in Section 3 [mutual releases by plaintiffs to GE and Regents, and respective release to them by the plaintiffs], the license granted in Section 4 of this Agreement [GE was granted a nonexclusive license in the 360 patent], and the covenants granted in Section 5 [plaintiffs covenant -21- [*21] not to sue either Regents or GE], the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by the Parties, GE shall

ning inequity for purposes of section 6015(f). Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 316; Garavaglia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-228, aff’d, 521 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2013); Crouse v. - 32 - Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-97. In Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 400-403, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, the Commissioner provided a list of nonexclusive factors to take into account when determining whether to grant equitable relief under section 6015(

ent near his residence. Cf. Yanke v. Commissioner, 2008 WL 2065068, at *3. We accordingly conclude that Mr. Geiman was away from home for purposes of section 162(a)(2) during the year at issue. b. Claimed Travel Expenses i. Meals Rev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, 522-523, states that employees who are not reimbursed by their employers may substantiate the amount of deductible meal and incidental expenses by using an amount computed at the Federal per diem rate for the locality o

2013). Generally, a settlement officer is directed to reject any offer substantially below the taxpayer’s RCP unless special circumstances justify acceptance of such an offer. See Mack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-54, at *10; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In reviewing the settlement officer’s determination we do not make an independent evaluation of what would be an acceptable collection alternative. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 173, 179 (2013); Murphy v.

similar equitable relief provision under sec. 6015(f), see Internal Revenue Service - 12 - The requesting spouse must satisfy five threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for equitable relief under section 66(c). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. One threshold condition is that “[t]he income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable (either in full or in part) to an item of the nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment resul

Cir. 2013); Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309. An SO is generally directed to reject offers substantially below the taxpayer’s RCP where the offer is premised, as it was here, - 9 - [*9] on doubt as to collectibility. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. The parties agree that the estate holds approximately $183,000 in a checking account that must be included in its RCP calculation. The parties dispute whether the RCP formula should also include amounts potentially c

pt. 5.8.4.3.1 (Apr. 30, 2015). The IRS generally will not accept an OIC that is less than the RCP without proof of special circumstances. Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 486 (2011), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. An OIC made for the sake of effective tax administration requires the IRS to predict whether collection in full would create economic hardship for the taxpayer. See sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i), (iii), Proced. & Admin.

le ifit is unlikely that the tax can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the Service could collect through other means, including administrative andjudicial collection remedies" (i.e., the RCP). See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 517; see also IRM pt. 8.23.3.l(4) (Oct. 15, 2014). The IRM advises, however, that in certain circumstances the Commissioner may reject an OIC ifacceptance would not be in the best interest ofthe Government. See IRM pt. 5.8

the IRS to file an NFTL to protect the 5A Letter 1153 constitutes the notice ofproposed assessment ofa section 6672 responsible person penalty required by sec. 6672(b) as a prerequisite to the IRS's imposition ofthe penalty. See Rev. Proc. 2005-34, sec. 4.01, 2005-1 C.B. 1233, 1234 (setting forth the procedures for mailing that letter and for the taxpayer's exercise ofhis right to either agree to or dispute the proposed assessment within 60 days ofthe date on the letter). -17- Government's inte

4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400-403. The mental or physi- cal health factor is evaluated as ofthe time the return was filed. Id. sec. 4.03(2)(g), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 403. -8- B. Scope and Standard ofReview Section 6015(e) permits a taxpayerwho is denied innocent spouse reliefto file a petition for review in this Court. "Such cases are referred t

esult ofthe conduct that caused the loss" the lead figure was charged by indictment or information with the commission of"fraud, embezzlement or a similar crime that, ifproven, would meet the definition oftheft for purposes of - 8 - [*8] § 165".4 R sec. 4.02(1), 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750. A qualified investor is defined as one qualified to deduct theft losses under section 165 who "did not have actual knowledge ofthe fraudulent nature ofthe investment arrangement prior to it becoming known to the ge

6015(f) Relief As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner's determination, the Court is not bound by them. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C

esult ofthe conduct that caused the loss" the lead figure was charged by indictment or information with the commission of"fraud, embezzlement or a similar crime that, ifproven, would meet the definition oftheft for purposes of - 8 - [*8] § 165".4 R sec. 4.02(1), 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750. A qualified investor is defined as one qualified to deduct theft losses under section 165 who "did not have actual knowledge ofthe fraudulent nature ofthe investment arrangement prior to it becoming known to the ge

- [*15] effect on the outcome because the application ofsection 6015(b)(1)(C) and (D) does not support any relief. As previously stated, the Secretary has set forth procedures for granting equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-403, sets forth a three-step procedure for evaluating requests for innocent spouse relief: (1) section 4.01 lists seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible for relief; (2) section 4.0

nalyze petitioner's request -14- [*14] under these guidelines to ascertain whether she satisfies the requirements for reliefunder section 6015(f). See Yancey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-59, at *17 (and cases cited thereat). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399, sets forth seven so- called threshold conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied in order for the requesting spouse to be eligible for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). The threshold conditions are:

ts for purposes ofsection 6015(b) are the same factors that we consider in determining inequity for purposes ofsection 6015(f). See Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 316; Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-112, slip op. at 15. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 400-403, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, lists the following nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner takes into account when determining whether to grant equitable reliefunder section 6

ofthe employee's travel; however, if the employee's employer provides a per diem allowance to the employee, then the amount that is deemed substantiated is limited to the lesser ofthe employer's per diem or the Federal per diem. Rev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.01, 4.02, 2011-42 I.R.B. at 522. The Bellwoods claimed deductions for unreimbursed employment expenses. Mr. Bellwood testified that he calculated those amounts using the difference between the State Department's per diem allowance (which is un

h CDP years and non-CDP years. Gallagher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-77, at *10 n.5. -15- [*15] potential unless special circumstancesjustify acceptance ofsuch an offer. See Mack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-54, at *10; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In reviewing the settlement officer's determination we do not make an independent evaluation ofwhat would be an acceptable collection alternative. S_e_e Thompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 173, 179 (2013); Murphy v.

32, 438-439 (2011). Petitionerbears the burden ofestablishing that she is entitled to relief. See Rule 142(a). Our review ofrespondent's determination is de novo. Sec. 6015(e)(7); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399, specifies threshold conditions that must be satisfied before a request for equitable reliefwill be considered. The parties do not dispute that the threshold conditions have been met. A taxpayerwho seeks equitable rel

s to collectibility will be acceptable only ifthe offer reflects the RCP ofthe case; i.e., that amount less than the full liability that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative andjudicial collection remedies. Rev. Proc. 2003- 71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517; see also Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309. The Appeals officer rejected petitioner's OIC of$12,603 because she calculated petitioner's RCP as $19.5 million, which included dissipated assets, amounts collectible f

a "conservation easement would ensure that such destructive mining techniques would never occur on the Property." The 14th "whereas" clause recites that a conservation easement would provide "a glimpse into the long-term effects ofsurface mining." Section 4.10 reserves to the grantor the right to "allow the Property to be used for scientific research on the natural reclamation ofstrip mining areas." The Property is described as "a good candidate" for such study "because there cannot be any subs

ofthe business represented in the block ofstock to be valued, and the value ofstock in similar, publicly traded companies. Sec. 25.2512-2(f)(2), Gift Tax Regs.; see also Estate ofAdell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-155, at *42; Rev. Rul. 59-60, sec. 4, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-242. When determining the fair market value ofan interest in a partnership, the value ofthe partnership's assets may be considered, along with the same factors considered in determining the fair market value ofstock. Sec. 2

ection 6015(f). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner's determination, the Court is not bound by them. Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

unlikely that the liability can be collected in full and (2) the offer reflects the taxpayer's total RCP (i.e., the amount that the IRS could collect through other means, including administrative andjudicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; IRM pt. 8.23.3.l(4) (Oct. 15, 2014). In some cases the IRS may accept an offer ofless than the total RCP ifthere are special circumstances. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 517; IRM pt. 5.8.4.2 (May

Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 4 Other adjustments made in the notice ofdeficiency are computational and need not be addressed in this opinion.

Section 4 ofthe Agreement generally covers spousal support and the effect on spousal support when retirement pay begins. 4Though it may have been a mere rounding matter, the agreement did not explicitly state a reason for the $1 reduction from the $2,271 paid under the Order. - 5 - [*5] The Agreement provides that the $2,270 in spousal support is

at 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. sec. 78d (2018)). In these instances, Congress explicitly created the agency as an independent agency through statute. - 9 - [*9] Petitioner further argues that Appeals' structure "exemplifies an independent agency" and that the structure ofAppeals violates the separation of powers doctrine

tion 6015(f). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner's determination, the Court is not bound by them. Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

In section 4 ofthe April Form 433-A petitioner indicated that she maintained a Bank ofAmerica checking account but did not indicate the account's balance. Also in section 4 ofthat form petitioner indicated that she had (1) available credit (from an American Express credit card) of$1,500, (2) a 2013 Volvo with no equity, and (3) "household furnishings/

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

ses. An unspecified business expense is not deductible. Accordingly, respondent's disallowance ofpetitioners' claimed deductions for unspecified business expenses is sustained. 8We are reluctant on our own to apply the benefits ofRev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, 522, which relaxes, to some extent, the strict substantiation requirements with respect to expenses for meals while traveling away from home. This is because the Forms 2106 on which the expenses are listed do not take i

5(f). A notice to Mr. Keeney ofhis right to intervene in this litigation was returned as "undeliverable". The Appeals Office denied petitioner's claim on the basis that she could not meet the threshold conditions for reliefunder Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399, because the tax was attributable to her. The Appeals officer's case memorandum noted the following: Petitioner was divorced, would not suffer economic - 5 - [*5] hardship, knew or had reason to know ofthe balance ow

receipts for parking and tolls but supplied no evidence linking those costs to any business activity. Petitioners also submitted receipts for gasoline purchases, but gasoline costs are subsumed within the mile- age allowance. See Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 4.02, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 884. - 9 - [*9] B. Other Employee Expenses The bulk ofMr. Edwards' other expenses were reported on line 4 ofForm 2106, which covers business expenses other than vehicle costs, meals, entertain- ment, and travel expenses

d enclosing copies ofa completed Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, for petitioners, and completed Forms 433-B, - 7 - [*7] Collection Information Statement for Businesses, for the LLPs.3 In section 4 ofthe Form 433-A petitioners indicated that they had cash on hand of$500, maintained three checking accounts that had total combined balances of $5,500, and had available credit totaling $26,186.

good faith effort to comply with the income tax laws in the years following the years for which reliefis sought, and (7) whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health at the time thejoint return was filed. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400- 403. 1. Significant Benefit Regulations under section 6015(b) define a significant benefit as any benefit in excess ofnormal support. Sec. 1.6015-2(d), Income Tax Regs. Transfers of propertybetween the spouses may

Article IV, section 4.l(a) ofthe operating agreements grants the manager the authorityto manage and control the business, property, and affairs ofthe trading companies.

.C. Cir. 2013). Generally, Appeals officers are directed to reject any offer substantially below the taxpayer's RCP unless special circumstancesjustify acceptance ofsuch an offer. See Fairlamb v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-22; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. We do not independently assess the reasonableness ofthe taxpayer's pro- posed offer. Rather, our review is limited to ascertaining whetherthe decision to reject his offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound

Article IV, section 4.l(a) ofthe operating agreements grants the manager the authorityto manage and control the business, property, and affairs ofthe trading companies.

ter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). The Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. These procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner's determination, the Court is not bound by them. Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Sriram v. Commissioner, T.C. Mem

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

Article IV, section 4.l(a) ofthe operating agreements grants the manager the authorityto manage and control the business, property, and affairs ofthe trading companies.

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

Article IV, section 4.l(a) ofthe operating agreements grants the manager the authorityto manage and control the business, property, and affairs ofthe trading companies.

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. Then, ifthose conditions are met, the IRS will consider whether the requesting spouse can receive reliefunder a streamlined determination. Id. sec. 4.02, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. Ifthe requesting spouse is not granted reliefthrough the streamlined determination, the IRS will consider whether the requesting spouse sho

ileage method includes an allowance for all fixed and variable costs ofa vehicle, including depreciation, maintenance and repairs, tires, gasoline, oil, insurance, and other fees. See Campana v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-395; Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 4.02, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 884-885. Under the standard mileage method a taxpayer deducts vehicle expenses in an amount equal to the predetermined rate set by the Commissioner each year multiplied by the number ofbusiness miles driven in the year.

p occurs when collection ofthe taxpayers' full collection potential leaves them unable to cover reasonable basic living ¹°(...continued) F. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Brombach v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-265, at *21; see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. "Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2); see Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309. ¹²See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301; McClanahan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-161, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1625 (2008); Leman

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

dures to aid in administering the statute. These procedures, set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, outline seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied for the Commissionerto grant reliefunder section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399- 400. We consider these factors in the light ofthe particular facts and circumstances, but we are not bound by them. See Molinet v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-109. Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfies thre

at 886-887 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1533 (2012)). See sec. 1.170A-14(d)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Nonetheless, we do not find a sufficient presence ofrare, endangered, or threatened species in the easement area to satisfy the conservation purpose requirement. Mr. Echols and Mr. Wilson each observed several species ofbi

03, 210 (2009). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Although the Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner's determination, the Court is not bound by them. Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Me

* [IRS] will take into account the taxpayer's reasonable basic living expenses. In some cases, the * * * [IRS] may accept an offer ofless than the total reasonable collection potential ofa case ifthere are special circumstances. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In general, it is not an abuse ofdiscretion for the Commissioner to refuse an OIC ifthe offer does not - 12 - [*12] reflect the taxpayer's RCP. E.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 486 (2011), afCd, 502 F. A

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

enerally, settlement officers are directed to reject offers substantiallybelow the taxpayer's RCP unless "special circumstances"justify acceptance ofsuch an offer. See Fairlamb v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-22, slip op. at 11; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Our review is limited to ascertaining whether the decision to reject that offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 320. We do not substitute ourjud

stances. Molinet v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-109; Sriram v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-91; see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. These procedures, set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399, outline seven threshold conditions that a spouse must meet to qualify for reliefunder section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis

at revenue procedure allows taxpayers to choose from two permissible methods ofaccounting for deferred (i.e., unearned) revenues aris- ing from (among other things) "the sale, lease, or license ofcomputer software." - 15 - [*15] Rev. Proc. 2004-34, sec. 4.01(3)(e), 2004-1 C.B. at 992. A taxpayer may elect the full inclusion method, which requires that advance payments be fully included in gross income in the year ofreceipt. R sec. 5.01, 2004-1 C.B. at 992. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect t

make it unlikely that the IRS will be able to collect the entire balance. Id. subpara. (2). The IRS will generally reject an offer where the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential (RCP) exceeds the amount he proposes to pay. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; see Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 485-486 (2011), ah, 502 F. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In reviewing the SO's determination we do not make an independent evalu- ation ofwhat would be an acceptable collectio

Article IV, section 4.l(a) ofthe operating agreements grants the manager the authorityto manage and control the business, property, and affairs ofthe trading companies.

ofhis claimed deductions for travel and living expenses and meals and entertainment. After application ofthe 3Petitioners on briefargued that the per diem rate for the location where Mr. Conway worked in 2012 was $71 per day, see Rev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, 522, not $39 as claimed on his return, and that he therefore is entitled to a higher deduction. Respondent objects. Since we conclude below that Mr. Conway may not deduct his claimed travel and meals and entertainment e

4(...continued) Court. She is thus precluded from challenging it here. See Thompson v. Com- missioner, 140 T.C. 173, 178 (2013) ("A taxpayer is precluded from disputing the underlying liability ifit was not properly raised in the CDP hearing."); sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, Proced. & Admin. Regs. - 7 - [*7] 6330(c)(2) and (3). In her hearin

6015(f), if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the spouse liable for any unpaid tax and reliefis not available to the spouse under section 6015(b) or (c). In applying the guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399- 403, respondent determined in the March 4, 2015, notice ofdetermination that petitioner is entitled to relieffromjoint and several liability for 2002 pursuant to section 6015(f). Petitioner seeks a refund ofher overpa

d (7) absent certain enumerated exceptions, the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse's income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. The record establishes that petitioner satisfies the first - 9 - [*9] six conditions, and respondent raised only the seventh condition in his answering brief. We therefore will focus on the seventh condition. Our a

In section 4 ofthat form she indicated that she maintained two checking accounts and a savings account that had total combined balances of$612, a mutual fund valued at $28,382, a pension plan valued at $10,346, and a section 401(k) plan valued at $17,066. Also in section 4 ofthat form, petitioner indicated that she owned (1) a single-familyhome valued

ayer is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(f). Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. The Commissioner has outlined procedures for determining whether a requesting spouse qualifies for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f) in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-400. The revenue procedure lists seven threshold conditions, all ofwhich a spouse must meet to qualify for reliefunder section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which re

ofhis claimed deductions for travel and living expenses and meals and entertainment. After application ofthe 3Petitioners on briefargued that the per diem rate for the location where Mr. Conway worked in 2012 was $71 per day, see Rev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, 522, not $39 as claimed on his return, and that he therefore is entitled to a higher deduction. Respondent objects. Since we conclude below that Mr. Conway may not deduct his claimed travel and meals and entertainment e

