§6901 — Transferred assets
247 cases·111 followed·21 distinguished·2 questioned·4 criticized·8 overruled·101 cited—45% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §6901
The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were incurred:
The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property—
of a taxpayer in the case of a tax imposed by subtitle A (relating to income taxes),
of a decedent in the case of a tax imposed by chapter 11 (relating to estate taxes), or
of a donor in the case of a tax imposed by chapter 12 (relating to gift taxes),
in respect of the tax imposed by subtitle A or B.
The liability of a fiduciary under section 3713(b) of title 31, United States Code, in respect of the payment of any tax described in subparagraph (A) from the estate of the taxpayer, the decedent, or the donor, as the case may be.
The liability, at law or in equity of a transferee of property of any person liable in respect of any tax imposed by this title (other than a tax imposed by subtitle A or B), but only if such liability arises on the liquidation of a partnership or corporation, or on a reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a).
Any liability referred to in subsection (a) may be either as to the amount of tax shown on a return or as to any deficiency or underpayment of any tax.
The period of limitations for assessment of any such liability of a transferee or a fiduciary shall be as follows:
In the case of the liability of an initial transferee, within 1 year after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the transferor;
In the case of the liability of a transferee of a transferee, within 1 year after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the preceding transferee, but not more than 3 years after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the initial transferor;
In the case of the liability of a fiduciary, not later than 1 year after the liability arises or not later than the expiration of the period for collection of the tax in respect of which such liability arises, whichever is the later.
except that if, before the expiration of the period of limitation for the assessment of the liability of the transferee, a court proceeding for the collection of the tax or liability in respect thereof has been begun against the initial transferor or the last preceding transferee, respectively, then the period of limitation for assessment of the liability of the transferee shall expire 1 year after the return of execution in the court proceeding.
If before the expiration of the time prescribed in subsection (c) for the assessment of the liability, the Secretary and the transferee or fiduciary have both consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the liability may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon. For the purpose of determining the period of limitation on credit or refund to the transferee or fiduciary of overpayments of tax made by such transferee or fiduciary or overpayments of tax made by the transferor of which the transferee or fiduciary is legally entitled to credit or refund, such agreement and any extension thereof shall be deemed an agreement and extension thereof referred to in section 6511(c).
If the agreement is executed after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the taxpayer with reference to whom the liability of such transferee or fiduciary arises, then in applying the limitations under section 6511(c) on the amount of the credit or refund, the periods specified in section 6511(b)(2) shall be increased by the period from the date of such expiration to the date of the agreement.
For purposes of this section, if any person is deceased, or is a corporation which has terminated its existence, the period of limitation for assessment against such person shall be the period that would be in effect had death or termination of existence not occurred.
The running of the period of limitations upon the assessment of the liability of a transferee or fiduciary shall, after the mailing to the transferee or fiduciary of the notice provided for in section 6212 (relating to income, estate, and gift taxes), be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from making the assessment in respect of the liability of the transferee or fiduciary (and in any event, if a proceeding in respect of the liability is placed on the docket of the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final), and for 60 days thereafter.
In the absence of notice to the Secretary under section 6903 of the existence of a fiduciary relationship, any notice of liability enforceable under this section required to be mailed to such person, shall, if mailed to the person subject to the liability at his last known address, be sufficient for purposes of this title, even if such person is deceased, or is under a legal disability, or, in the case of a corporation, has terminated its existence.
As used in this section, the term “transferee” includes donee, heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee, and with respect to estate taxes, also includes any person who, under section 6324(a)(2), is personally liable for any part of such tax.
For extensions of time by reason of armed service in a combat zone, see section 7508.
Treasury Regulations
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1 Procedure in the case of transferred assets
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(a) Method of collection—(1) Income, estate, and gift taxes.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(b) Definition of transferee.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(c) Period of limitation on assessment.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(d) Extension by agreement—(1) Extension of time for assessment.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(e) Period of assessment against taxpayer.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(f) Suspension of running of period of limitations.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §301.6901-1(i) §301.6901-1(i)
247 Citing Cases
395, 395 n.3 (1994), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
395, 395 n.3 (1994), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
395, 395 n.3 (1994), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
It does not distinguish between the type of item upon which the transferor’s liability is premised when determining the period of limitation under section 6901(c).
