§7491(a) — Burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence
3314 cases·882 followed·280 distinguished·147 questioned·11 criticized·2 limited·6 overruled·1986 cited—27% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §7491(a)
If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.
Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issue only if—
the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate any item;
the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews; and
in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).
Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust (as defined in section 645(b)(1)) with respect to liability for tax for any taxable year ending after the date of the decedent’s death and before the applicable date (as defined in section 645(b)(2)).
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any issue if any other provision of this title provides for a specific burden of proof with respect to such issue.
3314 Citing Cases
485, 493 (2017), supplementing and overruling in part 147 T.C.
4The Court finds that these exhibits are relevant to the case at hand; accordingly we overrule respondent's objections.
The Court overruled petitioners' objections and received respondent's evidence .
We overrule those objections at this time.
Petitioners have not argued or shown that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), and we conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply under the circumstances here.
3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability. The Court concludes that section 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Argument Four: Section 7491 and Penalties Section 7491(a) applies only to “factual issue[s] relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B.” Section 7491(a) does not apply to section 6662 penalties (found in subtitle F of the Code).
We conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
4 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability. The Court concludes that section 7491(a) does not apply because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Swanson does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), and we conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply here.
Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Evidentiary Issue On November 22, 2021, petitioners filed a Motion to Strike the Testimony of George Krmpotich, a revenue agent who testified. They argue that the APA provides grounds to strike his testimony. We disagree. Deficiency cases are subject to de novo review, and so the APA does not apply to them.
4 Section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances, does not apply to federal employment tax disputes.
We conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
If the taxpayers establish that they paid or 2 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability. The Court concludes that section 7491(a) does not apply because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
We determine a worker’s employment status by applying common law concepts, see §§ 3121(d)(2), 3306(i), while keeping in mind that doubtful questions should be resolved in favor of employment, Ewens & 6 Section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances, does not apply to federal employment tax disputes.
We will deny this Motion because section 7491(a) by its terms can shift the burden of proof only with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax imposed by subtitle A or B of the Code. The Code imposes interest under section 6601, which is not part of subtitle A or B; accordingly, section 7491 does not apply to petitioner’s interest- abatement claim.
Tillman-Kelly did not seek a shift in the burden of proof under section 7491(a) and that the submission of a case under Rule 122(a) does not shift the burden of proof. See Rule 122(b). 5 The flush text of section 104(a) provides that the general rule against exclusion of emotional-distress damages does not apply to “the amount paid for medical care” attributable to emotional distress.
“This Court has held that section 7491(a) applies only when the underlying tax liability is at issue in a CDP case.” Davison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-26, at *10, aff’d, 805 F. App’x 259 (5th Cir. 2020). As we will explain infra pp. 6–8, the underlying tax liabilities are not at issue in this case, and thus section 7491 is inapplicable.
The Court concludes that section 7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a). This presumption does not apply.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced evidence that it has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a)(1) and (2), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayerto the Commissioner as to that factual issue. However, sec. 7491(a) does not apply to employment tax disputes (and petitioner does not argue otherwise).
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Section 7491(a) may place the burden ofproofon the Commissioner as to a factual issue ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue and satisfies certain other requirements. Petitioner did not allege that section 7491(a) applies, nor did he satisfy the requirements ofthat section. Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not apply, and petitioner bears the burden ofproof.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that she has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not apply, and the burden of proofon this issue remains with petitioners.
As discussed infra, petitioner is precluded from challenging his entire underlying tax liability for 2005 in this proceeding; consequently, section 7491(a) is inapplicable here, and the burden ofproofis not shifted to respondent.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
In addition, section 7491(a) may serve to place the burden ofproofon the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability ifthe taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue and (2) satisfies certain other requirements. However, although petitioners' testimony was credible, section 7491 does not apply because there is no dispute between the parties regarding any factual issue.
However, we find Portillo to be distinguishable from the instant case.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has it established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met. Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner. See sec. 7491(a)(2). As an initial matter we note that section 280A, which allows a deduction for home office expenses, is inapplicable to C corporations such as petitioner.
7491(a) is inapplicable because it does not apply to taxes imposed by subtitle D ofthe Code, such as the taxes under sec.
In addition, section 7491(a) may serve to place the burden ofproofon the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence and satisfies certain other requirements. Petitioner did not allege that section 7491(a) applies, nor did she introduce credible evidence or otherwise satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Accordingly, that section does not apply, and petitioner bears the burden ofproof.
Petitioners have not claimed or shown that the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). They bear the burden ofestablishing that they are entitled to any bad debt deductions for the years in issue. Section 166(a) generally allows a deduction for "any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year." For taxpayers other than corporations, section 166(d) provides that section 166(a) does not apply with respect to any "nonbusiness debt".
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
We find that petitioners introduced no credible evidence with respect to this issue and that section 7491(a) does not apply.
And petitioners have not argued that the burden ofproof should be shifted to respondent; thus section 7491(a) does not apply.
7491(a)(1). But petitioner introduced little if any "credible evidence," sec. 7491(a)(1), and he did not "maintain[] all records required" by the Code, sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). He thus bears the burden ofproof. A. Business Bad Debt Deduction Section 166(a)(1) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes [wholly] worthless within the taxable year." For a nonbusi- ness bad debt held by a taxpayer other than a corporation, section 166(a)(1) does not apply, and the taxpay
7491(a); Estate ofTurner v. Commis- sioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2011-209. I. Bad Debt Loss A. Governing Statutory Framework Section 166(a)(1) allows as a deduction any bona fide debt that becomes worthless within the taxable year. For a nonbusiness bad debt held by a taxpayer other than a corporation, section 166(a)(1) does not apply, and the taxpayer is allowed a short-term capital loss for the taxable year in which the debt becomes completely worthless.
7491(a)(2);" Estate ofDieringer v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 117, 127-128 (2016). We hold that section 7491(a) does not apply to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Section 7491(a), which shifts the burden ofproofto the IRS under certain circumstances, does not apply with respect to any factual dispute in this case because Canatella did not keep adequate books and records.
7491(a); Estate of Turner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012). A. The Bad Debt Deduction Section 166(a)(1) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes [wholly] worthless within the taxable year." For a nonbusi- ness bad debt held by a taxpayer other than a corporation, section 166(a)(1) does not apply, and the taxpayer is allowed a short-term capital loss for the taxable year in which the debt becomes completelyworthless.
At trial petitioners moved to shift the burden ofproofto respondent under section 7491(a)(1). Several ofthe issues on which petitioners seek to shift the burden of proofinvolve legal conclusions, not factual matters; section 7491(a)(1) does not apply to shift the burden ofproofas to them.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) may also shift the burden ofproofto the Secretary concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for income tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and has satisfied certain other conditions, including that the taxpayer maintained all records required by the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). Since, as discussed p. 9, petitioner has failed to maintain such records for 2009, sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this case.
7491(a) does not apply to employment tax disputes.
However, section 7491(a) is inapplicable to excise tax liabilities, which are imposed under subtitle D ofthe Code.
However, section 7491(a) is inapplicable to excise tax liabilities, which are imposed under subtitle D ofthe Code.
7491(a); Estate of Turner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012). A. The Bad Debt Deduction Section 166(a)(1) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes [wholly] worthless within the taxable year." For a nonbusi- ness bad debt held by a taxpayer other than a corporation, section 166(a)(1) does not apply, and the taxpayer is allowed a short-term capital loss for the taxable year in which the debt becomes completelyworthless.
Section 7491(a), which shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner under certain circumstances, is inapplicable in TFRP cases.
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner, but that section does not apply where a taxpayer fails to satisfy the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements.
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). We therefore conclude that sec. 7491(a)(1) does not apply in this case.
7491(a) is inapplicable in this case.
7491(a)(1), and the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses and information, sec. 7491(a)(2). See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). We need not and do not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofas petitioners desire. This is because, as discussed below, we hold that section 6901 does not apply to these cases because the record fails to establis
7491(a)(1), and the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses and information, sec. 7491(a)(2). See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). We need not and do not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofas petitioners desire. This is because, as discussed below, we hold that section 6901 does not apply to these cases because the record fails to establis
7491(a)(1), and the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses and information, sec. 7491(a)(2). See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). We need not and do not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofas petitioners desire. This is because, as discussed below, we hold that section 6901 does not apply to these cases because the record fails to establis
In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because the Court decides this case without regard to the burden ofproof, section 7491 is inapplicable.
7491(a)(1), and the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses and information, sec. 7491(a)(2). See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). We need not and do not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofas petitioners desire. This is because, as discussed below, we hold that section 6901 does not apply to these cases because the record fails to establis
7491(a) is inapplicable herein because petitioners have failed to.introduce credible evidence that respondent's adjustments were in error, see sec.
7491(a) is inapplicable herein because petitioners have failed to.introduce credible evidence that respondent's adjustments were in error, see sec.
7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue. This section is inapplicable because petitioner failed to maintain records and substantiate deductions.
5Section 7491(a)(1), which shifts the burden ofproofto the Secretary in certain circumstances, does not apply to employmenttax disputes.
7491(a) is inapplicable herein because petitioners have failed to.introduce credible evidence that respondent's adjustments were in error, see sec.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the meaning ofsec.
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts to the Commissioner part or all ofthe.burden ofproofwhere the taxpayer introduces credible evidence of a factual matter, but that section does not apply where a , taxpayer fails to satisfy the related requireinents.
7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to respondent if petitioners introduce credible evidence with respect to any factual issue. This section is inapplicable because petitioners failed to maintain business records.
7491(a) provides that the burden ofproofshall shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence relating to the issue. This section is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence.
7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue. This section is inapplicable because petitioners failed to maintain records.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that she has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Section 7491(a)(1), which shifts the burden ofproofto the Secretary in certain other circumstances, does not apply to employment tax disputes.
7491(a) is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the meaning ofsec.
