§7430 — Awarding of costs and certain fees

Accordingly, we overrule petitioners' Rule 70(e) and relevance objections and admit into evidence Exhibits G, H, I, J, and L.

Petitioners' argume barred from pursuing is c - 12 - [*12] should overrule G_usstafso;1or create some sort ofequitable exception--are unpersuasive.

Held: R's general objections to the motion to compel are overruled.

We find that case to be materially distinguishable from the instant case and petitioners' reliance on that case to be misplaced.

The IRS's decision as to costs under section 7430(f)(2) should be distinguished from a "decision " as to tax under section 7430(b)(4), i .e ., "the final decision of the Internal Revenue Service as to the etermination of the tax", which starts the 90-day period within which the application for costs must be filed .

Therefore, the exception under section 301.7430-1(f)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs., does not apply.

Accordingly, the instant case is properly distinguishable from Huckaby and Wilkerson. Under these circumstances, we need not, and we do not, examine into the analysis presented in Scrimgeour v. Internal Revenue, 149 F.3d 318, 326-329 (4th Cir. 1998), relating to whether section 7430 applies to disputes of the sort presented in Huckaby.

3342, 3743, we find them to be inapposite.

- 9 - [*9] Because petitioners' administrative costs were incurred before the Appeals Office issued the notice ofdetermination, they do not constitute "reasonable administrative costs." In the light ofthis conclusion, we need not decide whether petitioners were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding.

We recently expressed reservations about the analysis in those opinions.

Accordingly, the Court need not decide whetherthe costs claimed by petitioners are reasonable in amount.

Because ofour holding, we need not decide whetherpetitioner was the prevailing party.

- 11 - [*11] Petitionerresponds that respondent should be considered to have taken a position adverse to petitioner when on July 28, 2009, the IRS sent the aforementionedtwo Letters 3784 denyingpetitioner's abatement request.6 We do not agree with petitioner's position.

10 We disagree with respondent that Estate of Gillespie v.

On the other hand, petitioner asserts that this case involves an uncommon and difficult issue, which entitles him to the full amount of attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the court proceeding.11 We disagree with petitioner that he is entitled to enhanced attorney’s fees.

This is because, under the Johnson standard, this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the possibility that “a more egregious example of [governmental] misconduct might, even if confined to a narrow but important issue, taint the government’s ‘position’ in the entire case as unreasonable”.

Most courts have rejected such a narrow reading of the statutory provisions and generally have allowed such out-of-pocket costs to be recovered.

O’Nan then timely filed a Motion for Reasonable Litigation or Administrative Costs (Motion) pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

Before the Court is petitioner’s Motion for Reasonable Litigation or Administrative Costs (Motion for Costs) pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 We conclude that petitioner is not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of section 7430 because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) “establishe[d] that the position of the United States in the proceeding 1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the In

The issue remaining for consideration is petitioner’s Motion in which she requests administrative and litigation costs of $5,601 and $129,750, respectively, pursuant to section 7430(a).1 Respondent has conceded the administrative costs.

Served 06/13/23 2 [*2] MEMORANDUM OPINION KERRIGAN, Chief Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ Motion for Reasonable Litigation or Administrative Costs pursuant to section 7430.

On December 28, 2016, petitioner sent to the IRS a letter (December 2016 offer letter or offer) stating that she was making a qualified offer pursuant to section 7430(g).

Jacobs, pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 As described further below, we conclude that 1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Served 05/05/21 - 2 - [*2] Mr.

The motion is made pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.¹ Petitioners seek to recover (1) administrative costs of$2,465, and (2) litigation costs of$5,757 in connection with respondent's determination sustaining the filing ofa notice ofFederal tax lien (NFTL) for tax years 2013 and 2014.

Thus, we hold that section 6673 is not unconstitutional.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: Currently before the Court is petitioner's motion for an award oflitigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ Neither party requested a hearing on this matter, and no material fact is ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all statutoryreferences are to the Internal Reve- (continued...) SERVED May 01 2019 - 2 - [*2] in dispute.

Petitioner's "liability pursuant to thejudgment" would then not be equal to or less than the qualified offer he made--$500 for each year--with the result that petitioner would not be treated as the prevailing party pursuant to section 7430(c)(4)(E).

Section 7430 provides for the award of reasonable costs incurred in any administrative or court proceeding against the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund ofany tax, interest, or penalty pursuant to the Code.

SERVED Aug 28 2017 -2- section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.¹ This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of reasonable litigation or administrative costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

On the basis ofthe evidence presented at trial, we hold that Mr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for award oflitigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ Neither party requested a hearing on this matter, and no material fact is in ¹All statutoryreferences are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and (continued...) SERVED Jul 10 2017 - 2 - [*2] disp

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award ofadministrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule SERVED May 24 2017 - 2 - [*2] 231.¹ The parties agree that a hearing on the motion is not required.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GUY, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for litigation and administrative costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.¹ Respondent filed a response opposing petitioner's ¹Unless otherwise specified, section references are to the Internal Revenue (continued...) SERVED Oct 19 2016 -2- [*2] motion, and petitioner filed a reply and a first amended reply to respondent's response.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for award oflitigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ None ofthe ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

Presently before the Court is petitioner's Motion for Reasonable Litigation or Administrative Costs, filed August 13, 2014, pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

2015-231, we held that R failed to meet his burden ofproofto establish that P was liable under I.R.C. sec. 6901 as a transferee for Alterman Corp.'s 2003 income tax liability. P, a trust whose case was consolidated with other cases for purposes ofthat opinion, has moved for an award ofadministrative and litigation costs under I.R.C. sec. 7430. Generally, individual taxpayers seeking costs must have a net worth of$2 million or less at the time the civil action was filed, as required by 28 U.S.C.

MEMORANDUM OPINION NEGA, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.2 'Shellie H.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for award oflitigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ None ofthe ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

Petitioner seeks attorney's fees, SERVED Dec 11 2014 - 2 - [*2] accounting fees, and other professional fees under section 7430 and Rule 231.' We hold that he is not entitledto such an award.

An award ofadministrative costs maybe made where (1) the taxpayer is the "prevailing party"; (2) the taxpayer did not unreasonablyprotract the 3Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are not entitled to an award of litigation costs.

We hold that McCauley is not entitled to recover any costs because she was not the prevailing party in her dispute.

On the record before us, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to an award ofadministrative costs under section 7430(a)(1).

WHERRY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion for administrative and litigation costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 and 231.2 Respondent filed a response opposing petitioners' motion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION THORNTON, Mdge: Petitioner moves the Court to award her litigation costs of$53,001 in attorney's fees and $60 in other costs pursuant to section 7430 SERVED APR - 1 20ß - 2 - [*2] and Rule 231.1 None ofthe parties have requested an evidentiary hearing on this matter, and we conclude that a hearing is not necessary.

We hold they are not.

We hold that they were.

MEMORANDUMFINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION CHIECHI, Judge: This proceeding commenced pursuant to section 7430(f)(2)' is an appeal to the Court with respect to petitioner's request for 'All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect at all relevant times.

We hold in favor ofthe IRS.

We hold that it was.

We hold that section 7491(a) (1) does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GUY, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for litigation and administrative costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and SERVE9 DEC 1 8 2012 - 2 - [*2] Rule 231.' Respondent filed a response opposing petitioner's motion, and petitioner filed a reply to respondent's response.

We hold that petitioner may not.

Introduction Section 7430 provides that a taxpayer may recover reasonable costs, including attomey's fees, incurred in connection with any tax proceeding (administrative orjudicial) against the United States ifthe taxpayer is the prevailing party in the proceeding.

Section 7430 requires costs to.actually be "incurred" to be recoverable.

After concessions,1 the issue for decision on remand is whether petitioner incurred attorney's fees.2 We hold that he did not.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for recovery of reasonable litigation and administrative costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Petitioners Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time petitioners filed their petition or incurred their litigation costs, as (continued.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 Petitioner seeks an award of $9,622 in respect of All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, (continued...) SERVED Jun 012011 - 2 - respondent's deficiency determination of $4,500.

The parties have settled all issues in the case except petitioner's entitlement to administrative and litigatio n costs pursuant to section 7430 .

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for recovery of reasonable litigation costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Petitioner's Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to.

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion .for award of administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231 .1 Neither party 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section :-references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax (continued.

3 *, * * In the event that petitioner elects to request an award of reasonable litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430, petitioner should review section 7430 and follow the requirements outlined in Rules 230 through 233, particularly Rule 231(b) [requiring certain specific assertions] and (d) [requiring an affidavit describing the costs] .

Respondent is,arguing .in effect- th:-a,tthe-,-capped rate under section 7430 applies to, section, 6673 (a) (2),.

of an overall integrated transaction, but he did not do so .9 On the basis of the evidence available to respondent, as well as the facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent's legal position was substantially justified in both the administrative and judicial proceedings .