Parties' Arguments Petitioners argue that they cannot be liable as tran fei.ees because ' " respondent failed to.issue the notices ofliability within the applicable three-year period oflimitations set forth in section 6901(c)(2), and that the six-yearperiod of limitations in section 6501(e)(1)(A) does not apply because Double-D Ranch did not sell its marketable securities during the July 2, 1999, axable year.
Vellalos, supra at 708 n.3, criticized the decisions in Fernon and Wurdemann as "an overly mechanical application of the dicta in Summerlin without serious consideration of the significant implications such a rule has for state sovereignty".) The situation in Vellalos is factually distinguishable from the situation herein. In Vellalos, the Government was unable to invoke section 6901 because it missed the limitations period prescribed by subsection (c).
Spenlinhauer (petitioner) is liable for the estate tax deficiency, the addition to tax, and the accuracy- related penalty as a transferee pursuant to section 6901.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis we applied in Shockley III, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis we applied in Shockley III, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis we applied in Shockley III, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis we applied in Shockley III, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
State law determines the elements of transferee liability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure that the Commissioner employs as the means ofenforcing that liability.
State law determines the elements of transferee liability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure that the Commissioner employs as the means ofenforcing that liability.
State law determines the elements of transferee liability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure that the Commissioner employs as the means ofenforcing that liability.
State law determines the elements of transferee liability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure that the Commissioner employs as the means ofenforcing that liability.
(Double-D Ranch), pursuant to section 6901;¹ (4) whetherpetitioners are liable as transferees ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.
Stern requires the satisfaction ofa two-pronged test in order for a tax - 10 - [*10] liability to be imposed on a transferee pursuant to section 6901.
- 106 - [*106] Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: SEC.
Stern requires the satisfaction ofa two-pronged test in order for a tax - 10 - [*10] liability to be imposed on a transferee pursuant to section 6901.
(Double-D Ranch), pursuant to section 6901;¹ (4) whetherpetitioners are liable as transferees ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.
Accordingly, we conclude that (1) petitioners are liable under Oregon law for the full amount ofMAC's 2003 tax deficiency and penalty and (2) the IRS may collect this liability from petitioners as "transferees" pursuant to section 6901.
Stern requires the satisfaction ofa two-pronged test in order for a tax - 10 - [*10] liability to be imposed on a transferee pursuant to section 6901.
Accordingly, we conclude that (1) petitioners are liable under Oregon law for the full amount ofMAC's 2003 tax deficiency and penalty and (2) the IRS may collect this liability from petitioners as "transferees" pursuant to section 6901.
Section 6901 provides for the assessment, payment, and collection ofa fiduciary's liability under 31 U.S.C.
- 106 - [*106] Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: SEC.
Stern requires the satisfaction ofa two-pronged test in order for a tax - 10 - [*10] liability to be imposed on a transferee pursuant to section 6901.
Accordingly, we conclude that (1) petitioners are liable under Oregon law for the full amount ofMAC's 2003 tax deficiency and penalty and (2) the IRS may collect this liability from petitioners as "transferees" pursuant to section 6901.
- 106 - [*106] Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: SEC.
Respondent has set forth a chain ofevents, including extensions by the shareholders pursuant to section 6901(d)(1) ofthe section 6901(c) period of limitations, that appears to belie petitioners' claim that the period oflimitations for assessing transferee liability had run when the notices were sent.
Respondent has set forth a chain ofevents, including extensions by the shareholders pursuant to section 6901(d)(1) ofthe section 6901(c) period of limitations, that appears to belie petitioners' claim that the period oflimitations for assessing transferee liability had run when the notices were sent.
We hold that they are partially liable.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis applied supra, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
Respondent has set forth a chain ofevents, including extensions by the shareholders pursuant to section 6901(d)(1) ofthe section 6901(c) period of limitations, that appears to belie petitioners' claim that the period oflimitations for assessing transferee liability had run when the notices were sent.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis applied supra, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
We hold that they are partially liable.
In accordance with the substance over form analysis applied supra, petitioners, as distributees ofSCC, are determined to be transferees pursuant to section 6901.
