§633

Respondent invites us to overrule our opinion in Robinette and limit our review to the administrative record .

.) - 15 - because section 6330 requires a de novo standard of review when the underlying liability is properly in issue, the administrativ e record rule is not applicable to such a case .10 5 U.S.C . sec . 554(a)(1) (20.0(6A) dministrative Procedure Act does not apply where "a matter [is] subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo :in a court") .

We need not decide whether Mrs .

Under the circumstances, specifically petitioner's credible testimony and his history of promptly responding to tax-related notices, we are not convinced tha t petitioner received the notice of deficiency .

-3- [*3] MEMORANDUM OPINION GUSTAFSON, Judge: This is a "collection due process" ("CDP") appeal pursuant to section 6330(d),¹ in which petitioner, Bahig Bishay, asks us to review the determination by the Office ofAppeals ("Appeals") ofthe Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to sustain the filing ofa notice ofFederal tax lien ("NFTL") to collect section 6672 trust fund recovery penalties assessed against him for failing

MEMORANDUM OPINION GUSTAFSON, Judge: This is a collection due process ("CDP") appeal pursuant to section 6330(d),¹ in which petitioner Kelvin Trent Tucker asks this Court to review the determination by the Office ofAppeals ("Appeals") ofthe ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (codified in 26 U.S.C., and referredto herein as "the Code") as in effect

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge : Pursuant to section 6330(d),' petitioner seeks review of respondent's determination to proceed with the collection of petitioner's 2002 Federal income tax liability .

had no prior involvement with the matter and ordered that petitioner be afforded a face-to-face hearing pursuant to section 6330 .' Additionally, .

MEMORANDUM OPINION JACOBS, Judge : This base arises from a petition for judicial review pursuant to section 6330(d) of respondent' s determination to proceed with collection of petitioner's unpai d -Federal income taxes for 2001 by levy .

d he has not asserted any argument or offered any documentation to convince us that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity or receipt of the notices for any of the - 13 - years that would preclude us from granting respondent's motion for summary judgment .10 Accordingly,- we hold that respondent properly determined that petitioner was not entitled to challenge his underlying tax liabilities during the section 6330 hearing, and we will review respondent's determination

Discussion Petitioners petitioned the Court pursuant to section 6330(d) challenging respondent's determination to sustain hisjfinal notices of intent to.

The taxpayer or the taxpayer' s representative does not have the right to subpoena and examine witnesses at a * * * [section 633 ] hearing.

OPINION Section 633 0 Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot proceed with collection by way of a levy until the taxpayer has been given notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing), and, if dissatisfied, the person may obtain judicial review of the administrative dete

Clinger discovered that petitioner's assessment for 2001 was too high, and, even though petitioner was not entitled to challenge his underlying liability in the section 633 0 hearing, she had the assessment corrected (i .e ., it was partially abated) .

Section 6330 Hearing Lastly, petitioner argues that he was denied a proper section 633 0 hearing .

.e., petitioner’s 1994 election). Our holding is a straightforward application of section 1374, as amended, to petitioner’s 1994, 1995, and 1996 taxable years. We also note that our holding is consistent with the legislative history accompanying TRA section 633. See H. Conf. Rept. 99-841 (Vol. II), supra at II-198 to II-207, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) at - 7 - 198-207. Accordingly, the TRA section 633(d) transition rule is not applicable to petitioner’s years in issue. Contentions we have not addresse

633a (2012))); see also 48 C.F.R. sec. 637.104-71(b) (2017) (defining a PSA as "a method ofemployment using the statutory authority under 22 U.S.C. [sec.] 2669(c)"). Petitioner has cited, and we are aware of, no other clause ofthe Basic Authorities Act or any other provision of law that would suggest any other construction or effect ofthe Basi

Section 633.0(c)(2)(B) provides that'the existence and amount of the underlying tax liability may be contested at an Appeals Office hearing only if the person'-did not receive a notice of deficiency for the-tax in question or did not(cid:127)otherwise have an earlier opportunity to-dispute the. tax liability . See Sego v . Commissioner, 114 T .C .°

On December 22, 2005 , Settlement Officer Splinter and petitioner held a section 633 0 hearing via telephone .

MEMORANDUM OPINION SWIFT, Judge : In these consolidated cases, petitioners challenge respondent's proposed levies under section 633 0 1 Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith : Galen K .

Because the Court has determined that the section 633 0 notice issued to petitioner on October 28, 2003, was valid and that equitable principles do not preclude application of the 2- year limitations period, the Court finds that her request for relief from joint and several liability was untimely .