MEMORANDUM-OPINION MARVEL, Judge : This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231 .

'In Dixon VII and Young, in applying section 7430, and in Gridley II, in applying section 6673, we determined that if it was not clear that a fee or expense entry describing client communications was compensable , we would assume 50 percent of the time spent on the communication is compensable .

" Accordingly, petitioners are a prevailing party, and we hold that they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs .

We hold that they are not .

We hold that petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies by participating in an Appeals Office conference, and, therefore, petitioners are not entitled to an award of litigation costs .

This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of administrative costs and their supplement to motion for award of administrative costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231 .

The parties indicated that they had been unable to negotiate a stipulation of settled issues or a settlemen t document which both parties could sign,5 and petitioner indicated his desire to seek administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230-233 .

- 2 - This matter is before the Court on petitioner's Motion for itigation and Administrative Costs filed pursuant to section 7430.

This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for award of costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430.

Section 7430 Section 7430 provides for the award of administrative costs in any administrative proceeding which is brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.

OPINION THORNTON, Judge: This case is before us on petitioners’ motion for reasonable litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Background Mr.

On January 31, 2003, petitioners made a qualified offer, pursuant to section 7430, to resolve petitioners’ tax liabilities for the 1989, 1991, and 1992 tax years.

This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430.

7430, we distinguished the holding in Smalldridge on the (continued...) - 18 - On the basis of the evidentiary record and previously cited cases, we hold that respondent has not met his burden of production with respect to the appropriateness of imposing the section 6651(a)(2) additions to tax.

This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430.

DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Litigation and Administrative Costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

WELLS, Chief Judge: The instant case involves petitioners' claim for administrative costs of $5,377.22 pursuant to section 7430.1 Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

Awards of costs and certain fees (pursuant to section 7430) would be available to eligible taxpayers with respect to Tax Court determinations pursuant to the bill.

OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

OPINION CLAPP, Judge: This case is before us on petitioner's Motion for Award of Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

MARY JO BLASIUS, ET AL.¹, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 4366-01, 4367-01, Filed September 14, 2005. 4368-01. Ps and R have settled all issues in these consolidated cases save for Ps' claims made pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C., for recovery of administrative and litigation costs totaling $8,700.50. Ps' grounds for recovery are that R's position in these proceeding with respect to the capitalization of certain expenditures, which position R conceded before

MARY JO BLASIUS, ET AL.1, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 4366-01, 4367-01, Filed September 14, 2005. 4368-01. Ps and R have settled all issues in these consolidated cases save for Ps’ claims made pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C., for recovery of administrative and litigation costs totaling $8,700.50. Ps’ grounds for recovery are that R’s position in these proceeding with respect to the capitalization of certain expenditures, which position R conceded before

d appellate court (the Sixth Circuit in the Estate of Clarks case) does not support an assertion that the government’s [sic] in this case was without substantial foundation. This court determines that Foster is not entitled to litigation costs under § 7430. The assignment by a taxpayer of a right to collect a doubtful and uncertain pending claim against the United States in exchange for cash and other consideration did not constitute an anticipatory assignment of income in Jones v. Commissioner,

r. Edwin A. Herrera and Linas N. Udrys, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION JACOBS, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for award of litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rule 231. 1 References to sec. 7430 are to that section as amended (continued...) - 2 - Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the matter under consideration, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Prac

Nonetheless, in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer meets the net worth limitations that apply for awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430; i.e., a corporation, trust, or partnership whose net worth exceeds $7 million is ineligible for the benefits of section 7491(a)(1).

In any event, in the case at hand our Opinion addressed the Sixth Circuit’s Summa Holdings decision and concluded that it was not directly on point because (1) it addressed only a corporate-level issue rather than the shareholder-level issue and (2) differences between DISCs and FSCs distinguished Summa Holdings from the case at hand. Similarly, in its opinion in the case at hand the Ninth Circuit observed that none of these appellate DISC cases “addressed the exact question presented here” and

7430(c)(4)(A). However, section 7430(c)(4)(B)(i) provides that a party shall not be treated as the prevailing party ifthe United States establishes that its position in the proceeding was substantiallyjustified. We held in Fla. Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 73 (2004), , 404 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005), that identifying the Government's position is a precondition for determining whether the taxpayer is a prevailing party.6 See also Purciello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-50; Kwe

- 12 - [*12] Section 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) provides: A party to a court proceeding * * * shall be treated as the prevailing party ifthe liability ofthe taxpayerpursuant to thejudgment in the proceeding (determined without regard to interest) is equal to or less than the liability ofthe taxpayerwhich would have been so determined ifthe United States had accepted a qualified offer ofthe party [as defined] under subsection (g). Under the qualified offer rule ofsection 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g), a taxpayer m

- 12 - [*12] Section 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) provides: A party to a court proceeding * * * shall be treated as the prevailing party ifthe liability ofthe taxpayerpursuant to thejudgment in the proceeding (determined without regard to interest) is equal to or less than the liability ofthe taxpayerwhich would have been so determined ifthe United States had accepted a qualified offer ofthe party [as defined] under subsection (g). Under the qualified offer rule ofsection 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g), a taxpayer m

In its analysis, the Court ofAppeals distinguished two ofour Memorandum Opinions that had considered the net worth requirement as applied to taxpayers who were not parties to those particular cases. See Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-189, 2006 WL 2564109; Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006- 97, 2006 WL 1275497 (test cases). The taxpayers in the test cases were among many participants in certain tax shelters who had filed petitions in this Court. Most ofthe additional participants ent

That same day, the Court issued an order directing petitionerto file a motion for costs under section 7430 by January 17, 2014.

That same day, the Court issued an order directing petitionerto file a motion for costs under section 7430 by January 17, 2014.

The'sanctioning statutes do not distinguish between winners and losers or between the Government and the opposing party or the taxpayer and the Commissioner . See Roadway Express, Inc. v . Piper, 447 U .S . at 762 (discussing 28 U .S .C . sec . 1927) . Neither section 6673(a)(2) nor 28 U .S .C . sec . 1927 requires that the fees have been incurred by the other party . The sanctioning statutes merely require that the excess fees be incurred because of the misconduct of the opponent's attorney . I

Section 7430 and the Equal Access to Justice Act . !> CO 9. Law of the Case Doctrine . O 05 F. Fees “Incurred” in Pro Bono Representation and Contingent Fee Arrangements . CO CO 1. Caselaw Under Prevailing Party Statutes.. CO ^ 2. Section 7430(c)(3)(B) . 100 G. Respondent Must Pay Attorneys’ Fees and Excess Expenses Requested on Behalf of Petitione

518-87, 32365-88, 27448-89. P-Wife moved to amend the petitions to assert a claim for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(c) and (f), I.R.C. Subsequently, P-Wife moved for summary judgment, and R conceded. P-Wife now seeks litigation costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C., on the basis that she was the prevailing party and R’s position was not substantially justified and because she submitted a qualified offer to R and P-Wife’s liability was determined to be less than if R had accepted her offer. Held

518-87, 32365-88, 27448-89. P-Wife moved to amend the petitions to assert a claim for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(c) and (f), I.R.C. Subsequently, P-Wife moved for summary judgment, and R conceded. P-Wife now seeks litigation costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C., on the basis that she was the prevailing party and R’s position was not substantially justified and because she submitted a qualified offer to R and P-Wife’s liability was determined to be less than if R had accepted her offer. Held

docket No. 29643-86. - 2 - CONTENTS Page Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. Overview of Section 7430 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 B. Tax Court’s Authority To Award Appellate Fees Under Section 7430 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 C. The Other Side of the Coin: Inapplicability of Section 6673(a)(2) and the Bad Faith Exception . . . . . . .

o. 9532-94. SEP 6 200 - 2 - CONTENTS Page Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. Overview of Section 7430 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 B. Amplification of September 8, 2005 Order . . . . . 19 1. Inapplicability of Section 6673 . . . . . . . 20 2. Real Parties in Interest . . . . . . . . . . . 21 II. Entitlement to Relief Under Section 7430 .

, docket No. 9532-94. - 2 - CONTENTS Page Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. Overview of Section 7430 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 B. Amplification of September 8, 2005 Order . . . . . 19 1. Inapplicability of Section 6673 . . . . . . . 20 2. Real Parties in Interest . . . . . . . . . . . 21 II. Entitlement to Relief Under Section 7430 .

7491(a)(1).83 Nonetheless, in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer meets the net worth limitations that apply for awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430; i.e., a corporation, trust, or partnership whose net worth exceeds $7 million is ineligible for the benefits of section 7491(a)(1).