Respondent has set forth a chain ofevents, including extensions by the shareholders pursuant to section 6901(d)(1) ofthe section 6901(c) period of limitations, that appears to belie petitioners' claim that the period oflimitations for assessing transferee liability had run when the notices were sent.
We hold that petitioner is liable for West Side's tax under the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and that the IRS may collect West Side's tax liabilities in full from petitioner under section 6901(a)(1)2 as a direct or indirect transferee ofWest Side.
2011-298 (Frank Sawyer II).1 The issue for decision on remand is whether Frank SawyerTrust ofMay 1992 (the Trust) is liable as a transferee ofa transferee under section 6901.2 We hold that it is; however, we conclude that the Trust is a good-faithtransferee and, therefore, is not liable to the full extent stated in the notices ofliability.
- 3 - [*3] The primary issue in this case is whetherpetitioner is liable forNeches' tax liabilities for the years at issue as a transferee pursuantto section 6901.2 For the reasons stated herein, we hold that he is.
Thus, State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability.
We must decide two issues: I whether to grant petitioners' motions for summary judgment on the issue ofwl ether petitioners are liable as transferees pursuant to section 6901 for Holiday Bèwl's 2003 income tax and related penalties; and (2) whether to grant respondent's motion for a stay ofthe instant proceedings.
Accordingly, the elements of liability are governed by State law, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability.
Thus, State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employedby the Commissioner as the means ofenforcingthat liability.
Thus, State law determines the elements of liability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means of enforcing that liability.
We hold that he is not.
The issue for decision is whether petitioners are liable as transferees pursuant to section 6901 for Tarcon's unpaid tax, penalty, and interest for 2003.
The issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable as a transferee pursuant to section 69011 for the unpaid tax and section 6662 accuracy-related penalty owed by Double-D Ranch for that taxable year.
Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: - e 4 - SEC.
THORNTON, Judge : Respondent determined that pursuant to section 6901 petitioner has transferee liability of $44,681, plus interest as provided by law, arising from.
tax pursuant to section 6654 of $4,682 .' We must decide whether petitioner is liable as a transferee of the bankruptcy estate for the bankruptcy estate's tax liability and additions to tax pursuant to section 6901 .
Petitioner's argument that Estate ofMing is distinguishable because the taxpayers there sought a dismissal without prejudice whereas he is seeking a dismissal with prejudice is unconvincing. As we indicated in Estate ofMing, the fact that the taxpayers denominated their motion a motion to dismiss without prejudice was effectively meaningless because, pursuant to section 6512(a), the "mere filing" oftheir valid petition in this Court vested this Court with exclusive jurisdiction for the taxable y
cannot be held liable for any interest because respondent failed to issue any notices ofliability. The basis oftheir argument is that the IRS issued "two" notices ofdeficiency on August 21, 2008, instead ofissuing notices ofliability as required by section 6901. We reject this argument, having already found that the IRS sent to each petitioner a transferee notice ofliability statement on August 21, 2008. Shockley III, at *24; Shockley I, slip op. at 9. While no particular form is prescribed for
6901(a); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. at 45; Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1962), a_fff'g 35 T.C. 1148 (1961); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. The applicable St
6901(a); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. at 45; Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1962), a_fff'g 35 T.C. 1148 (1961); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. The applicable St
6901(a); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. at 45; Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1962), a_fff'g 35 T.C. 1148 (1961); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. The applicable St
6901(a); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. at 45; Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. State law determines the elements ofliability, and section 6901 provides the remedy or procedure to be employed by the Commissioner as the means ofenforcing that liability. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1962), a_fff'g 35 T.C. 1148 (1961); Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-63, slip op. at 15. The applicable St
The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner trusts are liable as transferees under section 6901 for Davreyn’s unpaid Federal income tax liability for Davreyn’s TYE February 15, 2001.
--- MAJORITY --- Jacobs, Judge: By means of a notice of transferee liability dated August 2, 1996, respondent determined that petitioner is liable under section 6901 as a transferee of property from Jaussaud Enterprises, Inc.
