§46 — Amount of credit

247 cases·27 followed·21 distinguished·4 questioned·2 criticized·7 overruled·186 cited11% support

For purposes of section 38, the amount of the investment credit determined under this section for any taxable year shall be the sum of—

(1)

the rehabilitation credit,

(2)

the energy credit,

(3)

the qualifying advanced coal project credit,

(4)

the qualifying gasification project credit,

(5)

the qualifying advanced energy project credit,

(6)

the advanced manufacturing investment credit, and

(7)

the clean electricity investment credit.

  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1 Determination of amount
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(a) Effective dates—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(b) General rule.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(c) Credit available.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(d) Credit earned.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(e) Designation of credits.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(f) Special rules for certain energy property.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(g) Transitional rule for regular and ESOP credit—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(h) Tax liability limitation—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(i) §1.46-1(i)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(j) Tax liability—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(k) Special rule for refundable energy credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(l) FIFO rule.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(m) Special ordering rule—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(n) Examples.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(o) Married individuals.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(p) Apportionment of $25,000 amount among component members of a controlled group—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(q) Rehabilitation percentage—(1) General rule—(i) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-1(v) §1.46-1(v)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2 Carryback and carryover of unused credit
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2(a) Effective date.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2(b) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2(c) Unused credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2(d) Taxable years to which unused credit may be carried.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.46-2(e) Special rule for pre-1971 years—(1) In general.

247 Citing Cases

Respondent also argues that Petitioners are precluded by section 469 from claiming such credits because they did not have any taxable income from passive activities in the years at issue and that Petitioners are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) because their underpayments for those years are attributable to negligence. See § 6662(a), (b)(1), (c). Petitioners counter that section 469 does not apply with respect to credits under section 48, that they had sufficient bases

310 (property subject to nonrecourse debt)--are materially distinguishable from his case.

DIST. Lee E. & Kathy H. Newell, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2010-23 · 2010

Because a member of an Iowa L .L .C ., unlike a limited partner, was not prohibited by State law from participating in the partnership's business and more closely resembled a general partner, we concluded that a member of an Iowa L .L .C . came within the general partner exception of section 1 .469-5T(e)(3)--(ii), Temporary Income Tax 13 - Regs ., sura .

Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies; however, the Court need not decide whether the burden shifted to respondent since there is no dispute as to any factual issue .

We hold that s mmaryjudgment is not appropriate as to the precise amount (s_ee section V ofthe argument below), but we hold in favor ofthe IRS on the interpretation and application ofthe economic performance requirement.

Reginald & Ronda Charlson, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2001-52 · 2001

ed the Charlsons’, but not C & C’s, 1989 Federal income tax return, without challenging the ITC carryover. OPINION 1. Eligibility for Investment Tax Credit Section 38 allows an ITC, for qualified investments, the amount of which is determined under section 46. Section - 4 - 46(e)(3), as in effect in 1985, limited the availability of the ITC to noncorporate lessors, including S corporations. Noncorporate lessors were entitled to the ITC only if either: (A) The lessor manufactured or produced the

ommissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 839 (1974)), aff’d without published opinion, 114 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 38 permits a general business credit against tax equal to the sum of various enumerated credits, including the investment tax credit under section 46. For all years relevant to these cases, the investment tax credit included the energy credit under section 48. See § 46(2). Relevantly, section 48 provided that the “energy credit for any taxable year is the energy percentage of the basis

Code § 46-204(b)19—does not help the Estate, as the MSA makes no provision for the payment of alimony or maintenance.20 In short, based on the foregoing, even assuming the MSA should be viewed as incorporated into the Judgment, Appeals Officer Duff did Husband agrees that his notarized signature on page [13] of this Agreement constitutes his irrevocable

46:3-17.4 (West 2014) ("Neither spouse may sever, alienate, or otherwise affect their interest in the tenancy by entirety during marriage or upon separation without the written consent ofboth spouses."); id. sec. 46:3-17.5 ("Upon the death ofeither spouse, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to have owned the whole ofall rights under the orig

ner, supra, at 234-239 ("A provision may be either disregarded orjudicially corrected as an error * * * iffailing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve."); 2A Sutherland Stat- utes and Statutory Construction, sec. 46:1 (7th ed.). The "anti-absurdity" canon, while ofancient pedigree, is invoked by courts nowadays quite rarely. In order for a party to show that a "plain meaning" con- struction ofa statute would render it "absurd," the party must show that t

s certain language in one part ofthe statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intend- ed." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, sec. 46:06, at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). We have no occasion in this case to decide whether "collected proceeds" as used in section 7623(b)(1) is broad enough to include civil penalties paid for violation ofTitle 31. See supra note 6. Even ifthat ques

Nonpartisan Analysis, Study, or Research Foundation argues that even ifthe radio messages refer to and reflect a view on the various ballot measures, its expenditures for the messages were not "direct lobbying communications" or attempts to influence legislation under section 46Respondent argues on briefthat the second radio message's reference to the first effectively incorporates the "will soon be asked" language.

