§47 — Rehabilitation credit

121 cases·19 followed·9 distinguished·2 questioned·5 criticized·3 overruled·83 cited16% support

(a)General rule
(1)In general

For purposes of section 46, for any taxable year during the 5-year period beginning in the taxable year in which a qualified rehabilitated building is placed in service, the rehabilitation credit for such year is an amount equal to the ratable share for such year.

(2)Ratable share

For purposes of paragraph (1), the ratable share for any taxable year during the period described in such paragraph is the amount equal to 20 percent of the qualified rehabilitation expenditures with respect to the qualified rehabilitated building, as allocated ratably to each year during such period.

(b)When expenditures taken into account
(1)In general

Qualified rehabilitation expenditures with respect to any qualified rehabilitated building shall be taken into account for the taxable year in which such qualified rehabilitated building is placed in service.

(2)Coordination with subsection (d)

The amount which would (but for this paragraph) be taken into account under paragraph (1) with respect to any qualified rehabilitated building shall be reduced (but not below zero) by any amount of qualified rehabilitation expenditures taken into account under subsection (d) by the taxpayer or a predecessor of the taxpayer (or, in the case of a sale and leaseback described in section 50(a)(2)(C), by the lessee), to the extent any amount so taken into account has not been required to be recaptured under section 50(a).

(c)Definitions

For purposes of this section—

(1)Qualified rehabilitated building
(A)In general

The term “qualified rehabilitated building” means any building (and its structural components) if—

(i)

such building has been substantially rehabilitated,

(ii)

such building was placed in service before the beginning of the rehabilitation,

(iii)

such building is a certified historic structure, and

(iv)

depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable with respect to such building.

(B)Substantially rehabilitated defined
(i)In general

For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i), a building shall be treated as having been substantially rehabilitated only if the qualified rehabilitation expenditures during the 24-month period selected by the taxpayer (at the time and in the manner prescribed by regulation) and ending with or within the taxable year exceed the greater of—

(I)

the adjusted basis of such building (and its structural components), or

(II)

$5,000.

(ii)Special rule for phased rehabilitation

In the case of any rehabilitation which may reasonably be expected to be completed in phases set forth in architectural plans and specifications completed before the rehabilitation begins, clause (i) shall be applied by substituting “60-month period” for “24-month period”.

(iii)Lessees

The Secretary shall prescribe by regulation rules for applying this subparagraph to lessees.

The adjusted basis of the building (and its structural components) shall be determined as of the beginning of the 1st day of such 24-month period, or of the holding period of the building, whichever is later. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the determination of the beginning of the holding period shall be made without regard to any reconstruction by the taxpayer in connection with the rehabilitation.

(C)Reconstruction

Rehabilitation includes reconstruction.

(2)Qualified rehabilitation expenditure defined
(A)In general

The term “qualified rehabilitation expenditure” means any amount properly chargeable to capital account—

(i)

for property for which depreciation is allowable under section 168 and which is—

(I)

nonresidential real property,

(II)

residential rental property,

(III)

real property which has a class life of more than 12.5 years, or

(IV)

an addition or improvement to property described in subclause (I), (II), or (III), and

(ii)

in connection with the rehabilitation of a qualified rehabilitated building.

(B)Certain expenditures not included

The term “qualified rehabilitation expenditure” does not include—

(i)Straight line depreciation must be used

Any expenditure with respect to which the taxpayer does not use the straight line method over a recovery period determined under subsection (c) or (g) of section 168. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any expenditure to the extent the alternative depreciation system of section 168(g) applies to such expenditure by reason of subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 168(g)(1).

(ii)Cost of acquisition

The cost of acquiring any building or interest therein.

(iii)Enlargements

Any expenditure attributable to the enlargement of an existing building.

(iv)Certified historic structure

Any expenditure attributable to the rehabilitation of a qualified rehabilitated building unless the rehabilitation is a certified rehabilitation (within the meaning of subparagraph (C)).

(v)Tax-exempt use property
(I)In general

Any expenditure in connection with the rehabilitation of a building which is allocable to the portion of such property which is (or may reasonably be expected to be) tax-exempt use property (within the meaning of section 168(h), except that “50 percent” shall be substituted for “35 percent” in paragraph (1)(B)(iii) thereof).

