§53 — Credit for prior year minimum tax liability
133 cases·17 followed·7 distinguished·6 questioned·3 overruled·100 cited—13% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §53
There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for any taxable year an amount equal to the minimum tax credit for such taxable year.
For purposes of subsection (a), the minimum tax credit for any taxable year is the excess (if any) of—
the adjusted net minimum tax imposed for all prior taxable years beginning after 1986, over
the amount allowable as a credit under subsection (a) for such prior taxable years.
The credit allowable under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed the excess (if any) of—
the regular tax liability of the taxpayer for such taxable year reduced by the sum of the credits allowable under subparts A, B, D, E, and F of this part, over
the tentative minimum tax for the taxable year.
For purposes of this section—
The term “net minimum tax” means the tax imposed by section 55.
The adjusted net minimum tax for any taxable year is—
the amount of the net minimum tax for such taxable year, reduced by
the amount which would be the net minimum tax for such taxable year if the only adjustments and items of tax preference taken into account were those specified in clause (ii).
The following are specified in this clause—
the adjustments provided for in subsection (b)(1) of section 56, and
the items of tax preference described in paragraphs (1), (5), and (7) of section 57(a).
In the case of a corporation—
the preceding provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply, and
the adjusted net minimum tax for any taxable year is the amount of the net minimum tax for such year.
The term “tentative minimum tax” has the meaning given to such term by section 55(b).
In the case of a corporation—
subsection (b)(1) shall be applied by substituting “the net minimum tax for all prior taxable years beginning after 2022” for “the adjusted net minimum tax imposed for all prior taxable years beginning after 1986”, and
the amount determined under subsection (c)(1) shall be increased by the amount of tax imposed under section 59A for the taxable year.
Treasury Regulations
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-1 Limitation based on amount of tax
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-1(a) General rule—(1) Targeted jobs credit.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-1(b) Special rule for 1978-79 fiscal year.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-2 Carryback and carryover of unused credit
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-2(a) Allowance of unused credit as a carryback or carryover—(1) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-2(b) Limitations on allowance of unused credit—(1) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3 Separate rule for pass-through of jobs credit
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(a) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(b) Application of credit earned.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(c) Amount of separate limitation.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(d) Portion of taxable income attributable to an interest in a partnership, estate or trust, or subchapter S corporation—(1) General rule.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(e) Deductions not attributable to a specific activity—(1) Specific activity defined.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(f) Carryback or carryover of credit subject to separate limitation.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.53-3(i) §1.53-3(i)
133 Citing Cases
Petitioner protests that caselaw concerning entitlement to deductions is inapposite because the issue at bar is entitlement to a credit.
We conclude that the cited regulation, fashioned in an environment of “disqualified persons” and “prohibited transactions”, is distinguishable from what we face in the instant case, viz, “insiders” and “inurement”.
We need not decide whether petitioner was a disqualified person with re- spect to AMMC by virtue of being a director or having “ultimate responsibility for managing the finances of the organization.” Sec.
We note in this regard the letter's reference to a "point of 56Since we have concluded that Foundation's expenditure for the first 2000 radio message was not a taxable expenditure, we need not decide whether Mr.
We note in this regard the letter's reference to a "point of 56Since we have concluded that Foundation's expenditure for the first 2000 radio message was not a taxable expenditure, we need not decide whether Mr.
10- (continued...) - 34 - [*34] The Commissioner does argue that the stock sale by itself, quite apart from the redemption, was a liquidation, but that still wouldn't free it from the MBCA's restrictions.2° Following the plain language ofthe statute and the reasoning of these courts, we hold that neither the stock redemption nor the stock sale and redemption together is governed by MUFTA.
10- (continued...) - 34 - [*34] The Commissioner does argue that the stock sale by itself, quite apart from the redemption, was a liquidation, but that still wouldn't free it from the MBCA's restrictions.2° Following the plain language ofthe statute and the reasoning of these courts, we hold that neither the stock redemption nor the stock sale and redemption together is governed by MUFTA.
10- (continued...) - 34 - [*34] The Commissioner does argue that the stock sale by itself, quite apart from the redemption, was a liquidation, but that still wouldn't free it from the MBCA's restrictions.2° Following the plain language ofthe statute and the reasoning of these courts, we hold that neither the stock redemption nor the stock sale and redemption together is governed by MUFTA.
Conclusión In summary, we hold that (1) Èëtitioner is a pedper party before this dourt, ( ) Donald Cave, the assoaiate attorneys, and Mr.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that they cannot.