Section 6901 does not impose liability on the transferee, but merely gives the Commissioner a procedure or remedy to enforce the transferor’s existing liability. See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 42 (1958); see also Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993). Respondent bears the burden of proving that Larry, Ronnie, and Sylvia are lia
Section 6901 does not impose liability on the transferee, but merely gives the Commissioner a procedure or remedy to enforce the transferor’s existing liability. See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 42 (1958); see also Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 180, 183 (1993). Respondent bears the burden of proving that Larry, Ronnie, and Sylvia are lia
Section 6901 and Period of Limitations The estate maintains that even if Mr. Frese could be liable for the unpaid estate tax under the FPS, the period of limitations on collection expired in 2013. The estate argues that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2415(a) the applicable period of limitations in this case is six years from the February 2007 distribut
Introduction Section 6901 provides that the liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property “shall * * * be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were incurred”.
mitations for assessment expired before the mailing ofthe transferee notices to petitioners; (2) whether the substance over form doctrine applies to recast the transactions at issue; and (3) if so, whetherpetitioners are liable as transferees under section 6901 for Arizona Media Holding, Inc.'s (Arizona Media) unpaid Federal income tax liability for the tax year ended June 30, 2002.2 FINDINGS OF FACT Some ofthe facts have been stipulated and are so found.
We must decide two issues: I whether to grant petitioners' motions for summary judgment on the issue ofwl ether petitioners are liable as transferees pursuant to section 6901 for Holiday Bèwl's 2003 income tax and related penalties; and (2) whether to grant respondent's motion for a stay ofthe instant proceedings.
The issue for decision is whether'petitioners are liable under section 6901 as transferees for their respective shares of Woodside Ranch's $593,979 Federal income tax liability for 2002, plus the addition to tax, penalties, and interest.3 FINDINGS .
Few courts have consid red this issue direct ly; however, the Courts of Appeals fo the Th rd Circuit and the T nth Circuit have held that respondent may collect estate tax from a transferee pursuant to section 6324 (a (2) without a prior assessment against the transferee unde section 6901. United States v. Geniviva, 16 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. l 94) ; United States v. Russell, 461 F.2d 605, 607 (10th Cir 19'7/2) . This Court has found tl ose cases to be persuasive and well reason d. Ripley v. Comm
The issue for decision is whether petitioners are liable as transferees pursuant to section 6901 for Tarcon's unpaid tax, penalty, and interest for 2003.
Petitioners argue that respondent is precluded from assessing transferee liability under section 6901 because the notices issued on August 21, 2008, were barred by the statute of limitations.
Petitioners argue that respondent is precluded from assessing transferee liability under section 6901 because the notices issued on August 21, 2008, were barred by the statute of limitations.
We would therefore emphasize that Gumm 's distillation of the trust fund theory is viable only as a generalization of typical State law; section 6901 does not itself impose those requirements .
We would therefore emphasize that Gumm 's distillation of the trust fund theory is viable only as a generalization of typical State law; section 6901 does not itself impose those requirements .
--- MAJORITY --- Thornton, Judge: Respondent determined that pursuant to section 6901 petitioner has transferee liability of $44,681, plus interest as provided by law, arising from his father’s transfer to him of a Florida condominium.
OPINION Under section 6901 and applicable State law or equity, respondent may be allowed to collect from a transferee of assets 5 Because Richard's 1994 and 1995 Federal income tax returns were filed on Aug.
