§51 — Amount of credit

118 cases·10 followed·8 distinguished·1 questioned·1 criticized·98 cited8% support

(a)Determination of amount

For purposes of section 38, the amount of the work opportunity credit determined under this section for the taxable year shall be equal to 40 percent of the qualified first-year wages for such year.

(b)Qualified wages defined

For purposes of this subpart—

(1)In general

The term “qualified wages” means the wages paid or incurred by the employer during the taxable year to individuals who are members of a targeted group.

(2)Qualified first-year wages

The term “qualified first-year wages” means, with respect to any individual, qualified wages attributable to service rendered during the 1-year period beginning with the day the individual begins work for the employer.

(3)Limitation on wages per year taken into account

The amount of the qualified first-year wages which may be taken into account with respect to any individual shall not exceed $6,000 per year ($12,000 per year in the case of any individual who is a qualified veteran by reason of subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii)(I), $14,000 per year in the case of any individual who is a qualified veteran by reason of subsection (d)(3)(A)(iv), and $24,000 per year in the case of any individual who is a qualified veteran by reason of subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii)(II)).

(c)Wages defined

For purposes of this subpart—

(1)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection (h)(2), the term “wages” has the meaning given to such term by subsection (b) of section 3306 (determined without regard to any dollar limitation contained in such section).

(2)On-the-job training and work supplementation payments
(A)Exclusion for employers receiving on-the-job training payments

The term “wages” shall not include any amounts paid or incurred by an employer for any period to any individual for whom the employer receives federally funded payments for on-the-job training of such individual for such period.

(B)Reduction for work supplementation payments to employers

The amount of wages which would (but for this subparagraph) be qualified wages under this section for an employer with respect to an individual for a taxable year shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount of the payments made to such employer (however utilized by such employer) with respect to such individual for such taxable year under a program established under section 482(e) 11 See References in Text note below. of the Social Security Act.

(3)Payments for services during labor disputes

If—

(A)

the principal place of employment of an individual with the employer is at a plant or facility, and

(B)

there is a strike or lockout involving employees at such plant or facility,

the term “wages” shall not include any amount paid or incurred by the employer to such individual for services which are the same as, or substantially similar to, those services performed by employees participating in, or affected by, the strike or lockout during the period of such strike or lockout.

(4)Termination

The term “wages” shall not include any amount paid or incurred to an individual who begins work for the employer after December 31, 2025.

(5)Coordination with payroll tax forgiveness

The term “wages” shall not include any amount paid or incurred to a qualified individual (as defined in section 3111(d)(3)) 1 during the 1-year period beginning on the hiring date of such individual by a qualified employer (as defined in section 3111(d)) 1 unless such qualified employer makes an election not to have section 3111(d) 1 apply.

(d)Members of targeted groups

For purposes of this subpart—

(1)In general

An individual is a member of a targeted group if such individual is—

(A)

a qualified IV–A recipient,

(B)

a qualified veteran,

(C)

a qualified ex-felon,

(D)

a designated community resident,

(E)

a vocational rehabilitation referral,

(F)

a qualified summer youth employee,

(G)

a qualified supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits recipient,

(H)

a qualified SSI recipient,

(I)

a long-term family assistance recipient, or

(J)

a qualified long-term unemployment recipient.

(2)Qualified IV–A recipient
(A)In general

The term “qualified IV–A recipient” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency as being a member of a family receiving assistance under a IV–A program for any 9 months during the 18-month period ending on the hiring date.

(B)IV–A program

For purposes of this paragraph, the term “IV–A program” means any program providing assistance under a State program funded under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act and any successor of such program.

(3)Qualified veteran
(A)In general

The term “qualified veteran” means any veteran who is certified by the designated local agency as—

(i)

being a member of a family receiving assistance under a supplemental nutrition assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 for at least a 3-month period ending during the 12-month period ending on the hiring date,

(ii)

entitled to compensation for a service-connected disability, and—

(I)

having a hiring date which is not more that 1 year after having been discharged or released from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States, or

(II)

having aggregate periods of unemployment during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date which equal or exceed 6 months,

(iii)

having aggregate periods of unemployment during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date which equal or exceed 4 weeks (but less than 6 months), or

(iv)

having aggregate periods of unemployment during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date which equal or exceed 6 months.