53-12-91 (1997), and constructive trusts, see Ga. Code 10 Prior to July 1, 1991, Georgia statutory law provided (Ga. Code Ann. secs. 53-12-22 and 53-12-26 (1982)): 53-12-22. Distinction between express and implied trusts. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those trusts created and manifested by agreement of the parties. I
An unused section 29 credit of $6,057 from 1988 was carried over to 1989 pursuant to the section 53 minimum tax credit.
§ 53.4958-4(a)(2)(i). The same is true where a disqual- ified person derives an indirect benefit from the diversion of charitable 76 [*76] funds to a third party. See, e.g., Ononuju v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-94, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 109, 113 (holding that a taxpayer en- gaged in an excess benefit transaction when she diverted a charity’s funds
§ 53.4958-4(a)(2)(i). The same is true where a disqual- ified person derives an indirect benefit from the diversion of charitable 76 [*76] funds to a third party. See, e.g., Ononuju v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-94, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 109, 113 (holding that a taxpayer en- gaged in an excess benefit transaction when she diverted a charity’s funds
reasons for our conclusion that the microcaptive arrangement is not insurance in the commonly accepted sense, and therefore does not constitute insurance for federal income tax purposes, we discuss the legal effect of that conclusion in the next subsection. 53 [*53] 1. Commonly Accepted Notions of Insurance To determine whether an arrangement constitutes insurance in the commonly accepted sense, we look at numerous factors including: (1) whether the insuring company was organized, operated, and
And it must issue to each income beneficiary a Schedule K–1 properly describing the tax character of all distributions. See I.R.C. § 6034A(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6034-1(a). G. Burden of Proof The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving those de
Section 53 authorizes a taxpayer to claim a credit for net minimum tax imposed in prior years, adjusted for specified items. The minimum tax credit allowable for a taxable year is the excess, if any, of the adjusted net minimum tax imposed for all prior taxable years, over the amount allowable as a credit under section 53(a) for all prior taxable y
A summary of the requirements Section 170(f)(11) imposes, for charitable contribution deductions, heightened substantiation requirements on taxpayers, depending on the value of the contribution.27 Section 170(f)(11)(A)(i) provides that for 26 If SCT were to fail to enforce the terms of the easement deed, then “the Attorney General or the district attorney of the circuit in which the major portion of trust property lies shall represent the interests of the beneficiaries and the interests of this
It must issue to each income beneficiary a Schedule K–1, Beneficiary’s Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc., properly describing the tax character of all distributions. See § 6034(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(a)(6). And it must maintain a record of the basis of all property contributed to it. See § 1015(a). 2. Analysis As petiti
irs of the organization.” Sec. 4958(f)(1)(A). B. Analysis 1. “Disqualified Person” The Department of the Treasury has issued comprehensive regulations un- der section 4958, including an elaboration of what it means to be a “disqualified person.” See sec. 53.4958-3, Foundation Excise Tax Regs. Persons holding specified powers and responsibilities with respect to a charity are automatically deemed to be “in a position to exercise substantial influence over * * * [its] af- fairs.” Id. para. (c). Th
53a-119(1) (2016). Respondent agrees that Connecticut law controls and that embezzlement constitutes a "theft." See sec. 1.165-8(d), Income Tax Regs. (defining "theft" to include "embezzlement"). But respondent disputes that Mr. Bruno's actions amounted to felony embezzlement under Connecticut law. We share respondent's concern. Embezzlement w
53-12-203 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 5807.02 (West 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 60, sec. 175.24(E) (2017); Unif. Trust Code sec. 702(a) (Unif. Law Comm'n 2016). Since the MTAs are explicitly labeled "trust agreements," we find the requirement ofcollateral to be a neutral factor here. - 57 - • Whether repayments were made: As far as the recor
53-12-203 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 5807.02 (West 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 60, sec. 175.24(E) (2017); Unif. Trust Code sec. 702(a) (Unif. Law Comm'n 2016). Since the MTAs are explicitly labeled "trust agreements," we find the requirement ofcollateral to be a neutral factor here. - 57 - • Whether repayments were made: As far as the recor
53-4- 63(a) (West 1996). In an effort to identify and define the residue, the parties focus on Items Eight and Nine ofClyde Sr.'s will. Item Eight expresses Clyde Sr.'s intent to leave assets to Jewell undiminished by any estate, inheritance, succession, death, or similar taxes and having a value "equal to the maximum marital deduction".6 5The
On that record, we further find that during each ofthe years 2010, 2011, and 2012 AHA was an applicable tax-exempt organization, as defined in section 4958(e).