- 3 - administrative costs pursuant to section 74302 and Rule 231.3 The issues for decision are: (1) Whether Sandra is the “prevailing party” for purposes of section 7430--in particular: (A) Whether respondent established that respondent’s position was “substantially justified”, within the meaning of section 7430(c)(4)(B)(i), or (B) Whether Sandra submitted a “qualified offer” withing the meaning of section 7430(g); (2) Whether Sandra unreasonably protracted the proceedings; and (3) Whether Sand

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Chabot, Judge: This matter is before us on petitioners’ motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

the most important issue in the case, that they had not unreasonably protracted this proceeding, and that they meet the net worth requirement. Nevertheless, respondent contends that petitioners are not entitled to an award of any fees or costs under section 7430. Respondent’s position is based upon four points. First, respondent contends that, contrary to petitioners’ assertion, petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service as required by section 7

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Thornton, Judge: This case is before us on petitioners’ motion for reasonable litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

- 5 - judgment may be awarded under section 7430 if a taxpayer (1) was the “prevailing party”, (2) exhausted the administrative remedies available to the taxpayer within the Internal Revenue Service,4 and (3) did not unreasonably protract the proceedings. Sec. 7430(a) and (b)(1), (3). Respondent’s position is that petitioner is not a “prevailing party”, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and unreasonably protracted the proceedings. For a taxpayer to qualify as the “prevailing party”,

MEMORANDUM OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.

Respondent contends that none of the petitioners qualifies for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 7430 inasmuch as petitioners "have not substantially prevailed with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues" and petitioners have not established (1) that they "meet the applicable net worth requirements", (2) that they have exhausted available administrative remedies, and (3) that "the pro

Respondent contends that none of the petitioners qualifies for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 7430 inasmuch as petitioners "have not substantially prevailed with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues" and petitioners have not established (1) that they "meet the applicable net worth requirements", (2) that they have exhausted available administrative remedies, and (3) that "the pro

Respondent contends that none of the petitioners qualifies for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 7430 inasmuch as petitioners "have not substantially prevailed with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues" and petitioners have not established (1) that they "meet the applicable net worth requirements", (2) that they have exhausted available administrative remedies, and (3) that "the pro

d and David N. Brodsky, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for reasonable litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rules 230 through 232, filed 1References to sec. 7430 in this opinion are to that section of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR 2), Pub. L. 104-168, secs. 701-704, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996), which is effective with respect to (continued...) - 2 -

the existing record. See Rule 232(a). Background The respective petitions in the underlying case were filed on September 13, 1991. The cases were then consolidated and were submitted fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122.3 Petitioners 2References to sec. 7430 in this opinion are to that section before it was amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 701, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996), effective with respect to proceedings commenced after July 30, 1996. The amendments to

Respondent contends that none of the petitioners qualifies for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 7430 inasmuch as petitioners "have not substantially prevailed with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues" and petitioners have not established (1) that they "meet the applicable net worth requirements", (2) that they have exhausted available administrative remedies, and (3) that "the pro

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE DINAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motion, and supplemental motion, for award of litigation and administrative costs pursuant to the provisions of Rule 231 and of section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition in this case was filed.

- 3 - Section 7430 provides for the award of reasonable administrative and litigation costs to a taxpayer in an administrative or court proceeding brought against the United States involving the determination of any tax, interest, or penalty pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. An award of administrative or litigation costs may be made where the taxpay

788, 1055; emphasis added.] On August 5, 1997, paragraph (c)(4) of section 7430 contained no such “subparagraph (A)(iii)”.

On the same date, petitioners filed a Motion for Award of Reasonable Litigation Costs under section 7430 and Rule 231, seeking to recover costs in the amount of $78,070, plus attorney's fees incurred during the prosecution of the motion.

. Matthew J. McCann, for petitioners. Wendy L. Wojewodzki, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION GERBER, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for award of litigation costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rule 231. 1 References to sec. 7430 in this opinion are to that section as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104- 168, sec. 701, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996), effective with (continued...) - 2 - All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in ef

ii) was present in this case which would justify an award of attorney's fees higher than $110 per hour. We hold that no special factor was present. 1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue. References to sec. 7430 are to that section as amended by sec. 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2752 (effective for proceedings commenced after Dec. 31, 1985), and by sec. 6239(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,

MEMORANDUM OPINION COHEN, Chief Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of litigation costs under section 7430, after remand by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Beeler, for petitioner. Clinton M. Fried, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for award of litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rule 231. 1 References to sec. 7430 in this opinion are to that section as amended by sec. 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (effective for proceedings (continued...) - 2 - All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effec

MEMORANDUM OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, as amended and supplemented, under section 7430 and Rule 231.

Respondent Docket No. 8017-94. Filed June 11, 1997. P, a California corporation, filed a petition for redetermination before the enactment of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBR2), Pub. L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). Among the amendments made to sec. 7430, I.R.C., by TBR2 was a change regarding the burden of proof. Prior to amendment, sec. 7430, I.R.C., required the taxpayer to prove that the Commissioner's position in the administrative and court proceedings was not substantially justified.

-2- MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION PARR, Judge: These cases are before the Court on Laura Austin's (petitioner) and Richard Hashimoto's (Hashimoto) motion for administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231, filed on November 27, 1996.2 Neither party has requested a hearing on petitioners' motion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1 We have previously issued opinions in this case at T.C.

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION NlMS, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of reasonable litigation and administrative costs (motion for costs) filed pursuant to Rule 231 and section 7430 on January 2, 1997.

- 2 - OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioner's motions for award of litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

A judgment of administrative or litigation costs may be awarded under section 7430 if a taxpayer (1) was the "prevailing party", (2) exhausted the administrative remedies available to the taxpayer within the IRS, and (3) did not unreasonably protract the proceedings.

-2- OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's Motion for Litigation and Administrative Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE Dean, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court pursuant to petitioners’ motion for award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.

o tax and interest for 1984, 1985, and 1986. R's Examination Division and P reached an agreement on P's case for 1984, 1985, and 1986. R's Office of Appeals Division (Appeals) did not consider the case. P seeks an award of administrative costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C. - 2 - Held: P is not entitled to an award of administrative costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C., because R did not issue a notice of deficiency and Appeals did not issue a notice of decision. Sec. 7430(c)(2), I.R.C.; Estate of Gillespie v

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION NIMS, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for award of reasonable administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233, and request for a hearing.

SERVED FEB V6 NM - 2 - section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to recover $16,5222 for expenses incurred.

petitioner of respondent’s decision to concede the case. On December 2, 2004, after the filing of the parties’ supplemental stipulation of settlement, petitioner filed her instant motion seeking an award of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430. In her motion, petitioner seeks to recover certain fees and costs that she incurred from April 10, 2003, through November 24, 2004, plus any additional expenses that she might incur in pursuing that motion. From April 10, 2003, through

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ claim for administrative costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1 Unless otherwise specified, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

xtent not addressed above, conclude that they are irrelevant or without merit. To reflect the foregoing, An order and order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction will be entered, and petitioner’s motion for award of litigation costs as amended will be denied. 13(...continued) Court includes costs petitioner incurred in this Court in an award under sec. 7430.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 Petitioner seeks an award of $13,511 in respect of 1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended; however, references to section 7430 are to such (continued...) - 2 - respondent’s deficiency determination of $4,328.2 After concessions by respondent,3 the issues

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 Petitioner seeks an award of $15,222 in respect of 1 Unless other indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended; however, references to sec.

the Court a timely petition for review, assigned - 4 - docket No. 12440-00, challenging respondent’s determination.2 On December 8, 2000, petitioner filed with respondent an application for administrative costs for 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985 under section 7430. On December 15, 2000, respondent wrote to petitioner informing him that his application for administrative costs for 1982 and 1983 was premature in light of his then-pending petition for review of his interest abatement claim in docket N

MEMORANDUM OPINION PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s Motion for Litigation and Administrative Costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

180, 181, and 183.1 1 All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue. However, all references to sec. 7430 are to such section in effect when the petition was filed (Feb. 20, 1997). - 2 - The Court agrees with and adopts the Opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judg

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Award of Reasonable Litigation and Administrative Costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

ward was substantially justified. In general, we look separately at the dates that respondent took a position in the administrative proceeding and in the proceeding in this Court. Sec. 7430(c)(7)(A) and (B); Huffman v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 6 Sec. 7430, as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR 2), Pub. L. 104-168, secs. 701-704, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463- 1464 (1996), requires the Commissioner to establish that the Commissioner's position in such proceedings was substantially justifie

ward was substantially justified. In general, we look separately at the dates that respondent took a position in the administrative proceeding and in the proceeding in this Court. Sec. 7430(c)(7)(A) and (B); Huffman v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 6 Sec. 7430, as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR 2), Pub. L. 104-168, secs. 701-704, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463- 1464 (1996), requires the Commissioner to establish that the Commissioner's position in such proceedings was substantially justifie

13, 1988, respondent's Office Auditor Linda Barrow was assigned to examine petitioners' 1986 Federal income tax return. On October 20, 1988, Office Auditor Barrow sent 2(...continued) filed on Jan. 26, 1995, and, therefore, has been considered under sec. 7430 as amended by sec. 6239(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3743-3744, effective for all civil tax proceedings commenced after Nov. 10, 1988. All Rule references are to the Tax Court R

by Mr. Burke, to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance. 1Hereinafter, all references to petitioner are to petitioner Vivian Burke. 2The petition in this case was filed on Aug. 30, 1993; therefore, the motion has been considered under sec. 7430 as amended by sec. 6239(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3743-3744, effective for all civil tax proceedings commenced after Nov. 10, 1988. All Rule references are to the Tax Court R

MEMORANDUM OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for award of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.