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that petitioners' understatement for 2011 (before considering any reduction under section 4In theory, the Commissioner might make a rebate on the basis oferroneous third-party reporting that would increase the affected taxpayer's understatement for purposes ofthe accuracy-related penalty.

ed relief.9 Dr. Ryke does not qualify for streamlined reliefbecause she and Mr. Ryke remain married.¹° In the absence ofa 6Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). 7Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011). 8Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-400. °Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.02, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. ¹°Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.02(1). - 8 - [*8] streamlined reliefdetermination, the Commissioner conducts a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether it "

,493 meals and 5 Petitioners' Schedule C reported 83,256 miles driven for business in 2012, and petitioners appeared to claim the standard mileage rate in lieu ofactual costs ofusing their vehicles for business, as prescribed by Rev. Proc. 2010-51, sec. 4.02, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883, 884. See sec. 1.274-5(g)(1), Income Tax Regs. At the standard mileage rate for 2012, Notice 2012-1, sec. 2, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260, petitioners would be entitled to a deduction of$46,207 ifthey could establish that those mile

procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. The Commissioner generally will not grant reliefunless the taxpayer meets seven threshold conditions. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. Respondent concedes that petitioner meets these conditions with respect to the portion ofthe cancellation ofdebt income attributable to Mr. Tomko. Ifa taxpayermeets the threshold conditions, the Commissioner then cons

uitable relief, we must determine whether the returns filed for petitioners for 2011 and 2012 were validjoint returns. Equitable reliefcan be granted only for an individual who "has made ajoint return". Sec. 6015(a)(1); see also Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(1), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. H opposes our granting ofequitable relieffor W on the ground that the returns that he caused to be filed for himselfand W for the years in issue were not validjoint returns. In support ofhis position, H cites W's t

4.03(1), 1984-2 C.B. 501, 502-503. However, "a taxpayerwho makes a remittance before a tax liability has been ascertained is generally presumed to have intended to make a deposit." Malachinski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-182, 1999 WL 349342, at *8, a_f[d, 268 F.3d 497 (2001); see also Rev. Proc. 84-58, sec. 4.02(1), 1984-2 C.B. at 502 (re

are met or (2) reliefisjustified upon consideration of multiple equitable factors. Maren's claim for relieffails one ofthe IRS's threshold conditions because she knowinglyparticipated in the filing ofa fraudulentjoint return. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(6), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399. The 2007 partnership return, which consisted entirely offictitious deductions, was fraudulent, and Maren must have known from experience that it was false when she signed it. Furthermore, Maren would not be entitl

4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Respondent concedes that petitioner meets these seven threshold conditions. The second step ofthe analysis provides three conditions that, ifmet, will qualify a requesting spouse for a streamlined determination ofreliefunder section 6015(f). E sec. 4.02, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. Petitioner is not eligible for a s

Because, as just discussed, expenses for the production or collection ofincome were within the class ofdeductions allowed by section 4(...continued) (1) for the production or collection ofincome; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance ofproperty held for the production of income; * * * - 8 - [*8] 23(a)(2), clearly those types ofexpenses are generally within the reach ofthe origin-of-the-claim test that the Court adopted in Gilmore.

een the IRS and taxpayers, such as verifying discrepancies or "matching information on a tax return with * * * other records or information items that are already in the Service's possession" do not constitute "examinations". See Rev. Proc. 2005-32, sec. 4.03, 2005-1 C.B. 1206, 1207; Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 4.71.4.1 (Oct. 15, 2010) (discrepancyadjustment program); id. pt. 25.12.1.3 (Sept. 25, 2008) (refund hold research) (setting forth internal IRS research tools that assist in resolvi

ofhis claimed deductions for travel and living expenses and meals and entertainment. After application ofthe 3Petitioners on briefargued that the per diem rate for the location where Mr. Conway worked in 2012 was $71 per day, see Rev. Proc. 2011-47, sec. 4.03, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, 522, not $39 as claimed on his return, and that he therefore is entitled to a higher deduction. Respondent objects. Since we conclude below that Mr. Conway may not deduct his claimed travel and meals and entertainment e

prejudiced in this instance by petitioner's request to be allowed to deduct the Federal per diem amount for his meals and incidental expenses. - 12 - [*12] and that on those trips he conducted business on behalfofDesperado. See Rev. Proc. 2001-47, sec. 4.03, 2001-2 C.B. 332, 334 (providing that the Federal M&IE rate is deemed substantiated for purposes ofthe revenue procedure and for purposes ofsection 1.274-5(c), Income Tax Regs., ifthe self-employed individual substantiates the elements oftim

pp'x 34 (6th Cir. 2004). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. The Court considers the guidelines set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, when reviewing the Commissioner's denial ofrelief, but we are not bound by them as our determination ultimately turns on an evaluation ofa

C. Cir. 2013). Generally, Appeals officers are directed to reject offers substantiallybelow the taxpayer's RCP unless "special circumstances"justify acceptance ofsuch an offer. See Fairlamb v. Com- missioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-22; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. We do not independently assess the reasonableness ofthe taxpayer's pro- posed offer. Rather, our review is limited to ascertaining whether the decision to reject her offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound

Section 4 ofthe divorce order divides certain items ofpersonal propertybetween petitioner and his ex-wife. Section 5 orders: 5. [Petitioner] * * * is to pay the following lump sum payments to * * * [petitioner's ex-wife]: 2 The order in the record is not the divorce order but the order for financial provision issued by the English court. We nonethe

E subpara (2). Generally, an OIC will be accepted ifit is unlikely that the tax can be collected in full and the OIC reasonably reflects the amount the IRS could collect through administrative andjudicial collection remedies. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Absent a showing ofspecial circumstances, settlement officers are directed to reject offers substantiallybelow the taxpayer's RCP when the OIC is premised on doubt as to collectibility. R The main components ofa ta

ceptable only ifthe offer exceeds the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential (i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. A taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is determined, in part, using published guidelines for certain national and local allowances for basic living expenses and essentially treating income and assets in exce

nder section 6015(f) is warranted: (1) marital status; (2) economic hardship; (3) knowledge or reason to know; (4) legal obligation; (5) significant benefit; (6) compliance with income tax laws; and (7) mental or physical health. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. The IRS also considers whether the requesting spouse was abused before the return was filed. Id. sec. 4.03(2)(c)(iv), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402. The AO addressed these seven factors in a lengthy memorandum and con- clude

s, or a Federal court. - 13 - circumstances, see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; Hudgins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012- 260, at *39-*40. II. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). There is no dispute that petitioner satisfies the seven thres

Section 4 ofthe agreement, captioned "Compensation," supports respon- dent's view that Mutual was paying royalties for rights to use the Technology gen- erally, not for the felodipine formulation specifically. Petitioners submit that Dr. Spireas was "the sole inventor" ofthe felodipine formulation and that he "invented the felodipine technology in

der the guidelines applicable to petitioner's request, the IRS considers requests for reliefunder section 6015(f) only from a spouse who "filed a joint return for the taxable year for which he or she seeks relief." Rev. Proc. 2013- - 10 - [*10] 34, sec. 4.01(1), 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. The legislative history ofsection 6015 supports conditioning reliefunder subsection (f) on the filing ofajoint return. See H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1008. Therefore, we approve

not knowingly participate in the filing ofa fraudulent tax return; and (7) absent certain enumerated exceptions, the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable to an item ofthe nonrequestmg spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. These conditions, like the conditions under section 6015(b), are stated in the conjunctive; thus, a requesting spouse must satisfy all seven ofthem before relief may be granted. Agudelo v. Commissioner, at *18. P

Furthermore, Section 4 ofthe stock purchase agreement provided that "Seller [i.e., Makric] and each Owner [i.e., Makric's shareholders], jointly and severally represent and warrant to Buyer [i.e., TS3] that, as ofthe Closing Date": Makric was duly organized, Makric was in compliance with its organizational documents, Makric was not in violation ofany law, Makri

nsidering a sale ofthe Shares. ARTICLE IV. CONDITIONS OF PURCHASER'S OBLIGATIONS TO CLOSE The obligations ofthe Purchaser under this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment, at or before the Closing, ofeach ofthe following conditions: * * * * * * * Section 4.7. Financial Condition and Redemption. Immediately prior to the Closing, the Company shall possess assets consisting solely of(i) the right to receive the State Tax Refund, (ii) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (iii) $11,955.46

s. All property interests assigned, conveyed, or delivered to the Trustee must be - 35 - [*35] acceptable to and acceptable by the Trustee to become trust property. * * * * * * * Article Four Beneficial Ownership ofthe Trust and Trust Distributions Section 4.01. Beneficiaries and Beneficial Ownership While the Trustmaker is alive, the Trustmaker shall be the sole beneficiary ofthis trust, and the Trustee shall pay to the Trustmaker, at least quarterly, all ofthe net income and net capital gains

1, 1974-2 C.B. 399. "[C]ourts have consistently found that a refund should be disbursed in proportion to the amount each spouse paid to the taxes owed." United States v. MacPhail, 149 F. App'x 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.04, 2013- 43 I.R.B. 397, 403, discusses tax liabilities paid in innocent spouse cases and states: .04. Refunds. In both understatement and underpayment cases, a requesting spouse is eligible for a refund ofseparate payments made by the requesti

efshould be granted. While this Court is not bound by IRS revenue procedures, we often look to them for guidance. Hollimon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-157, at *7-*8; see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-403, sets forth a three- step procedure to be followed in evaluating requests for relief: (1) section 4.01 lists seven threshold conditions which must be met; (2) section 4.02 lists circumstances in which the IRS will ma

Cir. 2013). Generally, Appeals officers are directed to reject offers sub- stantially below the taxpayer's RCP unless "special circumstances"justify ac- ceptance ofsuch an offer. See Fairlamb v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-22; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. We do not independently review the reasonableness ofthe taxpayer's pro- posed offer. Our review is limited to ascertaining whether the decision to reject that offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis

Cir. 2013). Generally, Appeals officers are directed to reject offers sub- stantially below the taxpayer's RCP unless "special circumstances"justify ac- ceptance ofsuch an offer. See Fairlamb v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-22; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. We do not independently review the reasonableness ofthe taxpayer's pro- posed offer. Our review is limited to ascertaining whether the decision to reject that offer was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis

4.04, 1997-1 C.B. at 645. No matter how fast and expensive a new service is, the Secretary may - 18 - decline to designate it under section 7502(f) ifit does not satisfy this (and other specified) requirements. Section 7502(f) provides that a private delivery service must be "designated by the Secretary" and that "[t]he Secretary may designat

individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion ofeither)". A. Threshold Conditions A requesting spouse must satisfy seven threshold conditions before a request under section 6015(f) will be considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403, modifying and superceding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 3Accordingly, we need not discuss whether petitioner satisfies the requirements ofsec. 6015(b)(1)(B). - 15 - [*15] 2003-2 C.B. 296. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013

ditions for Granting Relief The Commissioner has outlined procedures for determining whether a requesting spouse qualifies for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f) fromjoint and several liability. These procedures, set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-400, outline seven threshold conditions that a spouse must meet to qualify for reliefunder section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the relief

perseding Rev. Proc. - 87 - [*87] 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. We consider these factors in the light ofthe attendant facts and circumstances, but we are not bound by them. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible for relief under section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint Federal income tax return for the tax year or yea

owever, we often look to them for guidance, especially when we are presented with whether a requesting spouse is entitled to reliefunder sec. 6015(f). See, e.g., Hollimon v. Commis- sioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-157, at *7-*8. - 22 - [*22] Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Those procedures include seven threshold conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied in order for the requesting spouse to be eligible for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). See id. sec. 4.01, 2013

not knowingly participate in the filing ofa fraudulent tax return; and (7) absent certain enumerated exceptions, the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable to an item ofthe nonrequestmg spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. These conditions, like the conditions under section 6015(b), are stated in the conjunctive; thus, a requesting spouse must satisfy all seven ofthem before relief may be granted. Agudelo v. Commissioner, at *18. P

However, Grantor desires to place certain limitations on the discretion of* * * [petitioner] to ensure that the income and principal ofthe trust estate (other than as provided for in Section 4.2[41) will fulfill the intentions ofthe Grantor in establishing this Trust Agreement and ensure that [the] trust estate will not be taxable to * * * [petitioner] in any manner, whatsoever.

at 399-403, sets forth a three-step procedure to be followed in evaluating requests for relief: (1) section 4.01 lists seven threshold conditions which must be met; (2) section 4.02 lists circumstances in which the IRS will make streamlined reliefdeterminations; and (3) section 4.03 sets forth nonexclusive factors that the IRS will consider in determining whether equitable reliefshould be granted because it would be inequitable to hold a requesti

h the requesting spouse is a party or which involves property ofthe requesting spouse." S_e_e sec. 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. - 14 - applicable return or 2 years after he or she has paid the applicable tax, sec. 6511). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(3), 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. And against this backdrop, together with the prescribed manner for requesting section 6015 relief, it is apparent that the words "filed" and "made" in section 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II) are used interchangeably. See sec

at 1170 (1980). - 10 - [*10] To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered under Tax Court Rule ofPractice and Procedure 155.

Observing that CGGA did not own any mineral interests, the IRS contends that the survey expenses are not "geological and geophysical expenses" as used in section 4The IRS distinguishesbetweenthe two arguments in its summary-judgmentpapers: "Theexpenses in disputearenot 'geophysicalexpenses' for federal incometax purposes.

nsidering a sale ofthe Shares. ARTICLE IV. CONDITIONS OF PURCHASER'S OBLIGATIONS TO CLOSE The obligations ofthe Purchaser under this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment, at or before the Closing, ofeach ofthe following conditions: * * * * * * * Section 4.7. Financial Condition and Redemption. Immediately prior to the Closing, the Company shall possess assets consisting solely of(i) the right to receive the State Tax Refund, (ii) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (iii) $11,955.46

perseding Rev. Proc. - 87 - [*87] 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. We consider these factors in the light ofthe attendant facts and circumstances, but we are not bound by them. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible for relief under section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint Federal income tax return for the tax year or yea

4(b)(1), 80 Stat. at 116. The limit on the rate oftax applicable to earned income provided by sec. 1348 was repealed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97- 34, sec. 101(c)(1), 95 Stat. at 183. ¹#The observation, in dictum, ofthe U.S. District Court for the Southern District ofOhio in Hubbard-Ragsdale, 15 F.2d at 411, that th

nsidering a sale ofthe Shares. ARTICLE IV. CONDITIONS OF PURCHASER'S OBLIGATIONS TO CLOSE The obligations ofthe Purchaser under this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment, at or before the Closing, ofeach ofthe following conditions: * * * * * * * Section 4.7. Financial Condition and Redemption. Immediately prior to the Closing, the Company shall possess assets consisting solely of(i) the right to receive the State Tax Refund, (ii) cash in an amount not less than $875,855.49, (iii) $11,955.46

3¹ Conversely, "[a]n employee without a principal place ofbusiness may treat a permanent place ofresidence at which he incurs substantial continuing living expenses as his tax home."32 And ifa taxpayer does not have a principal 28Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811-812; Rev. Proc. 2006- 41, sec. 4.03, 2006-2 C.B. at 780; Rev. Proc. 2005-67, sec. 4.03, 2005-2 C.B. at 732. 2°Sec. 274(d). 3°Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. 3¹Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190,

Memo. 2004-22; Rowe - 9 - [*9] v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-325. We therefore consider petitioner's claim that he is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(f) from the interest and additions to tax for 2003. Rev. Proc. 2013-34 Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403, provides guidelines the Commissioner considers in determining whether a requesting spouse qualifies for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f).6 Although this Court considers those guidelines when reviewing the Comm

applicable for the Simonettas' taxable years 2008, 2009, and 2010 and that are generally used in determining whether it would be inequitable to find the requesting spouse liable for part or all ofthe unpaid tax in question." See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. While this Court is not bound by IRS revenue procedures, we often look to them for guidance, especially when we are presented with the issue ofwhether to grant a requesting spouse reliefunder section 6015(f). See

. Because petitioners' offer was less than the reasonable collection potential that Settlement Officer Blue calculated, the offer was unacceptable under the Commissioner's procedures for the submission ofoffers-in-compromise. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; see also Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 321, a_f[d, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). Although petitioners argue Settlement Officer Blue should have granted additional time for them to provide more supporting doc

both credits define the term "qualifying child" with reference to the definition ofthe same term as it appears in section 152(c).4 See secs. 24(c)(1), 32(c)(3), 151(c). We therefore examine the status ofMrs. Saenz and DS as qualifying children under section 4Sec. 24 additionally requires the "qualifying child" to be under the age of 17. DS was under the age of 17 at the close of2011. 152(c) to determine petitioner's entitlementto the credits and dependency exemption deductions at issue. Section

its compliance with the sta- tutory requirements. Ifthe IRS believed these requirements were satisfied, it would issue, for the tax period at issue, "[a] favorable determination letter or rul- ing" to the requesting organization. Rev. Proc. 2014-9, sec. 4.01, 2014-2 I.R.B. 281, 285.4 Ifthe IRS concluded that these requirements were not satisfied, it 3The First Revocation Letter was not a "technical advice memorandum" (TAM) because it was not issued by the IRS National Office to an IRS district d

at 1170, so the regulations under sec. 183, which were published for notice and comment on August 19, 1971, see 36 Fed. Reg. 16112, 16117 (Aug. 19, 1971), and issued in final form on July 13, 1972, s_ee 37 Fed. Reg. 13679, (continued...) - 12 - [*12] This Court regularly analyzes the foregoing factors, among other facts and circum

in administeringthe statute. These procedures, set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, outline seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied for the Internal Revenue Service to grant reliefunder section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. We consider these factors in the light ofthe particular facts and circumstances, but we are not bound by them. See Molinet v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-109. Because ofthe straightforwardnature ofthe record

and (7) the income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable (either in full or in part) to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse's income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. We find that Ms. Sapp has failed to meet the seventh requirement because the liabilities are attributable to the business for which she was responsible for handling the finances. However, Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec.