ability need not have been known when the transfer was made." Wyche v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 414, 419 (1937); see also Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1941), a_ffg 1939 WL 12120 (B.T.A.); 14A Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation, sec. 53.40 (2014) ("A transferee is retroactively liable for the transferor's taxes in the year ofthe transfer and also prior years, to the extent ofthe assets received from the transferor. This rule applies even where the transferor's tax liability
ability need not have been known when the transfer was made." Wyche v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 414, 419 (1937); see also Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1941), a_ffg 1939 WL 12120 (B.T.A.); 14A Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation, sec. 53.40 (2014) ("A transferee is retroactively liable for the transferor's taxes in the year ofthe transfer and also prior years, to the extent ofthe assets received from the transferor. This rule applies even where the transferor's tax liability
ability need not have been known when the transfer was made." Wyche v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 414, 419 (1937); see also Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1941), a_ffg 1939 WL 12120 (B.T.A.); 14A Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation, sec. 53.40 (2014) ("A transferee is retroactively liable for the transferor's taxes in the year ofthe transfer and also prior years, to the extent ofthe assets received from the transferor. This rule applies even where the transferor's tax liability
ability need not have been known when the transfer was made." Wyche v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 414, 419 (1937); see also Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1941), a_ffg 1939 WL 12120 (B.T.A.); 14A Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation, sec. 53.40 (2014) ("A transferee is retroactively liable for the transferor's taxes in the year ofthe transfer and also prior years, to the extent ofthe assets received from the transferor. This rule applies even where the transferor's tax liability
ted liability as being that ofa transferee or of a transferee ofa transferee nor to evaluate its legal effect.'" Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 712 F.3d 597, 612 n.5 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting 14A Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation sec. 53:24, at 53-68). In Bos Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1965-71, 1965 Tax Ct. Memo. LEXIS 259, at *31, aff'd, 354 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1965), we also said: "This identificationmay be necessary ifand when the additional one-yearperiod ofth
edit); sec. 30 (credit for qualified electric vehicles); sec. 30A (Puerto Rico economic activity credit); sec. 30B (alternative motor vehicle credit); sec. 30C (alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit); sec. 38 (general business credit); sec. 53 (credit for prior year minimum tax liability); and sec. 54 (credit to holders ofclean renewable energy bonds). In using that same phrase, the general business credit under section 38 brings along with it more than 30 other credits that must al
redit); sec. 30 (credit for qualified electric vehicles); sec. 30A (Puerto Rico economic activity credit); sec. 30B (alternative motor vehicle credit); sec. 30C (alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit); sec. 38 (general business credit); sec. 53 (credit for prior year minimum tax liability); sec. 54 (credit to holders of clean renewable energy bonds). In using that same phrase, the general business credit under section 38 brings along with it more than 30 other credits that must also
2002 petitioner subsequently filed Forms 1120X, Amended U.S . Corporation Income Tax Return, for the consolidated group . For 1996 through 1998 petitioner's returns reflected a liability for regular income tax which was reduced by AMT credits under section 53 . For 1999 and 2000, petitioner's returns reflected a liability for AMT under section 55 . For 2001 and 2002 petitioner's returns reflected a liability for regular - 5 - income tax that was reduced by AMT credits under section 53 . Petitio
nd 2002 petitioner subsequently filed Forms 1120X, Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the consolidated group. For 1996 through 1998 petitioner’s returns reflected a liability for regular income tax which was reduced by AMT credits under section 53. For 1999 and 2000, petitioner’s returns reflected a liability for AMT under section 55. For 2001 and 2002 petitioner’s returns reflected a liability for regular income tax that was reduced by AMT credits under section 53. Petitioner paid
Section 53 authorizes a taxpayer to claim a credit for net minimum tax paid in prior years, adjusted for specified items . The minimum tax credit allowable under section 53 is the exbess - 12 - if any of the adjusted net minimum tax imposed for all prior taxable years beginning after 1986, over the amount allowable as a credit under section 53(a)
Although petitioners were not subject to the AMT in 2001, they computed their 2001 AMTI to ascertain the amount of the section 53 credit for prior year minimum tax liability that they could claim in 3 A statement attached to petitioners' 2001 return reports that the selling price of the shares totaled $248,972 and that the resulting gain was $149,024 ($248,972 - $99,948) .