The only issue presented by the parties is - 2 - whether petitioner is liable as a transferee of property pursuant to section 6901.1 FINDINGS OF FACT Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
6901; Rule 13(a); Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 309 (1977). The validity of a notice of - 12 - transferee liability does not depend upon the issuance to the transferor of a valid notice of deficiency. See Kuckenberg v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 473, 483 (1960), affd. on this issue 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Cleveland v. Commissioner, 28
6901; Rule 13(a); Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 309 (1977). The validity of a notice of - 12 - transferee liability does not depend upon the issuance to the transferor of a valid notice of deficiency. See Kuckenberg v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 473, 483 (1960), affd. on this issue 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Cleveland v. Commissioner, 28
Section 6901 allows the Commissioner in certain cases to collect from a transferee of assets unpaid taxes owed by the assets’ transferor if a basis exists under State law or equity for holding the transferee liable. Bresson v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 172 (1998), affd. 213 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2000); Gumm v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 475, 479 (1989). Sect
ro underpaid its tax liability for tax years 1988 through 1990; the underpayments were due to petitioners’ fraudulent actions as officers of Metro; and petitioners, as transferees of Metro’s assets, are liable for Metro’s tax liabilities pursuant to section 6901. Petitioners contend that there was no underpayment of tax attributable to the conduct of Metro officers, and that the period of limitations relating to Metro’s tax years 1988 through 1990 expired. I. Statute of Limitations, Deficiency D
ro underpaid its tax liability for tax years 1988 through 1990; the underpayments were due to petitioners’ fraudulent actions as officers of Metro; and petitioners, as transferees of Metro’s assets, are liable for Metro’s tax liabilities pursuant to section 6901. Petitioners contend that there was no underpayment of tax attributable to the conduct of Metro officers, and that the period of limitations relating to Metro’s tax years 1988 through 1990 expired. I. Statute of Limitations, Deficiency D
typically lacks jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s interest liability in deficiency proceedings. E.g., LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589, 597 (1975). We do have jurisdiction, however, in cases involving a transferee’s liability for interest under sec. 6901. Lowy v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 393, 395 (1960). 3All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 3 - On October 1, 1997
Section 6901 sets forth the procedures that are applicable prior to the assessment and collection of an income, estate, or gift tax liability from a transferee. Section 6901(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides: SEC. 6901. TRANSFERRED ASSETS. (a) Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided,
The issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable as the transferee of assets of ACT under section 6901 and, if so, the amount of his liability.
Section 6901 sets forth the procedures that are applicable prior to the assessment and collection of an income, estate, or gift tax liability from a transferee. Section 6901(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides: SEC. 6901. TRANSFERRED ASSETS. (a) Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided,
17, 1997, without having sent a notice of deficiency to T based upon the filed returns but after previous attempts to collect from T had yielded insufficient funds to satisfy his tax debts, R issued to P a notice of transferee liability pursuant to sec. 6901, I.R.C. R premises transferee liability on the grounds that the transfer of stock from T to P was a fraudulent conveyance under the California Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Cal. Civ. Code secs. 3439 through 3439.12 (West 1997). - 2 - Hel
Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: (a) Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with re- spect to which the liabilities were incurred:
Section 6901 provides for the assessment, payment, and collection of the liability of a fiduciary under title 31 U.S.C. section 3713(b). See sec. 6901(a)(1)(B). A fiduciary includes a personal representative, administrator, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity. See sec. 7701(a)(6). The Federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. sec. 3713, re
Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: (a) Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with re- spect to which the liabilities were incurred:
d to collect from a transferee of assets a transferor's tax liability if the transferee is liable at law or in equity for the transferor's tax liability. See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 42 (1958) (interpreting then sec. 311, a predecessor to sec. 6901); Stansbury v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 486, 489-490 (1995), affd. 3 At trial, respondent's agent testified that Hanna PC's transferee liability under sec. 6901 should be increased to $28,648. Respondent, however, has not moved to amend his p
section 3713(b) (1994), for unpaid Federal estate and income taxes, and additions to tax, owed by the estate; and (3) whether David Allen is liable as a transferee pursuant to section 6901 for unpaid Federal estate and income taxes, and additions to tax, owed by the estate.
Section 6901 provides in pertinent part: SEC. 6901(a). Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as herein- after in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were
Fisher under section 6901,2 and, if so, the amount of such liability.
Section 6901 permits the Commissioner to proceed against a transferee of property of a decedent in order to collect unpaid estate taxes. Sec. 6901(a)(1)(A)(ii). The period of limitations for assessment of a transferee's liability ends 1 year after the expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the transferor.2 Sec. 6901(c)(1). Re
bility. Commissioner v. Stern, supra at 45; Gumm v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 475, 479 (1989), affd. without published opinion 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, we apply Nebraska law in deciding whether petitioner is liable as a transferee under section 6901. The Commissioner bears the burden of proving that the taxpayer is liable as a transferee under State law or in equity. Sec. 6902(a); Rule 142(d); Gumm v. Commissioner, supra at 479- 480. Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the t
6901; Great Falls Bonding Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 307. An order and order of dismissal will be entered.