(II)Clause not to apply for purposes of paragraph (1)(C)

This clause shall not apply for purposes of determining under paragraph (1)(C) whether a building has been substantially rehabilitated.

(vi)Expenditures of lessee

Any expenditure of a lessee of a building if, on the date the rehabilitation is completed, the remaining term of the lease (determined without regard to any renewal periods) is less than the recovery period determined under section 168(c).

(C)Certified rehabilitation

For purposes of subparagraph (B), the term “certified rehabilitation” means any rehabilitation of a certified historic structure which the Secretary of the Interior has certified to the Secretary as being consistent with the historic character of such property or the district in which such property is located.

(D)Nonresidential real property; residential rental property; class life

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the terms “nonresidential real property,” “residential rental property,” and “class life” have the respective meanings given such terms by section 168.

(3)Certified historic structure defined
(A)In general

The term “certified historic structure” means any building (and its structural components) which—

(i)

is listed in the National Register, or

(ii)

is located in a registered historic district and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as being of historic significance to the district.

(B)Registered historic district

The term “registered historic district” means—

(i)

any district listed in the National Register, and

(ii)

any district—

(I)

which is designated under a statute of the appropriate State or local government, if such statute is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as containing criteria which will substantially achieve the purpose of preserving and rehabilitating buildings of historic significance to the district, and

(II)

which is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as meeting substantially all of the requirements for the listing of districts in the National Register.

(d)Progress expenditures
(1)In general

In the case of any building to which this subsection applies, except as provided in paragraph (3)—

(A)

if such building is self-rehabilitated property, any qualified rehabilitation expenditure with respect to such building shall be taken into account for the taxable year for which such expenditure is properly chargeable to capital account with respect to such building, and

(B)

if such building is not self-rehabilitated property, any qualified rehabilitation expenditure with respect to such building shall be taken into account for the taxable year in which paid.

(2)Property to which subsection applies
(A)In general

This subsection shall apply to any building which is being rehabilitated by or for the taxpayer if—

(i)

the normal rehabilitation period for such building is 2 years or more, and

(ii)

it is reasonable to expect that such building will be a qualified rehabilitated building in the hands of the taxpayer when it is placed in service.

Clauses (i) and (ii) shall be applied on the basis of facts known as of the close of the taxable year of the taxpayer in which the rehabilitation begins (or, if later, at the close of the first taxable year to which an election under this subsection applies).

(B)Normal rehabilitation period

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “normal rehabilitation period” means the period reasonably expected to be required for the rehabilitation of the building—

(i)

beginning with the date on which physical work on the rehabilitation begins (or, if later, the first day of the first taxable year to which an election under this subsection applies), and

(ii)

ending on the date on which it is expected that the property will be available for placing in service.

(3)Special rules for applying paragraph (1)

For purposes of paragraph (1)—

(A)Component parts, etc.

Property which is to be a component part of, or is otherwise to be included in, any building to which this subsection applies shall be taken into account—

(i)

at a time not earlier than the time at which it becomes irrevocably devoted to use in the building, and

(ii)

as if (at the time referred to in clause (i)) the taxpayer had expended an amount equal to that portion of the cost to the taxpayer of such component or other property which, for purposes of this subpart, is properly chargeable (during such taxable year) to capital account with respect to such building.

(B)Certain borrowing disregarded

Any amount borrowed directly or indirectly by the taxpayer from the person rehabilitating the property for him shall not be treated as an amount expended for such rehabilitation.

(C)Limitation for buildings which are not self-rehabilitated
(i)In general

In the case of a building which is not self-rehabilitated, the amount taken into account under paragraph (1)(B) for any taxable year shall not exceed the amount which represents the portion of the overall cost to the taxpayer of the rehabilitation which is properly attributable to the portion of the rehabilitation which is completed during such taxable year.

(ii)Carryover of certain amounts

In the case of a building which is not a self-rehabilitated building, if for the taxable year—

(I)

the amount which (but for clause (i)) would have been taken into account under paragraph (1)(B) exceeds the limitation of clause (i), then the amount of such excess shall be taken into account under paragraph (1)(B) for the succeeding taxable year, or

(II)

the limitation of clause (i) exceeds the amount taken into account under paragraph (1)(B), then the amount of such excess shall increase the limitation of clause (i) for the succeeding taxable year.

