§6304 — Fair tax collection practices
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Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §6304
Without the prior consent of the taxpayer given directly to the Secretary or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Secretary may not communicate with a taxpayer in connection with the collection of any unpaid tax—
at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the taxpayer;
if the Secretary knows the taxpayer is represented by any person authorized to practice before the Internal Revenue Service with respect to such unpaid tax and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such person’s name and address, unless such person fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the Secretary or unless such person consents to direct communication with the taxpayer; or
at the taxpayer’s place of employment if the Secretary knows or has reason to know that the taxpayer’s employer prohibits the taxpayer from receiving such communication.
In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, the Secretary shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a taxpayer is after 8 a.m. and before 9 p.m., local time at the taxpayer’s location.
The Secretary may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of any unpaid tax. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this subsection:
The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.
The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.
Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.
Except as provided under rules similar to the rules in section 804 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (
15 U.S.C. 1692b
), the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.
For civil action for violations of this section, see section 7433.
5 Citing Cases
) Segal took Rosènbloom 9 In the RRA 1998 Congress added section 6304 to the Code, prohibiting the IRS from communicating directly with a taxpayer known to be represented by an attorney. See Pub. L. 105 206, sec. 3566(a), 112 stat. 768. 1 ° As a result of RRA 1998, sec. 3461(a), 112 Stat. 764, waivers executed after 1999 are invalid if not agreed to at the time the installment agreement is entered into. See sec. 6502. But because Rosenbloom' s waiver was given .in 1997, that limitation does not
Section 6304, captioned "Fair Tax Collection Practices," provides that the Secretary generally "may not com- municate with a taxpayer in connection with the collection ofany unpaid tax" if the Secretary "knows the taxpayer is represented by any person authorized to practice" before the IRS and "has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such perso
ematurely because she had not been given the opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Third, she argued that her rights were violated because a revenue agent visited her at work, a visit that she contends violated her rights pursuant to - 5 - [*5] section 6304. Fourth, she contended that the lien was filed in violation of section 6320, which requires that the Commissioner notify a taxpayerwithin five business days after filing an NFTL. In support ofher contention, she attached a certified copy
ner, through Myster, 2Petitioner also contends that his right to due process was violated when respondent knew that petitioner was represented by counsel but called petitioner directly. Petitioner contends that respondent violated subsec. (a) (2) of sec. 6304, Fair Tax Collection Practices, and is subject to a sec. 7433 claim. We do not have jurisdiction over such claims. See sec. 7433(a). - 6 - did not follow the proper procedure for submitting the $60,000 payment. See sec. 301.7122-1(h)), Proc
6304 as added by RRA 1998, sec. 3466, 112 Stat. 768; see also H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 291 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1045. Petitioner’s reliance upon FDCPA practices that Congress has not included in the Internal Revenue Code is unavailing. Nor has petitioner convinced us that respondent has deprived him of constitutional due process by a per