evaluation ofall the facts and circumstances, see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; Hudgins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012- 260, at *39-*40. II. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Petitioner satisfies the seven threshold conditions.4 III. S

liability against the person. See Mason -16- [*16] v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 322-323. After sending the Letter 1153, he allows the person 60 days to administratively appeal the proposed assessmentto the Office ofAppeals. See Rev. Proc. 2005-34, sec. 4, 2005-1 C.B. 1233, 1234. Section 6672(b)(3)(B) provides that ifthe person makes a "timely protest ofthe proposed assessment", then the limitations period on respondent assessing the penalty does not expire until 30 days after his final determin

at 1170, so the regulations under sec. 183, which were published for notice and comment on August 19, 1971, see 36 Fed. Reg. 16112, 16117 (Aug. 19, 1971), and issued in final form on July 13, 1972, s_ee 37 Fed. Reg. 13679, (continued...) - 12 - [*12] This Court regularly analyzes the foregoing factors, among other facts and circum

Interest As discussed in section 4, the $40,251 overpayment for 1987 was applied for the 1988 tax year as ofthe due date for paying the 1988 tax.

and (7) the income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable (either in full or in part) to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse's income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. We find that Ms. Sapp has failed to meet the seventh requirement because the liabilities are attributable to the business for which she was responsible for handling the finances. However, Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec.

s, the business she owns and operates. On the basis ofour examination ofthe record before us and the parties' arguments at trial, we find that Ms. Panetta is not entitled to reliefunder section 6015(c) or (f) for 2009 or 2010. To reflect the foregoing and the concessions ofthe parties, Decision will be entered for respondent. ¹7Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400.

axpayer appeals and the Appeals officer 8A Letter 1153 constitutes the notice ofproposed assessment ofa section 6672 responsible person penalty required by sec. 6672(b) as a prerequisite to the IRS's imposition ofthe penalty. See Rev. Proc. 2005-34, sec. 4.01, 2005-1 C.B. 1233, 1234 (setting forth the procedures for mailing that letter and for the taxpayer's exercise ofhis right to either agree to or dispute the proposed assessment within 60 days ofthe date on the letter). -12- [*12] determines

). Generally, this type ofOIC will be accepted only ifthe amount offered equals or exceeds the taxpayer's RCP; i.e., the amountthat the IRS could collect through other means such as administrative andjudicial collection remedies. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; s_e_e IRMpt. 5.8.1.1.3 (Mar. 16, 2010). The IRM sets forth procedures for analyzing a taxpayer's financial condition to determine the taxpayer's RCP. See IRM pt. 5.8.5.1 (Sept. 23, 2008). A taxpayer's RCP is genera

was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Late filing ofa return is due to reasonable cause "[i]fthe taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time." Sec. 4Petitioners also claimed $25,709 in home office expense deductions. As we stated earlier, petitioners did not use the Diamond Bar property as their principal residence. See sec. 280A. Therefore, we conclude that no home office deduction is allo

r federal tax purposes for all taxable years prior to the discovery year, including taxable years for which a refund is barred by the statute oflimitations", minus the total cash or propertythat the taxpayerwithdrew in all years. Rev. Proc. 2009-20, sec. 4.06(1)(a) and (b), 2009-14 I.R.B. at 750 (emphasis added). Petitioners did not include the $730,786, or any portion thereof, as income for prior years. To constitute basis, for purposes ofsection 165 or Rev. Proc. 2009-20, supra, the amounts ow

Interest As discussed in section 4, the $40,251 overpayment for 1987 was applied for the 1988 tax year as ofthe due date for paying the 1988 tax.

2003-2 C.B. 296, the predecessor revenue procedure to Rev. Proc. 2013-34, supra); Hall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-171, at *34-*42 (analyzing taxpayer's entitlement to section 6015(f) reliefunder Rev. Proc. 2013-34, supra). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, lists seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible for relief. The seven conditions are stated in the conjunctive; a requesting spouse must satisfy all seven conditions before r

even though the deficiency or underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item ofthe requesting spouse. '°(...continued) Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. ¹¹Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-240, at *10. ¹²Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. ¹³Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. ¹4Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7)(d), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. - 9 - [*9] We find that Ms. Hollimon was a victim ofabuse. Although the record is clear

ptable only ifthe offer reflects the reasonable collection potential ofthe case (i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; see also Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309. The offer must include all unpaid tax liabilities and periods for which the taxpayer is liable. Internal - 22 - [*22] Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.8.1.4.1 (Mar. 16, 20

Monthly compensation amounts for each ofthe VA's 10 grades ofdisability are fixed by statute. See 38 U.S.C. secs. 1114, 1134 (2012). Compensation amounts increase ifthe disabled service member has a spouse and/or dependents. S_e_e Dept. ofVeterans Affairs, Veterans Benefits Administration, Compensation Rate Table (Dec. 1, 2009),

id. (citing Rule 142(a)). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. These procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. I. Rev. Proc. 2013-34: Equitable Factors Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01-4.03, lists threshold conditions, circumstances, and factors used to make a section 6015(f) determination. Although the Court consults these g

was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Late filing ofa return is due to reasonable cause "[i]fthe taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time." Sec. 4Petitioners also claimed $25,709 in home office expense deductions. As we stated earlier, petitioners did not use the Diamond Bar property as their principal residence. See sec. 280A. Therefore, we conclude that no home office deduction is allo

The Commissioner has specified the procedures governing equitable reliefin Revenue Procedure 2013- 34, section 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B.

Child Tax Credit and Additional Child Tax Credit Section 24(a) and (c)(1) provides that a taxpayer is entitled to a child tax credit with respect to "each qualifying child", as defmed in section 152(c), who has not attained age 17 and for whomthe taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151.

only ifthe offer reflects the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential, i.e., the amount the Commissioner could collect through administrative andjudicial collection proceedings. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309 (citing Rev. Proc. 2003- 71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517). Thus an OIC would include disclosure of the taxpayer's assets and income in order forthe IRS to determine the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at 518. On the b

B. Coast Guard As previously mentioned, to qualify for disability retirement from the armed forces a service member generally must be found unfit to perform the duties ofhis office, grade, or rank because ofphysical disability, see 10 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a) (2012); Parks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-182, and must have at least 2

nsiders those guidelines, but is not bound by them, in evaluating the facts and circumstances ofa case. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C.. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. II. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfyto be eligible to submit a request for reliefunder section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint Federal income tax return for

- 16 - travel. Under this optional method, meal and incidental expenses may be computed on the basis ofthe Federal meal and incidental expense rate for the locality oftravel for each calendar day the employee is away from home. Rev. Proc. 2009-47, sec. 4.03, 2009-42 I.R.B. at 526; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec. 4.03, 2008-2 C.B. at 860. Expenses will be deemed substantiated for purposes of section 1.274-5, Income Tax Regs., ifthe employee substantiates the elements of time, place, and business purpos

n evaluation ofall the facts and circumstances, see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; Hudgins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-260, at *39-*40. A. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). There is no dispute that petitioner satisfies each ofthe seven t

Section 4: Evidence that governmenthas delayed contracting activity that has placed a tremendous burden on the taxpayer'sbusiness for the periods ofDecember 2009 - June 30, 2010. Section 5: Evidence to support withdrawal ofFederal Tax Lien, as per Publication 594, to allow us to pay our debt more quickly. -21- [*21] None ofthe material in the lett

6th Cir. 2004). A. Threshold Conditions for Granting Relief The guidelines begin by establishing threshold requirements that, the Commissioner contends, must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest may be considered. _S_ee Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the cl

ice their premiums to have significant underwriting losses. They compensate for 16A class 4 insurance company may carry on insurance business, including excess liability business or property catastrophe reinsurance business. See Insurance Act, 1978, sec. 4E. - 20 - underwriting losses by retaining sufficient assets (i.e., more assets per dollar of premium resulting in lower premium-to-surplus ratios) to earn ample amounts of investment income. Captives in Bermuda, however, have fewer assets per

2-260, at *39-*40. A. Threshold Conditions for Granting Relief The revenue procedure begins by establishing threshold requirements that must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest pursuant to 6015(f) maybe considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) reliefis not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the claim

lip op. at 9-11. I. Threshold Conditions for Granting Relief The guidelines begin by establishing threshold requirements that, the Commissioner contends, must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest may be considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis not available to the requesting - 10 - [*10] spouse under section 6015(b) or (c)

I_i. (citing Rule 142(a)). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissionerhas prescribedprocedures to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. These procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. See generallyReilly-Caseyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-292. The Court recognizes the use ofthese procedures in reviewing a section 6015(f) determination. See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 147 (reviewi

Under section 4.3 ofthe GHP amended operating agreement, WAHD was entitled to an annual preferred return of9.5% on the WAHD contribution, payable out ofoperating profits to the extent ofavailable cashflow from the date ofcontribution until the occurrence ofan "extraordinary event". The GHP amended operating agreement defines an "extraordinary event" as t

stee." Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 386 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J); see also 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law ofRemedies 2°(...continued) was not an issue for resolution in a partnership-level case." IcL (emphasis added). - 45 - [*45] § 4.3(2), pp. 589-90 (2d ed. 1993). But Rogers is not arguing that PPI, whichhe controls, converted or otherwise wrongfully deprived [Sugarloaf] ofany money or other property; and ifit had, that could hardly generate a tax benefit for Rogers, for he w

lines, but is not bound by them, in evaluating the facts and circumstances ofa case. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. II. Rev. Proc. 2013-34: Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfyto be eligible for relief - 11 - under see tion 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint Federal income tax retum for the taxyear

om the understatements. - 33 - [*33] We may consider whether the requesting spouse was deserted, divorced, or separated from the nonrequesting spouse. he Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 315; sec. 1.6015-2(d), Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(a), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400, provides that this factor will weigh in favor ofreliefifthe requesting spouse is no longer married to the nonrequesting spouse. Mr. Hall was married to Mrs. Hall and they resided at the same address until her dea

011); Sriram v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1484- 1485. The guidelines begin by establishing threshold requirements that, the Commissioner contends, must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest may be considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis not available to the requesting 8Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, supers

sioner may review matching information on a tax return with other records or information in his possession. Lim; see Ellis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-207, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 346 Fed. Appx. 346 (10th Cir. 2009); Rev. Proc. 2005-32, sec. 4.03(1)(b), 2005-1 C.B. 1206, 1207. A taxpayer's voluntary provision ofinformation to the Commissioner regarding a return is not considered an examination. See Rev. Proc. 2005-32, sec. 4.03(1)(c). The record demonstrates that petitionerprovided in

hen it became clear it was untrue. IV. Special Circumstances In some cases, the IRS inay accept an offer-in-compromise ofless than the amount ofa taxpayer's reasonable collection potential ifthere are "special circumstances." See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Special circumstances are: (1) circumstances demonstratingthat the taxpayer would suffer economic hardship ifthe IRS were to collect from him/her an amount equal to the reasonable collection potential and (2) compe

c. 2007-63, 2007-2 C.B. 809; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, 2008-2 C.B. 857. Use ofthis optional method, however, does not relieve the taxpayer ofsubstantiating the elements oftime, place, and business purpose ofthe travel for that day. See Rev. Proc. 2006-41, sec. 4.03, 2006-2 C.B. at 780; Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811-812; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec. 4.03, 2008-2 C.B. at 860. As mentioned supra, the record does not show the specific dates that petitioners were working in each ofthe 12 di

- I. Threshold Conditions for Granting Relief The revenue procedure guidelines begin by establishing threshold requirements that, respondent contends, must be satisfied before an equitable relief request may be considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the clai

4Petitioners did not identify any assets used in the Amway activity that they expected to appreciate in value. Thus, this factor is not relevant to our analysis. - 14 - 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. However, ifthere is a lack ofevidence that the taxpayer's records were used to improve the performance ofa losing operation, such records gener

9 (2011); Sriram v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-91. 1. Threshold Requirements The Commissioner's guidelines begin by establishingthreshold requirements that must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest may be considered. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. The threshold requirements are: (1) The spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which the spouse seeks relief; (2) reliefis not available to the spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the claim for

determination. The factors include: marital status, economic hardship, knowledge or reason to know, the nonrequesting spouse's legal obligation, significant benefit, compliance with income tax laws, and mental or physical health. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03, 2013-34 I.R.B. at 400-403. Mrs. Bowerman fails to qualify for reliefunder section 6015(f) forthe omitted income because such reliefis based on the facts and circumstances and Mrs. Bowerman has given no facts or circumstances that indicate

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-91. The revenue procedure guidelines begin by establishing all the threshold requirements that, the Commissioner contends, must be satisfied before an equitable reliefrequest may be considered. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. Those conditions are: (1) the requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxable year for which reliefis sought; (2) the reliefis not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the cla

4:165(A); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. secs. 4:177, 4:218. -7- [*7] Petitioner owned three mares that he bred to Choosing Choice in 2001. He planned on breeding the mares to Choosing Choice everyyear and having the resulting foals sold or trained to race. By breeding Choosing Choice in Louisiana, petitionerwould become eligible to earn stalli

e Johnson, 136 T.C. at 486. Absent _ 9 _ [*9] a showing ofspecial circumstances, Appeals officers are directed to reject offers substantially below the taxpayer's RCP where the OIC is premised on doubt as to collectibility. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Petitioner submitted two OICs after this case was remanded for a supple- mental hearing. The second was lower than the first, and each was $100,000 below his RCP. Cf. Lindleyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-229 (find

4.01, 1959-1 C.B. at 238. These factors cannot be applied with mathematical precision, and must be considered in the light ofthe particular facts ofeach case. Estate ofAndrews v. - 43 - [*43] Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 940-941 (1982); Kohler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-152. In the absence ofarm's-length sales, the fair market value ofnon

2013, whether before the IRS, the Office ofAppeals, or a Federal court. - 13 - T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; Hudgins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-260, at *39-*40. A. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must generally be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). There is no dispute that petitioner satisfies each ofth

nes contained in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, supra, to determine whether she satisfies the requirements for reliefunder section 6015(f). h Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Sriram v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-91. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, contains seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy before the - 27 - [*27] Commissioner determines he or she is eligible for relief. The seven conditions are stated in the conjunctive, and

dered acceptable ifit is unlikelythat the tax can be collected in full and the offer reasonablyreflects the amount the Service could collect through other means * * * This amount is the reasonable collection potential ofa case." Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 517. The policy ofpromoting effective tax administration means that the IRS has discretion to compromise liability when full collection could be achieved but would cause an economic hardship to the taxpayer and the comprom

. EL (citing Rule 142(a)). As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissionerhas prescribed procedures to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable relieffromjoint and several liability. These procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. See generallyReilly-Caseyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo..2013-292. The Court recognizes the use ofthese procedures in reviewing a section 6015(f) determination. See Washingtonv. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 147 (reviewin

ice their premiums to have significant underwriting losses. They compensate for 16A class 4 insurance company may carry on insurance business, including excess liability business or property catastrophe reinsurance business. See Insurance Act, 1978, sec. 4E. - 20 - underwriting losses by retaining sufficient assets (i.e., more assets per dollar of premium resulting in lower premium-to-surplus ratios) to earn ample amounts of investment income. Captives in Bermuda, however, have fewer assets per

ice their premiums to have significant underwriting losses. They compensate for 16A class 4 insurance company may carry on insurance business, including excess liability business or property catastrophe reinsurance business. See Insurance Act, 1978, sec. 4E. - 20 - underwriting losses by retaining sufficient assets (i.e., more assets per dollar of premium resulting in lower premium-to-surplus ratios) to earn ample amounts of investment income. Captives in Bermuda, however, have fewer assets per

6330(c)(3); see also Lunsford v.

lure to pay the tax shawn on a return, the knowledge or reason to know factor addresses "whether the r questing spouse did not know and had no reason to know that the nonrequesting s ouse would not pay the income tax liability." Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03 2)(a)(iii)(A), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. As the Appeals Office determined, petitioner asserted that Wallace had no income when she signed the return. She also was well aware ofWallace's health issues and had no reason to believe that the tax would

r, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003), we are not bound by them inasmuch as our analysis and determination ultimately turns on an evaluation ofall the facts and circumstances, see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011).7 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must generally be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 7On January 5, 2012, the Commiss

eliminate some ofthe substantiation requirements ofsec. 274 (essentially, the cost element), the taxpayer is not relieved ofsubstantiating the time, place, and business purpose ofthe travel. See sec. 1.274-5(j), Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2005-67, sec. 4.03, 2005-2 C.B. at 732; Rev. Proc. 2006-41, sec. 4.03, 2006-2 C.B. at 780; Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811-812. Mr. Martin's testimony is insufficientto substantiate the time and business purpose ofpetitioners' travel, and th

tax liabilities. For that independent reason, Mr. Ramdas's OIC was rejected. Under the Commissioner's administrative procedures, an OIC based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only ifit reflects the taxpayer's RCP. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. RCP is generally calculated by multiplying a taxpayer's monthly income available to pay taxes by the number ofmonths remaining in the statutory period for collection, see sec. 6502, and adding to that product the r