In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because there is no factual dispute in this case, section 7491 is inapplicable.
7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofunless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue. See Rule 142(a). This section is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the meaning ofsec.
7491(a). In any event, sec. 7491(a) does not apply to shift the burden ofproofbecause petitionerhas failed to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent.
7491(a) does not apply here because petition has not shownthat he has satisfied the preconditions for its applicatio See sec.
7491(a), which shifts the burden ofproof to the Commissioner in certain situations. We conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
- 42 - Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) (1) applies. In addition, petitioners have not established that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) (2). We hold that section 7491(a) (1) does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner, but that section does not apply here because we find that petitioners failed to satisfy each requirement set forth in section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).20 Petitioners argue that respondent has the burden ofproofirrespective ofany applicability ofsection 7491 because, they state, respondent never examined their joint Federal income tax ret
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner, but that section does not apply where a taxpayer fails to satisfy the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements.
7491(a) is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the meaning ofsec.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) is inapplicable.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) (1) . -However .this provision does not apply if the tax ayer has failed to co ply with the substantiation require ents.
7491(a). Petitioner argues that section 7491(a) shifts the burden to respondent because petitioner has introduced credible evidence with respect to every factual issue. Respondent counters that section 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner did not comply with respondent's reasonable requests for information during informal discovery, which necessitated the.use of formal discovery procedures.
7491(a) does not apply here to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Since petitioner has failed to introduce credible evidence, section 7491(a) does not apply.
Accordingly, section 7491(a) is inapplicable, and the burden remains .on petitioner to prove that respondent's determination of the income tax deficiency is incorrect .
Accordingly, we conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply and the burden of proof on the charitable contribution deductions issue has not been shifted to respondent.
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. We conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Accordingly, we conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply and the burden of proof on the charitable contribution deductions issue has not been shifted to respondent.
7491(a); and because she has failed to substantiate her claims or introduce credible evidence for any of the issues, sec. 7491(a) does not apply.
We conclude that section 7491(a) does not apply here becaus e petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application .
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioners have not produced credible evidence, nor have they satisfied the other conditions for the application of sec.
7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application.
Furthermore, petitioners did not claim 4 - 6 that section 7491(a) applies . Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not apply in this case .
In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ., As there is no dispute as to a factual issue, section 7491(a) is inapplicable to this case .
Accordingly, the case is decided by the application of law to the undisputed facts, and section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
Section 7491(a), providing for a shift to the Commissioner of the burden of proof in certain circumstances, is inapplicable to trust fund penalty cases .15 In any event we find on a preponderance ofthe evidence that employment taxes were not paid, that petitioner wa s 15Sec .
In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Because there is no dispute as to any factual issue in this case, .section 7491(a) 'is inapplicable .
Accordingly, the case is decided by the application of law to the undisputed facts, and section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
- 9 - Petitioners argue that pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof should shift to respondent. Section 7491(a)(1) provides that if “in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer * * * the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.” This burden-shifting provision is inapplicable unless the taxpayer has, among other things, complied with all requirements u
Petitioners’ argument applies Griffin II too broadly and fails to acknowledge that Griffin II is distinguishable from this case. In Griffin v. Commissioner, supra at 1020, the taxpayers appealed an unfavorable Tax Court decision and argued that the Tax Court erred in holding that the taxpayers failed to present sufficient evidence to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner under section 7491(a).
7491(a). Petitioner concedes that section 7491(a) does not apply.13 Consequently, petitioner bears the burden of proof herein.
is decided by the application of law to the undispute d section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
Accordingly, this case is decided by the application of law to the undisputed'facts, and section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
7491(a) is inapplicable bec'use petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the maning of sec .
Because there is no factual issue in dispute, section 7491(a) is inapplicable, and the burden of proof does not shift to respondent .
Based on the following, because petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of section 7491, section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof as to factual matters to the Commissioner under certain circumstances, does not apply because petitioners have neither alleged its application nor established that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
The case is decided by applying the law to the undisputed facts, and section 7491(a) is inapplicable .
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. This Court concludes that sec. 7491 does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that establishes the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) is inapplicable to this case as respondent’s examination of the 1982, 1983, and 1984 tax years began before July 22, 1998.
7491(a)(1) does not apply in the instant case because petitioner did not comply with the substantiation and document production requirements.
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. This Court concludes that sec. 7491 does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that establishes the preconditions for its application.
7491(a) does not apply in the instant case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner did not raise the issue and also did not comply with the substantiation and record keeping requirements of sec .
Discussion As the issue for decision in this case is a question o f law, section 7491(a) does not apply .
7491(a) does not apply in the instant case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner did not raise the issue and also did not comply with the substantiation and record keeping requirements of sec.
7491(a)(1). Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if an individual taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2). In this case, section 7491 is inapplicable because petitioner did not introduce any credible evidence with respect to the gambling winnings and Social Security benefits and failed to comply with the substantiation
7491(a)(1) does not apply.
7491(a) does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), however, section 7491 is inapplicable.
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations, and we conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply.
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 applies to court cases arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. Because the examination underlying this case commenced before July 23, 1998, sec. 7491(a) does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. This Court concludes that sec. 7491 does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that establishes the preconditions for its application.
7491(a)(2). In this case, section 7491 is inapplicable because petitioner did not introduce any credible evidence with respect to the origination of his disability and failed to comply with the substantiation, cooperation, and record-keeping requirements.
7491(a) which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. This Court concludes that sec. 7491 does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that establishes the preconditions for its application.
Because petitioners did not comply with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), section 7491(a)(1) is inapplicable here.
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner. Because the alimony deduction issue is a question of law, section 7491 is inapplicable, and the Court decides the issue without regard to the burden of proof.
Section 7491 does not apply here because petitioner has failed to substantiate his deductions and provide evidence other than his own testimony.
Section 7491(a) does not apply because this case involves a legal issue.
7491(a) does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec.
Section 7491(a) does not apply because this case involves a legal issue.
7491(a) does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec.
Section 7491(a) does not apply because this case involves a legal issue.
Section 7491(a) does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Therefore, section 7491(a) is inapplicable.
Section 7491(a) does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner. Because the unreimbursed employee business expense issue is a question of law, section 7491 is inapplicable, and the Court decides the issue without regard to the burden of proof.
7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances, does not apply with respect to any factual dispute in this case because petitioner did not keep adequate books and records and did not meet statutory substantiation requirements.
Because the issues to be decided are questions of law, section 7491(a) is inapplicable, and the Court decides the issues without regard to the burden of proof.
Discussion Because we decide this case on the preponderance of the evidence, without regard to the burden of proof, section 7491(a) is inapplicable.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), however, section 7491 is inapplicable.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), however, section 7491 is inapplicable.
Section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances, does not apply with respect to this factual circumstance because petitioners neither alleged that section 7491 was applicable nor established that they fully complied with the statutory substantiation requirements of section 7491, as shown below.
Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner. Because the unreimbursed employee business expense issue is a question of law, section 7491 is inapplicable, and the Court decides the issue without regard to the burden of proof.
- 4 - Discussion Because petitioners did not comply with the requirements of section 7491(a), section 7491 is inapplicable here. Tax Year 1999 Section 280A, Disallowance of Certain Expenses in Connection With Business Use of Home, Rental of Vacation Homes, etc., limits otherwise allowable deductions by individuals with respect to a dwelling unit that is used by the taxpayer during the year as a "residence". The provision does not apply to deductions for amounts allowable without regard to the ta
Section 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of that section.
7491(a), concerning the burden of proof, is inapplicable because petitioner has not satisfied its requirements.
Petitioners do not argue the applicability of section 7491(a), and the record reflects that section 7491(a) does not apply.
The Court concludes that section 7491(a) is inapplicable.
We also note that section 7491(a), which in certain cases shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, does not apply to employment tax determinations.
Petitioner does not argue the applicability of section 7491(a), and the record reflects that section 7491(a) does not apply.
Petitioner does not argue the applicability of section 7491(a), and the record reflects that section 7491(a) does not apply.
Petitioner does not argue the applicability of section 7491(a), and the record reflects that section 7491(a) does not apply.
7491(a) is inapplicable.
7491(a) does not alter the taxpayer’s burden of proof where the taxpayer has not complied with all applicable substantiation requirements, sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this case.
7491(a) does not apply here.
We need not decide who bears the burden of proof.
However, because we decide all issues on the preponderance of the evidence, we need not decide which party bears the burden of proof.
We need not decide the Youngs’ contention in this regard because our findings and analysis do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof.
However, because we decide all issues on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, we need not decide which party bears the burden of proof.
We need not decide who bears the burden of proof because the parties have provided sufficient evidence to enable us to decide the dis- puted valuation questions by a preponderance of the evidence.
We need not decide the effect of this error as it does not affect our resolution of this case.
Besser, and never asked anyone to create Xong Services on her behalf.35 We are not convinced.
In any event, on the basis of the record before us, we have doubts as to whether petitioners have established that all of the requirements for shifting the burden of proof under that section have been met.
(CCH) 809, 815 (finding, contrary to the taxpayer’s position that “she never received any interest at all on child support debt,” that she had received interest on child support arrearages), aff’d per curiam without published opinion, 3 In view of petitioner’s concession, we need not decide whether petitioner has satisfied the preconditions under section 6201(d) to impose a burden on respondent to produce, in addition to the information return reporting the $7,824 payment, reasonable and probati
Sonntag testified that he took business partners with him to the spa as a “thank you.” We are not convinced, on the basis of our review of the record as a whole, that this was not a personal trip to the spa.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether petitioners have complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), and petitioners retain the burden of proving they are entitled to the Schedule F deductions claimed.
The Court need not decide this issue.
Therefore, we need not decide whether petitioner satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a).
Because we decide all factual issues on a preponderance ofthe evi- dence, we need not decide who has the burden ofproof.
435, 440 (1934).8 7Under the circumstances, we need not decide whether Mr.