(B)Veteran

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “veteran” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency as—

(i)
(I)

having served on active duty (other than active duty for training) in the Armed Forces of the United States for a period of more than 180 days, or

(II)

having been discharged or released from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States for a service-connected disability, and

(ii)

not having any day during the 60-day period ending on the hiring date which was a day of extended active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States.

For purposes of clause (ii), the term “extended active duty” means a period of more than 90 days during which the individual was on active duty (other than active duty for training).

(C)Other definitions

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the terms “compensation” and “service-connected” have the meanings given such terms under section 101 of title 38, United States Code.

(4)Qualified ex-felon

The term “qualified ex-felon” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency—

(A)

as having been convicted of a felony under any statute of the United States or any State, and

(B)

as having a hiring date which is not more than 1 year after the last date on which such individual was so convicted or was released from prison.

(5)Designated community residents
(A)In general

The term “designated community resident” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency—

(i)

as having attained age 18 but not age 40 on the hiring date, and

(ii)

as having his principal place of abode within an empowerment zone, enterprise community, renewal community, or rural renewal county.

(B)Individual must continue to reside in zone, community, or county

In the case of a designated community resident, the term “qualified wages” shall not include wages paid or incurred for services performed while the individual’s principal place of abode is outside an empowerment zone, enterprise community, renewal community, or rural renewal county.

(C)Rural renewal county

For purposes of this paragraph, the term “rural renewal county” means any county which—

(i)

is outside a metropolitan statistical area (defined as such by the Office of Management and Budget), and

(ii)

during the 5-year periods 1990 through 1994 and 1995 through 1999 had a net population loss.

(6)Vocational rehabilitation referral

The term “vocational rehabilitation referral” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency as—

(A)

having a physical or mental disability which, for such individual, constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment, and

(B)

having been referred to the employer upon completion of (or while receiving) rehabilitative services pursuant to—

(i)

an individualized written plan for employment under a State plan for vocational rehabilitation services approved under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

(ii)

a program of vocational rehabilitation carried out under chapter 31 of title 38, United States Code, or

(iii)

an individual work plan developed and implemented by an employment network pursuant to subsection (g) of section 1148 of the Social Security Act with respect to which the requirements of such subsection are met.

(7)Qualified summer youth employee
(A)In general

The term “qualified summer youth employee” means any individual—

(i)

who performs services for the employer between May 1 and September 15,

(ii)

who is certified by the designated local agency as having attained age 16 but not 18 on the hiring date (or if later, on May 1 of the calendar year involved),

(iii)

who has not been an employee of the employer during any period prior to the 90-day period described in subparagraph (B)(i), and

(iv)

who is certified by the designated local agency as having his principal place of abode within an empowerment zone, enterprise community, or renewal community.

(B)Special rules for determining amount of credit

For purposes of applying this subpart to wages paid or incurred to any qualified summer youth employee—

(i)

subsection (b)(2) shall be applied by substituting “any 90-day period between May 1 and September 15” for “the 1-year period beginning with the day the individual begins work for the employer”, and

(ii)

subsection (b)(3) shall be applied by substituting “$3,000” for “$6,000”.

The preceding sentence shall not apply to an individual who, with respect to the same employer, is certified as a member of another targeted group after such individual has been a qualified summer youth employee.

(C)Youth must continue to reside in zone or community

Paragraph (5)(B) shall apply for purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv).

(8)Qualified supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits recipient
(A)In general

The term “qualified supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits recipient” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency—

(i)

as having attained age 18 but not age 40 on the hiring date, and

(ii)

as being a member of a family—

(I)

receiving assistance under a supplemental nutrition assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 for the 6-month period ending on the hiring date, or

(II)

receiving such assistance for at least 3 months of the 5-month period ending on the hiring date, in the case of a member of a family who ceases to be eligible for such assistance under section 6(

o

) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008.

(B)Participation information

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Agriculture shall enter into an agreement to provide information to designated local agencies with respect to participation in the supplemental nutrition assistance program.