Section 4 ofthe employment agreement provided that "[t]he initial term of this Agreement shall commence on December 7, 1998 * * * and shall continue until January 1, 2004." Section ofthe Agreement, captioned "Employment," provided: During the term ofthis A reement * * * [employee] will devote all of his efforts to the performance ofhis duties as *

ev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. That proposed revenue procedure, iffinalized, will revise the factors that the IRS will use to evaluate requests for equitable reliefunder sec. (continued...) - 63 - [*63] (2003). According to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, Mrs. Alexander, as a requesting spouse, must satisfy threshold conditions in order to be eligible to submit a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Mrs. Alexander does not satisfy all ofthe threshold req

. 2012-312. Under this optional method, the taxpayermay compute meal and incidental expenses on the basis ofthe Federal meal and incidental expense rate for the locality oftravel for each calendar day he or she is away from home. Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811-812; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec. 4.03, 2008-2 C.B. at 860; see also Harris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-312. The amount will be deemed substantiated for purposes ofsection 1.274-5(j)(1), Income Tax Regs., as long as the

's limited liability company did not affect Settlement Officer McAdams' determination. We agree with respondent. - 9 - [*9] Form 433-A requires taxpayers to include documentation to support their claimed income and expenses. See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. 517, 518 (stating that the "offer should include all information necessary to verify the grounds for compromise"). The supporting documentation includes copies of earnings statements, checking account statements, and bills or st

* * * An applicable fmancial statement is a financial statement listed in paragraphs (1) through (3) ofthis section 4.06 that has the highest priority (including within paragraph (2)).

itted the 2004 offer based on doubt as to collectibility. An OIC based on doubt as to -14- collectibility is acceptable ifit reflects the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential (RCP). Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. at 309; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. An OIC will generallybe rejected ifthe RCP meets or exceeds the amount offered in the OIC. IRM pt. 5.8.4.3 (May 10, 2013). The value ofdissipated assets may be included in a taxpayer's RCP. See Tucker v. Commissione

ed. Appx. 785 (11th Cir. 2005); sec. 301.7122-1(d)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. "Sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. 18See Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 485 (2011), aff'd, 502 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517. 19See Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 485. - 14 - [*14] guidelines for basic living expenses in evaluating the adequacy ofproposed installment agreements and offers-in-compromise.20 More particularly, there is no a

under section 6231(a)(2)(B). PCMG Trading Partners XX, L.P. v. Commissioner, 131 (cid:16)042 T.C. 206, 209-210 (2008). While the definition ofa "pass-thru partner" includes a trust through which "other persons hold an interest in the partnership", sec. 4The mere fact that the subsidiary member is a partner in a partnership does not make the common parent a partner in the partnership. Rev. Rul. 2006-11, 2006-1 C.B. 635. Rather, it is the several liability that requires the commonparent to be tre

Regs., provides that doubt as to collectibility is a ground for the compromise ofa liability.7 Section 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced.

y this revision given that petitioner's request was timely under any ofthese deadlines. - 8 - [*8] exceptions, the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks reliefis attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Respondent concedes that petitioner has met the first six threshold conditions; however, respondent contends that petitioner failed to show the tax liability was solely attributable to Mr. Williamson. Respondent contends

6015(b) or (c). See Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 73, 88 (2003). She may, however, be eligible for relief, pursuant to section 6015(f) ifit is inequitable to hold her liable for the unpaid Federal income tax liabilities. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298-299. We review respondent's determination de novo, and petitioner bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). For the following reasons, petitioner is not eligible for

5) she did not file or fail to file the returns with fraudulent intent; and (6) with enumerated exceptions, the income tax liability from which she seeks reliefis - 11 - [*11] attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse." Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298. Respondent has conceded that petitioner has met all ofthe threshold conditions.14 " Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297-298, also lists a seventh threshold condition: "The requesting spouse applies fo

d with the simultaneous application ofsection 121 and section 1031 to the exchange at issue. The Commissioner has indicatedthat in these circumstances "[s]ection 121 must be applied to gain realized before applying section 1031." Rev. Proc. 2005-14, sec. 4.02, 2005-1 C.B. 528, 529. Accordingly, any realized gain attributable to the exchange ofthe Lakeviewproperty as a distinct, discrete part of petitioners' overall like-kind exchange is excluded pursuant to section 121. Respondent proffers that

4 (LexisNexis 2011). In Massachusetts, an unrecorded mortgage is invalid as against third parties who do not have actual notice ofit. Moore v. Gerrity, Co., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that an unrecorded mortgage had priority over a recorded mortgage only to the extent that the lender had actual notice ofthe unrecordedm

4.04, 1997-1 C.B. at 645, requires, as a condition ofdesignation under section 7205(f)(2), that "[t]he delivery service offered must provide for delivery to all street addresses within the United States to which documents and payments subject to § 7502 must be sent." 5Although petitioner cannot pursue his case in this Court, he may not be with

iew respondent's denial ofpetitioner's request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). See sec. 6015(e)(1). We apply a de novo standard ofreview as well as a de novo scope ofreview. See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298,2 provides a list of nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner may weigh in making his 2 On January 5, 2012, the Commissioner issued Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, announcing a proposed revenue procedure updating R

qualify for reliefunder subsections (b) and (c). Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329-331 (2000). A requesting spouse must satisfy seven threshold conditions before a request under subsection (f) will be considered.6 See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. A requesting spouse that satisfies the threshold conditions must then demonstrate that equitable reliefis appropriate under certain factors. Id. secs. 4.02 and 4.03, 2013 I.R.B. at 400. 6We may COnsider guidelines

Memo LEXIS 248, at *12; see also Broz v.

cludes the days where he went to various malls to check on his kiosks. While he Rev. Proc. 2009-47, 2009-2 C.B. 524; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, 2008-2 C.B. 857; Rev. Proc. 2007-63, 2007-2 C.B. 809; Rev. Proc. 2006-41, 2006-2 C.B. 777. 24Rev. Proc. 2009-47, sec. 4.03, 2009-2 C.B. at 526; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec 4.03, 2008-2 C.B. at 860; Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811-812; Rev. Proc. 2006-41, sec. 4.03, 2006-2 C.B. at 780. "Sec. 274(d). 26Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Re

Section 4.01: Threshold Conditions Under the Commissioner's published guidance, the requesting spouse must first satisfy certain threshold conditions in Rev: Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298. Respondent does not dispute that Mrs. Reiffsatisfies the threshold conditions. 2. Section 4.03: Facts and Circumstances Test Where,.as here, a

5) she did not file or fail to file the returns with fraudulent intent; and (6) with enumerated exceptions, the income tax liability from which she seeks reliefis - 11 - [*11] attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse." Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298. Respondent has conceded that petitioner has met all ofthe threshold conditions.14 " Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297-298, also lists a seventh threshold condition: "The requesting spouse applies fo

ev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. That proposed revenue procedure, iffinalized, will revise the factors that the IRS will use to evaluate requests for equitable reliefunder sec. (continued...) - 63 - [*63] (2003). According to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, Mrs. Alexander, as a requesting spouse, must satisfy threshold conditions in order to be eligible to submit a request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f). Mrs. Alexander does not satisfy all ofthe threshold req

can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the Service could collect [also referred to as reasonable collection potential] through other means, including administrative andjudicial collection remedies." Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 517; see sec. 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The authorityto reject an OIC generally has been delegated within the Collection Division to numerous supervisorypositions including the division chief, branch chiefs, f

can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the Service could collect [also referred to as reasonable collection potential] through other means, including administrative andjudicial collection remedies." Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 517; see sec. 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The authorityto reject an OIC generally has been delegated within the Collection Division to numerous supervisorypositions including the division chief, branch chiefs, f

Gift of 1% General Partnership Interest Section 4.1 ofthe Mariposa agreement provides that "The General Partners must collectively own at all times Units equivalentto at least one percent (1%) participation interest." The estate argues that Robert and Joseph received this 1% general partnership interest by gift.

affg T.C. Memo. 2004-13; sec. 301.7122-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. In general, an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only ifit is for an amount at least as great as the taxpayer's RCP. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517. In his motion for summaryjudgment, without conceding any error by the settlement officer, respondent asserts that even ifone were to assume, solely for purposes ofhis motion, the accuracy of "many" ofthe items reflected

r-in-compromisebased on doubt as to collectibility must be for an amount that equals or exceeds the taxpayer's RCP; i.e., the amountthe IRS could collect through other means such as administrative andjudicial collection remedies. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517; see Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.8.1.1.3 (Sept. 23, 2008). In determining a taxpayer's RCP, the IRS is to take into account the taxpayer's reasonable basic living expenses. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2).

7 According to the Commissioner, Gaggero committed a material misrepre- sentation offact for the purpose ofavoiding the transfer tax--a misdemeanor under Los Angeles, Cal., County Code section 4.60.170 (1967)--by not recording a deed showing a transfer from Gaggero ofpart ownership to BCC and then later omitting BCC from the deed to Monticello.

4Petitioner may be entitled to a greater deduction ifthere were additional local general sales taxes in place forthe taxable year. See 2009 Instructions for Schedule A (Form 1040), at A-5 (instructing residents ofCalifornia to make an additional calculation iftheir combined State and local general sales tax rate exceeds 8.0034%). - 14 - [*14]

Commissioner; T.C. Memo. 2004-89 ("It also must be shownthat the payments were not made with thejoint feturn and were notjoint payments or payments that the nonrequesting spouse mad "). :This conclusion is consistent with Revenue Procedure 2003-61, sec. 4.04(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 299, in which the IRS stated: In a case involving an underpayment ofincome tax,(cid:16)040raequesting spouse is eligible for a refund ofseparate payments that he or she made after July 22, 1998, ifthe requesting spouse est

ceptable only ifthe offer reflects the reasonable collection potential ofthe case (i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative andjudicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Where, because the reasonable collection potential ofthe case exceeds the taxpayer's liability, doubt as to collectibility is not a ground for compromise, the - 21 - [*21] Secretary may enter into a compromise on t

8-2 C.B. at 857. Under this optional method, meal and incidental expenses may be computed on the basis ofthe Federal meal and incidental expense rate for the locality oftravel for each calendar day the employee is away from home. Rev. Proc. 2007-63, sec. 4.03, 2007-2 C.B. at 811; Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec. 4.03, 2008- 2 C.B. at 860. The amount will be deemed substantiated for purposes ofsection 1.274-5, Income Tax Regs., provided the employee substantiates the elements of time, place, and business

oner, T.C. Memo. 2010-255; O'Meara v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-71. Petitioner bears the burden ofproving that she is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(f). See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; see also Rule 142(a). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, lists seven threshold requirements that a requesting spouse must satisfy before the Commissioner will consider a request for reliefunder section 6015(f): 1(1) The requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxabl

ding whenhe ceased to control those assets. Generally, a doubt as to collectibility OIC may be accepted only when it equals or exceeds the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. IRM pt. 5.8.1.1.3(3) (Sept. 1, 2005); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Amountsjincludible in a taxpayer's reasonable collection potential include amounts collectible from third parties throughjudicial action, such as a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. IRM pt. 5.8.4.4.1 (Sept

at spouse liable for any deficiency or unpaid tax. Sec. 6015(f); sec. 1.6015-4(a), Income Tax Regs. The requesting spouse must satisfy seven threshold conditions before the Commissioner considers a request for equitable relief. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. The income tax must be attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse or an underpaymentresulting from the nonrequesting spouse's income, unless an enumerated exception applies. See id.; sec. 4.01(7), 2003-2 C.B. at 2

. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-259. 4A Letter 1153 constitutes the notice ofproposed assessment ofa sec. 6672 responsible person penalty required by sec. 6672(b) as a precursor to the Commissioner's imposition ofthe penalty. See Rev. Proc. 2005-34, sec. 4.01, 2005- 1 C.B. 1233, 1234 (setting forth the procedures for mailing that letter and for the taxpayer's exercise ofhis right to either agree to or dispute the proposed assessment within 60 days ofthe date on the letter). Rev. Proc. 2005-34, s

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. 3See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297 (all requesting spouses must meet seven threshold conditions: (i) the requesting spouse filed a joint return forthe taxable year for which he or she seeks relief; (ii) reliefis not available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (iii) the reques

for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6015(f)(1). Both the scope and standard ofour review in cases requesting equitable relieffrom joint and several income tax liability are de novo. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(1)-(7), 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297, sets out seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must meet before the Commissioner will consider a request for reliefunder subsection (f). We employ these conditions when reviewing the Commissioner'

1, provides that the net proceeds ofevery State- supervised lottery game are to be guaranteed and permanently dedicated to the preservation, protection, enhancement, and management ofthe State's wildlife, park, river, trail, and open space heritage.

ary and necessary , 16Certain small business owners (cid:16)040iathverage annual receipts of$1 million or less, as VK U.S. was during the years at issue, need not take inventories at the beginning and end ofeach taxable year. See Rev. Proc. 2001-10, sec. 4.01, 2001- 1 C.B. 272, 273. - 24 - business expenses incurred or paid during the taxable year. Sec. 162(a). Thus, cost ofgoods sold is an offsetto gross receipts for purposes ofcomputing gross income, and deductions are subtracted from gross in

t 210; see also Rule 142(a). The Commissioner has outlined procedures or determining whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable rel ef under section 6015(f) from joint and several liabïlity. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra. First, Rev. Proc. 2003-61·, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for I - 10 - equitable relief under section 6015(f). There is no dispute that petitioner meets the thresho

Value Motorcycle equity $4,645 401(k) 28,000 Bank account 389 Excess income 40,478 Total 73,512 The Commissionerwill generally accept an offer-in-compromisebased on doubt as to collectibility only ifit equals a taxpayer's RCP. Rev. Proc. 2003 71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. But even in the light ofour recalculation of Brombach's RCP--bending in his favor in every reasonable way--his offer still falls short by more than $45,000. We have consistently held thatthe Commissioner doesn't abus

oner, T.C. Memo. 2010-255; O'Meara v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-71. Petitioner bears the burden ofproving that she is entitled to reliefunder section 6015(f). See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210; see also Rule 142(a). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, lists seven threshold requirements that a requesting spouse must satisfy before the Commissioner will consider a request for reliefunder section 6015(f): 1(1) The requesting spouse filed ajoint return for the taxabl

ofability to pay. In determining ability to pay, the Secretary will permit taxpayers to retain sufficient funds to pay basic living expenses." Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(2)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also sec. 7122(d)(2)(A) and (B). Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517, states that [d]oubt as to collectibility exists in any case where the taxpayer's assets and income cannot satisfy the full amount ofthe liability. An offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility generall

ssets to him; (5) he did not file or fail to file the returns with fraudulent intent; and (6) with enumerated exceptions, the income tax liability from which he seeks reliefis attributable to an item ofthe nonrequesting spouse.22 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 22 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297-298, also lists a seventh threshold condition: "The requesting spouse applies for reliefno later than two years after the date ofthe Service's first collection activity

nd courts consider those factors when reviewing the IRS's denial of relief. See - 23 - Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003) (consulting Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B 447). One such factor, which according to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7), 2003-2 C.B. at 297, is a condition of section 6015(f) relief, is that "The income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the requesting spouse filed the joint re

Under section 4, "ALIMONY", they agreed that "[t]he Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum ofFive Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month as alimony, first payment to be made on January 31, 1994, payment to cease upon death or remarriage ofthe Wife." .The divorce decree also provided - 4 - that Mr. Chiavacci had to pay Ms. Charles child support each month st

, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981) (eight factors), to the equity ofgranting innocent-spouse relief, see, e.a., Henson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-288, 2012 WL 4815166, at *6-*7 (applying factors listed in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at 298-299) (at least eight factors), to figuring out whether an activity is engaged in for profit, see, e.a., Foster v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-207, 2012 WL 3000350, at *5 (applying factors listed in sec. 1.183-2(b), Inco

f r any unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6015(f)(1). Both the scope and standard of our review in cases requesting equitable relieffromjoint and several income tax li bility are de novo. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(1)-(7), 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297, sets out seven threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must meet before the Commissioner will consider a request for reliefunder subsection (f). We employ these conditions y hen reviewing the Commissioner

r section 274(n) this amount was reduced on Form 2106 by 50% to $3,978. In computing his claimed meal expense deduction petitioner used the rates set forth in the Federal guidelines - 4 - for meal and incidental expenses (M&IE), Rev. Proc. 2008-59, sec. 4.03, 2008-2 C.B. 857, 860. Also on the Form 2106, petitioners claimed a deduction for $13,612 in unreimbursed business vehicle mileage expenses (using petitioner's estimate of 24,308 business miles driven for his work). On audit respondent disal

n-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility generally will be considered acceptable where it is unlikely hat the full unpaid liability can be collected and the offer reflects the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003- 71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. A taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is determined, in part, using published guidelines that establish national and local allowances for necessary living expenses. See Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.15.