7430.15 15 Sec. 7430 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: SEC. 7430. AWARDING OF COSTS AND CERTAIN FEES. (a) In General.--In any administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty under this title, the prevailing pa

Section 7430 permits the prevailing party to recover an award of reasonable litigation costs. Section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) generally limits the hourly rate for attorney’s fees. To the extent that attorney’s fees are part of the estates’ claimed litigation costs, they are being claimed at the statutory hourly 3 To the extent relevant, the findings of

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Marvel, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for reasonable litigation costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

The sole issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled to reasonable administrative costs under section 7430 for expenses incurred in proceedings within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding their 1993 and 1994 Federal income taxes.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GERBER, Judge: Petitioner moved for an award of fees and costs under section 7430.1 Petitioner alleges that he is the prevailing party, has exhausted administrative remedies, did not unreasonably protract the administrative or court proceeding, and 1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect for the period under consideration.

or respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7443A and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1 This case is before the Court on petitioners’ Motion for Reasonable Litigation Costs under section 7430. Because of 1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 2 - concessions by respondent, the sole issue now before us is the allowabl

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Swift, Judge: This case is before us under section 7430 on petitioners’ motion for litigation costs.

contends that she “waited longer than she should have [to receive her refund] and should be compensated for having to incur unnecessary attorney fees.” Respondent opposes this request be- cause it does not comply with the requirements set forth in section 7430. We agree with respondent. Section 7430 authorizes the award of reasonable costs to parties who (1) are the prevailing party, (2) timely exhausted their administrative remedies, (3) did not unreasonably pro- tract proceedings, and (4) cla

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award ofadministrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule SERVED May 24 2017 - 2 - [*2] 231.¹ The parties agree that a hearing on the motion is not required.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for award oflitigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ None ofthe ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure.

SIDENTIAL CARE HOME I, INC., ET AL.,1 Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 1448-10, 1480-10, Filed June 20, 2013. 1481-10. Ps filed a motion for recovery ofreasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 7430. Held: R's position was substantiallyjustified. P is not entitled to recovery ofreasonable administrative and litigation costs. 1Cases ofthe following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home I, Inc.

Introduction Section 7430 provides that a taxpayer may recover reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in connection with any tax proceeding - 6 - [*6] (administrative orjudicial) against the United States ifthe taxpayer is the prevailing party in the proceeding.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GOEKE, Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioner's amended motion for litigation costs under section 7430 .1 The issue we must decide is whether petitioner is 'Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure .

In Dixon VII we awarded appellate attorney's fees and expenses .under section 7430 to Kersting project petitioners represented in the Dixon V appeal by John R .

In Dixon VII we awarded appellate attorney's fees and expenses .under section 7430 to Kersting project petitioners represented in the Dixon V appeal by John R .

Accordingly, we need not, nor do we, address whether any remaining requirements of section 7430 have been satisfied.

Discussion For purposes of petitioners’ motion for litigation costs under section 7430, respondent does not dispute that petitioners - 5 - exhausted all administrative remedies, did not protract the proceedings, substantially prevailed, and satisfy the net worth limitation of section 7430.

Discussion Pursuant to section 7430, we may award the prevailing party in a Tax Court proceeding reasonable litigation and administrative costs.

Discussion Pursuant to section 7430, we may award the prevailing party in a Tax Court proceeding reasonable litigation and administrative costs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PANUTHOS, Chief'"Special Trial Judge : This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231 .1 For the reasons discussed below, we shall deny petitioners' motion .

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for award of litigation costs and related costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 We see no reason 1 All references to sec.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge: The instant matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for litigation fees and costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GOEKE, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for.award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Discussion Petitioners contend that they meet the requirements of section 7430 and, thus, are entitled to recover litigation and administrative costs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GOEKE, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's Motion Requesting For Reasonable Litigation Costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ The issue is whether ¹Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

ldren in 1993 each made a gift valued at $250,000 to their parents, but no gift tax was owed because of the available unified credit under section 2505. On December 8, 2000, petitioners submitted requests to respondent for administrative costs under section 7430. Linda Johnson and Marc Fretwell filed joint requests with their spouses, Arlen Johnson and Dorene Fretwell. On May 27, 2003, respondent sent separate letters to petitioners denying their claims for administrative costs. The respective p

ldren in 1993 each made a gift valued at $250,000 to their parents, but no gift tax was owed because of the available unified credit under section 2505. On December 8, 2000, petitioners submitted requests to respondent for administrative costs under section 7430. Linda Johnson and Marc Fretwell filed joint requests with their spouses, Arlen Johnson and Dorene Fretwell. On May 27, 2003, respondent sent separate letters to petitioners denying their claims for administrative costs. The respective p

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for litigation and administrative costs - 2 - (motion)1 pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.2 Petitioner resided in Kenmore, Washington, when her petition in this case was filed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION SWIFT, Judge: This matter is before us on a motion for an award under section 7430 of $1,657.50 in administrative costs, plus costs in connection with the instant motion.

ldren in 1993 each made a gift valued at $250,000 to their parents, but no gift tax was owed because of the available unified credit under section 2505. On December 8, 2000, petitioners submitted requests to respondent for administrative costs under section 7430. Linda Johnson and Marc Fretwell filed joint requests with their spouses, Arlen Johnson and Dorene Fretwell. On May 27, 2003, respondent sent separate letters to petitioners denying their claims for administrative costs. The respective p

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs (motion) pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of (continued...) - 2 - Petitioner resided in Kennewick, Washington, when her petition in this case was filed.

ldren in 1993 each made a gift valued at $250,000 to their parents, but no gift tax was owed because of the available unified credit under section 2505. On December 8, 2000, petitioners submitted requests to respondent for administrative costs under section 7430. Linda Johnson and Marc Fretwell filed joint requests with their spouses, Arlen Johnson and Dorene Fretwell. On May 27, 2003, respondent sent separate letters to petitioners denying their claims for administrative costs. The respective p

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for recovery of reasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 This 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s Motion to Recover Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 This Court ruled in 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for litigation and administrative costs (motion) filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time petitioner filed (continued...) - 2 - Petitioner resided in Aurora, Colorado, when her petition in this case was filed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for award of reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 We see no reason for an 1 All references to sec.

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for reasonable litigation costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

On January 31, 2003, petitioners made a qualified offer, pursuant to section 7430, to resolve petitioners’ tax liabilities for the 1989, 1991, and 1992 tax years.

ues that the ultimate 1 At this point, it is not clear whether petitioners also (or in the alternative) will be seeking the recovery of litigation costs relating to the water rights adjustment under the general litigation cost recovery provisions of sec. 7430. In any event, petitioners acknowledge that, under the qualified offer provision of sec. 7430(c)(4)(E), they are entitled to recover only litigation costs incurred after May 12, 1999, the date on which petitioners made their qualified offer

deductible by H as alimony paid. H filed a petition for redetermination. This Court held that the payments were alimony for Federal income tax purposes and were deductible by H, under sec. 215, I.R.C. H seeks recovery of litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C., in the amount of $54,012.63. *This opinion supplements our previously filed opinion in Kean v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-163. - 2 - Held: R’s position that the payments made by H to W were not deductible by H as alimony paid wa

tions for personal exemptions under sec. 151(c), I.R.C., with respect to persons claimed as dependents. Ps filed a petition for redetermination, and R subsequently conceded the entire case. Ps seek recovery of costs in the amount of $880 pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C. Held: R’s position in the proceeding at issue was substantially justified within the meaning of sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i), I.R.C., thereby precluding Ps’ recovery of costs under that section. James L. and Sherri R. Goertler, pro sese. T

d that respondent was wrong. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of respondent's case at trial, respondent's position was substantially justified. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to an award of litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430. Section 6673(a)(2) allows the Court to sanction an attorney who has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in any case. Because we conclude that respondent's position was substantially justified, we also conclude that pe

deductible by H as alimony paid. H filed a petition for redetermination. This Court held that the payments were alimony for Federal income tax purposes and were deductible by H, under sec. 215, I.R.C. H seeks recovery of litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C., in the amount of $54,012.63. *This opinion supplements our previously filed opinion in Kean v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-163. - 2 - Held: R’s position that the payments made by H to W were not deductible by H as alimony paid wa

MEMORANDUM OPINION WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of administrative costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

- 2 - MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motions for award of litigation and administrative costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.3 We see no reason for an evidentiary hearing on this matter.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's motion for litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

- 2 - MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motions for award of litigation and administrative costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.3 We see no reason for an evidentiary hearing on this matter.