Because we decide this case on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide which party has the burden ofproof.
The Court need not decide which party bears the burden ofproofas to factual matters because its decision rests on a preponderance ofthe evidence.
435, 440 (1934).8 7Under the circumstances, we need not decide whether Mr.
We need not decide that issue because we decide this case on the basis ofa preponderance ofthe evidence rather than on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof.
Because we decide all factual issues on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide who has the burden ofproof.
Because we decide this case on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide which party has the burden of proof.
Because we decide all factual issues on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide who has the burden ofproof.
We therefore need not decide whether petitioner satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a).
Because we can decide all ofthe issues in these cases without regard to the ultimate allocation ofthe burden ofproofunder section 7491(a)(1), we need not decide whether petitioners satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
Because we can decide all ofthe issues in these cases without regard to the ultimate allocation ofthe burden ofproofunder section 7491(a)(1), we need not decide whether petitioners satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
Because we decide this case on a preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide which party has the burden ofproof.
We therefore need not decide whetherpetitioners satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a).
However, we need not decide whether petitioners satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(1) and (2) with respect to the remainder ofthe issues in this case because we decide them on the preponderance ofcredible evidence and not on any failure to carry the burden ofproof.
We need not decide whetherthe burden ofproof shifts to the IRS because the relevant facts are stipulated and only a legal issue remains.
We need not decide whetherthe burden of proofshould shift, because we decide this case on a preponderance ofthe evidence--particularlypetitioner's forthright, credible, and largely undisputed testimony--withoutreference to the placement ofthe burden ofproof.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule ofsection 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
We need not decide whether section 7491(a) imposes the burden ofproofon the IRS.
We therefore need not decide whether petitioners have met the conditions ofsection 7491(a)(2) required to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with respectto those issues.
Furthermore, because the relevant facts are stipulated and only a legal issue remains, we need not decide whether the burden ofproofshifts to respondent.
We therefore need not decide whether petitioners satisfied the requirements ofsec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whetherpetitioners satisfy the requirements of section 7491(a)(1) and (2).
We need not decide whetherthat exception applies because the parties have provided sufficient evidence for us to decide the factual issues in dispute without regard to the burden ofproof.
Consequently, we need not decide whether pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent.
Because we decide this issue on the basis ofthe preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide upon which party the burden ofproofrests.
Consequently, we need not decide whether pursuantto section 7491(a) the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent as to this issue.
Because we hold that petitioner was not engaged in an active trade or business during 2006, we need not decide whether petitioner's Schedule C expenses were substantiated.
The issues for decision in this case are legal issues; therefore, the Court need not decide who bears the burden ofproof.
Although petitioner contends that he satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2), we need not decide whether the burden ofproofshifts to respondent - 5 - [*5] with respect to factual issues under section 7491(a)(1) because our conclusions herein are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence: See Estate of Bongard v.
In any case, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to 5Ifan employee ofa foreign government executes and files with the Attorney General the waiver under sec.
As we decide thes cases on the preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide upon which y the burden rests.
Because we decide on the preponderance ofthe evidence whether petitioners were engaged in the active conduct ofa trade or business during 2006, we need not decide whether section 7491 applies to this issue.
Furthermore, because the relevant facts are stipulated and only a legal issue remains, we need not decide whether the burden ofproofshifts to respondent.
Because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance ofthè evidence, we need not decide upon which partÿ the burden rests.
Because we decide this issue on the basis ofthe preponderance ofthe evidence, we need not decide upon which party the burden rests.
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and the Court need not decide whether the burden should be shifted because the Court decides this case on the record, not on who has the burden of proof.
We need not decide whether sec .
We :herefore need not decide whether petitioner has also mets the conditions of section 7491(a) (2)i required to shift the burden of proof to respondent with respect- to those issues.
We need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to the material factual issue in these consolidated cases (the viability of Robucci P.C.
In a case where the standard of proof is based on a e preponderance of the evidence, as it is here, the Court may decide the case on the weight of the evidence and need not decide it on an allocation of the burden of proof.
Because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance .of the evidence, we need not decide upon which party the burden rest s Section 61(a)(3) provides that gross income .
We need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to this case because we decide the parties' gambling loss dispute on the basis of the record at hand .
We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence .
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in specified circumstances, we need not decide which party bears the burden of proof because in this case the outcome does not depend on the burden of proof .
However, we need not decide whether decedent's estate has satisfied the .
Petitioner 4 - has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, but the Court need not decide whether the burden shifted to respondent since the Court's analysis is based on the record before it, not on who bears the burden of proof .
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, but the Court need not decide whether the'burden shifted to respondent since the Court's analysis is based on the record before it, not on who bears the burden of proof .
We need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to that issue because we resolve it upon a preponderance of the evidence .
Petitioner has not alleged that -section 7491(a)- applies ; however,--the Court'need not decide whether,t:he burden shifted to respondent since the Court's analysis-is based on the record before it and not on who bears the.burdenwof proof .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies ; however, the Court need not decide whether the burden shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) since the Court's analysis is based on the record before it and not on who bears the burden of proof .
But Christiansen did not bequeath any of he r ' We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) because the case is mostly determined by applying the law to undisputed facts .
Because we decide this case without regard to the burden of proof, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies .
Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies in this case .
We need not decide this issue, however, because our analysis in 2 There is nothing in the record to support respondent’s determination recharacterizing the gross income reported on Schedules C for RBS during the years at issue as reimbursement for expenses from petitioner’s employer, IRS.
Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies ; however, we need not decide whether the burden shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491 (a) ecause our analysis is based on the record before the Court and not on who bears the burden of proof .
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies in this case .
Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies in this case .
n - 4 - Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies in this case .
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
We need not decide the point because our findings and analysis in this case do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
We need not decide that question because our decision on petitioners’ 1997 self-employment tax liability does not depend on the burden of proof.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
2 We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec.
9 We need not decide whether sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether current section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec.
111, 115 (1933).6 Based on all of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not convinced that petitioner engaged in his “health, wealth and healing ministry” activity for profit.
We need not decide petitioners’ contention because our findings and analysis do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof.
Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether current sec.
We do not agree that respondent bears the burden ofproof.
We do not agree that respondent bears the burden ofproof.
We disagree with petitionerregarding the consequences ofrespondent's concession.
We disagree with both .of respondent's arguments .
We disagree with petitioner's .argument that the $54,819 is not-taxable to him in .2005 .
However, we cannot agree that those factors, alone or in combination, outweigh the inherently personal nature of Mr.
We disagree with both of petitioner’s arguments.
Although the Code does not define what constitutes a gift for purposes ofsection 2501, transfers subject to the gift tax "are not confined to those only which, being without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept ofgifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions ofproperty for a consideration to the extent that the value ofthe propertytransferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's
Petitioners have not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with them.
Any 3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, nor have they complied with substantiation requirements or maintained adequate records.
Kramarenko received the salary from MUSC, and she does not argue that the burden of proof has shifted pursuant to section 7491(a) or that, for any other reason, she does not bear the burden of proof.
In any event petitioners have not established that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioner has not argued nor established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with him.
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies and did not comply with substantiation requirements or maintain adequate records.
Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B and meets other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall have the burden of proof with respect to that is
Petitioners have not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with them.
Under certain circumstances the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to the taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and meets certain other conditions.
Petitioner has not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with him.
11 [*11] Petitioners allege that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) because they have “introduced credible evidence concerning [their] profit motive.” Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his or her federal income tax liability and meets certain other requirements, the burden of
In any event petitioner has not established that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner on a factual issue if (among other requirements) the taxpayer “introduces credible evidence with respect to [that] issue” and “has maintained all records required under this title.” See § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B).
6 Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer “introduces credible evidence with respect to any [relevant] factual issue” and satisfies three additional conditions.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer “intro- duces credible evidence with respect to [a relevant] factual issue.” But that section applies only if the taxpayer (among other things) “intro- duces credible evidence” and “has maintained all records required under this
Whether a payment qualifies for a deduction under section 162(a) is a factual issue which must be decided on the basis of all relevant facts and 5 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
In an exception to the general rule that the taxpayer bears the burden of proof, section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof shifts to the IRS with respect to an issue related to income tax liability if the following conditions are met: (1) the taxpayer introduced credible evidence with respect to that factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability, (2) the taxpayer complied
2015-227, at *11 (“A taxpayer seeking to shift the burden of proof pursuant to section 7491(a)(1) has the burden of showing that he has satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) preconditions.”).
The Estate does not contend that section 7491(a) applies, and the record does not otherwise indicate that it should.
The Pascuccis do not argue that the burden of proof has shifted pursuant to section 7491(a).
A qualified first-time homebuyer may except up to a lifetime limit of $10,000 from the 10% additional tax on early distributions from an individual retirement plan if he had no present ownership interest in 3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
5 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
10 Section 7491(a) provides that in certain circumstances the burden of proof with respect to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner.
Petitioner also argues that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) concerning all factual issues underlying his deficiency determinations, including the determination premised on the unreported IRA distributions.
Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to the taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and meets certain other conditions.
Tibin has not argued or established that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), and therefore the burden of proof largely remains with Mr.
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that expenses were of 3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability.
1993-398.7 7 Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer “introduces credible evidence with respect to any [relevant] factual issue” and satisfies three additional conditions.
Petitioners have not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with them.
Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B of the Code and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof shall shift to the Commissioner w
The Estate does not contend that section 7491(a) applies, so we do not consider it here.
Davison is entitled to relief from joint and several liability pursuant to section 6015.16 Finally, petitioners assert that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore, the burden of proof remains with them.
15 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
Because petitioners have not alleged or shown that section 7491(a) applies, the burden of proof remains on them.
To prove entitlement to deduct an expense, the taxpayer must 10 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner has neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements have been met.
111, 115 (1933).3 Deductions are a matter of 3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to respondent if petitioners introduce credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining petitioners’ tax liability.