, and again requesting reliefunder section 6015.8 On January 5, 2012, the Commissioner issued Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, providing a proposed revenue procedure that, iffinalized, would, inter alia, change the requirement ofRev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(3), 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297, and section 1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., that a requesting spouse must file a claim for equitable reliefno later than two years after the date ofthe Commissioner's first collection activity. The new requiremen

(Please refer to the attachments required in Section 4 (page 4) on Form 433-A.) (cid:16)042 You are required to include proof/receipts ofall current income and expenses that you paid for the past 3 months, including Banks and investments, assets, utilities, rent, insurance, property taxes, etc.

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-98. It theli lists three "safe-harbor" factors, and a spouse who can show that she has st'owed all three aboard her ship can sail safelyhome to win relief. See id. sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-98. ForAllison, the safe harbor would require proofthat (cid:16)042 she was divorced or separated from Michael on the date she

bility will generally be considered acceptable where two conditions are met: First, where it is unlikely that the unpaid.tax liability, can be collected in full; and second, where the offer reflects the taxpayer's total RCP. See Rev. Proc. 2003-.71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may also accept an offer of less than the total RCP_where there are special circumstances such as economic hardship or compelling public policy or equitable considerations. See Murphy

nd courts consider those factors when reviewing the IRS's denial of relief. See - 23 - Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003) (consulting Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B 447). One such factor, which according to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7), 2003-2 C.B. at 297, is a condition of section 6015(f) relief, is that "The income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the requesting spouse filed the joint re

only if the offer reflects the taxpayer's reasd>nable collection potential; i.e., the amount the Commissioner Nould collect through administrative and ju icial collection proceedings. Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 309 (citing Rev. Pr c. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 * C.B. 5]7, 517) . Thus an OIC would include disclosure of the taxpayer' s assets and income in order for the IRS --to determine the taxpayer' s reasonable collection potential.. . Id. P titioner argues that Åhe is not required t

Ir section 4 of that.form, peti- tioner indicated that he maintained a (cid:0)541avingtasccount that had a balance of $14 , stoçk investmentsgvalued . at $2 , 877, ¶ and a sec- tion 401(k) plantwith respect to which he failed to state a value. In sections 3 and 4 of petitioner's Form 433 A, peti- tioner: próvided.-the responses indicated to. the follo

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. The parties agree that petitioner has met the preliminary requirements for relief.3 3One of the seven threshold conditions requires that the requesting spouse apply for relief no later than 2 years after the date of the Service's first collection activity with respect to the requesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec.

ifies for equitable relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. We now analyze the facts under these procedures to determine whether Ms. Terfanyan qualifies for equitable relief. 1. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f), as follows: (i) The requesting spouse filed a joint income tax

; In- that letter, the attorney stated his opinion that "under subsection 4.20 of the indenture dated as of August 26, 1988 between Ralphs and the United States Trust Company of New York as trustee .

purposes of section 6015(f) and thus for purposes of section 6015 (b) (1) (D), see id., is whether in signing the tax return the requesting spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, of an understatement in that return, see Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, sec. 4.03 (2) (a) (iii) (B), 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298.¯ In determin- ing whether-a requesting spouse satisfies section 6015(b) (1) (D), we may consider, inter alia, whether such spouse satisfies sec- tion 6015 (b) (1) (C)-." We have found that Ms. Crouse

- 13 - (cid:16)042 Section 4.1 provided that "the General Partner shall be the sole manager of the Partnership and have sole authority in the conduct and management of the business of the Partnership." (cid:16)042 Section 4 .

tioner meets two of the safe harbor requirements wholly or partially but does not meet the third. 1. Marital Status Petitioner satisfies this requirement because she and Mr. Waldron were divorced when she applied for relief. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02(1) (a), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. 2. Knowledge or Reason To Know To satisfy this safe harbor requirement, the requesting spouse, when she signed the joint return, must not have known or have had reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would n

se she had an underpayment of tax on as joint return, not a deficiency or an understatement of tax. See Rev. - 9 - Proc. 2003-61, sec. 2..04, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297. Therefore, her only avenue for relief is under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, sets forth threshold requirements before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). All requesting spouses must meet seven threshold requirements: (i) The requesting spouse filed a joint re

procedures, an employee who receives an M&IE only per diem from her employer may treat the lesser of the employer's per diem or the Federal M&IE rate for the locality of travel for that day or partial day as deemed substantiated. Rev. Proc. 2005-10, sec. 4.02, 2005-1 C.B. at 343; Rev. Proc.. 2005-67, sec. 4.02, 2005-2 C.B. at 731; Rev. Proc. 2006-41, sec. 4.02, 2006-2 C.B. at 779-780. A per diem is treated as an M&IE-only per diem if the employer pays the actual expenses for lodging directly to

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at.297. Respondent concedes that petitioner has met the preliminary requirements for relief. We agree. A. Balancing Test for Determining Whether Section 66 (c) Equitable Relief Would Be Appropriate Where, as here, the requesting spouse meets. the five threshold conditions set forth in. Rev. _Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, . we emp

. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sed. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Respondent concedes that petitioner meets all seven of the threshold requirements. 1 If a requesting spouse satisfies the threshold requirements, the Commissioner then looks to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 298, for the criteria or guidelines of circumstances in which relief wili ordinarily abe granted under section 6015(f) with respect to an underpayment of a properly reported liability. The principal criteria considered are w

4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 298. On the date that petitioner signed the joint income tax return, she knew that Mr. Haggerty was deceased and would not pay the tax liability. See George v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004- 261 (holding that the requesting spouse had knowledge that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the t x liability because the nonr

bmitted on Form 656, properly executed, and accompanied by a financial statement on Form 433 (if based on in bilit to pay)." Form 433-A requires taxpayers to include documentation to support their claimed incom and expenses. See Rev. Proc. 2003- 71, sec. 4.03, 2003 2 C.B. t 518 (stating that the "offer should include all information nec ssary to:verify the grounds for compromise"). The supporting documentation includes copies of earnings statements, checki g acc unt statements, and bills or stat

set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003 61, supra, were satisfied in deciding whether a taxpayer qualifies for section 6015(f) relief. See, e.g., Pugsley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-255; O'Meara v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-71. A. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.01: The Threshold Requirements The Commissioner generally will not grant relief unless the taxpayer meets seven threshold requirements. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. The seven threshold requirements are: (1) The requesting

03. We consider those guidelines as well as any other facts and circumstances to determine the appropriate equitable relief. See sec. 6015(e) (1) (A), (f). - 32 - 2. Factors Bearing on Equitable Relief - a. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-2982, lists seven threshold conditions which generally must be satisfied for the Commissioner to grant relief if he determines in the light-of all the facts and circumstances that it would be inequitable to hold the reques

ity. 26 C.F.R. sec. 301.7122-1(b) (2). Under the Commissioner's administrative procedures, an OIC based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the taxpayer's "reasonable collection potential" (RCP). Re9. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. RCP is generally calculated by multiplying a taxpayer's monthly income available to pay taxes by the number of months remaining in the statutory period for collection, see sec. 6502, and adding to that product the r

en the Appeals officer has followed the IRM. Atchison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-8. The IRM directs Appeals officers to reject offers for less than a taxpayer's RCP unless the taxpayer proves he has special circumstances.2 Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Without proof of special circumstances, the Appeals officer rejected Churchill's offer because it was significantly less than his RCP. We look to see if her calculation of the RCP was reasonable, or at least not arb

4.01, 1999-2 C.B. at 580. The pronouncement in the revenue procedure is not supported by any analysis of text or legislative history or any other relevant guidance. It is not an interpretation but a litigation position. The extent to which deference is accorded a given agency pronouncement "[depends] upon the -33- thoroughness evident in its

Section 4.01 of that revenue procedure lists the following threshold conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the Commis- sioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015 (f) : (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint tax return for the taxable year for which such spouse seeks relief; (2) relief is not available t

T.C. 115, 117 (2008). The Commissioner prescribed procedures in Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, 2003-2 C..B. 296, that IRS personnel must use to determine whether a requesting spouse qualifies for relief under section 6015(f). According to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, a requesting spouse must satisfy seven conditions (threshold conditions) before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). The threshold conditions of this section are stated in the c

ed that !he was ineligible for section-6015(f) relief because (1) the 10-percent additional tax was attributable to him, not his former wife, and (2) he is not entitled to relief after consideration of he seven factors listed in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298. OPINION Section 6013(d) (3) provides that the income tax for a married couple who files a joint return is computed by aggregating the two incomes and that their income-tax liability is joint and several. Section 6015(a

audulent intent; and (vii) absent enumerated exceptions, the income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the requesting spouse filed the joint return. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. We employ these factors when reviewing the Commissioner's denial. Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003); see also Schultz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-233. Respondent asserts that petitioner fails

ice stated that the Secretary was currently - 35 - developing regulations- under section 199 and that taxpayers could rely on the interim-guidance until the regulations were issued. Id. sec. 1, 2005-1-C.B. at- 502. As relevant here, Notice 2005-14, sec. 4.04(11) (a) and (b), 2005-1 C.B. at 520, stated that "The term 'construction' means the construction or erection of real property" and that Activities constituting construction include activities performed in connection with a project to erect o

ls for the Ninth Circuit, we follow this Court's precedent articulated in Lantz and Hall. - 7 - now analyze the facts under these procedures to determine whether petitioner qualifies for equitable relief. I. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297-298, - sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f), as follows: (i) The requesting spouse filed a joint income ta

tioner meets two of the safe harbor requirements wholly or partially but does not meet the third. 1. Marital Status Petitioner satisfies this requirement because she and Mr. Waldron were divorced when she applied for relief. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02(1) (a), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. 2. Knowledge or Reason To Know To satisfy this safe harbor requirement, the requesting spouse, when she signed the joint return, must not have known or have had reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would n

er section 6015(c) and (f) because of our holding regarding petitioner's qualification for relief under section 6015(b). We note, however, that petitioner and respondent agree that petitioner meets all the threshold conditions of Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298. - 14 - We have considered all arguments the parties made in reaching our holdings, and, to the extent no mentioned, we find them to be irrelevant or without merit. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered fo

ts of the parties to the annuity contracts, therefore, must be determined by applying Texas law. Texas law allows the assignment of any rights under an annuity contract in accordance with the terms of the contract. Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.22-4,.sec. 4 (West 1997). State law permitted the Lays, the owners of the annuity contracts, to assign the annuity contracts to Enron in accordance with the terms of the annuity contracts. The terms of the annuity contracts permitted the transfers of the an

ame factors when reviewing the IRS' denial of relief. Pullins v. Commissioner, supra at __ (slip op. at 11). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra, provides a three-step analysis for IRS employees to follow in evaluating requests for relief: Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297 (section 4.01), lists seven threshold conditions that must be.met before the IRS will grant any relief; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 298 (section 4.02), lists circumstances in which the IRS will ordinari

Revenue Procedure 2003-61, supra, provides a three-step analysis for IRS personnel to follow in evaluating requests for relief: Section 4.01 lists seven threshold conditions that must be met before the IRS will grant any relief; section 4.02 lists - 12 - circumstances in which Ithe IRS will ordinarily grant relief as to liabilities that were reported on as Ireturn "(the .underpay ents at issue in this case); and.section 4,.03 sets out eight non - exclusive factors-that the

The requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1) (c) bf this revenue procedure) if relief from the iability is not granted.

& Admin..Regs., provides that during a levy hearing, "Taxpayers will be expected to provide all relevant information requested by Appeals, inclùding financial statements, for its consideration of the facts and issues involved in the hearing." When an Appeals officer refùses to consider an offer- -14- in-compromise because of a

se qualifies for relief under that subsection. The applicable provision is found in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. "Petitioner is not entitled to relief under sec. 6015(b) or (c) because she has underpayments of tax. - 8 - Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, sets forth threshold requirements the Commissioner will consider before granting a request for relief under section 6015(f). All requesting spouses must meet seven threshold requirements: (1) The requesting spouse filed

he Commissioner's administrative guidelines, an offer to compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the RCP. See Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), pt. 5.8.1.1.3(3) (Mar. 16, 2010); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2),. 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517 (stating that an offer will be considered acceptable if it reflects the taxpayer's RCP). Where the Appeals officer has followed the IRS guidelines to ascertain a taxpayer's RCP and has rejected the taxpayer's colle

; In- that letter, the attorney stated his opinion that "under subsection 4.20 of the indenture dated as of August 26, 1988 between Ralphs and the United States Trust Company of New York as trustee .

Section 4 .01 : The Threshold Requirements Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec . 4 .01, 2003-2 C .B . at 297-298, sets forth seven threshold conditions a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible to submit a request for relief under section 6015(f) : (1) The taxpayer filed joint Federal income tax returns for the taxable year or years for which relief is

4.03(2) (a) (i) and (ii), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. Such circumstances are to be weighed together with the events during the year in question, and no one factor is determinative. Id. The consideration of contemporaneous circumstances distinguishes subsection (f) analysis from the taxable year factual analysis required under subsections (b) and (c).

4.06, 1983-2 C.B. 575, 580. -15- petitioner's bona fide business purposes -for the transactions. KPMG was simply advising a client on different ways to minimize the tax consequences of a proposed transaction--precisely what tax accountants are paid to do. The inventory transactions were valid section 351 transactions. III. The Inventory Trans

Section 4 .03 Factors a. Marital Status Respondent concedes that because Gary Bozick was dead at the time the IRS made its innocent spouse determination, this factor weighs in favor of granting relief . b . Knowledge or Reason To Know Respondent argues that Bozick knew or had reason to know that her husband would not pay the 2003 .income tax liabil

not a real estate professional under section 4'69 (c) (7) (B), her.

petitioner or her former spouse is responsible for the 1996 and 2001 income tax liabilities . Accordingly, this factor is neutral . See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T .C . 137, 148-149 (2003) . 5 . Significant Benefit Under Rev . Proc . 2003-61,, sec. 4 .03(2)(a)(v), .2003-2 C .B . 299., consideration is given to whether the spouse seeking relief significantly benefited (beyond normal support)-from the unpaid - 12 income tax liability . If so, the significant benefit factor weighs against gra

istrative record. Both parties submitted evidence at trial which was not available to respondent's Appeals officer. .The Court has considered all relevant evidence in making its determination. - 16 - Threshold Requirements Under Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.01 Under section 6015(f) the Commissioner decides whether to grant relief according to procedures the Secretary has prescribed. These procedures have been described in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. Under section 6015(e) and (f) (1), the

determining whether a I spouse qualifies for relief under subsection (f). See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra. - 8 - Respondent conceded that Mrs. Sommer met the threshold conditions to be eligible for section 6015(f) relief found in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. If the threshold conditions are met, the IRS will ordinarily grant equitable relief with respect to underpayments on joint returns if the following elements are satisfied generally: (1) On the date of the request for rel

Vlock as stated in section 4 of the purported employment agreement .

ptable if it is unlikely that the tax can be collected in full and the offer reasonably reflects the amount the Service could collect through other means - 8 - * * * This amount is the reasonable collection potential of a case." Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. A compromise based on doubt as to collectibility may be accepted where the taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability. Sec. 301.7122-1(b) (2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Generally, under

4 .03,(2)(a)(iv.), 2003 C .B . 298 . There was no agreement which imposed a legal bligation on Mr . Acoba to pay all the outstanding income tax lia ilities . This is a neutral factor . Where the requesting spouse significantly bene ited (beyond normal support) from the unpaid income tax liability, this is a factor against granting equitable re

140. The next year Congress- noted that this regime rais d questions about the definition of a "deficiency' (i.e., "tax im osed" over "amount shown" minus "See S. Rept. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1944), 1944 C.B. 858, 887: Under the systemgof ta collection which now obtains with respect to individuals, it is apparent that in - c

ties for those years because he satisfies two of the enumerated exceptions to the threshold condition pertaining to attribution. First, he claims that Susan áisappropriated funds intended for payment of their tax liabilities. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7) (c), 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Petitioner contends that Susan used the money to pay off her individual debts. Considering the fact that he has not identified when, in what amount, or from what source any funds were earmarked for payment of tax

6015 (f ) . See Rule 142 (a) . 7 A. Threshold Conditions Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, prescribes guidelines that the Commissioner applies in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f).* Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, lists threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief.under section 6015(f).* 7Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respond

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Respondent's Appeals Office concluded that petitioner had satisfied all seven. In brief, however, respondent argued that petitioner has not shown that the Drayers' underpayments are attributable to her ex-husband." We disagree. Mr. Drayer started his business, Signs of All Kinds, as a sole proprietorship before he met

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. The parties agree that petitioner has met the preliminary requirements for relief. I. Safe Harbor for Section 6015(f) Relief We now turn to whether petitioner satisfies the three conditions of a safe harbor under section 6015 (f) that the Commissioner has established. See Gonce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-328; Bi

hether relief is justified we give no, deference to the IRS' determinationåthat petitioner is not entitled to relief . See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T. C. at 210 . If a: requesting spouse -fulfills the threshold requirements of Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, ,the Commissioner will - 5 - ordinarily grant relief from joint and several, liability with respect to underpayments on a joint Federal income tax return, provided all of the following additiònal requirements are satisfied: (1) On the date

met these threshold conditions . Once the. threshold conditions have been .met, relief will ordinarily be granted with respect to underpayments of tax if the requesting spouse satisfies the so-called tier 1 factors described in Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec. 4 .02, 2003-2 C .B. at 298 . Respondent determined that petitioner failed to satisfy all these tier 1 factors, finding that petitioner had not established that he had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid or that he would

670; Ying v . Commissioner, 25 F .3d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir . 1994), affg . in part and revg . in part 99 T .C . 273 (1992) . 12In enacting new section 893 as a stand-alone section, .Congress included in section 893 the introductory language fro m section 116 that specified that such compensation is not included in gross income and is

yer, in its sole discretion, may pay Employee additional compensation from time to time. At no time during the taxable years at issue did (1) Mr. Sundrup and Consulting determine a rate of-compensation to be paid to Mr. Sundrup as contemplated under section 4 of Mr. Sundrup's purported employment agreement and (2) Ms. Sundrup and Consulting determine a rate of compensation to be paid to Ms. Sundrup as contemplated under section 4 of Ms. Sundrup's pur- ported employment agreement. At all relevant

4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Among these conditions is that the item in question be - 12 - attributable only to the spouse not seeking relief from joint liability, unless one of four exceptions ap

In section 4 of his petition, petitioner states, in part : "The Petitioner's requested relief in this matter is $50,000 .00 ." In his January 29, 2008, memorandum * * * petitioner demands a $100,000 tax-free payment from the government to .avoid public disclosure of respondent's actions in challenging petitioner's claimed alimony deduction . The Tax C

2003-61, supra , lists the factors that IRS employees should consider, and the Court also-uses the factors when reviewing-the Commissioner's denial of relief . See Washington v . Commissioner, 120 T .C . 137, 147-152 (2003). Rev . Proc . 2003-,61, sec. 4 .01, 2003-2 C .B . at 297, lists seven threshold conditions that a taxpayer must satisfy in order to qualify for equitable relief . Among other things, it requires a requesting spouse to request relief from joint and several liability no later t

First, respondent determined as an affected item that 'petitioners were not at risk in an activity to which section 4 65 applies .

e past-present :distinction, both sections, of the regulations guiding our determination ofawhat is "inequitable" inexplicably direct us to the same :.revenue procedure 45 - the threshold requirements ." Although he cites Revenue Procedure 2003-61, section 4 .01 for this proposition, that requirement is actually in section 5 and allows a taxpayer to make the request by Form 8857 or "other similar statement signed under penalties of perjury." See also sec .

The requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship-(within the meaning of section 4 .02(1) (c) of this revenue procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted .

Where the requesting spouse has satisfied the threshold conditions of section 4 .01 but does not qualify for relief under section 4 .02, a determination may nevertheless be made' under section 4 .03 to grant relief .

2003-61, section 4 .01, 2003-2 C .B .

The-requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4 .02(1)(c) of this revenue ,procedure) if relief from liability.

n met . We agree . Where as here the requesting spouse might not qualify for relief under Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec . 4 .01, the IRS may nevertheless grant relief under Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec . 4 .03, 200342, C .B . at 298 . Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec. 4 .03(2), 20Q3-2 C .B . at 298, lists the eight nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all

ned in the matter, see supra note 2 . I 10 - circumstances in which the IRS will ordinarily grant relief unde r section 6015 ( f) with respect .to an underpayment of a properly reported liability . To qualify for relief under Rev . Proc . 2003- 61, sec. 4 .02 , the requesting spouse must : .. (1) No longer be married to , be legally separated from, or have not been a member of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request

4 .02(cid:127)(1)(a) In'dispute is whether (a) petitioner at. the time .of signing the return had no knowledge or reason-'to know that Mr . Stolkin would not pay .the tax liability, and (b) pe''titioner .would suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted . . "See id . sec . .4 .02(1)(b) and '(c) . . We address these two .condition.s in tu

Occupation Counsellor In section 4 of petitioners' Form 433-A, petitioners pro- vided the response indicated to the following question : 10 .

Whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4 .02(1)(c) of this revenue procedure) if the Service does not grant relief from the income tax liability.

4 .03(2), states that the Commissioner will "consider and weigh all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed in this section 4 .03 ." We find four additional factors merit consideration .

ntories under sec. 471, in a tax year ending before Dec. 17, 1999, if the taxpayer would satisfy the 3-tax-year-period gross receipts test of Rev. Proc. 2001-10, sec. 5.01, 2001-1 C.B. 272, 273. Id. sec 8., 2001-1 C.B. at 275. - 17 - Proc. 2001-10, sec. 4.02, 2001-1 C.B. at 273. For a cash method taxpayer, the cost of such inventoriable items are deductible only in that year, or in the taxable year in which the taxpayer actually pays for the inventoriable items, whichever is later. Id. CGS is no

In section 4 of petitioner's June 24, 200 Form 433-A, petitioner provided the response indicated to he following question : 10 . Do you receive income from sources o her than your own business or your employer? (Chec all that apply . ) ® Pension ® Social Security ® Other (sp cify, i .e . child sup ort, alimony, rental) R ntal In section 5 of petitione

4.02, 1979-1 C.B. 563, 563; see also Grunwald v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 85, 89 (1986). Accordingly, we find and hold that respondent timely issued the notice of deficiency to petitioners within the applicable period of limitations provided by section 6501(a), given that the Greenfields executed the Form 872-A extending the limitations period an

oner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Before the Commissioner will consider a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015(f), the taxpayer must satisfy all seven threshold conditions listed in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297.5 These conditions are as follows: (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable 4 This Court has held that our determination of whether a taxpayer is entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f) “is made in

Petitioners asked Ed Brown and Associates to pre- pare a plan (petitioners’ subdivision plan) and a plat (petition- ers’ subdivision plat) for the subdivision of the Severn Chapel Road property into 13 lots under the family conveyance subdivi- sion provisions of section 4-301 of article 26 of the Anne Arundel County Code (family conveyance subdivision provisions of the Anne Arundel County Code).

ors listed therein in reviewing a negative determination under section 6015(f). See, e.g., Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125-126 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent agrees that these threshold conditions are satisfied for taxable years

Would the children remain the qualifying children of the mother (to the exclusion of the grandmother) under the tie-breaking rule of what is now section 4 The referenced tie-breaking rule is now at sec.

income tax laws in subsequent years ; (7) the requesting spouse was abused by the nonrequesting spouse ; and (8) the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health when - 11 - signing the return or requesting relief . Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec. 4 .03(2), further provides that no single factor will be determinative, but that all relevant factors will be considered. We will now consider petitioner's request in the light of these relief factors . In this case, petitioner divorced Ms . Payt

4 .03(2), further provides that no single factor will be determinative, but that all relevant factors will be considered .

The third criterion under section 4 .02 of Rev.

Whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4 .

Under section 4At the conclusion of the trial, petitioner was ordered to file an opening brief . Petitioner submitted an opening brief; however, the brief was not filed and was returned for copies as required by Rule 151(d) . Respondent was ordered to file an answering brief, and a brief was submitted to the Court by respondent . That brief, however, was

According to section 4 .01 in both sets of guidelines, the requesting spouse must satisfy seven conditions (threshold conditions) before the Commissioner will consider a request for - 6 - relief under section 6015(f) .

. Regs. Generally, under the Commissioner’s administrative pronouncements, an offer-in- compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable - 14 - only if it reflects the taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In some cases, the Commissioner will accept an offer of less than the reasonable collection potential if there are “special circumstances”. Id. Special circumstances are: (1) Circumstances demonstrating that the tax

r, T.C. Memo. 2004-274. The Commissioner has prescribed guidelines that are considered in determining whether it is inequitable to hold a requesting spouse liable for all or part of the liability for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2001-1 C.B. 447, 448, sets forth seven threshold conditions that the requesting spouse must satisfy before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f).8 Respondent 8Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which s

has made a good faith effort to comply with income tax laws in taxable years following the year in issue . Therefore, we consider this factor neutral . Petitioner's failure to satisfy the seven threshold conditions set forth in Rev . Proc . 2003-61, sec. 4 .01, and all but one of the factors in Rev. Proc . 2003-61, sec . 4 .03, is determinative . On these facts and circumstances, the Court holds that there was no abuse of discretion by respondent in denying - 13 - relief to petitioner under sect

& Admin. Regs. Generally, under the Commissioner’s administrative pronouncements, an offer-in- compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In some cases, the Commissioner will accept an offer-in- compromise of less than the reasonable collection potential if there are “special circumstances”. Id. Special circumstances are: (1) Circumstances demonstrat

urrent compliance with filing requirements, see Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-153; and altered the standard terms of Form 656 so as to delete the statement that he was signing the form under penalties of perjury, see Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 517 (Form 656 must be signed under penalty of perjury and none of its standard terms may be stricken or altered). - 19 - 4. Conclusion Petitioner has failed to make a valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent’s colle

see supra note 2, they did not raise doubt as to liability as a grounds for compromise. - 13 - compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In some cases, the Commissioner will accept an offer of less than the reasonable collection potential if there are “special circumstances”. Id. Special circumstances are: (1) Circumstances demonstrating that the tax

- 18 - Section 4 .1 states that the employer must annually contribute to the STEP plan such amounts as are calculated by the plan actuary to provide for severance benefits of its covered employees . The total amount to be contributed by all employers is "based upon reasonable actuarial assumptions and methods taking into account the experience of the Plan

4 .02(1)(b), 2003-C.B . at 298 . ] Petitioner argues that respondent erred in concluding that she possessed knowledge or reason to know that the taxes would not be paid. As to 1997, petitioner contends that she had a reasonable belief that the taxes would be paid either out of the bankruptcy proceeding, from Dr . Banderas's pension plan, or fr

Section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 2003-61 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the IRS will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). In the instant case, respondent concedes that those conditions are satisfied. Where, as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold condi- tions, section 4.0

he taxpayer by the nonrequesting spouse ; and (7) the taxpayer did not file the returns with fraudulent intent . Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec . 4 .01, 2000-1 C.B . at 448 . Respondent concedes that petitioner meets these conditions . Rev . Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4 .03, lists two factors which, if true, the Commissioner treats only as favoring relief : (1) The taxpayer is separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse ; and (2) the taxpayer was abused by the nonrequesting spouse . Rev . Proc. 2000-1

& Admin. Regs. Generally, under the Commissioner’s administrative pronouncements, an offer-in- compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In some cases, the Commissioner will accept an offer of less than the reasonable collection potential if there are “special circumstances”. Id. Special circumstances are: (1) Circumstances demonstrating that the ta

ual or exceed a taxpayers [sic] reasonable collection potential (RCP) in order to be considered for acceptance. The excep- tion is that if special circumstances[10] exist as de 10The special circumstances referred to in part 5.8.1.1.3 of the IRM and sec. 4.02(2) of Revenue Procedure 2003-71 (discussed below) are (1) circumstances demonstrating that the taxpayer would suffer economic hardship if the IRS were to collect from him an amount equal to the reasonable collection potential of the case or

& Admin. Regs. Generally, under the Commissioner’s administrative pronouncements, an offer-in- compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable only if it reflects the taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. In some cases, the Commissioner will accept an offer-in- compromise of less than the reasonable collection potential if there are “special circumstances”. Id. Special circumstances are: (1) Circumstances demonstrat

Frahm's 2000 employee benefit form, which con- sisted solely of noninsurance medical expenses, is the correct total of all of the noninsurance medical expenses listed in "Section 3 Medical Expenses" and "Section 4 Medical Expenses" of that form .

- 18 - Section 4 .1 states that the employer must annually contribute to the STEP plan such amounts as are calculated by the plan actuary to provide for severance benefits of its covered employees . The total amount to be contributed by all employers is "based upon reasonable actuarial assumptions and methods taking into account the experience of the Plan

- 20 - Section 4 .03 of the revenue procedures provides : In lieu of using actual expenses in computing the amount allowable as a deduction for ordinary and necessary meal and incidental expenses paid or incurred for travel away from home, employees and self-employed individuals who pay or incur meal expenses may use an amount computed at the Federal M&IE

consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra. Respondent agrees that petitioner has satisfied those threshold conditions. Where, as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold conditions, Rev. proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03,5 lists factors to be considered in determining whether to grant equitable relief. Therefore, the Court considers the factors in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a) and (b) in determining whether respondent abused his discretion in denying

liable for the 1999 deficiency. As contemplated by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 to be used in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under that - 9 - section.1 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297, sets forth seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that petitioner has satisfied the threshold c

C. Memo. 2004-274. The Commissioner has prescribed guidelines that are . considered in determining whether it is inequitable to hold a O requesting spouse liable for all or part of the liability for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Rev. Proc. 2000-15,6 sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, sets forth seven threshold conditions that the requesting spouse must satisfy before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent agrees that petitioner has satisfied those thr

Under Revenue Procedure 2003-61, section 4 .01(7)(b), an exception is provided to the above limitation denying section 6015(f) equitable relief from the portion of a tax liability attributable to an item of the requesting spouse where the requesting spouse establishes that her ownership of the assets producing the income was only nominal .

questing spouse must satisfy seven conditions 4 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which supersedes (continued...) - 8 - (threshold conditions) before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent agrees that in this case those threshold conditions are satisfied. Where the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold conditions, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02(1), 200-1 C.B. at 448, sets forth the circumstanc

pouse relief under section 6015(f) must show. These include proof that he filed a joint return, did not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c), and did not fraudulently transfer property to anyone to avoid paying taxes. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. 448. Both Manns and the Commissioner admit that Motsko meets all these conditions. We next see if Motsko qualifies for the safe harbor under section 4.02 of the Revenue Procedure. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. 448.

iable for all or part of the liability for any unpaid tax or deficiency. The requesting spouse must satisfy seven conditions (threshold conditions) before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 9 . 448. Respondent agrees that in this case those threshold conditions are satisfied. Where,.as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold conditions, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02(1), 2000-1 C.B. at 448, sets fort

request under Rev. - 7 - Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447.4 Despite petitioner's contention that she did not consent to filing the joint return, the Appeals officer concluded that petitioner met the seven threshold requirements of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. The Appeals officer then examined whether petitioner satisfies all three prerequisites for section 6015(f) relief provided in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, and concluded that she failed to meet the elements because: (1)

Petitioners introduced no evidence concerning any allowances they received, nor have they shown that they received a cost of living allowance, foreign area allowance under chapter 9 of title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, or any other allowance described in section 912.

4.03(2)(d), 1981-2 C.B. 680, 682 (prerequisite to advance ruling that a type E recapitalization will be tax free is a representation that the fair market value (continued...) -23- 3. Respondent’s Argument To Disregard Transfer Restrictions and Purchase Option Respondent argues alternatively that the post-reorganization Kohler stock the estate

4.03(2)(d), 1981-2 C.B. 680, 682 (prerequisite to advance ruling that a type E recapitalization will be tax free is a representation that the fair market value (continued...) -23- 3. Respondent’s Argument To Disregard Transfer Restrictions and Purchase Option Respondent argues alternatively that the post-reorganization Kohler stock the estate

oss and those claimed credits were appropriate. - 57 - section 6015(b)(1)(D), see id., is whether in signing the tax return the requesting spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, of an understatement in that return, see Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, sec. 4..03(2)(a) (iii)(B), 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298. Moreover, in determining whether a requesting spouse satisfies section 6015(b)(1)(D), we ma'y consider, inter alia, whether such spouse satisfies section 6015(b)(1)(C).2° We have found that petitioner (

h Cir., June 16, 2004), cross-appeal (9th Cir., July 19, 2004).. 3 Petitioner does not allege that respondent bears the . burden of proof under séc. 7491(a). - 7 - 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at 298. We next consider the factors listed in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03. B. Factors in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.03 1. Whether the Requestino Spouse Is Separated or Divorced From the Nonrequesting Spouse Petitioner's divorce from Mr. Shattun became final on April 22, 2003. This factor favors petitioner. 2. Whet

4.03(2)(d), 1981-2 C.B. 680, 682 (prerequisite to advance ruling that a type E recapitalization will be tax free is a representation that the fair market value (continued...) -23- 3. Respondent’s Argument To Disregard Transfer Restrictions and Purchase Option Respondent argues alternatively that the post-reorganization Kohler stock the estate

Section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the IRS will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). In the instant case, respondent concedes that those conditions are satisfied. Where, as here, the re- questing spouse satisfies the threshold conditions, section 4.0

Petitioners introduced no evidence concerning any allowances they received, nor have they shown that they received a cost of living allowance, foreign area allowance under chapter 9 of title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, or any other allowance described in section 912.

Petitioners introduced no evidence concerning any allowances they received, nor have they shown that they received a cost of living allowance, foreign area allowance under chapter 9 of title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, .section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, or any other allowance described in section 912.