MEMORANDUM OPINION COLVIN, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.1 After concessions, the sole issue for decision is 1 Petitioner seeks an award of attorney’s fees of $6,980, accounting fees of $2,250, and court costs of $60.

, 2000 letter) to petitioners in response to petition- ers' June 12, 2000 letter and to a letter from petitioners dated July 31, 2000, that is not part of the instant record. In respondent's November 20, 2000 letter, respondent stated in part: Under I.R.C. § 7430, the prevailing party in a court proceeding may be awarded a judgment or settle- ment for reasonable administrative and litigation costs. Under I.R.C. [§] 7430(c)(4)(C), when a case is finally determined by a court, that court must make

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.¹ Neither party ¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

- 2 - MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners’ motions for award of litigation and administrative costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.3 We see no reason for an evidentiary hearing on this matter.

ies in tax, additions to tax, and penalties for fraud with respect to P’s 1991, 1992, and 1993 tax years. P filed a petition for redetermination, and R subsequently conceded the entire fraud penalty. P seeks recovery of litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430 in the amount of $47,640.98 or, in the event a special factor is present, $92,822.98. 1. Held: R’s assertion of the fraud penalty was substantially justified, within the meaning of sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i), with respect to one adjustment but wa

the mailing of the notices, had not filed Federal income tax returns for any of the years at issue. The deficiencies were assessed between July 19, 1993 and April 28, 1997. On August 21, 1997, respondent ¹(...continued) Procedure. All references to sec. 7430 are to that section as in effect when the petition was filed. rechrded a notice of a $34,950 Federal tax lien with the Clark County recorder in Las Vegas, Nevada. In November 2000, petitioner applied for a position as pit floor supervisor w

Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos pursuant to section 7443A(b)(5) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1 The Court agrees with and adopts the 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended; references to sec. 7430 are to that section in effect at the time that the petition was (continued...) - 2 - opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This matter is before

Petitioner subsequently moved for an award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

- 2 - pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.2 This Court ruled in favor of petitioners, in Park v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Administrative Costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

Petitioner subsequently moved for an award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

s’ failure to account for discharge of indebtedness income in 1994. Ps filed a petition for redetermination, and R subsequently conceded the entire case. Ps seek recovery of administrative and litigation costs in the amount of $10,978.74 pursuant to sec. 7430, I.R.C. 1. Held: R’s position with respect to the discharge of indebtedness issue was substantially justified within the meaning of sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i), I.R.C. 2. Held, further, R’s position with respect to the penalty issue was not subst

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ motion for allowance of claims for litigation and - 2 - administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 This Court ruled in favor of petitioners, in Dailey v.

Lacking any legal authority to support his argument, petitioner argues that it would be unfair to require a taxpayer to exhaust his administrative remedies as a condition to being eligible to recover legal fees under section 7430 where the Commissioner fails to give the taxpayer the opportunity to pursue the administrative remedies.

- 2 - pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.2 This Court ruled in favor of petitioners, in Park v.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Award of Administrative and Litigation Costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

VENUE, Respondent* MICHAEL A. HAAS AND ANGELA M. HAAS, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 16486-98, 16487-98. Filed August 10, 2001. Held: Evidence excluded at trial may be considered by the Court in ruling under sec. 7430, I.R.C., on a motion for litigation costs. Held, further, a “qualified offer” made under sec. 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g), I.R.C., does not satisfy the requirement under sec. 7430(b)(1), I.R.C., that in order to qualify for an award of litigation

2-95. Filed August 27, 2001. Jerry S. Payne, pro se. Richard T. Cummings, for respondent. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION SWIFT, Judge: This matter is before us on petitioner’s motion under Rule 231 for an award of $42,376 in litigation costs under section 7430. * This opinion supplements our prior Memorandum Opinion, Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-227, revd. 224 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000). - 2 - Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect

MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for award of litigation costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231 on June 5, 2001.1 Petitioner seeks to recover litigation costs of $187,958.22 incurred in contesting 1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended; however, references to sec.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's motion for administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GERBER, Judge: Respondent moved for summary judgment on the question of whether petitioner is entitled to administrative SERVED DEC 2 8 2001 - 2 - costs under section 7430¹ in excess of those allowed by respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION POWELL, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for reasonable litigation costs pursuant - 2 - to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231, and 232,1 filed April 14, 2000.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners move the Court under section 7430 to award them $1,656.25 in attorney’s fees and $89.20 in court costs.

Lane's (petitioners) motion for - 2 - costs and fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Petitioners do not request a hearing on this matter, and we see no reason for a hearing.

T.C. Memo. 2000-145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT THOMAS J. MITCHELL AND JANICE M. MITCHELL, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 14056-98. Filed April 21, 2000. Ps move the Court for litigation costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C. R had determined a deficiency in Ps’ 1994 and 1995 Federal income taxes and accuracy-related penalties with respect thereto. R’s determination was primarily attributable to an unclear application of a recent statutory amendment. We rejected R’s ap

- 2 - for an award of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.2 After concessions by respondent,3 the issues for decision are as follows: (1) Whether respondent's position in the administrative and court proceedings was substantially justified.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners move the Court under section 7430 to award them $1,656.25 in attorney’s fees and $89.20 in court costs.

or petitioners. Christopher A. Fisher, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for recovery of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 74301 and Rules 230 through 232. 1References to sec. 7430 are to sec. 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect for proceedings commenced after July 30, 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, other section references are (continued...) - 2 - We must decide whether petitioners are the prevailing party

MEMORANDUM OPINION THORNTON, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1 References to sec.

Lane's (petitioners) motion for - 2 - costs and fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Petitioners do not request a hearing on this matter, and we see no reason for a hearing.

--- MAJORITY --- Wells, Chief Judge: The instant case involves petitioners’ claim for administrative costs of $5,377.22 pursuant to section 7430. Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioners resided in Nassau, New York, when they filed their petition. FINDINGS OF FACT During 1987 and 1988, petitioner Raymond P. Corkrey (petitioner) and his former wife Gunn Corkrey (petitioner’s ex-wife) were estranged. They divorced in 1990. Petitioner failed to file tim

MEMORANDUM OPINION DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DINAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231, and 232,1 filed October 1, 1997.

nt of $199 for taxable year ending June 30, 1993. The corporation subsequently filed a motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs. Discussion Taxpayers may be awarded an amount for reasonable litigation costs if they meet the requirements of section 7430. In order to qualify for such an award, a party must: (1) Qualify as a prevailing party; (2) have exhausted available administrative remedies; (3) not have unreasonably protracted the court proceeding; and (4) show that the costs claimed

993, respectively. Petitioners then filed a motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs and a motion to determine prevailing party. Discussion Taxpayers may be awarded an amount for reasonable litigation costs if they meet the requirements of section 7430. In order to qualify for such an award, a party must: (1) Qualify as a - 7 - prevailing party; (2) have exhausted available administrative remedies; (3) not have unreasonably protracted the court proceeding; and (4) show that the costs c

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ Motion for Recovery of Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of litigation and administrative costs and attorney's fees pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 We see no reason for an evidentiary hearing on this matter.

case involved the award of costs and certain fees pursuant to section 7430, and it is apparently under this section that petitioner seeks relief.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's amended motion for award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

60 F.3d 1020 (3d Cir. 1995), revg. T.C. Memo. 1994-280, this Court should analyze the instant case under the "worst case scenario" standard. We disagree. Nicholson involved an appeal of this Court's refusal to award a taxpayer attorney's fees under section 7430. See Nicholson, supra at 1024. The Commissioner initially contended that the taxpayer was not at risk with respect to a long-term note used to finance a computer purchase and leaseback transaction. See id. at 1023. In particular, the Com

We so held because petitioners failed to prove that they met the net worth requirements of section 7430 and therefore failed to establish that they were the "prevailing party".

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion, as supplemented, for reasonable litigation and administrative costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DINAN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for An Award of Reasonable Litigation and Administrative Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231 and 232,1 filed April 11, 1997.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion, as supplemented, for reasonable litigation and administrative costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

satisfy a reasonable person". Pierce v. Underwood, supra at 565. The taxpayer need not show bad faith to establish that the Commissioner's position was not substantially justified for purposes of a motion for administrative or litigation costs under section 7430. See Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Powers v. Commissioner, supra at 471. The Commissioner's concession of a case is a factor to be considered. See Powers v. Commissioner, supra. The fact, however,

MEMORANDUM OPINION DINAN, Special Trial Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231 and 232,1 filed 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years 1993 and 1994.