816, 842 (1987).7 7 Although petitioners contend in their opening brief that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), as more fully discussed hereinafter, they have failed to introduce any “credible evidence” as provided in that section with respect to any factual issue underlying their capital loss claim.
Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to the taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and meets certain other conditions.
Alimony Deductions Section 215(a) generally allows a deduction for the payment of alimony as defined in section 71(b),4 which provides: (1) In general.—The term “alimony or separate maintenance payment” means any payment in cash if— 3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to respondent if the taxpayer “introduces credible evidence with respect to any [relevant] factual issue” and satisfies three additional conditions.
Because petitioners have not alleged or shown that section 7491(a) applies, the burden of proof remains on them.
3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden of proof remains with them.
When a 4 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability.
Valentine does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a), and there is no support in the record for such a contention.
10 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
The term “fair market value” is defined as “the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing 4Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability.
3 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
2 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability.
One exclusion from gross income is found in section 104(a)(2), which provides that gross income does not include “the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or 5 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
Petitioner does not contend, and respondent has not conceded, that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual matters if the taxpayer meets certain requirements.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to respondent if the taxpayer “introduces cred- ible evidence with respect to [a relevant] factual issue” and satisfies three additional conditions.
6 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
4 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner disputes 5 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
However, under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), a deduction for a 6 Petitioners do not contend, and the Court does not find, that the burden of proof has shifted pursuant to section 7491(a) on any of the matters before us.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to respondent if the taxpayer “introduces cred- ible evidence with respect to [a relevant] factual issue” and satisfies three additional conditions.
8 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
The Monroes have not argued that section 7491(a) applies, nor have they established that its requirements are met.
- 6 - Petitioner contends that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) and therefore the burden of proof as to all factual issues affecting the deficiency in tax for the year in issue should shift to respondent.4 Section 7491(a) requires petitioner to introduce credible evidence with respect to each issue for which he seeks to shift the burden of proof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
We hold that the burden of proof remains with petitioners.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Petitioner does not allege, nor has she proven, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), and petitioner bears the burden of proof as to all issues remaining in dispute.
- 7 - neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements are met.
Petitioner has not argued that section 7491(a) applies and has not shown that he meets its requirements to shift the burden of proof; therefore, the burden remains on him.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Because petitioners have not alleged or shown that section 7491(a) applies, the burden of proof remains on them.
Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
We hold that the burden of proof remains with petitioners.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Section 7491(a) provides that ifa taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining her liability for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Commissioner will have the burden ofproofwith respect to that issue.
Shifting the burden ofproof Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for income tax if: (1) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and (2) the taxpayerhas satisfied certain other conditions, including that he has comp
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with its requirements.
Petitioners allege that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) because they have provided "extensive, comprehensive, and corroborating evidence from witnesses, testimony and exhibits which consisted ofover 3,000 pages, 135 exhibits, and a 10 hour trial" to substantiate that the losses from Joshua Plaza and Conroe Plaza are nonpassive.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Because petitioner has not alleged or shown that section 7491(a) applies, the burden of proofremains on him.
We hold that the burden does not shift to the IRS as to any factual issue.
Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to the taxpayers' liability ifthey -31- [*31] provide credible evidence with respect to that issue and also substantiate the item, maintain records, and cooperate with the Commissioner's reasonable requ
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
7491(a) provides that in certain circumstances the burden ofproof with respect to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Section 7491(a) provides circumstances in which that burden may shift, but the Cuthbertsons do not invoke that provision.
In order to shift the burden as to any relevant factual issue the taxpayermust comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) applies, nor has he introduced evidence to prove he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements are met.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
7491(a) provides that if, in any Court proceeding, "a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B" and meets other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall have the burden ofproof with respect to th
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Simpson have neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements are met.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) provides that in certain circumstances the burden ofproof with respect to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Section 7491(a) provides an exception to this general rule.
7491(a) provides that in certain circumstances the burden ofproof with respect to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner.
7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Although section 7491(a) provides for shifting the burden ofproof, this case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
-27- [*27] Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence with respect to that issue and also substantiates the item, maintains records, and cooperates with the Commissioner's reasonable request
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for tax and meets other prerequisites, the burden ofproof shifts to the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Petitioner has not asserted that section 7491(a) applies in this case.
In order to shift the burden the taxpayermust comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters regarding the determination ofa deficiency may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer intro- duces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Petitioner does not contend, and respondent has not conceded, that the burden ofproofhas shifted pursuant to section 7491(a).
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters regarding the determination ofa deficiency may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners allege that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) because they have provided credible evidence to - 6 - [*6] substantiate their claimed loss deductions.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) provides that if, in any Court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
In order to shift the burden the taxpayermust comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden of proof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies 5Petitioners signed two Forms 872, Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax, for 2009.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Therefore we hold that petitioner has not met the requirements ofsection 7491 to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies, and they have not introduced evidence to prove they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies herein, nor did he show that he met its requirements for shifting the burden ofproof.
Petitioners have neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements are met.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that its requirements are met.
Given the demonstrated unreliability ofthese documents, we hold that respondent was prejudiced by petitioners' failure to comply with the 14-day rule.
111, 115 (1933).4 Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a 3 The record does not specify why there was a five-year gap between the car theft in 2008 and the release ofindebtedness in 2013.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax - 8 - liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue".
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
4(...continued) that section 7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with its requirements.
Although petitioners do not assert that section 7491(a) applies, the facts that are relevant to the disposition ofthis case are not in dispute.
Therefore, we hold that the Commissioner's inability to cross-examine Mr.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Although petitioners have not asserted that section 7491(a) applies, we find that the facts that are relevant to the disposition ofthis case are not in dispute.
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift pursuant to section 7491(a), and we conclude that the burden ofproofhas not shifted to respondent.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
7491(a) applies herein, nor do they show that they met its requirements for shifting the burden ofproof.
- 5 - [*5] Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with certain requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Respondent filed a response on October 13, 2015.2° The partnerships argue that the burden ofproofin these cases should be shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with certain requirements.
The legislative history of section 7491(a) provides in pertinent part: Credible evidence is the quality ofevidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to thejudicial presumption ofIRS correctness).
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Respondent filed a response on October 13, 2015.2° The partnerships argue that the burden ofproofin these cases should be shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Although petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, the facts material to the disposition ofthis case are not in dispute.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners did not introduce credible evidence that would, pursuant to section 7491(a), shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies herein, nor did he show that he met its requirements for shifting the burden ofproof.
Respondent filed a response on October 13, 2015.2° The partnerships argue that the burden ofproofin these cases should be shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners did not argue that section 7491(a) applies herein, nor did they show - 5 - that they meet its requirements to shift the burden ofproof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner has not argued that section 7491(a) applies and has not shown that it meets the requirements to shift the burden ofproof; therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner.
Petitioner has not argued that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden ofproofremains with him.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
7491(a) provides that the burden ofproof with respect to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner.
A taxpayer seeking to shift the burden ofproofpursuant to section 7491(a)(1) has the burden ofshowing that he has satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) preconditions.
Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proofmay shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual matters ifthe taxpayer meets certain requirements.
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant facthal issues may shift to the Commissioner.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden ofproof; therefore, the burden of proofremains with petitioners.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters - 28 - [*28] shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
A taxpayer seeking to shift the burden ofproofpursuant to section 7491(a)(1) has the burden ofshowing that he has satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) preconditions.
7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtit.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual matters if the taxpayermeets certain requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ¹°The request for admissions labeled the proceeds an "insurance settlement", but the parties later identified the proceeds in their briefs as proceeds from a settlement with BOA.
Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioner asserts that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
We hold it should not; (2) whether Twin City's payments totaling $371,892 incurred on the Schanks' behalffor the construction oftheir house and a barn, payment of personal credit card bills, and purchase ofa 2009 Can-Am Spyder Roadster (Spyder) should be characterized as compensation under section 162(a)(1
Thus the issues remaining for decision are: (1) whether the burden of proofshifted from petitioners to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a); (2) whether petitioners are entitled to depreciation and section 179 expense deductions greater than respondent allowed for the business use by Jefferson Cartwright (petitioner) ofa Navigator Rambler Motor Home (Navigator) for the tax years 2008 and 2009; and (3) whether petitioners are liable for
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements.
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies and have not shown that they meet the requirements to shift the burden ofproof; therefore, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the - 5 - burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
We hold it should not; (2) whether Twin City's payments totaling $371,892 incurred on the Schanks' behalffor the construction oftheir house and a barn, payment of personal credit card bills, and purchase ofa 2009 Can-Am Spyder Roadster (Spyder) should be characterized as compensation under section 162(a)(1
-5- Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
A taxpayer seeking to shift the burden ofproofpursuant to section 7491(a)(1) has the burden ofshowing that he has satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) preconditions.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissionerunder certain circumstances.
Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Under certain cigcumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissionerpursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual matters if the taxpayermeets certain requirements.
Section 7491(a) provides an exceptionthat can shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding relevant factual issues and has: (1) complied with all relevant substantiation requirements; (2) complied with all relevant recordkeeping requirements; and (3) cooperated with reas
Because petitionerhas not alleged or shownthat section 7491(a) applies, the burden ofproofremains on him.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner, however, as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue and (2) satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperatio
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor has he established his compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Participating partners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with its requirements.
Under certain circumstances, the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift pursuant to section 7491(a) from the taxpayerto the Commissioner, but only ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding a factual matter affecting liability and only ifthe substantiation requirements are met, required records are maintained, and the taxpayer cooperates with the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) reason
OPINION Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contentionthat the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden ofproofremains on them.
7491(a) provides an exception to the general rule that the taxpayerbears the burden ofproof.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners did not assert that section 7491(a) applies.
Petitioners did not allege that section 7491(a) applies.