Section 6901 does not create or define a transferee's substantive tax liability, and the substantive basis for the assertion of transferee liability under section 6901 must generally be found 2(...continued) we entered a stipulated decision on Aug. 1, 1995, that resolved the amount of the underlying deficiency in estate tax and addition to tax due
s transferee of assets received from the above-named transferor, assumes and agrees to pay the amounts of any and all Federal income or profits taxes finally determined or adjudged as due and payable by such transferor for the tax years ended December 31, 2000*, to the extent of the liability at law or in equity as transferee within the meaning of section 6901 of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding provisions of internal revenue laws.
dra transferred her assets after the liabilities arose. See Michael I. Saltzman & Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure ⁋ 17.01 (rev. 2d ed. 2018) (describing theories of transferee liability, including liabilities enforced under the procedures of section 6901); id. ⁋ 17.02[2] (explaining that a requirement for transferee liability under section 6901 is that “the taxpayer/transferor is liable for a tax both at the time of the transfer and at the time the transferee liability is asserted”). San
Served 02/07/22 2 [*2] the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Arizona UFTA) and section 6901.2 In July 2018, reversing our Court for the second time, the U.S.
Served 02/07/22 2 [*2] the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Arizona UFTA) and section 6901.2 In July 2018, reversing our Court for the second time, the U.S.
Served 02/07/22 2 [*2] the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Arizona UFTA) and section 6901.2 In July 2018, reversing our Court for the second time, the U.S.
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
r Taylor then declared in her final report dated March 16, 2009, that AC's 2003 tax liabilitywas uncollectible. On December 22, 2009, the IRS asserted AC's putative tax liability against the three petitioner trusts as transferees oftransferees under section 6901. The notices ofliability were sent to the Bryan S. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, the Richard C. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and the John M. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and in those notices the IRS determined that each oft
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
r Taylor then declared in her final report dated March 16, 2009, that AC's 2003 tax liabilitywas uncollectible. On December 22, 2009, the IRS asserted AC's putative tax liability against the three petitioner trusts as transferees oftransferees under section 6901. The notices ofliability were sent to the Bryan S. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, the Richard C. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and the John M. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and in those notices the IRS determined that each oft
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
r Taylor then declared in her final report dated March 16, 2009, that AC's 2003 tax liabilitywas uncollectible. On December 22, 2009, the IRS asserted AC's putative tax liability against the three petitioner trusts as transferees oftransferees under section 6901. The notices ofliability were sent to the Bryan S. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, the Richard C. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and the John M. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and in those notices the IRS determined that each oft
r Taylor then declared in her final report dated March 16, 2009, that AC's 2003 tax liabilitywas uncollectible. On December 22, 2009, the IRS asserted AC's putative tax liability against the three petitioner trusts as transferees oftransferees under section 6901. The notices ofliability were sent to the Bryan S. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, the Richard C. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and the John M. Alterman Trust U/A/D May 9, 2000, and in those notices the IRS determined that each oft
damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability offirms or their 6Respondent is arguing liability only under the theory ofsuccessor in interest and not under sec. 6901, providing for transferee liability, as respondent did not issue notices oftransferee liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio. - 23 - assets." Mark J. Roe, "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor CorporationLiab
On brief respondent concedes that he could have potentially applied transferee liability against petitioner under section 6901 by issuing Notices of Determination Concerning Worker Classification to the other six partnerships, assessing the resulting liabilities, and then issuing a Notice of Transferee Liability to TFT Galveston Portfolio.
Augustine under section 6901.1 Background The parties submitted this case ful"ly stipulated under Rule 122.
The issue for decision is whether'petitioners are liable under section 6901 as transferees for their respective shares of Woodside Ranch's $593,979 Federal income tax liability for 2002, plus the addition to tax, penalties, and interest.3 FINDINGS .
The issue for decision is whether'petitioners are liable under section 6901 as transferees for their respective shares of Woodside Ranch's $593,979 Federal income tax liability for 2002, plus the addition to tax, penalties, and interest.3 FINDINGS .
The issue for decision is whether'petitioners are liable under section 6901 as transferees for their respective shares of Woodside Ranch's $593,979 Federal income tax liability for 2002, plus the addition to tax, penalties, and interest.3 FINDINGS .
The issue for decision is whether'petitioners are liable under section 6901 as transferees for their respective shares of Woodside Ranch's $593,979 Federal income tax liability for 2002, plus the addition to tax, penalties, and interest.3 FINDINGS .