(9)Qualified SSI recipient

The term “qualified SSI recipient” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency as receiving supplemental security income benefits under title XVI of the Social Security Act (including supplemental security income benefits of the type described in section 1616 of such Act or section 212 of Public Law 93–66) for any month ending within the 60-day period ending on the hiring date.

(10)Long-term family assistance recipient

The term “long-term family assistance recipient” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency—

(A)

as being a member of a family receiving assistance under a IV–A program (as defined in paragraph (2)(B)) for at least the 18-month period ending on the hiring date,

(B)
(i)

as being a member of a family receiving such assistance for 18 months beginning after

August 5, 1997

, and

(ii)

as having a hiring date which is not more than 2 years after the end of the earliest such 18-month period, or

(C)
(i)

as being a member of a family which ceased to be eligible for such assistance by reason of any limitation imposed by Federal or State law on the maximum period such assistance is payable to a family, and

(ii)

as having a hiring date which is not more than 2 years after the date of such cessation.

(11)Hiring date

The term “hiring date” means the day the individual is hired by the employer.

(12)Designated local agency

The term “designated local agency” means a State employment security agency established in accordance with the Act of June 6, 1933, as amended (29 U.S.C. 49–49n).

(13)Special rules for certifications
(A)In general

An individual shall not be treated as a member of a targeted group unless—

(i)

on or before the day on which such individual begins work for the employer, the employer has received a certification from a designated local agency that such individual is a member of a targeted group, or

(ii)
(I)

on or before the day the individual is offered employment with the employer, a pre-screening notice is completed by the employer with respect to such individual, and

(II)

not later than the 28th day after the individual begins work for the employer, the employer submits such notice, signed by the employer and the individual under penalties of perjury, to the designated local agency as part of a written request for such a certification from such agency.

For purposes of this paragraph, the term “pre-screening notice” means a document (in such form as the Secretary shall prescribe) which contains information provided by the individual on the basis of which the employer believes that the individual is a member of a targeted group.

(B)Incorrect certifications

If—

(i)

an individual has been certified by a designated local agency as a member of a targeted group, and

(ii)

such certification is incorrect because it was based on false information provided by such individual,

the certification shall be revoked and wages paid by the employer after the date on which notice of revocation is received by the employer shall not be treated as qualified wages.

(C)Explanation of denial of request

If a designated local agency denies a request for certification of membership in a targeted group, such agency shall provide to the person making such request a written explanation of the reasons for such denial.

(D)Credit for unemployed veterans
(i)In general

Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for purposes of paragraph (3)(A)—

(I)

a veteran will be treated as certified by the designated local agency as having aggregate periods of unemployment meeting the requirements of clause (ii)(II) or (iv) of such paragraph (whichever is applicable) if such veteran is certified by such agency as being in receipt of unemployment compensation under State or Federal law for not less than 6 months during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date, and

(II)

a veteran will be treated as certified by the designated local agency as having aggregate periods of unemployment meeting the requirements of clause (iii) of such paragraph if such veteran is certified by such agency as being in receipt of unemployment compensation under State or Federal law for not less than 4 weeks (but less than 6 months) during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date.

(ii)Regulatory authority

The Secretary may provide alternative methods for certification of a veteran as a qualified veteran described in clause (ii)(II), (iii), or (iv) of paragraph (3)(A), at the Secretary’s discretion.

(14)Credit allowed for unemployed veterans and disconnected youth hired in 2009 or 2010
(A)In general

Any unemployed veteran or disconnected youth who begins work for the employer during 2009 or 2010 shall be treated as a member of a targeted group for purposes of this subpart.

(B)Definitions

For purposes of this paragraph—

(i)Unemployed veteran

The term “unemployed veteran” means any veteran (as defined in paragraph (3)(B), determined without regard to clause (ii) thereof) who is certified by the designated local agency as—

(I)

having been discharged or released from active duty in the Armed Forces at any time during the 5-year period ending on the hiring date, and

(II)

being in receipt of unemployment compensation under State or Federal law for not less than 4 weeks during the 1-year period ending on the hiring date.

(ii)Disconnected youth

The term “disconnected youth” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency—

(I)

as having attained age 16 but not age 25 on the hiring date,

(II)

as not regularly attending any secondary, technical, or post-secondary school during the 6-month period preceding the hiring date,

(III)

as not regularly employed during such 6-month period, and

(IV)

as not readily employable by reason of lacking a sufficient number of basic skills.