(D)Determination of percentage of completion

The determination under subparagraph (C)(i) of the portion of the overall cost to the taxpayer of the rehabilitation which is properly attributable to rehabilitation completed during any taxable year shall be made, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, on the basis of engineering or architectural estimates or on the basis of cost accounting records. Unless the taxpayer establishes otherwise by clear and convincing evidence, the rehabilitation shall be deemed to be completed not more rapidly than ratably over the normal rehabilitation period.

(E)No progress expenditures for certain prior periods

No qualified rehabilitation expenditures shall be taken into account under this subsection for any period before the first day of the first taxable year to which an election under this subsection applies.

(F)No progress expenditures for property for year it is placed in service, etc.

In the case of any building, no qualified rehabilitation expenditures shall be taken into account under this subsection for the earlier of—

(i)

the taxable year in which the building is placed in service, or

(ii)

the first taxable year for which recapture is required under section 50(a)(2) with respect to such property,

or for any taxable year thereafter.

(4)Self-rehabilitated building

For purposes of this subsection, the term “self-rehabilitated building” means any building if it is reasonable to believe that more than half of the qualified rehabilitation expenditures for such building will be made directly by the taxpayer.

(5)Election

This subsection shall apply to any taxpayer only if such taxpayer has made an election under this paragraph. Such an election shall apply to the taxable year for which made and all subsequent taxable years. Such an election, once made, may be revoked only with the consent of the Secretary.

  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1 Recomputation of credit allowed by section 38
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(a) The method of determining estimated useful lives described in paragraph (e)(3)(ii)(b) of § 1.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(b) The method he has selected under this subdivision for determining the order in which such assets are considered as having been disposed of.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(c) §1.47-1(c)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(d) The basis (or cost), actually or reasonably determined, of the property.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(e) Identification of property—(1) General rule—(i) Record requirements.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(f) Public utility property—(1) Recomputed qualified investment.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(g) Special rules for progress expenditure property.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(h) Special rules for energy property—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(i) §1.47-1(i)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(m) Commuter highway vehicles—(1) Recomputed qualified investment.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-1(v) In lieu of using subdivision (iv) of this subparagraph for purposes of recomputing qualified investment, a taxpayer may, for the first recapture year (as defined in paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(b) of this section) to which such subdivision (iv) would otherwise apply with respect to any mass asset account, recompute qualified investment on the basis of the difference between (a) the proper total qualified investment based on the percentage shown in column (5) of the table, and (b) the total qualified inv
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2 “Disposition” and “cessation”
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(a) General rule—(1) “Disposition”.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(b) Leased property—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(c) Reduction in basis of section 38 property—(1) General rule.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(d) Retirements.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(e) Conversion of section 38 property to personal use.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(i) §1.47-2(i)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-2(v) The property ceases to be section 38 property with respect to the lessee if in any taxable year subsequent to the credit year such property would not qualify as section 38 property (as defined in § 1.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-3 Exceptions to the application of § 1.47-1
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-3(a) §1.47-3(a)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-3(b) §1.47-3(b)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-3(c) §1.47-3(c)
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.47-3(d) The basis of such section 38 property in the hands of the transferee is determined in whole or in part by reference to the basis of such section 38 property in the hands of the transferor.

121 Citing Cases

To distinguish between them would deny economic reality. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470, 55 S.Ct.

FOLLOWED Arlene Nussdorf, Petitioner 129 T.C. No. 5 · 2007

- 23 - We hold that the determination set forth in paragraph 8 of the respective notices of deficiency that respondent issued to petitioners in these cases relates to certain partnership items described above .

Because the East Hall was a historic structure, this rehabilitation project had the potential to earn section 47 historic rehabilitation credits.