Respondent contends that the requirements of section 6901 prevented him from asserting the transferee liability claim 25 - during the pendency of the deficiency cases .
Respondent contends that the requirements of section 6901 prevented him from asserting the transferee liability claim during the pendency of the deficiency cases.
n was a C corporation or from the underpayment of the taxes imposed by sec. 1374 or 1375. Nor does personal interest include interest on an underpayment of income tax of a corporation payable by a shareholder by reason of transferee liability (under sec. 6901). (7) TAMRA 1988 On June 10, 1987, the Technical Corrections Act of 1987 was introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2636) by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski and Congressman Duncan, and in the Senate (S. 1350) by Fin
contends that the settlement belonged to the corporate entities and that P was a transferee. If it is decided that the transfer was of C’s asset to P, then P contends in the alternative that the transfer was made for adequate consideration so that sec. 6901, I.R.C. would be inapplicable. R contends that under Texas law, because P was considered an “insider”, the transfer to him was in avoidance of creditors. P contends that he comes within an exception to the rule relating to “insiders”. The ex
OPINION We consider, under section 6901, whether respondent has shown that petitioner is a transferee of JCC’s assets and, hence, liable for JCC’s unpaid Federal tax liability.
Section 6901 addresses the liability of a transferee of property (transferee) for certain taxes, including income taxes, of the transferor of such property (transferor). Pertinent provisions of section 6901 are set forth in the margin.2 2 SEC. 6901. TRANSFERRED ASSETS. (a) Method of Collection. The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except
731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982). 4. Petitioner's Other Contentions Petitioner contends that he is not liable for tax on amounts paid to Arivada unless respondent proves that Arivada is the transferee of petitioner under section 6901. Petitioner also contends that we may consider whether, under the Federal Debt Collection Act (FDCA), 28 U.S.C. sections 3001-3015, and the Federal Fraudulent Transfers Act (FFTA), 28 U.S.C. sections 3301- 3308, Arivada is a transferee o
Petitioner is a transferee at law of assets of FNPC and UFB and as such would be liable under section 6901 for any deficiencies in Federal income tax determined to be owing by FNPC and UFB for the years at issue.
Petitioner is a transferee at law of assets of FNPC and UFB and as such would be liable under section 6901 for any deficiencies in Federal income tax determined to be owing by FNPC and UFB for the years at issue.
We apply Florida law in deciding whether petitioners are liable as transferees under section 6901 because all of the - 22 - transfers occurred there.
We apply Florida law in deciding whether petitioners are liable as transferees under section 6901 because all of the transfers occurred there.
Prior to the disallowance of a deduction for personal interest, courts held that a transferee under section 6901 (tax liability resulting from transferred assets) could deduct interest on an income tax deficiency that accrued after the transfer of the assets to which the tax related.
- 2 - The issues for decision are: (1) Whether the statute of limitations bars the assessment and collection of the transferee liability; (2) whether petitioner is liable as a transferee under section 6901; and (3) whether petitioner is an innocent spouse as to the transferee liability.
6901; Great Falls Bonding Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 304, 307 (1974).
Prior to the disallowance of a deduction for personal interest, courts held that a transferee under section 6901 (tax liability resulting from transferred assets) could deduct interest on an income tax deficiency that accrued after the transfer of the assets to which the tax related.
986 119,260 OPINION In determining that petitioner is liable for the deficien- cies in, additions to, and penalties on withholding tax that she determined with respect to Radcliffe and BOT, respondent relies on the transferee liability provisions of section 6901. Peti- tioner does not dispute that he would be liable as a transferee of each of those taxpayers under section 6901 for those deficien- cies in, additions to, and penalties on tax in the event the - 59 - Court were to sustain respondent
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: These proceedings are under Rule 155.' The opinion of this Court, in which we found petitioners liable as transferees under section 6901, was filed on April 2, 1991, as T.C.
ding Company, Inc., and Kern County Refinery, Inc. Petitioners are husband and wife, and resided in Rolling Hills, California, at the time they filed their petitions. The sole issue for decision is whether petitioners are liable as transferees under section 6901. This requires us to determine whether money and other assets received by petitioner* were proceeds from the sale of stock (as petitioner contends), or * Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to petitioner in the singular ref