Respondent’s notice stated in pertinent part: We have completed our review of your claim for administrative costs under Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all sec.

Ryan, pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 The issues for decision are (1) whether petitioners should be awarded reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430, and if so, (2) whether the amount of litigation costs requested by petitioners is reasonable, and (3) whether petitioners have unreasonably protracted the litigation.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners’ Motion for Recovery of Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DINAN, Special Trial Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231 and 232,1 filed 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years 1993 and 1994.

Awards of costs and certain fees (pursuant to section 7430) would be available to eligible taxpayers with respect to Tax Court determinations pursuant to the bill.

- 2 - FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Award of Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

nistrative costs are inadvertent and that our proceedings relate only to litigation costs. 2 Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect for the years in issue. References to sec. 7430 are to that section as in effect for proceedings commenced at the time the petition in the instant case was filed. Because the petition was filed on Sept. 26, 1996, the amendments made by title VII of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION POWELL, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for award of reasonable litigation and administrative costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230, 231, and 232,1 filed March 24, 1998.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 1993, the taxable year (continued...) - 2 - After concessions by respondent,2 the issues for decision are as follows: (1) Whether petitioner unreasonably protracted the court proceeding.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's motion for litigation and administrative costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

-97. Filed August 24, 1998. Girish and Nalini G. Patel, pro sese. David B. Mora, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for the year in issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 2 At the time their p

e costs in the amount of $7,775.81 (of which $4,006.39 is attributable to their own time). The stipulated decision was vacated and filed as a Stipulation of Settled Issues on December 16, 1996. Respondent's response to the motion was 1 References to sec. 7430 are to that section as amended by sec. 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (effective for proceedings commenced after Dec. 31, 1985) and by sec. 6239(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Foley, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Neither party requested a hearing on the motion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge: The instant matter is before us on petitioners' motion for reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Costs, as amended, filed pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.2 Petitioners seek to recover approximately $16,000 incurred in resisting respondent's deficiency determinations for the taxable year 1989.

eases and special factors. Sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii). Respondent contends that petitioner does not meet this requirement. A taxpayer has the burden of proving that it meets each requirement before the Court may order an award of litigation costs under section 7430. Rule 232(e); Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir. 1993); Gantner v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 192, 197 (1989), affd. 905 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1990); Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492, 497 (1987).2 2 In 1996, leg

-2- 1997, pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.2 Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing.

on of the Special Trial Judge that is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE POWELL, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion, as supplemented, for an award of reasonable litigation costs,2 pursuant to section 7430. The only issues presented are: (1) Whether respondent's position was substantially justified, and (2) whether, if not, the claimed litigation costs are reasonable in amount.3 FINDINGS OF FACT Reliable Credit Association, Inc. (Reliable or

7430 was amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 701, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996), effective with respect to proceedings commenced after July 30, 1996. The amendments to the section place on the Commissioner the burden of establishing that the position of the Commissioner was substantially justified. Sec. 7430(c)(4

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 In separate notices of deficiency respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's 1988 and 1991 Federal income taxes in the amounts of $15,292 and $30,508, respectively.

Filed October 28, 1997. John P. McDonnell, for petitioner. Ronald G. Dong, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion for reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 74301 1 References to sec. 7430 in this opinion are to that section as amended by sec. 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2752 (effective for proceedings commenced after Dec. 31, 1985), and by sec. 6239(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Reve

MEMORANDUM OPINION CLAPP, Judge: This case is before us on a Motion for Award of Reasonable Litigation Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232 filed by Arlene Jacoby (petitioner).

MEMORANDUM OPINION KÖRNER, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner's motion to recover administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 The opinion in 1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners moved the Court on September 18, 1996, to recover administrative and litigation costs under -- 22 -- section 7430 and Rule 231.1 Respondent issued petitioners a notice of deficiency reflecting her determination that they were liable for a $14,939 deficiency in their 1993 Federal income tax and a $2,988 penalty under section 6662(a).

opts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge that is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE Panuthos, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430. Respondent concedes that petitioner has satisfied all of the requirements for entitlement to litigation costs. Therefore, the only issue presented for decision is whether the amounts of litigation costs claimed by petitioner are reasona

ge's opinion, which is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: These consolidated cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for awards of reasonable administrative and litigation costs, pursuant to section 7430. A hearing was conducted on petitioners' motions in Houston, Texas. The following witnesses testified at the hearing: Miriam Lawrence, petitioner in docket No. 4263-92; Alfonso Red, the revenue agent who conducted the relevant examinatio

MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners moved the Court on March 13, 1996, to recover $19,126 of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.

eum Refiners, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 685, 688 (1990). Petitioners, however, need not show bad faith to establish that respondent's position was not substantially justified for purposes of a motion for administrative and litigation costs under section 7430. Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457 (1993), affd. in part and revd. in part 43 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 1995). Whether the position of the United States in this proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners moved the Court on March 13, 1996, to recover $19,126 of administrative and litigation costs under section 7430 and Rule 231.

ge's opinion, which is set forth below. OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE CARLUZZO, Special Trial Judge: These consolidated cases are before the Court on petitioners' motions for awards of reasonable administrative and litigation costs, pursuant to section 7430. A hearing was conducted on petitioners' motions in Houston, Texas. The following witnesses testified at the hearing: Miriam Lawrence, petitioner in docket No. 4263-92; Alfonso Red, the revenue agent who conducted the relevant examinatio

MEMORANDUM OPINION PARKER, Judge: This consolidated case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for litigation costs, pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

eum Refiners, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 685, 688 (1990). Petitioners, however, need not show bad faith to establish that respondent's position was not substantially justified for purposes of a motion for administrative and litigation costs under section 7430. Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457 (1993), affd. in part and revd. in part 43 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 1995). Whether the position of the United States in this proceeding

P then moved for an award of reasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430, I.R.C.

eum Refiners, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 685, 688 (1990). Petitioners, however, need not show bad faith to establish that respondent's position was not substantially justified for purposes of a motion for administrative and litigation costs under section 7430. Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457 (1993), affd. in part and revd. in part 43 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 1995). Whether the position of the United States in this proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion filed September 18, 1995, and supplemental motion filed November 6, 1995, for litigation costs pursuant to Rules 230 through 2321 and section 7430.2 In our opinion of 1 All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice (continued...) - 2 - August 14, 1995, we decided that petitioners engaged in their cattle-raising activity for profit and that certain depreciation deductions claimed by petitioners wer

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION WELLS, Judge: The instant matter is before us on petitioners' motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Clapp, Judge: This case is before us on petitioner’s motion for award of reasonable litigation costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

MEMORANDUM OPINION JACOBS, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Litigation and Administrative Costs pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.

Respondent concedes that petitioner meets all of the requirements for an award of litigation costs under section 7430 except whether respondent's position in the underlying proceeding was substantially justified.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PARR, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion filed July 11, 1995, and supplemental motion filed October 23, 1995, for administrative and litigation costs, pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 At the time of filing of 1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice (continued...) - 2 - the petition herein, petitioners resided in Austin, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's Motion for Litigation and Administrative Costs, pursuant to section 7430 and Rule 231.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.

--- MAJORITY --- OPINION Parr, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for litigation and administrative costs filed September 30, 1994, pursuant to Rule 231 and section 7430. Respondent determined deficiencies in and additions to petitioner’s Federal income taxes for tax years 1986, 1987, and 1988. The case has been docketed, tried, and submitted to the Court for decision but has not yet been decided. After trial, respondent made a jeopardy assessment against petitioner an

Chinweze is not the prevailing party under section 7430, we will deny his request for litigation costs.

Later, petitioner filed a motion for attorney's fees under section 7430 for the litigation over the IRS' attempts to amend the proofofclaim.

§ 7430 Attorneys' Fees: Navigating Section 7430 and a Call for the Final Act", 15 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 731, 737 (2010). In some instances the 30-day letter requires the taxpayerto send a protest, which is a written document explaining why the taxpayer is contesting the examiner's findings. Saltzman & Book, supra, para. 9.05, at 9-60 (c

Section 7430, relating to administrative or litigation costs, does not grant this Court the authority to create and adopt the type ofrule that petitioners have proposed, nor does any other section ofthe Code. See Grigoraci v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 272 (2004) (determining Court lacked statutory authorityto award punitive damages). Consequently, we

d qualify for VA -6- benefits.3 We therefore hold that petitioner's military disability retirement income of$5,936 is excludible from his gross income. Finally, in his posttrial briefpetitioner asked for an award ofreasonable litigation costs under section 7430. Rules 230 to 233 set out procedures for making a claim for reasonable litigation costs under section 7430. Under those rules, petitioner's claim is premature. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for petitioner. 3 In anothe

Bias. In addition to voicing objections to section 7443(f), petitioners object to several features ofTax Court litigation, such as the burden ofproof, sec. 7491; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); limitation ofreimbursement oflitigation costs, sec. 7430; the lack ofjury trials, see Rule 74(c) (allowing the taking of depositions requested by one party without the consent ofthe other party only as an extraordinaryprocedure and when approved by the Court); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101,

2In his pretrial memorandum, petitioner alleges that he "is to be granted an allowance ofentitlements such as for IRC § 7430 cost and fees and any other furtherreliefa court may deem appropriate under the circumstances", and he seeks "reasonable fees and costs" in both his petition and amended petition.

e references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. All amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar. SERVED Aug 25 2014 - 2 - [*2] costs under section 7430. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Mr. Swiggart is entitled to administrative and litigation costs of$3,256.50. Background On May 19, 2011, Mr. Swiggart filed a 2010 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Mr. Swigga

74, 76-77 (1986); see also Chapman GlenLtd.