Section 47 sets out two prongs for the “mere change in the form” test — first, a continuing trade or business, and second, a retained substantial interest. The transactions herein clearly satisfy the continuing trade or business requirement.! However, after the transaction in question, petitioner no longer had any interest in its former glass busin

Hrach Shilgevorkyan, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2023-12 · 2023

§ 47-3419(A) (West 2022). If an accommodation party ends up paying on the instrument, that party may seek reimbursement from the primary obligor and may enforce the instrument, but the party does not have a right to the underlying property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-3419(E) (West 2022). From the testimony we reach the conclusion that Artur was nev

ent disallowed petitioners' special allowance for depreciation because the solar equipment was not "Section 179 property". Respondent disallowed petitioners' energy credit because their expenses did "not qualify for the Rehabilitation Credit" under section 47. Given that petitioners did not claim a section 179 deduction or a section 47 rehabilitation credit on their return, respondent's references to these sections were in error. Respondent now acknowledges that sections 179 and 47 are inapplica

Under - 71 - [*71] Federal tax law, interest in transferee liability cases is calculated in two separate periods, prenotice and postnotice; the applicable notice is the notice of transferee liability. Prejudgment interest (a State law term) includes prenotice interest and a portion ofthe postnotice interest. The postnotice interest

Under - 71 - [*71] Federal tax law, interest in transferee liability cases is calculated in two separate periods, prenotice and postnotice; the applicable notice is the notice of transferee liability. Prejudgment interest (a State law term) includes prenotice interest and a portion ofthe postnotice interest. The postnotice interest

Under - 71 - [*71] Federal tax law, interest in transferee liability cases is calculated in two separate periods, prenotice and postnotice; the applicable notice is the notice of transferee liability. Prejudgment interest (a State law term) includes prenotice interest and a portion ofthe postnotice interest. The postnotice interest

Under - 71 - [*71] Federal tax law, interest in transferee liability cases is calculated in two separate periods, prenotice and postnotice; the applicable notice is the notice of transferee liability. Prejudgment interest (a State law term) includes prenotice interest and a portion ofthe postnotice interest. The postnotice interest

Dictionary 1160-1161. While "noscitur a sociis" is most commonly applied to lists ofthree or more terms, it may apply "when two or more words are grouped together." 2A Norman J. Singer & -25- J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:16, at 359 (7th ed. 2014). Because "political subdivision" appears in the same clause as "agency or instrumentality," petitioner argues that the latter phrase should be given a limiting construction that essentially equates it to the former. T

47-05-02.1 (1999 & Supp. 2013) provided in pertinent part: Real property easements * * * which become binding after July 1, 1977, shall be subject to the requirements ofthis section. These requirements are deemed a part ofany agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document ofagreement. * * * * * * * 2. The du

47-05-02.1 (1999 & Supp. 2013) provided in pertinent part: Real property easements * * * which become binding after July 1, 1977, shall be subject to the requirements ofthis section. These requirements are deemed a part ofany agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document ofagreement. * * * * * * * 2. The du

For increase in tax due to the application ofsection 47, see §1.1502-3(f).

Wachter v. Commissioner 142 T.C. 140 · 2014

47-05-02.1 (1999 & Supp. 2013) provided in pertinent part: Real property easements * * * which become binding after July 1, 1977, shall be subject to the requirements of this section. These requirements are deemed a part of any agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document of agreement. * * * * * * * 2. The

For increase in tax due to the application of section 47, see §1.1502-3(1).

k’s Law Dictionary 1160-1161. While noscitur a sociis is most commonly applied to lists of three or more terms, it may apply “when two or more words are grouped together.” 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:16, at 359 (7th ed. 2014). Because “political subdivision” appears in the same clause as “agency or instrumentality,” petitioner argues that the latter phrase should be given a limiting construction that essentially equates it to the former.

eral resources." Id. at 307. While "n scitur a sociis" is most commonly applied to lists ofthree or more terms, it may apply "when two or more words are grouped together." 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:16, at 347 (7th ed. 2007). Here, the term "for cause" is susceptible to a wide variety ofnkeanings under private contracts. Applyingthe "noscitur a sociis" canon, we can surmise that the Department ofthe Treasury, by associating the phrase "f

Tommy K. Cryer, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-69 · 2013

47:42A (2001), wlÅich was in effect during the tax years 1994 through 2001, provided that "Gross income includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service * * * or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses * * *[and] from interest * * * or the transaction ofany business carried on for g

John Michael Gassaway, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2013-13 · 2013

part ofthe witness's account ofthe background and circumstances ofa material transaction, which as a matter ofhuman experience he would not have been mistaken about ifhis story were true." Carter, 953 F.2d at 1458 n. 3 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 47, at 112 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). Finally, Rule 403 does not provide for a time limit like Rule 609 does. * * * * * Rule 403 requires the court to weigh the probative value and the prejudicial effect. This circuit has consistently applied t