Section 7491(a) provides thatthe burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner, however, as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that 3Given that petitioners challenge respondent's determination ofunreported income, and for the sake of
7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofto respondentwith respect to any factual issue.
Because petitionerhas not alleged or shown that section 7491(a) applies, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner.
Petitioners did not allege that section 7491(a) applies.
Petitioners have not claimed, and the record does not establish, that section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Therefore, we hold that the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner, however, as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue, and (2) satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperati
Petitionerhas neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests.
Smith has not contended that the burden ofproofhas shifted pursuant to section 7491(a), and the record shows no basis for such a contention.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners have not claimed and the record does not establish that section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissionerunder certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies, and it has not introduced evidence to prove it satisfied the requirements ofsec.
For these reasons, we hold that Hoang had capital gains of $14,857,461 as that amount is calculated in the notice ofdeficiency.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) for any other issue or year, nor have they shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe other determinations at issue.
Petitioners have indirectly argued that section 7491(a) applies in this case by stating in their pretrial memorandum that one issue is "Whether the Respondent met its burden ofproof", citing Higbee v.
- 8 - [*8] Section 7491(a) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's proper tax liability, and the taxpayerhas complied with all substantiation requirements, maintained all records, and cooperated with all reasonable req
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies or established their compliance with its requirements.
Petitioner's counsel did not askthe Court to shift the burden at the end oftrial and did not otherwise allege that section 7491(a) applies, nor did petitioner establish her compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements.
OPINION In general, the Commissioner's determinations set forth in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that these determinations are in error.5 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if (1) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue; and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and coope
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." The burden will shift only ifthe taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requirement
In order to shift the burden, the taxpayer must comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the taxpayer may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
'Petitioner argues that respondent bears the burden ofproofpursuant to section 7491(a) with respect to relevant factual issues.
In order to shift the burden, the taxpayer must comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Petitioners have not established that they meet the requirements under section - 6 - [*6] 7491(a)(1)
Under certain circumstances the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a).
Frontier contends section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof, but the record is not clear on whet er Frontier meets the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(C).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay be shifted to the IRS.
However, the burden of proofmay shift to the Commissioner pursuant to section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence to support the deduction or position and demonstrates that the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2) have been met.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the .
Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) for any other issue or year, nor have they shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe other determinations at issue.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissionerunder certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under cert in circumstances.
- 5 - Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
In order to shift the burden the taxpayer must comply with all substantiation and - 10 - [*10] recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
In order to shift the burden the taxpayermust comply with all substantiation and recordkeeping requirements and cooperate with all reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." The burden will shift only ifthe taxpayerhas, inter alia, - 9 - [*9] complied with substantiation
The facts deemed established show that the Tinneys failed to report $101,963 in gross receipts.2 We hold that the Tinneys failed to report $101,963 in gross receipts for Travis Tinney's construction business.
7491(a) applies in this case.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) for any other issue or year, nor have they shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe other determinations at issue.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissionerunder certain circumstances.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofas to a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
Sasser's testimony, they have presented credible evidence ofvalue, thereby shifting the burden ofproofto respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners have not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden ofproofremains on petitioners.
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1) the taxpayer may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer complies with the relevant substantiation requirements in the Internal Revenue Code, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner with respect to witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and i
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proofas to a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Petitioners did not allege that section 7491(a) applies.
Petitioner has not argued that section 7491(a) applies in this case, and the record does not support a conclusion that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner in certain situations.
- 10 - Pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as to factual matters may shift from the taxpayer to the.Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner in certain circumstances.
7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any factual issue.
Therefore, we hold that the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent.
Courts have consistently held that the standard to be applied in section 6651 is one of"ordinary business care and prudence", as required by section 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proceed.
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies and has not established that she is in compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements ofthat section.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofas to a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner.
Petitioner does not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor has she shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe determinations at issue.
Alternatively, petitioner contends that respondentbears the burden of proofbecause section 7491(a) applies.
7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with its requirements.
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies, and the record does not permit us to conclude that petitioners satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
OPINION Pursuant to section 7491(a), petitioners have the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that petitioners have not established that they are entitled to the business expense deductions claimed.
Section 7491(a) provides an exception that shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with the substantiation and;recordkeepingrequirements.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability "for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B" m y shift to the Commissioner.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner in certain circumstánces.
- 12 - [*12] Section 7491(a) provides an exception that can shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner.
HP has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies or established its compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
We hold that section 7491(a)(1) does not shift the burd(:n ofproofto respondent.
Discussion As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contention that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Discussion We consider as apreliminary matter petitioner's contentionthat the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
7491(a) applies, nor has he introduced the requisite evidence to invoke that section.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
pursuant to section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies in this case and therefore bear the burden ofproof.
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies, and the sThe term "Secretary" means "the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate", sec.
Therefore, we hold that the burden ofproofdoes not slïift to respondent.
Therefore, we hold that the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent.
Petitioners argue, for the first time on brief, that reepondent bears the burden ofproofpursuant to section 7491(a) for the issue ofSiemens' intent with respect to the $100,000 settlement payment.3 Our concltsions, however, are based on a preponderance 3"This Court generally will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on brief, particularly where the belated claim would prejudice a party." Han (c
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner in certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioner did not allege that section 7491(a) applies.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability maybe shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." The burden will shift only ifthe taxpayerhas, inter alia, complied with substantiation requirements pu
Petitioner has not argued'that section 7491(a) applies in this case, and the record does not support a conclusion that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
With respect to those issues; therefore, the burden cfproofshifts to respondentpursuant to section 7491(a)(1).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden,0fproofas to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Therefore, we hold that the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent.
Petitioners have not argued that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden ofproofremains on them.
Petitioner does not assert that secti n 7491(a) shifts the burden to respondent, and the record does no permit us to conclude that section 7491(a) applies.
- 6 - the Commissioner in certains circumstances.« Petitioners have not, alleged that section 7491(a) applies, nor have they established their compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.- See sec.
Pursuant to section 7491(a); the burden of proof assto factual matters may shift to the Commissioner under-certain circumstances.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met for any of the determinations at issue.
Petitioners do not -argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor have they shown that .the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.
Pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as to factual matters may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden 3Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code), as amended and in effect for the tax year at issue.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the-burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain.
Petitioners contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
However, petitioner does not argue that section 7491(a) applies, and the record does not permit us to conclude that the requirements of section 7491(a) (2) have been satisfied.
7491(a) applies in the instant cases to shift the burden of proof to respondents - 8 - Taxpayers also bear the burden of proving that they have met all requirements to be entitled to-any claimed deductions.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden has shifted to respondent to prove that petitioner was not a real estate professional.
Pursuant to section 7491(a),i the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as to factual matters may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
6662(a) 2004 $7,965 $645.00 $1,593.00 2005 9,634 940.75 1,923.80 The issues we must decide are: (1) Whether the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a); (2) whether petitioner husband was an employee or an independent contractor of Temple University; (3) whether petitioners are entitled to deduct business expenses reported on their returns on Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business; (4) whether petitioners are entitled to deduct employee busines
However, pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as to a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted.
- 5 - that section 7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) for any other issue or year, nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met for any of the other determinations at issue.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met for any of the determinations at issue.
We need not address whether section 7491(a) applies because the parties have provided sufficient evidence for us to find that the value of decedent's units as of the valuation date was $32,601,640.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as to a factual issue that - 6 - affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner.
High has not contended that the burden of proof has -8- shifted pursuant to section 7491(a), and the record shows no basis for such a contention.
7491(a) applies here.
Section 7491(a) requires petitioner to introduce credible evidence with respect to each issue for which he seeks to shift the burden of proof.
500, "Under certain circumstances the burden can shift to respondent with respect to factual disputes pursuant to section 7491(a).
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, nor did they introduce a sufficiency of evidence to invoke that section; therefore, the burden of proof remains on petitioners.
The estate contends that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certa:.n circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the lurden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Second, section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof as to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a) , the burden of.
I 0 - Petitioner edoesenot/con end that -section 7491(a) applies, nor hássshe establiished,t-hat therrequirements of esection 74914(a) (2) have beensmet .
7491(a) applies in the instant cases to shift the burden of proof to respondents - 8 - Taxpayers also bear the burden of proving that they have met all requirements to be entitled to-any claimed deductions.
Section 6663(b) provides that a determination that any portion of an underpayment is attributable to fraud results in the entire underpayment's being treated as "Under certain circumstances the burden of proof can shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual disputes, pursuant to section 7491(a).
- 18 - OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners-argue that respondent bears the burden,of proof in this proceeding pursuant to section 7491(a).
Section -7491(a) provides an exception to the general presumption of correctness in that the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner in limited ·circumstances.
7491(a) provides that under certain circumstances he burden of proof with respect to factual matters shifts to respondent.
Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met for any of the determinations at issue.
h held that a redemption of 75 percent of a corporation's stock qualified as the indirect acquisition of an interest in a trade or business for purposes of section 197 ; and Recovery Group urges that its 6Under certain circumstances the burden can shift to the IRS .with respect: to factual disputes pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of.
a Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Under certain circumstances, the burden of proof as to factual matters may shift pursuant to section 7491(a) from the taxpayer to the Commissioner, but only if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding a factual matter affecting her liability and only if she has complied with substantiation -31- requirements , has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with the IRS 's reasonable re
8 - Petitioners assert that their_ 2000, 2001 , and 2002 Forms 1040 along with their testimony at trial constitute credible evidence of the nature and amount - of their income for the year s .in issue and argue that the burden shou .ld.be,.shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a)(1) on those issues .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof.
Section 7491(a) provides in part : SEC .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner .
Petitioner does not assert that section- 7491(a) shifts the burden to the Commissioner, and the record does not - permit us to conclude that section 7491(a) applies.