(15)Qualified long-term unemployment recipient

The term “qualified long-term unemployment recipient” means any individual who is certified by the designated local agency as being in a period of unemployment which—

(A)

is not less than 27 consecutive weeks, and

(B)

includes a period in which the individual was receiving unemployment compensation under State or Federal law.

(e)Credit for second-year wages for employment of long-term family assistance recipients
(1)In general

With respect to the employment of a long-term family assistance recipient—

(A)

the amount of the work opportunity credit determined under this section for the taxable year shall include 50 percent of the qualified second-year wages for such year, and

(B)

in lieu of applying subsection (b)(3), the amount of the qualified first-year wages, and the amount of qualified second-year wages, which may be taken into account with respect to such a recipient shall not exceed $10,000 per year.

(2)Qualified second-year wages

For purposes of this subsection, the term “qualified second-year wages” means qualified wages—

(A)

which are paid to a long-term family assistance recipient, and

(B)

which are attributable to service rendered during the 1-year period beginning on the day after the last day of the 1-year period with respect to such recipient determined under subsection (b)(2).

(3)Special rules for agricultural and railway labor

If such recipient is an employee to whom subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (h)(1) applies, rules similar to the rules of such subparagraphs shall apply except that—

(A)

such subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting “$10,000” for “$6,000”, and

(B)

such subparagraph (B) shall be applied by substituting “$833.33” for “$500”.

(f)Remuneration must be for trade or business employment
(1)In general

For purposes of this subpart, remuneration paid by an employer to an employee during any taxable year shall be taken into account only if more than one-half of the remuneration so paid is for services performed in a trade or business of the employer.

(2)Special rule for certain determination

Any determination as to whether paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (h)(1), applies with respect to any employee for any taxable year shall be made without regard to subsections (a) and (b) of section 52.

(g)United States Employment Service to notify employers of availability of credit

The United States Employment Service, in consultation with the Internal Revenue Service, shall take such steps as may be necessary or appropriate to keep employers apprised of the availability of the work opportunity credit determined under this subpart.

(h)Special rules for agricultural labor and railway labor

For purposes of this subpart—

(1)Unemployment insurance wages
(A)Agricultural labor

If the services performed by any employee for an employer during more than one-half of any pay period (within the meaning of section 3306(d)) taken into account with respect to any year constitute agricultural labor (within the meaning of section 3306(k)), the term “unemployment insurance wages” means, with respect to the remuneration paid by the employer to such employee for such year, an amount equal to so much of such remuneration as constitutes “wages” within the meaning of section 3121(a), except that the contribution and benefit base for each calendar year shall be deemed to be $6,000.

(B)Railway labor

If more than one-half of remuneration paid by an employer to an employee during any year is remuneration for service described in section 3306(c)(9), the term “unemployment insurance wages” means, with respect to such employee for such year, an amount equal to so much of the remuneration paid to such employee during such year which would be subject to contributions under section 8(a) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. 358(a)) if the maximum amount subject to such contributions were $500 per month.

(2)Wages

In any case to which subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) applies, the term “wages” means unemployment insurance wages (determined without regard to any dollar limitation).

(i)Certain individuals ineligible
(1)Related individuals

No wages shall be taken into account under subsection (a) with respect to an individual who—

(A)

bears any of the relationships described in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of section 152(d)(2) to the taxpayer, or, if the taxpayer is a corporation, to an individual who owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, or, if the taxpayer is an entity other than a corporation, to any individual who owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital and profits interests in the entity (determined with the application of section 267(c)),

(B)

if the taxpayer is an estate or trust, is a grantor, beneficiary, or fiduciary of the estate or trust, or is an individual who bears any of the relationships described in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of section 152(d)(2) to a grantor, beneficiary, or fiduciary of the estate or trust, or

(C)

is a dependent (described in section 152(d)(2)(H)) of the taxpayer, or, if the taxpayer is a corporation, of an individual described in subparagraph (A), or, if the taxpayer is an estate or trust, of a grantor, beneficiary, or fiduciary of the estate or trust.

(2)Nonqualifying rehires

No wages shall be taken into account under subsection (a) with respect to any individual if, prior to the hiring date of such individual, such individual had been employed by the employer at any time.