47:lA-1, et seq., and requesting information as to work performed on the 265 Cold Soil property, revealed that construction permits for the dwelling house ofthat property had not been issued until late 2009. The lack of evidence on fair rental value ofthe 265 Cold Soil property, coupled with the testimony ofrespondent's revenue agent that the

Austin v. Commissioner 141 T.C. 551 · 2013

ral resources.” Id. at 307. While “noscitur a sociis” is most commonly applied to lists of three or more terms, it may apply “when two or more words are grouped together.” 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:16, at 347 (7th ed. 2007). Here, the term “for cause” is susceptible to a wide variety of meanings under private contracts. Applying the “noscitur a sociis” canon, we can surmise that the Department of the Treasury, by associating the phrase

taxpayer has the burden ofpersuading the Court that the IRS's determination is mcorrect. Id. at 447. The burden ofpersuasion is satisfied ifa preponderance oftlie evidence supports the fact asserted. John Jay McKelvay, Handbook ofthe Law ofEvidence, sec. 47, at 96 (5th ed. 1944). As -6- explained below, we find that Ensyc has shown by a preponderance ofthe evidence that it had reasonable cause for not timely filing the return. We must first resolve the parties' dispute about whether Jessup maile

rms 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for 2000, 2001, and 2002, Historic Boardwalk Hall claimed qualified rehabilitation expenditures and allocated those expenditures to PB, allowing PB to claim historic rehabilitation tax credits pursuant to sec. 47, I.R.C. R issued an FPAA asserting alternative grounds for denying PB the claimed rehabilitation tax credits. R's overarching argument is that NJSEA sold the rehabilitation tax credits to PB for a fee. R also SERVED JAN -3 2011 - 2 - argues t

Billy L. & Renetta J. Evans, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2010-207 · 2010

47-2853.10(a) (12) (LexisNexis 007) and Mayor's Order 2000-70, dated May 2, 2000.a Their A court may take judicial notice of appropriate adjudicative facts at any stage in a proceeding, whether or not the notice is requested by the parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c), (f); see also United States v. Harris, 331 F.2d 600, 601 (6th Cir. 1964) (expl

Nussdorf v. Commissioner 129 T.C. 30 · 2007

For example, it may be necessary to determine whether contribution of the property causes recapture by the contributing partner of the investment credit under section 47 in certain circumstances in which that determination is irrelevant to the partnership.

supported by the “rule of the last antecedent”, under which the clause “which was irrevocable on September 25, 1985” should be construed to relate to the word “trust” and not to the word “transfer”. See 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:33 (6th ed. 2000); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). That conclusion also is supported by the fact that Congress apparently drafted the general rule with a broad and precise brush, providing explicitly that the GST “shall no

Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner 127 T.C. 139 · 2006

supported by the “rule of the last antecedent”, under which the clause “which was irrevocable on September 25, 1985” should be construed to relate to the word “trust” and not to the word “transfer”. See 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 47:33 (6th ed. 2000); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). That conclusion also is supported by the fact that Congress apparently drafted the general rule with a broad and precise brush, providing explicitly that the GST “shall no

47-2-105 (1963); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. sec. 2.105 (West 1967). Instead, a present sale of nonexisting property or goods operates as a contractual obligation to buy and sell property at a later date. A contractual right to purchase nonexisting property in the future is not a property interest in the underlying property. See Hoven v. Commis

A.J. Concrete Pumping, Inc., Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2001-42 · 2001

The regulations under section 47 raise rebuttable presumptions that the facts are adverse to the taxpayer who fails to maintain the required records.

Such other information would include those factors used in determining whether there is recapture under section 47 by the contributing shareholder of the general business credit because of the contribution of property in circumstances in which that determination is irrelevant to the corporation.

Chester F. & Faye L. Sidell, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1999-301 · 1999

According to petitioners, denial of the rehabilitation credit defeats the express legislative policy goal underlying the enactment of section 47; namely, to preserve historic landmarks and to provide an economic stimulus to areas susceptible to abandonment.