Section 633 0 Section 6330 (a) provides that no levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of the right to a hearing before the levy is made . If the person makes a request for a hearing, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer or employee of the Internal

Section 633 0 Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot proceed with collection by way of a levy until the taxpayer has been given notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing) and, if dissatisfied, the person may obtain judicial review of the administrative deter

MEMORANDUM OPINION SWIFT, Judge : In these consolidated cases, petitioners challenge respondent's proposed levies under section 633 0 1 Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith : Galen K .

" Procedure Under Section 633 0 Section 6330 entitles a taxpayer to notice of his right to request a hearing with the IRS Office of Appeals after notice of the Commissioner's intent to levy on his property and rights to property in furtherance of the collection of unpaid Federal taxes .

Section 633 0 Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot proceed with collection by way of a levy until the taxpayer has been given notice and the opportunity for an administrative - 6 - review of the matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing), and, if dissatisfied, the person may obtain judicial review of the administrati

ransfer of the FABG stock without consent during decedent's lifetime, and that the Rod Amlie Family had an enforceable right against decedent's estate to purchase the FABG stock (not passing to them by bequest) at the prescribed price. See Iowa Code sec. 633.71 (1992) (court orders bind conservator); Iowa Code sec. 633.637 (2003) (powers of ward under conservatorship restricted); In re Harker's Estate, 85 N.W. 786, 22(...continued) purchase option on all members of the Rod Amlie Family, which in

.e., petitioner’s 1994 election). Our holding is a straightforward application of section 1374, as amended, to petitioner’s 1994, 1995, and 1996 taxable years. We also note that our holding is consistent with the legislative history accompanying TRA section 633. See H. Conf. Rept. 99-841 (Vol. II), supra at 11-198 to 11-207, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) at 198-207. Accordingly, the TRA section 633(d) transition rule is not applicable to petitioner’s years in issue. Contentions we have not addressed are

se Ridge’s S corporation election was made on, not after, Dec. 31, 1986, sec. 1374, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA of 1986), Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, does not apply to tax the alleged sec. 311(b) gain to Ridge. See TRA of 1986 sec. 633(b); Rev. Rul. 86- 141, 1986-2 C.B. 151, 152. Sec. 1374 requires that "built-in gain" be taxed directly to an S corporation. The pre-TRA of 1986 version of sec. 1374 applied only during the first 3 years (not the first 10 years as under the am

se Ridge’s S corporation election was made on, not after, Dec. 31, 1986, sec. 1374, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA of 1986), Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, does not apply to tax the alleged sec. 311(b) gain to Ridge. See TRA of 1986 sec. 633(b); Rev. Rul. 86- 141, 1986-2 C.B. 151, 152. Sec. 1374 requires that "built-in gain" be taxed directly to an S corporation. The pre-TRA of 1986 version of sec. 1374 applied only during the first 3 years (not the first 10 years as under the am

se Ridge’s S corporation election was made on, not after, Dec. 31, 1986, sec. 1374, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA of 1986), Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, does not apply to tax the alleged sec. 311(b) gain to Ridge. See TRA of 1986 sec. 633(b); Rev. Rul. 86- 141, 1986-2 C.B. 151, 152. Sec. 1374 requires that "built-in gain" be taxed directly to an S corporation. The pre-TRA of 1986 version of sec. 1374 applied only during the first 3 years (not the first 10 years as under the am

Petitioner’s Tax Liability Under Section 1374 Section 1363(a) provides that, generally, S corporations are not subject to income tax.

633(b), 100 Stat. 2277 (providing for effective date of change). Sec. 1374(a), prior to amendment, provided that, if for a taxable year of an S corporation, its net capital gain exceeded $25,000 and 50 percent of its taxable income, and the S corporation's taxable income for the year exceeded $25,000, a tax was imposed on the income of the cor

633(b), 100 Stat. 2277 (providing for effective date of change). Sec. 1374(a), prior to amendment, provided that, if for a taxable year of an S corporation, its net capital gain exceeded $25,000 and 50 percent of its taxable income, and the S corporation's taxable income for the year exceeded $25,000, a tax was imposed on the income of the cor

ain small corporations to be eligible for section 337 nonrecognition if they distributed their assets in complete liquidation before January 1, 1989. Both FSRC and DHF satisfied the eligibility requirements for this transitional provision. See Id., sec. 633(d)(1), 100 Stat. at 2278. The terms "liquidation" or "complete liquidation" are not defined in section 331 or in the regulations thereunder. However, related section 1.332-2(c), Income Tax Regs., offers the following standard: A status of liq

633(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2280. A transition rule allowed certain small corporations to be eligible for section 337 nonrecognition for a longer period. ACT was eligible for the transitional exemption, provided that the liquidation was completed before January 1, 1989. Section 337 as it applied to ACT provided as follows: SEC. 337. GAIN OR LOSS O