Nonpartisan Analysis, Study, or Research Foundation argues that even ifthe radio messages refer to and reflect a view on the various ballot measures, its expenditures for the messages were not "direct lobbying communications" or attempts to influence legislation under section 46Respondent argues on briefthat the second radio message's reference to the first effectively incorporates the "will soon be asked" language.

ness credit under section 38, including the increasing research activities credit under section 41); A.J. Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-42 (general business credit under section 38, including the investment tax credit under section 46). - 23 - Section 6211(b)(4) provides: SEC. 6211(b). Rules for Application ofSubsection (a).--For purposes ofthis section-- * * * * * * * (4) For purposes ofsubsection (a)-- (A) any excess ofthe sum ofthe credits allowable under sections 24

Rand v. Commissioner 141 T.C. 376 · 2013

ness credit under section 38, including the increasing research activities credit under section 41); A.J. Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-42 (general business credit under section 38, including the investment tax credit under section 46). Of the credits at issue here, only the earned income credit was included in'section 6211(b)(4) in 1988. In 1998 Congress added the additional child tax credit to the Code, and in 2000 it incorporated the credit in the negative tax provis

Rick D. Feller, Petitioner 135 T.C. No. 25 · 2010

rebate" as does sec. 6664(a). See secs. 6211(b) (2), 6664(a) (flush language). But of course interpretations that render statutory language unnecessary or redundant are generally disfavored. See 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 46:6 (7th ed. 2007). - 32 - "underpayment" definition excluded such amounts from an underpayment only by virtue of. the definition's express linkager to the "determined without regard to" phrase of section 6211(b) . The breaking of that linkage

Feller v. Commissioner 135 T.C. 497 · 2010

“rebate” as does sec. 6664(a). See secs. 6211(b)(2), 6664(a) (flush language). But of course interpretations that render statutory language unnecessary or redundant are generally disfavored. See 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 46:6 (7th ed. 2007). For similar reasons, I also respectfully disagree with Judge Wherry’s dissent, which depends in large measure on the assumption that “the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return” under sec. 6664(a)(1)(A) cannot

TG Missouri Corp. v. Commissioner 133 T.C. 278 · 2009

b). It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 46:5, at 189-190 (7th ed. 2007), and courts consider the entire legislative scheme of which the particular provision is a part, 2A Singer & Singer, supra at 202-205. “‘[T]he Code must be given “as great an internal symmetry and consistency as it

imes referred to as investment credits). In addition, a substantial part of the project’s assets constituted alternative energy property within the meaning of section 48(l)(3) and constituted energy property eligible for the energy percentage under section 46(b)(2)(A). The partners and DOE relied on the availability of the investment and energy tax credits as a key 9 These contracts obligated the pipeline affiliates to a payment rate substantially above the market price for the gas produced; the

Great American Stageline, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2001-52 · 2001

ed the Charlsons’, but not C & C’s, 1989 Federal income tax return, without challenging the ITC carryover. OPINION 1. Eligibility for Investment Tax Credit Section 38 allows an ITC, for qualified investments, the amount of which is determined under section 46. Section - 4 - 46(e)(3), as in effect in 1985, limited the availability of the ITC to noncorporate lessors, including S corporations. Noncorporate lessors were entitled to the ITC only if either: (A) The lessor manufactured or produced the

Although respondent argues that petitioners are not entitled to an investment tax credit of $3,215 for 1993, respondent’s notice of deficiency does not contain an adjustment to income tax - 23 - to reflect the disallowed credit.11 Since respondent seeks to increase the amount of deficiency, respondent has the burden of proof to establish

Stephen Kowalchuk, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-153 · 2000

4 Petitioner did have a liability for self-employment taxes. - 9 - is that petitioner did not use reasonable and prudent care in investing in and claiming the deductions and credits from this scheme. Respondent’s determinations as to the additions to tax under section 6653(a) are sustained. B. Section 6659--Valuation Overstatement Unde