In addition, section 7491(a) provides that if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden o f proof with respect to factual issues relating to the taxpayer's ;liability for a .tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts .to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioner contends that the burden of proof regarding th e substantiation of his expenses should be placed on respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Petitioner does not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor has she shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a)i have been met for any of the determinations at issue.
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies or established their compliance with its requirements.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances ..
1949) Pursuant to section 7491(a) ., the burden of proof as to factual.
- 5 Section 7491(a) provides that under certain circumstances, the burden of proof with respect to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner .
Petitioners have not alleged that section .7491(a) applies, nor did they introduce the requisite evidence to invoke that section .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies or established her compliance with its requirements .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements .
7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue.
We note initially that petitioner has neither argued nor established that section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof to respondent on any of the three arguments that he makes .
section 7491(a) applies .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to,factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioners' Position Petitioners first contend that the burden of proof on -all issues is shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements .
1949 ) Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
7491(a) applies only to court proceedings.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with applicable substantiation requi
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence relevant to ascertaining his tax liability .
111, 115 (1933).1 However, pursuant to section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible -evidence with respect to * * * such issue." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requir
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Petitioner has not established that he meets the requirements under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .
Additionally, section 7491(a) requires that the taxpayer cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner fo r "witnesses,.
Because petitioner has not alleged or shown tha t section 7491(a) applies, the burden of proof remains on petitioner .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a) .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the,"taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requiremen
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts ; to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with its requirements .4 Petitioner therefore bears the burden of proof .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden o proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under Hertain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as t o factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioners have alleged section 7491(a) applies, and respondent bears the .burden of proof .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with its requirements .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has not complied with the substantiation requirements .
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has the burden of proof as to any disputed.
Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof may be shifted to the Commissioner where a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence regarding factual issues relevant to ascertaining his tax liability .
Petitioner has not claimed or' shown entitlement to any shift in .the burden of proof pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden'of proof may shift to the Commissioner where a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence regarding factua l issues relevant to ascertaining his tax liability .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
7491(a)(1) Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has.
Petitioners bear the burden of proof because they have neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor proven that they have complied with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of section 7491 (a) (2) (A) and (B ) II .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factua l matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Consequently, the burden of proofdoes not shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
The Bachmanns bear the burden of proving that the award should be treated in a manner other than the treatment claimed by the IRS in the deficiency notice unless the burden shifts to the IRS pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and they have neither compliedwith'the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Petitioners have not established that they meet the requirements under sectio n .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, andthey have neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .° See sec .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and he has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a) the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden'of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requiremen
y counsel Theref-orb, weconclu-de" 5 - that the burden of proof regarding the deficiency is not placed on respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Petitioner has neither alleged nor proven that section 7491(a) applies ; accordingly, the burden remains on him .
Accordingly, we hold that respondent satisfied his burden .
Petitioners have not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies ; accordingly, the burden remains on petitioners to show that they are entitled to the deductions .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore, the burden: of proof°has not shifted to respondent .
Petitioners do not argue that section 7491(a) is applicable, and they have not established that the burden of proof should shift to respondent, pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requiremen
We conclude that the burden of proof regarding the deficiency determined in the statutory notice of deficiency is not placed on respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Petitioners do not allege, nor do we find, that section 7491(a) applies .
With respect to the original deficiencies, petitioner contends that the burden of proof with respect to the factual issues thereunder has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) because it has .
Pursuant to section 7491(a)., the .burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to ascertaining the liability for tax shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer : (1) Maintained adequate records ; (2) satisfied the substantiation requirements ; (3) operated with the Commissioner's agents ; and (4) during the Court
7491(a) applies to this case.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Petitioner argues that the burden of proof shifts to respondent because petitioner has produced credib
Petitioner has not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies ; therefore, the burden remains on him .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certai circumstances .
Petitioners have not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies ; accordingly, petitioners must prove that they are entitled to the deductions .
de against any party any issue as to which such pa ty has the burden of proof, and such decision shall b treated as a dismissal * * * In the present matter, as regards t e deficiency determination, the burden of proof lies with petitioner under the general premise of Rule 142(a) and has n t shifted pursuant to section 7491(a) .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has complied with the substantiation requirements and
Petitioner has not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies ; accordingly, the burden remains on him to show that he is entitled to the claimed deductions .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue”.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue" .
- 4 - Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to respondent under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioner has not alleged or proven that section 7491(a) applies; accordingly, the burden remains on her .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests .
Petitioner has not proven or even alleged that section 7491(a) applies ; accordingly, the burden remains on him to show that he is entitled to the claimed deductions .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue" .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue" .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue".
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to ascertaining the liability for tax shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer : (1) Maintained adequate records ; (2) satisfied the substantiation requirements ; (3) cooperated with the Commissioner's agents ; and (4) during the Cou
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
However, petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
7491(a) requires departure from this general rule.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to respondent under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer 2 Petitioner clarified at trial that although he listed the church as Faith Tabernacle Baptist Church on his revised statement, the correct name was Faith Tabernacle Church .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully wit h ' At one point in his testimony petitioner said that he also gave money to his brother
Petitioners have neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent’s reasonable requests.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information.
Burden of Proof Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to respondent under certain circumstances.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other 4 - information .
Section 7491(a) provides, in limited circumstances, that the burden shifts to respondent.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to-respondent(cid:127)under certain circumstances .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to respondent under certain circumstances.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) or (B).
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating td ascertaining the liability for tax shifts t o the Commissionerjif the taxpayer : (1) Maintained adequate records ; (2) satisfied the substantiation requirements ; (3 ) cooperated with tie Commissioner's agents ; and (4) during the C
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established her compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) (A) and (B) to substantihte items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests.
For reasons discussed herein, we hold that petitioner did not meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies in this - 7 - case.
7491(a) applies in this case and have not established that they satisfied the requirements of sec.
- 8 - Petitioners have neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established their compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain all required records, and cooperate fully with respondent’s reasonable requests.
On the basis of the record, we hold that section 7491(a) does not operate to place the burden of proof on respondent; in short, petitioners did not introduce testimony evidence sufficient to place in doubt the exactitude of the documentary record.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are not liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy- related penalty.
On the basis of the record, we hold that section 7491(a) does not operate to place the burden of proof on respondent; in short, petitioner did not introduce testimonial (or other) evidence sufficient to place in doubt the documentary evidence in the record.4 Petitioner claims that he disputed his debt with MBNA in the fall of 1999, a
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with 3 Sec.
Petitioner has neither alleged that section 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent’s reasonable requests.
The burden of proof has not shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
On the basis of the record, we hold that section 7491(a) does not operate to shift the burden of proof to respondent because: (1) Petitioner did not introduce credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his liability; (2) he did not comply with the requirements to substantiate his deductions; and (3)
The burden of proof has not shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
The burden of proof has not shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under certain specified conditions.
Discussion Section 7491(a) provides that in a court proceeding, the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue shifts to respondent under certain prescribed conditions.
8 We hold that respondent satisfied the burden of production under sec.
Respondent issued petitioner a notice of deficiency dated November 15, 2002.1 Discussion Section 7491(a) provides that in a court proceeding, the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue shifts to the 1 The notice of deficiency included a rate adjustment credit of $138.65, which petitioner had not claimed in his 2001 tax return.
Additionally, the record is silent as to whether the Defense Finance and Accounting Service prepared a separate account and (continued...) - 8 - property settlement, and as such, the payments do not give rise to an alimony deduction.5 Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under certain specified conditions.
Petitioner does not argue the applicability of section 7491(a), and the record does not reflect that section 7491(a) applies.
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), however, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner if, among other requirements, the taxpayer introduces “credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining” his tax liability.
The burden of proof has not shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
We hold that the $30,211.66 damage award is not excludable under section 104(a)(2).
7491(a) requires that the taxpayer cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for "witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews".
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof is placed on the Commissioner as to any factual issue on which the taxpayer offers credible evidence relevant to his income tax liability, if certain conditions have been satisfied, including the commencement of the Commissioner’s examination after July 22, 1998.
7491(a) applies here.
We hold that petitioner has failed to introduce any credible evidence as to the relevant issue; thus, he has failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a).
Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not apply.
Section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof as to any factual issue to the IRS if the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B” and if the taxpayer satisfies the conditions in section 7491(a)(2). A taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the conditions in section 7491(a)(2) are satisfied. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440–41 (2001). Because H&S Investments
The facts stipulated are found, and the documents stipulated are accepted as authentic.3 2 Section 7491(a)(1) provides that, if a taxpayer offers credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to determining his tax liability, the burden of proof with respect to the issue is on the Commissioner. See also Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer complies with the relevant substantiation requirements in the Code, maintains all required records, and cooperates w
While section 7491(a)(1) provides that, in general, when “a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the [Commissioner] shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue,” petitioners did not argue that the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent and failed to introduce sufficient evidence to shift the burden to respondent. Accordingly, section 7491(a) doe
taxable year 2018, 100% of the federal poverty line for a family size of three in the continental United States was $20,420 and 400% was $81,680.6 Household income is defined as the MAGI of the taxpayer plus the MAGI of family members (1) for whom the taxpayer properly claims 4 Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability. The Cou
3 Section 7491(a)(1) provides that, if a taxpayer offers credible evidence with respect to any issue relevant to determining his tax liability, the burden of proof with respect to the issue is on the Commissioner. See also Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer complies with the relevant substantiation requirements in the Code, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner with respect to witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews.