Carpentier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-160. 'Unless otherwise indicated, Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue (continued...) SERVED APR 2 9 2014 - 2 - [*2] section 7430. The primary issue is whether under section 7430 petitioner can recover certain administrative and litigation costs and fees incurred in connection with this interest abatement proceeding or other such costs and fees incurred in connectio

4) all administrative remedies available to the taxpayerhave been exhausted. See sec. 7430(a), (b)(1), (3), (c); Purciello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-50, at *8-*9. Petitioner has the burden ofestablishing that she satisfied each requirement ofsection 7430. See Rule 232(e). To be a prevailing party a taxpayermust (1) substantiallyprevail with respect to the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set ofissues presented, see sec. 7430(c)(4)(A); and (2) meet the timing and net

In his pretrial memorandum, petitioner alleges that he “is to be granted an allowance of entitlements such as for IRC § 7430 cost and fees and any other further relief a court may deem appropriate under the circumstances”, and he seeks “reasonable fees and costs” in both his petition and amended petition.

This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award ofreasonable litigation and administrative costs filed in accordance with section 7430 and Rule 231.

We do not award costs unless a taxpayer satisfies all of the section 7430 requirements.

MEMORANDUM OPINION HAINES, Judge : This collection review case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for recovery of litigation costs brought under section 7430 and Rule 231 .1 Petitioners seek to 'Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended .

Whether Petitioners Are Entitled to an Award of Costs The Court understands that much of this dispute arises from the requirement in section 7430 that in order to receive an award of costs, taxpayers must prove that they substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or issues presented.

scheduled a date and time for the CDP hearing without consulting Industrial; and (4) Talbott ignored evidence of the agreement settling Industrial's deficiency case while it was on appeal. Industrial also requests an award of litigation costs under section 7430. 1. Ex Parte Communication Section 6330 sets out the process for administrative review of decisions by the IRS to levy taxpayers' property. One of the protections that section gives taxpayers is a promise that the hearing will be conduct

On or about August 1, 2004, petitioners mailed to respondent their claim under section 7430 for $7,253 in administrative costs relating to their attempt to resolve the question as to the taxability of their IRA conversion and the reversal thereof .

URT THOMAS J. AND- BONNIE F. RATKE, Petitioners v. FILES COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent' Docket No. 9641-OlL. ^ Filed September 5, 2007. After this Court ruled for Ps in the instant collection case, Ps moved for an award of costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C. 1986, and then for sanctions under sec. 6673(a) (2), I.R.C. 1986. In connection with these motions, Ps seek discovery of (1) a memorandum sent by R's initial trial counsel to R's national office at the time R's answer was filed in t

Amarasinghe and his spouse because section 7430 does not allow a petitioner to recover costs from another petitioner .

MEMORANDUM OPINION CHIECHI, Judge: This matter is before the Court on peti- tioners’ motion filed pursuant to Rule 2311 for an award under section 7430 of reasonable litigation costs (petitioners’ mo- 1All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

21,000.2 Simultaneously with the filing of its reply brief on June 8, 2006, the estate filed a motion to reopen the record for 2 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. - 14 - receipt of two additional exhibits. Respondent thereafter filed an objection to the motion. OPINION I. General Rules A. Federal Taxation Principles The Int

Amarasinghe and his spouse because section 7430 does not allow a petitioner to recover costs from another petitioner .

nk, pro se . William J . Gregg, for respondent . MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS , Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion for reasonable administrative and litigation SERVED APR 3 0 2007 - 2 - costs'pursuant to Rule 2312 and section 7430 . The issues we must decide are whether petitioners were the prevailing party within the meaning of section 7430 and whether petitioners have substantiated any recoverable costs . For the reasons stated below, petitioners' motion for reas

2006 . Lowell E . Mann, for petitioner . David A . Breen , for respondent . MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs' pursuant to Rule 2312 and section 7430 . The issue we must 'Although petitioner titled the instant motion "MOTION FOR AWARD OF REASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS", the attached list o f (continued . . . ) SERVED CCT_ 2 3 2006 14 2 decide is whether petitioner was the prevailing

uted to 9 Although petitioner claimed in her petition that she should be entitled to recovery of her administrative or litigation costs, she did not argue for costs at trial or on brief. In any event, consideration of her eligibility for costs under sec. 7430 would be premature, and the Court will not further discuss the issue in this report. See Rule 231. - 13 - petitioner. Because petitioner did not pay taxes on self- employment income, respondent maintains that petitioner is liable for self-e

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

2006 . Lowell E . Mann, for petitioner . David A . Breen, for respondent . MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs' pursuant to Rule 2312 and section 7430 . The issue we must 'Although petitioner titled the instant motion "MOTION FOR AWARD OF REASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS", the attached list of costs includes both administrative and litigation costs . We (continued . . . ) StFV11 OCT 2 3

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

2006 . Lowell E . Mann, for petitioners . David A . Breen, for respondent . MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs' pursuant to Rule 2312 and section 7430 . The issue we must 'Although petitioner titled the instant motion "MOTION FOR AWARD .OF REASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS",'the attached list of costs sought includes both administrative and litigation costs . (continued .. . ) SFI V a OC

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

2006 . Lowell E . Mann, for petitioners . David A . Breen, for respondent . MEMORANDUM OPINION WELLS, Judge : The instant matter is before the Court on petitioners' motion for reasonable administrative and litigation costs' pursuant to Rule 2312 and section 7430 . The issue we must 'Although petitioners titled the instant motion "'MOTION FOR AWARD OF REASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS", the attached list of costs includes both administrative and litigation costs . We (continued . . . ) SP.RVC,,FJ O

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners' requests for the award of attorney's fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a "prevailing party" as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

In so doing, the Court denied petitioners’ requests for the award of attorney’s fees under section 7430, on the ground that Dixon III had held that none of them was a “prevailing party” as defined in section 7430(c)(4).

21, 2004. Petitioner’s petition to this Court arrived in an envelope bearing a postmark of Feb. 20, 2004. See sec. 6330(d)(1). 5 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. 6 Principally, the exhibits accompanying respondent’s motion for summary judgment contained conflicting dates for issuance of (continued...) - 7 - denied the moti

Voelker, for respondent MEMORANDUM OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioner moves the Court under section 7430 to award him litigation costs of Š7, 893.75.¹ Respondent objects to this motion, arguing: (1) Petitioner did not exhaust his ¹ Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code, and Rule references are to the Tax Court' Rules of Practice and Procedure.

. E.g., id. at 19, 20; Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v. 4 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. - 7 - Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195. The circumstances of the instant case are analogous to those in Keene v. Com

n respondent and filed a copy with the Court on June 1, 2004. The 30 paragraphs generally asked respondent to admit to a broad 5 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be- further addressed. See Rule 231. - 9 - spectrum of alleged failures to comply with statutory requirements. Respondent filed a response denying the allegations in all material respects. By notice

2000. Additionally, petitioner asks the Court for recovery for legal fees to compensate her minor child for the child’s time “to protect” petitioner’s rights. Although petitioner did not specifically request litigation or administrative costs under sec. 7430, any consideration for costs under sec. 7430 would be premature, and the Court will not further discuss the issue. See Rule 231. - 9 - whatever source derived”. Sec. 61(a). Every U.S. resident individual whose gross income for the taxable y

r criminal investigation. The Court granted petitioner's motion but warned petitioner that "your position is somewhat extreme" 4 The Court notes that to the extent that the petitions seek reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claims are premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. and that the Court would entertain any motions either side wished to make, including "a motion under Rule 91(f) to force stipulation". The two cases were later

t was held that taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330 hearings. The taxpayer in 4 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. - 6 - that case had refused to proceed when denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id. In contrast, we ha

ition.2 After the pleadings were closed in this case, respondent filed the subject motion for summary judgment and to impose a 2 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. - 7 - penalty under section 6673. Petitioner was directed to file any response to respondent's motion on or before September 30, 2004. Discussion Rule 121(a) allo

ceived all the relief to which she is entitled under section 6330, we shall grant respondent’s motion to dismiss this case as moot. We shall also deny petitioner’s 8Petitioner has not explicitly claimed administrative or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430 even though she was specifically advised by the Court that if she wished to make such claim she would have to provide the facts and information required by Rule 231. Petitioner has not provided the information required by Rule 231. - 8 - “M

tended to expedite litigation and to avoid unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Rule 5 The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further addressed. See Rule 231. - 8 - 121(b) directs that a decision on such a motion shall be rendered “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other acce

To the extent that petitioner’s due process contentions take the form of a claim for litigation or administrative costs and fees under section 7430, such claim is premature.