Although petitioners were not subject to the AMT in 2001, they computed their 2001 AMTI to ascertain the amount of the section 53 credit for prior year minimum tax liability that they could claim in 2001.
olved for the subject years were as follows: - 8 - Date Principal Interest Amount Involved 1/1/96 $203,241 10% $20,324 1/1/97 223,565 10 22,356 1/1/98 245,922 10 24,592 1/1/99 270,514 10 27,051 1/1/00 297,565 10 29,756 124,079 Respondent noted that section 53.4941(e)-1(e)(1), Foundation Excise Tax Regs., treats prohibited transaction loans as occurring on the first day of each taxable year in the taxable period after the year in which the loan occurs and determined on the basis of these regulati
f an employees plan (sec. 401(a)) engaged in a prohibited transaction, then the entity lost its section 501(a) 7(...continued) the nature of the Plan's other assets, or (2) either the magnitude or the timing of the Plan's obligations. 8 We note that sec. 53.4941(d)-2(f), Private Foundation Excise Tax Regs., interprets sec. 4941(d)(1)(E), which is almost exactly the same as sec. 4975(c)(1)(D). Neither side cites this regulation for any purpose. Under the circumstances we do not explore in the ins
s. The phrase “substantially all of its income”, as used in the integral part test, has been interpreted to mean 85 percent or more of net income. Rev. Rul. 76-208, 1976-1 C.B. 161 (stating that the terminology should be given the same meaning as in sec. 53.4942(b)-1(c), Foundation Excise Tax Regs.). Since petitioner has indicated that it will distribute at least 85 percent of its net annual income, we focus on the further criteria intended to cultivate attentiveness. With respect to the first m
Section 53- 2-115, hereby irrevocably and unqualifiedly disclaims, renounces and refuses to accept any and all rights, title and interest (including, but not limited to, rights in intestacy) in the Disclaimed Property Interest. Except for this disclaimer and refusal to accept any interest in the Disclaimed Property Interest, CATHY LASSITER SMITH [o
t fiduciary standards." Sec. 4975(f)(5). Where the prohibited transaction is the lending of money, the disqualified person corrects the transaction by repaying the principal plus reasonable interest. See Kadivar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-404; sec. 53.4941(e)-1(c)(4), Foundation Excise Tax Regs. Mr. Medina's assignment to the plan of future sales proceeds did - 8 - not result in the repayment of principal or interest. Therefore, petitioners did not correct the prohibited transaction, and t
t was likely to injure the pension plan." Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., supra at 160. In this case, the contribution of accounts receivable presents concern over valuation and imposes collection duties on the Plan. -12- 651 (1991); sec. 53.4941(a)-1(a)(3), Foundation Excise Tax Regs. Further, those who participate in a section 4975 prohibited transaction are liable for the excise tax notwithstanding that they may have acted innocently or in good faith. Rutland v. Commissioner, 8
Former Georgia Code section 53-7-7, applicable to decedents dying before January 1, 1998, provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) An executor * * * shall have the legal right to borrow money * * * for the purpose of paying any gift, estate, inheritance, income, sales, or ad valorem taxes due the United States * * * [or] state * * *.
o extended the 1:00 p.m., deadline contained in the November 6 letter. It is hornbook law that, if an acceptance fails to comply with a time requirement in an - 20 - offer, the time requirement may be waived. E.g., 1 Jaeger, Williston on Contracts, sec. 53, at 171 (3d ed. 1957): Not infrequently an offeror who has imposed a limit of time in his offer does not care to insist upon it and by further negotiations may indicate a continued willingness to stand by the terms of his offer. Any such manif
53-12-4 (Michie 1978); (2) A corporation that has commenced business activity may dissolve voluntarily by written consent of the shareholders or by an act of the corporation. Id. at secs. 53-16-2 and 3; (3) Following the decision to dissolve the corporation, a statement of intent to dissolve must be filed with the State. Id. at sec. 53-16-4; a
o extended the 1:00 p.m., deadline contained in the November 6 letter. It is hornbook law that, if an acceptance fails to comply with a time requirement in an - 20 - offer, the time requirement may be waived. E.g., 1 Jaeger, Williston on Contracts, sec. 53, at 171 (3d ed. 1957): Not infrequently an offeror who has imposed a limit of time in his offer does not care to insist upon it and by further negotiations may indicate a continued willingness to stand by the terms of his offer. Any such manif
As security for the payment of Basic Rent, Lessee has delivered a letter of credit (herein, such letter of credit, and each extension or replacement thereof pursuant to this Section 53, is called the "Letter of Credit") in the aggregate amount equal to $8,872,245, with an expiry date of June 30, 1989, issued by Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("CIBC") and Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., and with the Lessor * * * as beneficiary, which Letter of Credit may be assigned for collateral purposes by the
As security for the payment of Basic Rent, Lessee has delivered a letter of credit (herein, such letter of credit, and each extension or replacement thereof pursuant to this Section 53, is called the "Letter of Credit”) in the aggregate amount equal to $8,872,245, with an expiry date of June 30, 1989, issued by Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”) and Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., and with the Lessor * * * as beneficiary, which Letter of Credit may be assigned for collateral purposes by the