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact. Therefore, petitioner bears the burden of proof as to all factual issues. person, such as the Commissioner or a particular IRS employee, are frivolous. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-192, 92 T
He attempted to substantiate these entries by providing 2016 Visa Signature (Alaska Airlines) credit card statements, which display numerous transactions and do not distinguish between personal and business expenses. And, as with his other logs, petitioner did not explain the specific business purpose for any of his meals and entertainment expenses. Discussion As a general rule, the Commissioner’s determinations of a taxpayer’s liability in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the ta
7491(a)(1) provides that, ifa taxpayer offers credible evidence with respect to any issue relevant to determining his tax liability, the burden ofproof with respect to the issue is on the Commissioner. See also Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491(a)(1) applies only ifthe taxpayer complies with the relevant substantiation requirements in the Code, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner with respect to witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2)
From there, Higbee transitions into a discussion ofthe difference between "burden ofproduction" and "burden ofproof" and cites section 7491(a)--which uses the word "taxpayer" and not "individual"--before explaining that "once the Commissioner meets his burden - 31 - [*31] ofproduction, the taxpayermust come forward with evidence sufficient to persuade a Court that the Commissioner's determination is incorrect." Id.
Pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner ifcertain criteria are satisfied. Section 7491(a)(2) provides that the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner only when the taxpayer has: (1) "complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate any item" and (2) "maintained all records required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, mee
ovides: "If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden ofproofwith respect to such issue." Section - 11 - [*11] 7491(a)(2) further provides that the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner only when the taxpayerhas: (1) "complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate any item" and (2) "maintai
easement given to NAT. Because there is no disagreement that these amounts exceed 10% ofthe tax required to be shown on petitioners' 24Petitioners contend that respondent bears the burden ofproofas to the penalties under the burden-shifting rules ofsec. 7491(a). We disagree. Sec. 7491(c), rather than sec. 7491(a), applies to penalties. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 447 n.6 (2001) ("Considering * * * [the] limiting language ofsec. 6665(a)(2), the reference in sec. 7491(a) to tax liab
7491(a)(1) provides an exception that shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if: (1) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2). Petitioner has not raised sec. 7491, and we conclude that
7491(a).3 Deductions and credits are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that he or she is entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). II. Dependency Exemption Deduction In general a taxpayermay claim a dependency exemption deduction "for each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152) ofthe taxpayer for the taxable year." S
This is because, petitioners argue, section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof on that issue to respondent.
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all dollar amounts to the nearest dollar. Petitioners have not invoked sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. In any event, sec. 7491(a) is inapplicable herein because petitioners have failed to introduce credible evidence that respondent’s adjustments were in error, se
a beliefthat any resulting increase in its estate tax liability is unlikely to be significant. That is because petitioner believes that estate tax attributable to the "(...continued) involving a mixed question offact and law, or a question offact", sec. 7491(a) applies to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with respect to any factual issues. As noted supra note 4, respondent also suggests that petitioner's motion raises issues offact, a suggestion that we have rejected as inconsistent with t
111, 115 (1933).6 Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayerto the Commissioner as to that factual issue. Petitioner has neither alleged that 6On rare occasions this Court has recognized an exception to these rules in cases involving unreported income where the Commissioner introduces no substantive evidence but
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts to the Commissioner part or all ofthe.burden ofproofwhere the taxpayer introduces credible evidence of a factual matter, but that section does not apply where a , taxpayer fails to satisfy the related requireinents. See, e.g., sec. 7491(a)(2)(A), (B), . and (C). Petitioner has failed to establish that it meets all o
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner, but that section does not apply here because we find that petitioners failed to satisfy each requirement set forth in section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).20 Petitioners argue that respondent has the burden ofproofirrespective ofany applicability ofsection 7491 because, they state, re
ant to resolution of the issues here presented, and we shall refer only to the provisions of those sections applicable to the latter years. The burden of proof plays little role in our analysis. Nevertheless, petitioners have not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. We conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply because petitioners have not produced any evidence that they have satisfied the preconditions for its application.
lty on petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1). An appropriate order and decision will be entered. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for the years in issue. Petitioner has not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. In any event, sec. 7491(a) does not apply here because petitioner has not shown that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application. See sec. 7491(a)(2)
Section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, but that section does not apply where a taxpayer fails to satisfy the record-keeping and substantiation requirements. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Petitioner has failed to satisfy those requirements. Respondent bears the burden of proof only with respect to the increased d
7491(a); Rule 142(a). We did not consider whether sec. 7491(a) would apply because our resolution of the issues is generally based on the preponderance of the evidence. See Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). We note here that, with respect to petitioners' basis in the house, the burden of proof is relevant. Petitioners have introduced no evidence with respect to their construction of and improvements to the house, other than very general testimony about costs. Accordingl
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those of Scar.. In the instant case., the adjustments in the notice of deficiency all relate to petitioner's 2005 income tax return . Moreover, petitioner claims that Ms . Robles reviewed his return but did not follow proper procedures. Finally, Scar involved a violation of a statutory provision, while petitioner alleges a violation of the IRM, whic h does not have the force and effect of law . See Valen Manufacturing Co . v . United States
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall. bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the taxpayer's liability for a tax 11 imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code . Petitioner does not dispute receiving the wages or respondent's calculation of tax . Rather, petitioner disagrees only with respondent's legal conclusions (i .e ., that petitioner's 11 wages are taxable
to the VFD less than their entire interest in the lake house; and (2) the lake house as donated to the VFD was worthless. B. Petitioners’ Position Petitioners first contend that the burden of proof on all issues is shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a). Petitioners assert that the Court should not consider respondent’s quid pro quo argument (to the effect that petitioners received a benefit in exchange for their donation) because this argument constitutes new matter that respondent
rincipal residence. Petitioners’ 2000 return was postmarked on Sept. 5, 2001. In the notice of deficiency respondent determined a $500,000 adjustment because petitioners had conceded a $91,406 capital gain adjustment. Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, and petitioners have not established that the requirements of sec. 7491(a) have been met. Moreover, because there are no factual issues in dispute, sec. 7491(a) does not apply. Black's Law Dictio
ssion issue. We accept petitioner’s concession. III. Conclusion Taking into account our prior Opinion in PPL Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 176 (2010), Decision will be entered under Rule 155. APPENDIX Petitioner has not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. We conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that it has satisfied the preconditions for its application. See s
435,-440 (1934) .' While'section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, that section is not applicable where, as here, petitioners have failed to meet the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements of the Code .
See Rule 142(a) ; Petitioners have not raised the issue of section 7491(a),,which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations .
In addition, section 7491(a) provides that if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code . 4 Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and he failed to cooperate with respondent's reasonable requests fo r 4 Petitioner did not dispute the accuracy of the information reported
See Rule 142(a) ; Petitioners have not raised the issue of section 7491(a),,which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations .
See Rule 142(a) ; Petitioners have not raised the issue of section 7491(a),,which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations .
Section 7491(a), providing for a shift to the Commissioner of the burden of proof in certain circumstances, is inapplicable to trust fund penalty cases. In any event we find on a preponderance of the evidence that employment taxes were not paid, that petitioner was a responsible person, and that she willfully failed to pay over those taxes. C. Resp
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
prescribed by the Secretary, sec. 170(a)(1), including certain substantiation requirements provided in section 1.170A-13(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. In addition, no deduction for any contribution in excess of $250 is allowed 26 Petitioners concede that sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this proceeding. - 40 - unless the taxpayer substantiates it by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8). The question of what constitutes a "contribution or gift" for purposes
Petitioners request that we reconsider whether they satisfied the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Section 7491(a) does not apply in this case because petitioner did not introduce credible evidence that he is entitled to the deduction he seeks . In general, under section 151(a) and (c), a taxpayer is allowed a dependency exemption deduction for each dependent . Sec. 152(a)(1) . The definition of a "dependent" provided by section 152(a) includes
Burden of Proof Section 7491(a) was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on any factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue" .
More fundamentally, section 7491 has no applicability to these consolidated cases.7 Section 7491(a) operates to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances with 7 Moreover, petitioner failed to establish that sec.
ibutable to DDR and that DDR is a separate legal entity from which he received a salary . Conversely, respondent contends that DDR does not exist, and that the $63,850 is attributable to petitioner . There is insufficient evidence to establish the 2 Sec. 7491(a) is inapplicable because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence within the meaning of sec . 7491(a)(1) . - 4 - existence of DDR . Moreover, when petitioner was questioned at trial about how much of the $63,850 he was paid from D
7491(a)(2)(B).) The doctrine of Cohan v. Commissioner, supra, permits the Court to estimate allowable deductions when it is clear that - 8 - deductible expenses have been incurred. However, there must be sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis for making an estimate. Mendes v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 308 (2003); Vanicek v. Commiss
Section 7491(a) does not apply in this case because petitioner has not substantiated the deductions he -6- seeks or shown that he has maintained sufficient records . Sec . 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B) . In his petition, petitioner claimed that respondent erred by not computing his deductions for Schedule C expenses, Schedule A interest, charitable cont
By their terms, neither section 7491(a) nor section 7491(c) is applicable here .