(3)Individuals not meeting minimum employment periods
(A)Reduction of credit for individuals performing fewer than 400 hours of service

In the case of an individual who has performed at least 120 hours, but less than 400 hours, of service for the employer, subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting “25 percent” for “40 percent”.

(B)Denial of credit for individuals performing fewer than 120 hours of service

No wages shall be taken into account under subsection (a) with respect to any individual unless such individual has performed at least 120 hours of service for the employer.

(j)Election to have work opportunity credit not apply
(1)In general

A taxpayer may elect to have this section not apply for any taxable year.

(2)Time for making election

An election under paragraph (1) for any taxable year may be made (or revoked) at any time before the expiration of the 3-year period beginning on the last date prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year (determined without regard to extensions).

(3)Manner of making election

An election under paragraph (1) (or revocation thereof) shall be made in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.

(k)Treatment of successor employers; treatment of employees performing services for other persons
(1)Treatment of successor employers

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, in the case of a successor employer referred to in section 3306(b)(1), the determination of the amount of the credit under this section with respect to wages paid by such successor employer shall be made in the same manner as if such wages were paid by the predecessor employer referred to in such section.

(2)Treatment of employees performing services for other persons

No credit shall be determined under this section with respect to remuneration paid by an employer to an employee for services performed by such employee for another person unless the amount reasonably expected to be received by the employer for such services from such other person exceeds the remuneration paid by the employer to such employee for such services.

  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1 Amount of credit
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(a) Determination of amount—(1) General rule.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(b) Definitions—(1) Qualified wages.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(c) Members of targeted groups—(1) In general.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(d) Certification—(1) General rule.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(e) Certain ineligible individuals—(1) Related individuals.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(f) Limitations—(1) Limitation on qualified first-year wages.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(g) Election not to claim the targeted jobs credit.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(h) Treatment of successor-employers.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(i) Treatment of employees performing services for other persons.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(j) Examples.
  • Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.51-1(v) §1.51-1(v)

118 Citing Cases

Barrett Business Services, Inc., Petitioner 166 T.C. No. 7 · 2026 · T.C.

Among those credits are the section 51 WOTC and the section 1396 EZEC.

t and the conflict cannot be resolved by interpretation, then the more specific statute controls over the more general one. Estate of Morgens v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 402, 423 (2009) (citing 2B Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, sec. 51:2, at 216218 (7th ed. 2008)). In addition, where two irreconcilably conflicting statutes are involved, the more recent of the two prevails. Id. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue. To

Petitioner does not dispute that its rentals, deriving from debt- - 17 - financed roperty, would be subject to UBTI pursuant to section 512(b)(4) . Petitioner suggests, however, that the operation of section 512(b)(4) is irrelevant for purposes of establishing eligibilit for the section 502(b)(1) exclusion . We disagree . Secti n 512(b)(4) provides that "Notwithstanding" the various ex lusi;ons from UBTI contained in section 512(b)(1), (2), (3), and ( ), unrelated debt-financed income is includ

Stephanie Murrin, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2024-10 · 2024

Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:3, at 222–28 (7th ed.

17 Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 51.04B(1) (1982)), aff’g 75 T.C.

Dennis Lincoln & Julia Lincoln, Petitioners T.C. Memo. 2023-84 · 2023

4 [*4] catalyst.3 Thermal oxidizers are designed to achieve the same result but do so by using a burner to generate extremely high heat to incinerate VOCs, rather than using a catalytic conversion process. There are three separate subtypes of thermal oxidizers: (1) direct/straight, (2) recuperative, and (3) regenerative. A dire

The Beltons petitioned this Court to review the section 7345 certifications under section 7345(e). IV. Proceedings in Our Court The Beltons moved for summary judgment. We construe their submissions liberally given that they are representing themselves. See Rule 31(d) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.

458, 492 ("Under section 51 ofthe Code, married taxpayers may file either separate returns or a singlejoint return.

1.1502-11, Income Tax Regs., provides that consolidated taxable income is computed by first taking into account the separate taxable income ofeach member ofthe group.

For amount of tax surcharge, see section 51 and §1.1502-7.