Equitable relief under IRC section 6015(f), however, is subject to two limitations in accordance with - Revenue Proce- dure 2000-15, 2000-1 CB 447, Section 4.02: If the return has been adjusted to reflect an understatement, relief will be available only to the extent of the liability shown on the return prior to the adjustment, or If no adjustment is made, relief is limited to the extent the unpaid liability is due to the non- requesting spouse.

win innocent spouse relief must show. These include proof that she filed a joint return, did not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c), and did not fraudulently - 8 - transfer property to anyone to avoid paying taxes. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. The Commissioner admits that Negoescu meets all these conditions. The revenue procedure then provides for a safe harbor; if Negoescu met these conditions, she would ordinarily get relief. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02. To

5(f), the Commissioner has issued guidelines setting out threshold conditions that must be met . before a request for relief under section 6015(f) can be considered. The guidelines that are applicable to this case are set out in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 296, 297. This Rev. Proc. is applicable to requests for relief that were pending on November 1, 2003, as to which no preliminary determination letter had been issued as of that date. Respondent agrees that, in this case, no p

er abused his discretion in denying relief. Subsection (f) cases rarely depend on one factor alone--even though the Commissioner - 8 - has described some of the factors that he will look at and weigh, his list is not exhaustive. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000- 1 C.B. 447, 448; see also Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 48- 49 (2004). Relief under subsection (b), in contrast, doesn’t even require a determination by the Commissioner denying relief before this Court can grant it. Butler v. C

ection 1001(a) provides that gain from th-e sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the amount realized over the property's adjusted basis and that loss from the sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the 4We note that sec. 4 of the Stock Pledge Agreement appears to require petitioner to tender the collateral for conversion, pledge shares of the newly reorganized entity as security on the loan, and deliver such pledged shares to CareMatrix. - 6 - property's adjuste

Furthermore, Article V, section 4 of the Agreement, entitled Miscellaneous Provisions, also provided that “except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall be binding upon and run for the benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, executors and assigns of the parties hereto”.

ly if the offer reflects the reasonable collection potential of the case (i.e., that amount, less than the full liability, that the IRS could collect through means such as administrative and judicial collection remedies). Rev. Proc. - 15 - 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517. The offer must include all unpaid tax liabilities and periods for which the taxpayer is liable. Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.8.1.7 (Sept. 1, 2005) (Liabilities to be Compromised).2 In some cases, the Secretary wil

4.03(2)(a), provides that the following factors are relevant to whether the Commissioner will grant equitable relief: (1) Marital status, (2) economic hardship, (3) knowledge or reason to know, (4) the nonrequesting 12 Rev.

cational institution is any college, university, vocational school, or other postsecondary vocational institution that is described in sec. 481 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1476. Sec. 529(e)(5); Notice 97-60, sec. 4, 1997-2 C.B. 310, 317-318. Respondent does not question, and we assume for the purpose of this opinion, that Miami University is an eligible educational institution. - 6 - however, specifically define “equipment” or address the treatment of ex

procedures by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, does not affect the resolution of this case.) Certain threshold conditions must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent does not contend that petitioner fails to satisfy these threshold conditions for the year here under consideration, and we focus our attention on other parts of the controlling revenue procedure. As in this c

elines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296,8 to 8This revenue procedure superseded Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000- (continued...) - 18 - be considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, lists seven conditions which must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 298, lists nonexclusive factors that the C

mitations on assessment will expire within 60 days. See generally Dallin v. United States 62 Fed. Cl. 589, 599, 601-602 (2004); Koss v. United States, 81 AFTR 2d 98-2049, 98-1 USTC par. 50,428 (E.D. Pa. 1998); 1 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 4.4.25 at 8477. 3 The Form 4340 for 1991 further records assessments in 1998 and 1999 totaling $1,217.36. - 4 - made an additional tax assessment of $6,500 (bringing the total assessment to the $14,152 petitioners reported as due on the amended

Section 6330 provides that no levy may be made on any property or right to property of a person unless the Secretary first notifies the person in writing of the right to a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals Office).5 Section 4Rule 121(b) provides: A decision shall thereafter be rendered if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materi

wledge factor. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 3.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency no longer is an extremely strong factor that should weigh more heavily against relief than other factors. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(B), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. Actual knowledge is to be considered a strong factor weighing against relief, which may nevertheless be overcome if the factors in favor of equitable relief are particularly compelling. Id. Appeals Officer

4.01(1)(d), if the taxpayer (and any predecessor organization) has not had gross receipts for a period of at least 47 months. Petitioners did not offer evidence showing the amount of Western’s gross receipts from sales and services for any period. Thus, petitioners have not established that Western may use a tax year other than a calendar year

r may qualify for equitable relief. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.9 Under these guidelines, a taxpayer such as petitioner must meet seven threshold conditions before the Commissioner will consider her request for equitable relief. See id., sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. One of these conditions is that the requesting spouse not have filed the joint return with fraudulent intent. Id., sec. 4.01(6), 2003-2 C.B. at 297; cf. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01(7), 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448 (same condi

cretion. Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 146 (2003). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, contains - 23 - guidelines that are considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f).5 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). One of these threshold factors is that the requesting spouse did not file the retu

The ruling lists as relevant eight specific factors. These factors, which are virtually identical to the factors referenced in section 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs., are: (a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception. (b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific

4.01(1)(d), if the taxpayer (and any predecessor organization) has not had gross receipts for a period of at least 47 months. Petitioners did not offer evidence showing the amount of Western’s gross receipts from sales and services for any period. Thus, petitioners have not established that Western may use a tax year other than a calendar year

ner, 122 T.C. 32, 39 (2004). Where relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c), petitioner may be entitled to relief if it would be “inequitable - 18 - to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax”. Sec. 6015(f)(1). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 29716 lists seven threshold conditions that petitioner must satisfy in order for respondent to consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). The threshold conditions are as follows: (1) The requesting spouse filed a jo

factors that are relevant” to the inquiry. Alt v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. Appx. 34, 39-40 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Silverman v. Commissioner, 116 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1997), revg. T.C. Memo. 1996-69), affg. 119 T.C. 306 (2002). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448-449, sets forth guidelines or factors to consider in deciding claims for equitable relief under section 6015(f) as follows: (1) Whether the requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship; (2) Whether the requesting sp

447 (the revenue procedure).6 Where, as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold conditions,7 section 4.02(1) of the revenue procedure sets forth the circumstances under which respondent ordinarily will grant relief to that spouse under section 6015(f) in a case like the instant case where a liability is reported on a joint return but not paid.

cedures by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, does not affect the resolution of this case.) Certain threshold conditions must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent agrees that petitioner satisfies these threshold conditions for each year here under consideration, and we focus our attention on other parts of the controlling revenue procedure. - 9 - Rev. Proc. 2000-15, se

rocedures in reviewing a negative determination. See Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Because of the dearth of evidence in the record on the conditions and circumstances specified in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, we need not address all the factors that are listed there. It appears that the unpaid liability was not attributable or attributed by the examiner to petitioner. Although the decree specified Malone’s obligation to reim

4(...continued) the time the suspension under this paragraph is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the Tax Court. The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this paragraph to enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely appeal has been filed under subsection (d)(1) and then only in respect of the unp

s to use in determining whether a relief-seeking spouse qualifies for relief under section 6015(f). At the time that petitioner filed her petition in this case, those procedures were found in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. Rev. Proc. 2000- 15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before respondent will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). The threshold conditions include the following: (5) No assets were transferred between

g the tax auditor’s findings, which were adopted by the Appeals officer. Her failure to file tax returns for years subsequent to 1998, as well as the factors considered by the tax auditor, are factors weighing against relief. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(2), 2000-1 C.B. 447, 449. On consideration of the entire record, we conclude that petitioners were provided several opportunities for a hearing contemplated by section 6330, they failed to take advantage of that opportunity, and they engage

015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, applies to requests for equitable relief with respect to any liability for tax arising on or before July 22, 1998, that was unpaid on that date. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 3, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists the threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f). We find that petitioner has satisfied the threshold conditions. Rev. Proc.

4.02, 1990-1 C.B. 491, 492, and it definitely showed a different address.5 Respondent chose not to file a reply brief and so missed his chance to grapple with Rizzo and Johnson. Instead, he argues that petitioner’s proposed test leaves out a critical fourth element: An express statement of intent by a taxpayer that his address of record be cha

on. See, e.g., Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125-126. Seven threshold conditions must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent agrees petitioner satisfies those threshold conditions. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists three conditions, which, if met, ordinarily will persuade the Commissioner to grant relief from

der evidence relating to all the facts and circumstances. Id. at 148. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, contains guidelines that are considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f).2 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent agrees that the threshold conditions are satisfied in this case. Rev. P

We concluded that the “sparse evidence” introduced by petitioners was insufficient upon which to base a decision that petitioners were “individually engaged in a trade or business, within the meaning of section 4 The evidence in this case consisted then (and consists now) of 18 numbered stipulations of fact, 4 joint exhibits, and direct and cross-examination testimonies of Mr.

dures have been applied by this Court. Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003). At the time that petitioner filed his petition, March 25, 2003, those procedures were found in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447.3 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before respondent will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). The threshold conditions are as follows: (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return

1, 2003, and for requests for such relief which were pending on, and for which (continued...) - 44 - would be inequitable to find the requesting spouse liable for part or all of the liability in question.39 Section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 sets forth the following seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the IRS will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f): (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable year for which relief is s

evidence relating to all the facts and circumstances. Id. at 148. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, contains guidelines that will be considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f).2 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a 2On Aug. 11, 2003, the Commissioner issued Rev. Proc. 2003- 61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, which supersedes Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 20

ee, e.g., Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125-126. (Subsequent modification of these procedures by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, does not affect our analysis of this case.) Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent has not argued that petitioner failed to meet those seven threshold co

pra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125-126; cf. Ewing v. Commissioner, supra at 45. (Subsequent modification of these procedures by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, does not affect our analysis of this case.) Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent conceded that petitioner has met those seven - 17 - threshold conditio

Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists the seven “threshold conditions” for eligibility to be considered for equitable relief, one of which (set forth in section 4.01(4)) is as follows: (4) Except as provided in the next sentence, the liability remains unpaid. A requesting spouse is eligible to be considered for relief in the

s a stand alone provision, but has roots in the equity test of former subparagraph 6013(e)(1)(D) carried forward into subparagraph 6015(b)(1)(D).”), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332. 5 The Commissioner has announced a list of factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, that the Commissioner will consider in deciding whether to grant equitable relief under sec. 6015(f). The revenue procedure takes into account factors such as marital status, economic hardship, and significant benefit

issioner, 120 T.C. 137, 146 (2003); Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 292. Before the Commissioner will consider a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015(f), the taxpayer must satisfy seven threshold conditions listed in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfies these conditions. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, provides that equitable relief may be granted under section 6015(f) if, taking into account all facts an

has significantly benefited (beyond normal support) from the unpaid liability; and (4) the requesting spouse is obligated under a divorce decree or agreement to satisfy the liability. See Notice 98-61, sec. 3.03, supra; see also Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2001-1 C.B. 448. In reviewing respondent’s determination, we do not substitute our judgment for his. Rather, we defer to respondent’s determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact. Jonson v. Commissioner,

Section 4.03 of the revenue procedure lists several nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining eligibility for relief. In denying equitable relief, respondent most heavily relied upon two of these factors--petitioner’s knowledge of the facts underlying the rental of the condominium unit to her daughter, and petitioner’s receipt of a signi

- 7 - set forth in section 4.01 of the revenue procedure,3 section 4.03 of the revenue procedure lists several nonexclusive factors to be considered by the Commissioner in determining eligibility for equitable relief.

uesting individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency or any portion thereof. Sec. 6015(f)(1). - 17 - As relevant here, a nonexclusive list of factors the Commissioner will consider in allowing relief under section 6015(f) is set forth in section 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000- 1 C.B. 448. No single factor is determinative; rather, all factors are considered and weighed appropriately. See Mellen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-280; Penfield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-254. Knowl

ffer in Compromise was not conducted pursuant to sec. 6330. - 19 - Counsel field attorneys who have previously provided advice on that issue in the case to the IRS employees who made the determination Appeals is reviewing. * * * Rev. Proc. 2000-43, sec. 4, 2000-2 C.B. 409, states that it is “effective for communications between Appeals Officers and other Internal Revenue Service employees which take place after October 23, 2000”. The communications between AO Petrohovich and RC Stanley, however,

Section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). Respondent agrees that in this case those threshold conditions are satisfied. Section 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449, list

Section 4.03 of the revenue procedure lists several nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining eligibility for relief. In his trial memorandum, respondent explained his application of these factors in the present case as follows: The factors favoring the granting of relief to petitioner herein are: (1) petitioner is divorced from Kimberly

undue economic hardship, whether the requesting spouse “had no reason to know that the liability would not be paid”, and whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited beyond normal support from the unpaid liability. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1) and (2), 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449. “No single factor will be determinative of whether equitable relief will or will not be granted in any particular case. Rather all factors will be considered and weighed appropriately.” Rev. Proc. 2000-15,

cted by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, that the Commissioner will consider in determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, lists seven threshold conditions which must be - 11 - satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f). These conditions are: (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable year for

4.03(1) and (2), 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449. “No single factor will be determinative of whether equitable relief will or will not be granted in any particular case. Rather, all factors will be considered and weighed appropriately.” Id. sec. 4.03. In concluding that petitioner be granted full relief from - 5 - liability, respondent pointed out tha

ndue economic hardship, whether the requesting spouse “had no reason to know of the items giving rise to the deficiency”, and whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited from the items giving rise to the deficiency. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1) and (2), 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449. We are at a loss to explain respondent’s comment that petitioner has not shown undue economic hardship. In a Statement of Disagreement as to respondent’s denial of innocent spouse relief petitioner stated

989) (quoting S. Rept. 91-1537, supra at 3, 1971-1 C.B. at 607-608); see Hayman v. Commissioner, supra at 1262. We find that petitioner significantly benefited from the unpaid liability or items giving rise to the deficiency. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(2)(c), 2000-1 C.B. 447, 449. The Doyles received significant tax refunds as a result of the tax 12The original predecessor of sec. 6015 explicitly required the consideration of “whether or not the other spouse significantly benefitted direc

4.01(c), 1959-1 C.B. at 238. Thus, the value derived under the net asset value method is entitled to some weight in valuing HII stock. However, in deciding the relative weight to give to the net asset value in valuing a corporation, we must consider the extent to which the company is actively engaged in producing income as opposed to simply ho

A “pre-need funeral services contract”, in turn, is: any written agreement whereby a licensed funeral establishment agrees, prior to the death of a named person, to provide specifically-identified funeral goods and/or services to that named person upon his/her death, and which is signed by both the buyer and a duly authorized repr

4.02(g), 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241-242. Furthermore, Mr. Schroeder does not indicate whether or to what extent the information from the prior transactions affected his overall conclusion of an appropriate lack of marketability discount. Instead, he states equivocally that the existence of prior transactions is “usually a factor that would decrease

filed a Statement of Disagreement regarding the denial of her request for relief. On March 28, 2002, respondent issued a final notice denying petitioner relief from the 1998 joint liability. Respondent’s denial rested solely upon Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01(4), 2000- 1 C.B. 447, 448, which requires, with certain exceptions, that the disputed tax liability must remain unpaid in order for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to consider a request for equitable relief under section 6015(f). In deny

. 111, 115 (1933). In certain circumstances, if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax, section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner.4 See sec. 4 Specifically, sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2) provides in part: SEC. 7491(a). Burden Shifts Where Taxpayer Produces Credible Evidence.-- (1) General rule.--If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factua

greement was Mr. Forste’s employment contract, and it provided for a term of employment that “shall extend from May 30, 1982 until the retirement or death of Director or the termination of such employment, in each case pursuant to the provisions of Section 4”. Under section 4, four types of retirement were available to DHS’s directors: (1) Mandatory retirement (age 62 with 15 years of service); (2) regular retirement (age 60 with 15 years of service); (3) early retirement (age 55 with 15 years o

pondent argues that when a section 6020(b) return is prepared, it is considered a return filed by the taxpayer for the purpose of calculating the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax pursuant to section 6651(g)(2).4 However, respondent contends that a section 4Sec. 6651(g) provides: SEC. 6651(g). Treatment of Returns Prepared by Secretary Under Section 6020(B).--In the case of any return made by the Secretary under section 6020(b)-- (1) such return shall be disregarded for purposes of determining

Consequently, the petition filed herein cannot be characterized as a stand-alone petition under section 4 Had respondent denied Ms.

Petitioner relies on these revenue procedures to support the per diem expense deductions claimed for the days he was in San Diego during the years at issue.4 While section 4.01 of each of the aforementioned revenue procedures authorizes the per diem method to substantiate lodging, meal, and incidental costs, the per diem method is available only to employers who pay a per diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing the actual expenses an employee incurs while traveling away from home.