Marsha M. Bland, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-98 · 2000

er contends she suffered while employed by PSC, is recognized as a tort under Oklahoma law. See Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 76 (Okla. 1986) (adopting the description of intentional infliction of emotional distress set forth in Restatement, Torts 2d, sec. 46 (1977)). This Court has likewise acknowledged infliction of emotional distress as a tortlike claim for purposes of section 104(a)(2). See Massot v. Commissioner, supra; Gajda v. Commissioner, supra; Brennan v. Commissioner, supra. We thus are

OPINION Before 1986, ITC was allowed under section 46 for the costs of certain types of property.

OPINION Before 1986, ITC was allowed under section 46 for the costs of certain types of property.

Mahendra K. Tandon, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1998-66 · 1998

Section 38 property is limited to certain property with respect to which depreciation or amortization is allowable. Sec. 48(a); sec. 1.48-1(a), Income Tax Regs. As observed above, petitioner is not entitled to depreciate the Chrysler. Moreover, because petitioner has not adduced, and we are not aware of, any authority providing that the

Because of the effect of the carryback of this FTC, petitioner was precluded by section 46 from using the ITC carried back from 1979, which was then carried forward to 1981, a year not at issue.

George A. & MarySue Coward, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-198 · 1997

48(c)(2)(A) provides: "The cost of used section 38 property taken into account under section 46(c)(1)(B) for any taxable year shall not exceed $100,000." This limitation applies at the partnership level and at the partner level.

Michael G. Kroposki, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-563 · 1997

Section 1001 et seq.; any and all claims under the Connecticut fair employment practices statutes, CGS §46a-60 et seq.; any and all contract or tort claims; and any and all other claims under any federal, state or local statute or ordinance or under any federal, state or local common law.

Nathanael Roman, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1997-143 · 1997

46-7- 4(D) (Michie 1978) (repealed July 1989). Under New Mexico law in effect during all relevant times, "A gift made in a manner prescribed in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act * * * is irrevocable and conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the security". N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 46-7- 3(A) (Michie 1978) (repealed July 1989). A tra

Because of the effect of the carryback of this FTC, petitioner was precluded by section 46 from using the ITC carried back from 1979, which was then carried forward to 1981, a year not at issue.

Donald D. & Deborah Bowers, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-333 · 1996

46b-36 (West 1995); Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 748, 345 A.2d 21, 25 (1974). If the purchase price is paid by one spouse and the conveyance is taken in the name of the other, there is a presumption that a gift to the other spouse is intended. Whitney v. Whitney, 171 Conn. 23, 33, 368 A.2d 96, 102 (1976) (citing Walter v. Home National Bank

Derwyn J. Booker, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-261 · 1996

Qualified investment in new property is a percentage of the property’s basis, generally its cost. Secs. 46(c)(1), 1012. The lessor of the property, here Encore, may elect to pass through the credit to the lessee, here petitioner, and the lessee generally is treated as having acquired the property for its fair market value. Sec. 48(d). I

Haralampos & Irene Katerelos, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-340 · 1996

Section 46 de- fines the amount of the investment credit to include the regular percentage of the qualified investment determined under section 46(c). Sec. 46(a)(1). Section 46(c)(1) provides that the term - 59 - "qualified investment" means with respect to any taxable year the aggregate of the applicable percentage of the basis of each new sectio

Derwyn Joseph Booker, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-347 · 1996

Qualified investment in new property is a percentage of the property’s basis, generally its cost. Secs. 46(c)(1), 1012. The lessor of the property, here Century Concepts, may elect to pass through the credit to the lessee, here petitioner, and the lessee generally is treated as having acquired the property for its fair market value. Sec

That section provides that the interest on the obligations is not taxable as long as (continued...) - 66 - Ultimately, I would hold that the interest on the Bonds is excludable from gross income under section 103(a).

Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner 101 T.C. 551 · 1993

as mailed Nov. 9, 1989.] As we noted in Murphree v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1309 (1986), some parts of the definition of deficiency may have been placed by the Congress outside sec. 6211; in Murphree, the definitional element appeared in what was then sec. 46(a)(10)(C)(ii). In White v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209 (1990), we held in effect that an element of the definition of a deficiency appeared in sec. 6601(e)(1). Note that the dissent in Kroh v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383 (1992), goes only to the

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