§60

The Court need not decide who has the burden of proof under subsection (c) because both parties introduced evidence and we shall decide the issues by a preponderance of the evidence.

5 We note that section 47(c)(3)(A) went through several numbering changes over the years. We will refer to the current section numbering for purposes of clarity. 7 As described in the current version of the regulations, last revised in 1981, the “National Register was designed to be and is administered as a planning tool,” and

Additionally, section 60.15(a)(2) provides that an eligible spouse may ..· request to limit her liability for any deficiency with respect to ajoint return under section 6015(c).

Certain expenses can be deducted onlÝ if the taxpayer can substantiate (1) the amount of the expense, (2) the time and place the* expense was incurr'ed, añd (3) the business purpose of the^expense. Sec. 274 (d); s'ec. 1.274-5A(b) (2), Income Tax Regs. Such expenses inòlude meals and entertainment expenses, travel expenses, and expenses r

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION MARVEL, Judge: Pursuant to section 6015, petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to deny relief from joint and several liability for unpaid Federal income taxes for 1997- 2000 under section 6015 (f) .1 Petitioner timely petitioned this 1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code fo

Petitioner's request for relief apparently included an attachment that contained such an.allocation for each year, bùt that attachment has not been provided to the Court. Because respondent has not tchallenged petitioner's allocation of the deficiency -for either year, we assume, without finding, that the allocation was acceptable

0 Several Liability under Section 6015 ( notice of determination) for tax years 1992 through 1997 . The accompanying Appeals Office. memorandum stated that the Appeals officer believed petitioner had submitted joint returns for all years . The notice of determination denied petitioner ' s appeal for relief under section 6015 and listed the joint liabilities as follows : Amount of Amount of Tax Tax Period Relief Requested Remaining 1992 $93,232 $93,232 1993 17,894 17,894 1994 26,541 26,54 1 1995

By its terms, section 6015 applies only .if an individual has made a joint return . Sec . 6015(a)(1) . Because petitioner filed no joint return for 2005, section . 6015 is inapplicable--indeed, it .

.Pursuant to section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribe d revenue procedure guidelines to help IRS employees deterjmine .whether a .

Additionally, I am concerned"that today the Court, on the' pretext that a 2006 amendment to section 6015(e) provides an occasion to reconsider our prior rulings,z essentially overrules our longstanding precedent that this Court reviews the Commissioner's denial of section 6015(f) relief for abuse of discretion .

6015 .` On or about March 26, 2002, petitioner filed Form 8857,,,-, Request for Innocent Spouse .Relief (And Separation of Liability and Equitable Relief), do which,she'requested relief from joint" and several liability for the 1979-81 liabilities pursuant to section 6015 .

section 6015(b). Section 6015(c) Analysis Because petitioner cannot avoid liability for the deficiency arising from the joint 1999 return under section 6015(b), we now turn our attention.to·her claim for relief from joint and several liability under section 60lS(c). Section 6015(c) allows a taxpayer, who is eligible and so elects, to limit his ór her liability to the portion of a deficiency that is properly - 23 - allocable to the taxpayer as provided in section 6015(d). Sec. 6015(c)(1). Under s

60-208(e)(1) (1994), the short plain statement of the claim is sufficient only if it gives the defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Rinsley v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334, 338 (Kan. 1977) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Though it is not necessary to spell out a legal theory o

60-208(e)(1) (1994), the short plain statement of the claim is sufficient only if it gives the defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Rinsley v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334, 338 (Kan. 1977) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Though it is not necessary to spell out a legal theory o

pal functions of cross- examination. * * * Rule 60(b) should not reward the lazy litigant who did not adequately investigate his or her case, or who did not vigorously cross-examine a witness. [Fn. refs. omitted.] 12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 60.43[1][c], at 60-131 to 60-132 (3d ed. 1998). In this regard, courts have denied relief under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party had a full and fair opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud or perjury

pal functions of cross- examination. * * * Rule 60(b) should not reward the lazy litigant who did not adequately investigate his or her case, or who did not vigorously cross-examine a witness. [Fn. refs. omitted.] 12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 60.43[1][c], at 60-131 to 60-132 (3d ed. 1998). In this regard, courts have denied relief under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party had a full and fair opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud or perjury

pal functions of cross- examination. * * * Rule 60(b) should not reward the lazy litigant who did not adequately investigate his or her case, or who did not vigorously cross-examine a witness. [Fn. refs. omitted.] 12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 60.43[1][c], at 60-131 to 60-132 (3d ed. 1998). In this regard, courts have denied relief under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party had a full and fair opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud or perjury

pal functions of cross- examination. * * * Rule 60(b) should not reward the lazy litigant who did not adequately investigate his or her case, or who did not vigorously cross-examine a witness. [Fn. refs. omitted.] 12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 60.43[1][c], at 60-131 to 60-132 (3d ed. 1998). In this regard, courts have denied relief under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party had a full and fair opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud or perjury

pal functions of cross- examination. * * * Rule 60(b) should not reward the lazy litigant who did not adequately investigate his or her case, or who did not vigorously cross-examine a witness. [Fn. refs. omitted.] 12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 60.43[1][c], at 60-131 to 60-132 (3d ed. 1998). In this regard, courts have denied relief under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party had a full and fair opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud or perjury

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

presentation or omission of the respondent. [Saigh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423 (1961).] See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); 15 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, sec. 60.05, at 19-23 (1989). Moreover, the doctrine of consistency does not impose an affirmative duty upon respondent to stay on the lookout, and to analyze for error, petitioners' returns for years later than those in issue. If the underlying trans

h Cir. 1956); Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 496 (1st Cir. 1948)(simple failure to report income “is not a representation that such income has in fact not been received” and does not, without more, furnish grounds for estoppel); Mertens, supra, sec. 60.05 ("Where there is a mistake of law and no factual misrepresentations, the doctrine of consistency does not apply."). Moreover, the misstatement must be one on which the government reasonably relied, in the sense that it neither knew, nor ou