Section 4.01 of the revenue procedure lists seven threshold conditions, including the filing of a joint return, that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section 6015 (f) .8 The legislative history of section 6015 further demonstrates that Congress intended a joint return requirement to apply to section

for respondent. 12(...continued) roots in the equity test of former subparagraph 6013(e)(1)(D) carried forward into subparagraph 6015(b)(1)(D).”), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332. 13 The Commissioner has announced a list of factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448, that the Commissioner will consider in deciding whether to grant equitable relief under sec. 6015(f). The revenue procedure takes into account factors such as marital status, economic hardship, and significant benefit

4Energy property is defined in sec. 48(a)(3) as any property–- (A) which is–- (i) equipment which uses solar energy to generate electricity, to heat or cool (or provide hot water for use in) a structure, * * * * * * * * * * (B) (i) the construction, reconstruction, or erection of which is completed by the taxpayer, or (ii) which is acquired by

hen Mattel owns or operates any extrusion units, finishing range ovens, carpet backing ovens, twist, ply or heat set equipment, dying equipment or tufting equipment shall be deemed to constitute an intentional breach hereof by Seller for purposes of Section 4 hereof. The ownership of an interest in or the involvement in the management of Mattel at a time when Mattel engages in the manufacture or sale of one or more new products (except as permitted by clause (c) above) or enters into one or more

94-77, section 4.03, 1994-2 C.B. 825, 827. We agree with respondent for taxable years 1990 and 1992. The band engagement logs are indecipherable. However, for taxable years 1993, 1994, and 1995, we find that petitioner met the meals-only per diem allowance requirements set forth in Rev. Proc. 94-77, section 4.03, supra. The three band engagement logs show

Section 4.01 of SThe Court's jurisdiction in this case is dependent upon sec. 6015(e)(1). See Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. , (2002); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 330-331 (2000); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 289-290 (2000). - 8 - Revenue Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) which must be satisfied

Where, as is the case here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold cónditions set forth in section 4.01 of the revenue procedure, section 4.03, applicable to a relief-seeking spouse in petitioner's situation, provides that equitable relief may be granted under section 6015(f) "if, taking into account all the f cts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the unpaid liability or deficien

Section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold conditions) that must be satisfied before the Internal Revenue service (Service) will consider a request for relief under section 6015(f).¹² If a requesting spouse satisfies all of the ¹¹Sec. 6015(f) provides: SEC. 6015. RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON JOINT RETU

4.01, 1992-1 C.B. 748, 750, in a general explanation of the alternative cost method, reference is made to the general capitalization rules and the interest capitalization rules of section 263A(f) as follows: The alternative cost method does not affect the application of general capitalization rules to developers of real estate. Thus, common im

r some sanction against respondent or relief to petitioner would be appropriate. I join the majority in answering the question in the negative in this case. Because petitioner has failed to dispel 1 See, e.g., 2 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 4.3.19.1.8.2, at 7712 (statutory notice letter must include the last day taxpayer can file petition with Tax Court); 2 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), Exhibit 4.3.19.1-2, at 7748 (form of deficiency notice cover letter, as revised in 1999,

1691; see S. Rept. 97-640, at 25 (1982), 1982-2 C.B. 718, 729; see also Katz v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 5, 12 n.7 (2001); Hang v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 74, 77-78 (1990). A subchapter S item is any item of an S corporation to the extent regulations provide that the item is more appropriately determined at the corporate level than

To assist Alcon [P.R.] in satisfying its obligations under this Agreement, MedChem [P.R.] shall grant to Alcon [P.R.] pursuant to the terms of Section 4 the right to use the Equipment, without charge therefor.

ce and on a perceived advantage of getting into court as soon as possible. See for explanations of this strategy, Saltzman, IRS Practice & Procedure, par. 9.04[1] (2d ed. 1991), and Shafiroff, Internal Revenue Service Practice & Procedure Deskbook, sec. 4.1, at 4-6 (3d ed. 2001). The possible adoption of such a strategy may explain the substance and tone of Haas’ letter of October 28, 1997, and the decision of petitioners’ prior and current counsel to bypass respondent’s Appeals Office. In light

Under this exemption, in general, the debtor's residence and the debtor's personal property to the value of $1,000 are exempt from creditors. Id. The Florida Statutes also provide exemptions for annuities and certain pension, retirement, and profit-sharing plans. Fla. Stat. Ann. secs. 222.14, 222.21 (West 1998). A debtor's inter

4.03, 1994-2 C.B. at 827; see Reynolds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-20. As we have noted, 3(...continued) roundtrip mileage. 4 Petitioner’s records state that the reason for many of the trips was to attend a “Conference” without any description of the nature of the conference. - 9 - petitioners have not satisfied this requirement. We sust

The "Special rules for taxpayers in real property business" contained in subsection 4For purposes of sec.

4.01(1), 1994-2 C.B. 803; 1 5 Rev. Proc. 94-68, sec. 5.01 (Policy), 1994-2 C.B. at 804, is virtually identical. - 17 - Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 4023.4, at 7064-7065. A no change letter is not a closing agreement under section 7121. See sec. 301.7121-1(d), Proced & Admin. Regs. i. Violation of Respondent’s Reopening Procedure

(By that time, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had become the receiver for Vernon.) As a result, in April 1987, THEI gave Dondi - 7 - written notice, under section 4.3.4.2(d) of the IHCL Restated Agreement, that Dondi’s 99-percent allocation of IHCL’s net losses was terminated.

4.01, 1992-1 C.B. 748, 750, in a general explanation of the alternative cost method, reference is made to the general capitalization rules and the interest capitalization rules of section 263A(f) as follows: The alternative cost method does not affect the application of general capitalization rules to developers of real estate. Thus, common im

The only apparently relevant provision of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act is section 4: “The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire administration of the trust to a cotrustee or another.” Unif.

ce and on a perceived advantage of getting into court as soon as possible. See for explanations of this strategy, Saltzman, IRS Practice & Procedure, par. 9.04[1] (2d ed. 1991), and Shafiroff, Internal Revenue Service Practice & Procedure Deskbook, sec. 4.1, at 4-6 (3d ed. 2001). The possible adoption of such a strategy may explain the substance and tone of Haas’ letter of October 28, 1997, and the decision of petitioners’ prior and current counsel to bypass respondent’s Appeals Office. In light

Section 4.05 Distribution of Net Cash Flow. (a) The. net cash flow of the Partnership shall be distributed to the Partners annually or at such more frequent intervals as the Managing Partner shall determine. The "net cash flow" of the Partnership as used herein shall mean the net profits derived from the property owned by the Partnership as compute

Based on this deficiency, respondent determined an additional section 4 The estate submitted a payment of $482,000 with the Form 4768, Application for Extension of Time to File a Return and/or Pay U.S.

onth period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits. - 13 - limited partnership when he or she files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-1, sec. 4.02(a)(4)(B) (West 1999). Thus, petitioners contend that petitioner ceased being the general partner of GSD, and GSD dissolved, when petitioner filed the petition in bankruptcy on July 11, 1991. We disagree. The GSD provision which states that GS

n particular, section 301.6241-1T(c)(2)(ii), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., supra, provides that the unified S corporation 2 Subchapter D of chapter 63 of subtitle F was codified pursuant to the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97- 354, sec. 4(a), 96 Stat. 1691-1692, effective with respect to tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982. Secs. 6241-6245 were repealed under the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1307 (c)(1), 110 Stat. 1755, effective with res

Section 4.01(2)(d) of each of those revenue procedures provides that, for purposes of reducing the understatement of income tax under section 6662(d), additional disclosure of facts relating to an issue involving - 39 - reasonable compensation is unnecessary if the taxpayer properly completes Form 1120, Schedule E, Compensation of Officers, includ

4.01, 1992-1 C.B. at 680, and Rev. Proc. 93-21, sec. 4.01, 1993-1 C.B. at 531, authorize the use of the per diem method to substantiate the amount of lodging, meal, and incidental costs, this method of reporting is available only to employees whose employers pay a per diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing the actual expenses incurred by the em

Proc. 93-50 authorizes the use of the per-diem method to substantiate the amount of lodging, meal, and incidental costs, this method of reporting is available only where employers pay a per-diem allowance in lieu of reimbursing the actual expenses an employee incurs while traveling away from home. Therefore, petitioner’s expens

4.01, 1989-2 C.B. 792, 793; Rev. Proc. 90-59, sec. 4.01, 1990-2 C.B. 644, 645; Rev. Proc. 91-67, sec. 5.01, 1991-2 C.B. 887, 888. - 11 - Petitioners also argue that petitioner wife was not reimbursed for certain expenses which she paid in connection with her employment as a schoolteacher. Petitioner wife did not testify at trial. Petitioners

4(...continued) treatment under subsection (a) of section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 with respect to such an individual, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the Tax Court may determine whether such a determination by the Secretary is correct. Any such redetermination by the Tax Court shall have the force and effect of a decision of

e Services by the members of SC subject to the approval by SC of all such materials and programs. The cost of such materials and programs shall be borne by ABS, and SC shall not be liable for any costs related thereto with the exception specified in Section 4.3 below. SC shall cooperate fully with ABS in encouraging the acquisition and use of the Services. 4.3 SC may elect to pay for the production and mailing costs associated with direct mail or other solicitations to its members to encourage t

4(...continued) Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We need not reconcile any differences in the legal tests, as we would reach the same result under either test. See Haeri v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-20. In the context of determining the identity of a taxpayer’s employer, this Court has also held that it is necessar

4.901-2(b)(2)(iii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 45 Fed. Reg. 75649 (Nov. 17, 1980), as applicable to 1979 to 1982. Applying that test, we held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 289-297, that Norway's Special Tax constituted a tax and not payment for specific economic benefits. The Nhrway Special Tax was enacted in 1975 and wa

Any notice so rescinded shall not be treated as a notice of deficiency for purposes of subsection (c)(1) (relating to further deficiency letters restricted), section 4 We observe that, at the time that the notices of deficiency were issued, the only confusion concerned whether respondent would allow prepayment credits to petitioner.

Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-242, sets forth criteria that are virtually identical to those listed in section 20.2031- 2(f)(2), Estate Tax Regs., and "has been widely accepted as setting forth the appropriate criteria to consider in determining fair market value". Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217. Section 5 of

4(...continued) Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We need not reconcile any differences in the legal tests, as we would reach the same result under either test. See Haeri v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-20. In the context of determining the identity of a taxpayer’s employer, this Court has also held that it is necessar

4.01, 1984-2 C.B. 501, 502. On brief, respondent expends substantial effort to establish that decedent's 1986 remittance was not a deposit. (For simplicity, when referring to decedent's "remittance" we refer to the $89,410 segment of her $185,327 remittance, except where • noted.) But respondent need not have made this effort, because petition

Section 4 The Ginns and the Beals appear not to have made a written request to respondent for a consistent settlement. - 12 - 6224(c)(2) reads in pertinent part and with exceptions not applicable herein, as follows: SEC. 6224(c)(2). Other partners have right to enter into consistent agreements.--If the Secretary enters into a settlement agreement

Rul. 59- - 10 - 60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-242, sets forth criteria that are virtually identical to those listed in section 25.2512-2(f)(2), Gift Tax Regs., and "has been widely accepted as setting forth the appropriate criteria to consider in determining fair market value". Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217. Section

Wegener stated that, in the wake of those negotiations, Häagen-Dazs “clearly * * * [had its] work cut out concerning the financial issues raised by Section 4.5 of the proposed agreement.” Mr.

Article IX, section 4 of the collective bargaining agreement between the City of 3 Warwick and the Firefighters Union, however, provides in pertinent part: In any case where an employee covered by this Agreement is disabled from performing his regular duties as a fireman because of a heart condition or respiratory ailment, it shall be conclusively presumed th

6212. The Internal Revenue Manual directs that the delegate authorized to sign notices of deficiency will either sign, initial, or have a machine imprint the Director's signature on the notice of deficiency. 4 Examination, Internal Revenue Manual, sec. 4(13)14.3(2). Respondent's failure to comply with the Internal Revenue Manual does not invalidate a notice of deficiency or confer substantive rights upon taxpayers. Cf. Vallone v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 794, 808 (1987) (failure to comply with Int

1.6081-1(a), Income Tax Regs., authorizes district directors and directors of service centers to grant reasonable extensions of time for filing returns required by Subtitle A or the regulations promulgated thereunder. An application made pursuant to sec. 1.6081-1(a), Income Tax Regs., may be made by an individual on either a Form 2688 o

731, 15 U.S.C. sec. 15, does not denote physical or emotional harm to a person.) In Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals held in this regard as follows: A plaintiff seeking recovery under RICO must allege injury "in his business or property" caused by violation of the Act. In Re

In the case of a charitable contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction covering a portion of the contiguous property owned by a donor and the donor’s family, the amount of the deduction under section 4(...continued) value of the easement conveyed because of the nonexistence of comparable sales records, but the 100th participant would be limited to establishing a value for the easement conveyed that is no more than 50 to 80 percent of its fair market value.

4.01, 1959-1 C.B. at 237, 238-239; see also sec. 20.2031- 2(f), Estate Tax Regs.] These factors are not intended to be all-inclusive, and cannot be applied with mathematical certainty. See Rev. Rul. 59-60 sec. 3.01, 1959-1 C.B. at 238. Because petitioners made a section 83(b) election with respect to the subject stock, and because the restrict

First, upon the release of the letters of credit by the lender as referred to in subsection 4.3.5(a), then to the General Partner up to the amount to which the General Partner is entitled under Section 4.3.5(a).

Under section 4.01 of each plan, however, if Rozenblatt and Jakubowicz are married at retirement, each will receive monthly annuity payments in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity (QJSA). Under a QJSA, periodic annuity payments are made over the joint lives of the participant and his spouse. The participant receives annuity payments for hi

6(d), Comment to Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, p. 655 (West 1985). Respondent's revenue agent interviewed Mrs. Pert soon after Mr. Riffe died. Kaltenbach referred Mrs. Pert to a tax attorney. At a conference on June 5, 1991, the revenue agent gave Mrs. Pert's tax attorney a copy of a detailed report with his recommended adjustment

Subchapter D of chapter 63 of subtitle F was codified by section 4(a) of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub.

4.01, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-239; see also sec. 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs. These factors cannot be applied with mathematical precision. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, supra, 1959-1 C.B. at 238. Rather, the weight accorded each factor must be tailored to account for the particular facts under consideration. See Messing v. Commissioner, supra. Both part

Petitioner has assigned error to respondent’s determination of a section 4 On brief, respondent states that $179,000 is the amount of the 1986 expenditures.

In the case of a charitable contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction covering a portion of the contiguous property owned by a donor and the donor’s family, the amount of the deduction under section 4(...continued) value of the easement conveyed because of the nonexistence of comparable sales records, but the 100th participant would be limited to establishing a value for the easement conveyed that is no more than 50 to 80 percent of its fair market value.

Section 4.02(h) of Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. at 242, cautions that it is necessary to exercise care when selecting companies that are to serve as comparables so as to avoid comparing inherently dissimilar companies that are otherwise in the same or similar lines of business. In light of the magnitude of the differences between RLIC and the publi

The parties have stipulated that petitioner's books and records satisfy this requirement. Petitioner relies on Rev. Proc. 71-21 for its method of accounting for these annual credit card fees. Section 3.14 of Rev. Proc. 71-21 provides that the deferral of income in accordance with this procedure will be treated as an acceptable method of acc

4-27-203 (Michie 1987). Wisconsin law essentially tracks that of Arkansas in this regard. Wis. Stat. Ann. secs. 856.21, 856.23 (West 1991); sec. 223.12(1), (4) (West 1957 & Supp. 1981). - 52 - Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186, 190 (1931) (venue in Federal diversity case); Buchheit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 81

re recoverable in the years in issue. - 10 - 4. Processing Allowance Most OMT taxpayers can deduct a processing allowance under the third method for calculating OMT profit.1 Id. sec. 3(3)(c)(i) and (ii) (as amended in 1975); Ont. Rev. Regs. 126/75, sec. 4 (1975). During the years in issue, the processing allowance was calculated at a rate prescribed by the regulations or determined by the mine assessor. MTA, R.S.O., ch. 269, sec. 3(7)(c)(ii). The processing allowance was a percentage of the cost

Shares") of the subsidiaries of Seller set forth on Schedule 1.01(a) hereto (the "Subsidiaries") which hold the assets of the hospitals (the "Hospitals") and related medical facilities and professional office buildings set forth on Schedule 1.01(b) hereto (together with the Hospitals, the "Facilities"), and (ii) all of the New Notes (as defined in Section 4.10 hereof), and Buyer shall purchase the Subsidiary Shares and the New Notes from Seller.

That exhibit and section 4 of the purchase contract allocated the 1 Although the purchase contract defined Donald C.

on is known to be incorrect. See 2 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), secs. 4243.2 (handling of undeliverable mail in the examination function), 4462.1(3), at 7900 (manner of sending notices of deficiency); 3 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 4(14)53, at 9142 (30-day notice returned as undeliverable). - 10 - In sum, we conclude that respondent failed to mail the notice of deficiency concerning petitioner's tax liability for 1990 to petitioner's last known address. Accordingly, we wil

A ruling on the supplemental request was issued on August 11, 1981, which did not address the indirect subsidy rules under section 4.901-2(f), Temporary Income Tax Regs, 45 Fed.

fect a conversion pursuant to Article Four), such acquisition shall not operate as a redemption or satisfaction of the indebtedness represented by such Debentures unless and until the same are delivered to the Trustee for cancellation. * * * * * * * Section 4.12. All Debentures upon conversion pursuant to this Article Four (hereinafter in this Section 4.12 called "Converted Debentures") shall be imprinted or stamped with a legend indicating such conversion and whether it was effected by the Guar

4, entitled "POLICY", states: .01 The Internal Revenue Service will not reopen any case closed after examination by a district office or service center to make an adjustment unfavorable to the taxpayer unless: (continued...) - 6 - for the reopening fall well within the parameters of that policy. In any event, it is clear that Rev. Proc. 85-13

a forward contract generally intend to make and take delivery, while the parties to a futures contract are speculators who intend to close out their positions by offset before delivery. 1 Kramer, Financial Products: Taxation, Regulation, and Design, sec. 4.3(b) (1991 rev.). See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1982) (surveying the legislative history of the Commodity Exchange Act to establish the same distinction); Commodity Futu