Roy E. & Linda Day, Petitioner 108 T.C. No. 2 · 1997

(c) Regular Tax.-- (1) In general.--For purposes of this section, the term "regular tax" means the regular tax liability for the taxable year (as defined in section 26(b)) reduced by the foreign tax credit allowable under section 27(a) and the section 936 credit allowable under section 27(b).

Day v. Commissioner 108 T.C. 11 · 1997

Such term shall not include any tax imposed by section 402(e) and shall not include any increase in tax under section 47 or subsection (j) or (k) of section 42.

Elaine S. Bennett, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1996-502 · 1996

position or occupation", is to no avail. Our analysis is necessarily governed by the meaning of the operative term as it is specifically defined by Congress and not as it may be more popularly construed. 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction sec. 47.07, at 151, (5th ed. 1992). As we have already discussed, section 4980A(e)(1)(A) defines the term "retirement distribution" to mean the amount distributed during the taxable year under a qualified employer plan with respect to which the indiv

Jerome J. & Beatrice A. Mack, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 1995-482 · 1995

47-10-01 (1978). The requisites of an executory contract for the purchase and sale of real property, also known as a contract for deed, are that there - 20 - should be: (1) Parties capable of contracting; (2) the consent of the parties; (3) a lawful object; and (4) sufficient cause of consideration. N.D. Cent. Code sec. 9-01-02 (1987); Gerhar

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Walt Disney Inc. v. Commissioner 97 T.C. 221 · 1991
Zuanich v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 428 · 1981
Brown v. Commissioner 75 T.C. 172 · 1980
Bremer v. Commissioner 66 T.C. 360 · 1976
Goldstone v. Commissioner 65 T.C. 113 · 1975
Blevins v. Commissioner 61 T.C. 547 · 1974
Southern v. Commissioner 87 T.C. 49 · 1986
R. M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 317 · 1977
Potter v. Commissioner 27 T.C. 200 · 1956
Williamson v. Commissioner 22 T.C. 684 · 1954
Tandy Corp. v. Commissioner 92 T.C. 1165 · 1989
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Soares v. Commissioner 50 T.C. 909 · 1968
Berry v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 351 · 1956
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Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. And Subsidiaries, F/k/a Trinova Corp. And Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 347 F.3d 173 · Cir.
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Rome I, Ltd. v. Commissioner 96 T.C. 697 · 1991
Woody v. Commissioner 95 T.C. 193 · 1990
Brown v. Commissioner 93 T.C. 736 · 1989
McDonald v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 293 · 1987
Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 550 · 1987
Skripak v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 285 · 1985
McClelland v. Commissioner 83 T.C. 958 · 1984
Scar v. Commissioner 81 T.C. 855 · 1983
Benak v. Commissioner 77 T.C. 1213 · 1981
Austin Co. v. Commissioner 71 T.C. 955 · 1979
Millar v. Commissioner 67 T.C. 656 · 1977
Shaheen v. Commissioner 62 T.C. 359 · 1974
Krueger v. Commissioner 48 T.C. 824 · 1967
Marcello v. Commissioner 43 T.C. 168 · 1964
George v. Commissioner 26 T.C. 396 · 1956
Smull v. Commissioner 17 T.C. 1393 · 1952
Theriot v. Commissioner 15 T.C. 912 · 1950
Visintainer v. Commissioner 13 T.C. 805 · 1949
Freudmann v. Commissioner 10 T.C. 775 · 1948
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Sidell v. Commissioner 225 F.3d 103 · Cir.
Ellis v. J.R.'s Country Stores, Inc. 779 F.3d 1184 · Cir.
Skiba v. Laher · Cir.
James L. Thom v. United States 283 F.3d 939 · Cir.
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Jay Isaac Hollis v. Loretta Lynch 827 F.3d 436 · Cir.
Leathers v. Leathers 856 F.3d 729 · Cir.
Marilyn Marshall v. Denise Blake 885 F.3d 1065 · Cir.
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Andrea Byers v. IRS 963 F.3d 548 · Cir.
James L. Thom Jean M. Thom v. United States of America, Leroy W. Thom Jean E. Thom v. United States of America, David W. Thom Janis Thom v. United States of America, Tom Thom Ladena Thom v. United States 283 F.3d 939 · Cir.
Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 694 F.3d 425 · Cir.
Renaldo White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company 104 F.4th 1182 · Cir.