Upen G. & Avanti D. Patel, Petitioner 138 T.C. No. 23 · 2012

Young cites a similar principle with respect to timber; namely, a license to cut and sell timber conveys no property interest in the timber until it is cut, i.e., severed from the land. Young, 63 S.E. at 749; see also Minor on Real Property, 2d ed., sec. 51 ("the grant of * * * [a] license * *.* under which the grantee is entitled to mine the ore, stone, etc., and remove it * * * [gives the grantee] no interest in the land or in any ore save that actually mined."), cited with approval in Bostic,

Patel v. Commissioner 138 T.C. 395 · 2012

Young cites a similar principle with respect to timber; namely, a license to cut and sell timber conveys no property interest in the timber until it is cut, i.e., severed from the land. Young, 63 S.E. at 749; see also Minor on Real Property, 2d ed., sec. 51 (“the grant of * * * [a] license * * * under which the grantee is entitled to mine the ore, stone, etc., and remove it * * * [gives the grantee] no interest in the land or in any ore save that actually mined”), cited with approval in Bostic,

Yarish v. Commissioner 139 T.C. 290 · 2012

should be interpreted in pari materia with section 72. Statutes may be considered in pari materia when they relate to the same subject matter or have the same purpose. See 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 51:3, at 222 (7th ed. 2012). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that identical terms or phrases used in the Code need not be interpreted to have the same meaning where the sections in which they are found serve different legislative purp

Estate of Morgens v. Commissioner 133 T.C. 402 · 2009

tion 2035(b). However, the statutory conflict rule of construction is properly invoked only when two statutes irreconcilably conflict and the conflict cannot be resolved by interpretation. See 2B Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, sec. 51:2, at 216-218 (7th ed. 2008) (“Where two irreconcilably conflicting statutes are involved * * * the more recent of the two prevails * * *. Where a conflict exists the more specific statute controls over the more general one.”). We reject the

section of the same statute, it is generaly presumed that the disparate inclusion and exclusion was done intentionally and purposely.” United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 513 (8th Cir. 1992); see also 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 51.02, at 122-123 (5th ed. 1992). More substantial evidence exists here to persuade us that we cannot attribute Congress’ failure to amend subsection (c)(7) to mere congressional inadvertence or oversight. First, the original version of the RRA

Flahertys Arden Bowl, Inc., Petitioner 115 T.C. No. 19 · 2000

tion of the same statute, it is generally presumed that the disparate inclusion and exclusion was done intentionally and purposely.” United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 513 (8th Cir. 1992); see also 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 51.02, at 122-123 (5th ed. 1992) (“where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention exis

Harvey R. Leventhal, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-92 · 2000

(N.Y. 1997) (“Generally, the obligation to make maintenance payments terminates upon the death of either party”); 2 Foster et al., Law and the Family New York, sec. 12:57 (2d ed., 1988 & Supp. 1999); 4 New York Civil Practice: Matrimonial Actions, sec. 51.02[6] (1998).13 Because there is nothing in the record to indicate that Harvey had agreed or was otherwise obligated to make the payments required by the June 1 letters after Hermine’s death, the requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D) is satisfied

* * * The duty of ordinary diligence, formerly codified at OCGA § 53-13-51 and defined as “that degree of care which is exercised by ordinarily prudent persons under the same or similar circumstances” in OCGA § 51-1-2, is now encompassed by § 53-12-190 (a).

Hermine Leventhal, Petitioner T.C. Memo. 2000-92 · 2000

(N.Y. 1997) (“Generally, the obligation to make maintenance payments terminates upon the death of either party”); 2 Foster et al., Law and the Family New York, sec. 12:57 (2d ed., 1988 & Supp. 1999); 4 New York Civil Practice: Matrimonial Actions, sec. 51.02[6] (1998).13 Because there is nothing in the record to indicate that Harvey had agreed or was otherwise obligated to make the payments required by the June 1 letters after Hermine’s death, the requirement of section 71(b)(1)(D) is satisfied

494, 562-564. H. Rept. 98-432, which accompanied H.R. 4170, which became the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, indicates that we should inquire into the taxpayer’s purpose for incurring the indebtedness and trace the use of the borrowed money: "[I]f indebtedness is clearly incurred for the purpose of acquiring dividend-paying stock o

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