To the extent that petitioner’s due process contentions take the form of a claim for litigation or administrative costs and fees under section 7430, such claim is premature.

rejected this argument as it relates to our jurisdiction in a prior proceeding involving petitioner and respondent that arose out of Martin I. In Rothhammer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-46, petitioner unsuccessfully sought litigation costs under sec. 7430. Petitioner contended that Mr. Berg's failure to attach the notice, as required by Rule 34(b)(8), deprived this Court of jurisdiction. Petitioner cited cases, as he does now, in which the taxpayers' original petitions failed to name certain

To the extent that petitioner’s due process contentions take the form of a claim for litigation or administrative costs and fees under section 7430, such claim is premature.

To the extent that petitioner’s due process contentions take the form of a claim for litigation or administrative costs and fees under section 7430, such claim is premature.

exemption where applicable, and indicated married, filing separately status constituted a return filed by the Commissioner pursuant to sec. 6020(b). In our subsequent opinion in Phillips v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. at 534 n.8, concerning a claim under sec. 7430, we distinguished the holding in Smalldridge on the basis that the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Commissioner filed valid returns pursuant to sec. 6020(b) in Smalldridge, whereas in Phillips “No such returns were filed”. But see P

Although technically applicable only to qualified offers made in administrative and court proceedings after January 3, 2001, petitioners emphasize that the temporary regulations promulgated under section 7430 support their interpretation of section 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I) because the temporary regulations provide that the settlement limitation will apply only where the settlement occurs and the judgment is entered “exclusively’ pursuant to a settlement.

g should have “the force and effect of law.” Id. at 1146. Given the circumstances of that case, we construe the statement in Stubbs that the 11Our decision in Phillips v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 529 (1987), involving an award of litigation costs under sec. 7430, was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 851 F.2d 1492 (1988). However, that reversal was not a result of the statements quoted above. Instead, the Court of Appeals found the Commissioner’s re

On January 25, 2002, petitioner’s motion for costs was filed in which he sought an award of $3,555 for administrative and litigation costs under section 7430.2 Petitioner’s $3,555 claim may be broken down into two major categories comprising $3,000 for petitioner’s time of 120 hours at $25 per hour and $555 for claimed expenditures for costs, travel, and legal fees.

Both estates moved for litigation and administrative costs under section 7430.2 The Estate of John L.

uccessful in this Court in showing that a $130,000 payment received in settlement of an insurance claim was not for punitive damages and that any gain realized would not be recognized under sec. 1033, I.R.C. Ps seek to recover litigation costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C. The parties disagree about one of the prerequisites to recovery--whether Ps exhausted their administrative remedies before the Internal Revenue Service. Sec. 7430(b)(1), I.R.C.; sec. 301.7430- 1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Followi

mo. 1993-627; Callison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-626; Zuhone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-142, affd. 883 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1989). Our decision in Phillips v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 529 (1987), involving an award of litigation costs under sec. 7430, was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 851 F.2d 1492 (1988). However, that reversal was not a result of the statements quoted above. Instead, the Court of Appeals found the Commissioner’s re

1988)(approving award of section 7430 litigation costs after determination that Tax Court lacked jurisdiction); Weiss v.

This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's oral - 2 - motion for litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

This case is before the Court pursuant to petitioner's - 2 - motion for litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

as filed. Rothhammer and Martin invested in the Elektra/Hemisphere tax shelter in the early 1980's and deducted amounts based on those investments. 2 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue. References to sec. 7430 are to that section as amended by sec. 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2752, effective for proceedings which commenced after Dec. 31, 1985. A “proceeding” under sec. 7430 commences when the petition is fi

VENUE, Respondent* MICHAEL A. HAAS AND ANGELA M. HAAS, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 16486-98, 16487-98. Filed August 10, 2001. Held: Evidence excluded at trial may be considered by the Court in ruling under sec. 7430, I.R.C., on a motion for litigation costs. Held, further, a “qualified offer” made under sec. 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g), I.R.C., does not satisfy the requirement under sec. 7430(b)(1), I.R.C., that in order to qualify for an award of litigation

--- MAJORITY --- SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION Swift, Judge: This matter is before us on petitioners’ motion under Rule 231 for an award of $44,559 in litigation costs and fees under the general provisions of section 7430 and under the qualified offer rule of section 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g).

To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order will be issued in docket No. 27394-86; and orders and decisions will be entered in docket Nos. 5879-89, 25436-90, and 1321-92.

d appellate court (the Sixth Circuit in the Estate of Clarks case) does not support an assertion that the government’s [sic] in this case was without substantial foundation. This court determines that Foster is not entitled to litigation costs under § 7430. - 24 - U.S. 213, 219 (1961). We can identify no specific exclusion from gross income for the payment made to Fox & Fox. While it is true that petitioner did not physically receive the portion of the settlement proceeds used to pay the attorne

To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order will be issued in docket No. 27394-86; and orders and decisions will be entered in docket Nos. 5879-89, 25436-90, and 1321-92.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: These cases are before the Court on petitioner’s motion for an award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 233.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GERBER, Judge: Petitioners, by motion under section 7430 and Rule 231,1 seek the award of litigation costs incurred in this controversy where they have shown that respondent’s 1 Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Respondent asserts that such a scenario would be counter to the public policy in favor of settling litigation and further that respondent in the 1989 Fong case might have been subject to an award of litigation costs under section 7430 for pursuing an adjustment (namely, disallowance of the claimed 1989 depreciation expense of the Lily - 17 - Partnership) that was not substantially justified.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court pursuant to petitioners' motions for award of reasonable litigation costs under section 7430 and Rules 230 through 232.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Vacate or Revise Decision to Seek Litigation Costs Under Code Section 7430 (petitioners' Motion for Leave).

MEMORANDUM OPINION GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for an award of reasonable litigation and administrative costs under section 7430.1 The merits of the underlying case were decided in Cox v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOLEY, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s Motion for Award of Reasonable Administrative and Litigation Costs and Fees under section 7430 and Rule 231.

d Sept. 30, 1989; (2) J&J for the taxable years ending Sept. 30, 1987, Sept. 30, 1988, and Sept. 30, 1989; and (3) MMM for years 1986 through 1989. 3 In their motions to dismiss, petitioners also moved for litigation costs and attorney's fees under sec. 7430. That motion is premature and not properly filed. See Rule 231. Were we to consider it, in light of our decision in this case, petitioners' request would be denied as moot. 4 partnership exception of section 6231(a) and, thus, all issues sho

Finally, there are no grounds to award petitioners litigation costs under section 7430, since petitioners are not the prevailing party.

No. 23997-92. Filed January 22, 1996. Joseph M. Inman, pro se. Roberta Duffy, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION SWIFT, Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of $5,000 in administrative and litigation costs under section 7430. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and - 2 - Procedure. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Laguna Niguel, California. In January

), 151(d)(4), 513(h)(2)(C), 4001(e)(2). In addition, it is the measure of inflation that courts often use where the measure is not specified by statute, e.g., for the purpose of computing legal costs awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act or sec. 7430. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992); Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d 1044, 1053 n.8 (5th Cir. 1991). If we use the Consumer Price Index, $10,938,143.51 in 1978 amounts to $19

d Sept. 30, 1989; (2) J&J for the taxable years ending Sept. 30, 1987, Sept. 30, 1988, and Sept. 30, 1989; and (3) MMM for years 1986 through 1989. 3 In their motions to dismiss, petitioners also moved for litigation costs and attorney's fees under sec. 7430. That motion is premature and not properly filed. See Rule 231. Were we to consider it, in light of our decision in this case, petitioners' request would be denied as moot. 4 partnership exception of section 6231(a) and, thus, all issues sho

), 151(d)(4), 513(h)(2)(C), 4001(e)(2). In addition, it is the measure of inflation that courts often use where the measure is not specified by statute, e.g., for the purpose of computing legal costs awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act or sec. 7430. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992); Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d 1044, 1053 n.8 (5th Cir. 1991). If we use the Consumer Price Index, $10,938,143.51 in 1978 amounts to $19

ing, we will grant petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and deny respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.6 An appropriate order and order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction will be entered. 6 Petitioner has requested leave to file a motion for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and other expenses, pursuant to sec. 7430. Should petitioner desire to pursue this matter, he must comply with Rules 230 and 231.