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual - 5 - issues that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue”.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 468, 476 n.5 (1986). In order to satisfy their initial burden of production, petitioners were required to introduce evidence sufficient, if believed, to demonstrate by a 32In the stipulation of facts, petitioners conceded that sec. 7491(a) does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent. - 27 - preponderance of the evidence that respondent’s determination is excessive; i.e., erroneous, and/or arbitrary; i.e., “without rational foundation”. Helvering v. Taylor, 293
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that if, in any court proceeding, the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for a tax, the burden of proof with respect to such factual issues will be placed on the Commissioner. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner has not raised the issue of section 7491(a)(1), nor has he introduced any credible evidence with respect to the factual issues. Therefore, sect
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 468, 476 n.5 (1986). In order to satisfy their initial burden of production, petitioners were required to introduce evidence sufficient, if believed, to demonstrate by a 32In the stipulation of facts, petitioners conceded that sec. 7491(a) does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent. - 27 - preponderance of the evidence that respondent’s determination is excessive; i.e., erroneous, and/or arbitrary; i.e., “without rational foundation”. Helvering v. Taylor, 293
7491(a) is inapplicable to this case as respondent’s examination of the 1982, 1983, and 1984 tax years began before July 22, 1998. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). --- DISSENT --- Marvel, J., dissenting: I agree with the majority’s statement that “The crux of this dispute is the application of the last sentence of section
Section 7491(a), however, shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the tax liability of a taxpayer who meets certain preliminary conditions. Petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent and did not produce any credible evidence with respect to any matter in this case. See sec. 7491(a). Furthermore,
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the tax liability of a taxpayer who meets certain preliminary conditions. Petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent and did not - 4 - produce any credible evidence with respect to any matter in this case. See sec. 7491(a). Furthermore, pet
Section 7491(a) modifies the general rule regarding the burden of proof in court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(1), 112 Stat. 727. When a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence with respect to a factua
ment. As of the time of the trial in this case, the Maryland Circuit Court was considering in the insurance litigation numerous posttrial motions and had not reduced the insurance litigation verdict to final judgment. -13- OPINION We first address section 7491(a). The parties agree that the examination in this case commenced after the effective date of section 7491. The parties disagree, however, over whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under that section. Section 7491(a)(1) may shi
ation by showing an income source beneficially owned by petitioner. Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, supra. “‘Beneficial ownership is marked by command over property or enjoyment of its economic benefits.’” Cordes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-377 6 Sec. 7491(a) was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, effective for court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22
7491(a) is inapplicable because petitioner does not meet the net worth requirements of sec. 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), which are cross-referenced in sec. 7491(a')(2)(C). - 8 - Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-58. In determining the economic reality of a related party transfer, "'the ultimat
Therefore, section 7491(a) does not apply in this case. Another case in which the burden may shift to respondent concerns the determination that there is unreported income. Under the holdings of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (to which an appeal would normally lie for petitioner) respondent is required to build an evi
Section 7491(a) modifies the general rule regarding the burden of proof in court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(1), 112 Stat. 727. When a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence with respect to a factua
111, 115 (1933).4 Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other·prérequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).
Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not apply.
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code. For the burden to shift, however, the taxpayer must comply
; Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 291 (6th Cir. 1960), and a finding of economic substance turns on whether the transfer would have followed the same form had it been between the transferee and an 6 Petitioners have not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations, and we conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply. In the case of a corporation such as each petitioner, sec. 7491(a)(2) limits the shifting of the burden of pro
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 applies to court cases arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. Because the examination underlying this case commenced before July 23, 1998, sec. 7491(a) does not
OPINION Because the Court decides the issues in this case without regard to the burden of proof, section 7491(a) is inapplicable.
Whether respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a)2 as to respondent’s deficiency determination.
7491(a) shifts the burden of proof under certain circumstances to respondent and applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. Because the examination in this case commenced on Jan. 6, 1998, sec. 7491(a) does not apply. 4The debt must also be a bona fide debt in order to be deductible; that is, a debt that arises from a debtor-credito
and (H) of sec. 4975(e)(2)). Respondent contends that the Plan's loans to 6 Sec. 7491, relating to burden of proof, was not drawn in issue by either side. However, for completeness, and in light of petitioner's pro se status, we note the following: Sec. 7491(a) provides for shifting the burden of proof (if certain conditions have been satisfied) with respect to "any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B". Sec. 7491(a)(1). The
Section 7491(a) does not apply because this case involves legal issues. On Form 1040, U.S. Individual Tax Return, for taxable year 2000, petitioner reported $11,835 in wage income. Petitioner did not report any other income. Petitioner also claimed head of household filing status, two dependency exemptions, and the standard deduction. Petitioner cl
A failure to cooperate would also seem to render section 7491(a) inapplicable.
Whether Petitioner or Respondent Bears the Burden of Proof Petitioner contends that respondent bears the burden of proof relating to the deficiency because section 7491(a) applies and because the notices of deficiency were arbitrary and erroneous for each year in issue.
xpayer to deduct an NOL for a taxable year. The amount of the NOL deduction equals the sum of the NOL carryovers plus NOL carrybacks to that year. Sec. 172(a). Absent an election to the contrary, an NOL for any taxable year 2 The parties agree that sec. 7491(a) is inapplicable in this case, as the examination began before the effective date of the statute. - 11 - must first be carried back 3 years and then carried over 15 years.3 Sec. 172(b)(1)(A), (2), and (3). A taxpayer claiming an NOL deduct
- 5 - rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence on the factual issue.
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon respondent the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with respondent, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence on the factual issue.3 The legislative history of 3 The relevant language
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence on the factual issue.
812 deficiency in their 1998 Federal income tax and an accuracy-related penalty of $8,762.40 under section - 2 - 6662(a).1 After concessions, we decide the following issues: 1. Whether the burden of proof has been shifted to respondent by virtue of section 7491(a). We hold that the burden of proof remains with petitioners. 2. Whether petitioners underreported their Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, gross receipts by $137,221. We hold that they did. 3. Whether petitioners are liable for t
7491(a) does not apply, and petitioner bears the burden of proof on all issues in this case. Rule 142(a)(1). - 9 - return files for 1993. Those documents were not admitted in part because petitioner did not exchange them 15 days before trial as required by our standing pretrial order served on him more than 5 months before trial. Materials no
7491(a) does not apply because the examination for each year in issue commenced before July 23, 1998. - 13 - B. Whether Petitioner Had Unreported Income in 1993-95 1. Petitioner’s Gross Receipts for 1993 Respondent contends that petitioner had unreported gross receipts of $345,172 for 1993. Petitioner contends that he had unreported gross rec
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with respondent, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence on the factual issue.
xpayer to deduct an NOL for a taxable year. The amount of the NOL deduction equals the sum of the NOL carryovers plus NOL carrybacks to that year. Sec. 172(a). Absent an election to the contrary, an NOL for any taxable year 2 The parties agree that sec. 7491(a) is inapplicable in this case, as the examination began before the effective date of the statute. - 11 - must first be carried back 3 years and then carried over 15 years.3 Sec. 172(b)(1)(A), (2), and (3). A taxpayer claiming an NOL deduct
ill be income to petitioner. See secs. 61(a)(3), 1001, 1011. Petitioner has the burden to establish that he sold assets to Czarnowski and to establish his bases in the assets sold. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).3 3 Sec. 7491(a) does not apply because petitioner failed to maintain adequate records. - 4 - While we are willing to assume that petitioner sold some assets to Czarnowski, petitioner failed to provide any information concerning the identity of the asset
We also note that section 7491(a), which in certain cases shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, does not apply to employment tax determinations.
- 11 - section 7491(a)(1), however, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner if, inter alia, the taxpayer first introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for income tax.12 Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). With respect to a taxpayer’s liability for any penalty, however, section 7491(c) places on the Commissioner the burden of production. A. The IRA Distribution13 Generally, any amount paid or distributed
Section 7491(a) does not apply because the examination of petitioner’s liabilities in issue commenced before the effective date of that section. The Commissioner has 3 years from the time a return is filed to issue a notice of deficiency with respect to income tax. See secs. 6212(a), 6213(a), 6501(a). Section 7502(a)(1) provides that, in certain ci
Thus, section 7491(a) does not apply, and respondent's determination is presumed to be correct and petitioner bears the burden of proof on all issues in this case. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). C. Whether Petitioner Constructively Received All of His Lottery Winnings in 1989 Petitioner contends that the NYSL amounts that h
ce or otherwise.” Under section 165(a), a theft loss deduction is allowable for the year “in which the taxpayer discovers such loss.” Sec. 165(e). If in the year of discovery the taxpayer has a claim for reimbursement on which there is a reasonable 4Sec. 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner in certain circumstances in court proceedings arising from IRS examinations beginning after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising from examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 685, 726. The parties have stipulated that respondent’s examination began in May 1996. Accor
in Ram.3 The parties disagree on whether the disputed transactions increased Jerry’s adjusted basis in Ram. Each of those transactions involved funds provided to Ram directly from someone other than Jerry. Petitioners contend that Jerry indirectly 3 Sec. 7491(a), which places the burden of proof upon the Commissioner in specified circumstances, is inapplicable to this case. Sec. 7491(a) applies only to court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue S
“necessary” an expense must be “appropriate and helpful” to the taxpayer’s business. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). To be 4 Upon reviewing the record, it is unclear when the audit of petitioner’s 1996 return commenced. However, since sec. 7491(a) does not alter the taxpayer’s burden of proof where the taxpayer has not complied with all applicable substantiation requirements, including those of sec. 274(d), sec. 7491(a) does not apply in this case. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.
payer has the usual burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Commissioner’s determination is arbitrary or erroneous. Rapp v. Commissioner, supra at 935; Petzoldt v. Commissioner, supra at 689. The Court 7 The provision of sec. 7491(a) for shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner applies only to Court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
- 4 - Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on respondent with regard to certain factual issues. Section 7491 applies to examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726. Upon reviewing the record, it is unclear when the examination of petitioner’s 1997 return com
Although section 7491(a) may operate in specified circumstances to place the burden on the Commissioner, subsection (a)(3) of that section provides that the burden-shifting does not apply "to any issue if any other provision of this title provides for a specific burden of proof with respect to such issue." Section 6015(b)(1)(C) expressly requires the spouse
ber 15, 1999. After she was evicted from her house in July 1999, petitioner in January 2000 permanently moved into the condominium that she owned and had previously rented out. Petitioner asserts that she was living in temporary housing and lacked 6 Sec. 7491(a) does not apply to place the burden of proof on respondent because petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that she complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, ma
Whether Petitioner Bears the Burden of Proof Petitioner contends that respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a).1 We disagree.
at 219, and petitioners bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to such a deduction.2 Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v. ¹ Petitioners make no assertion that GBI also had an economic interest in the usable materials. 2 The parties agree that sec. 7491(a), which places the burden of proof on respondent in certain cases, does not apply here. Sec. 7491 applies only to court proceedings arising from (continued...) U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934
Section 7491(a), cited by petitioners, does not apply because the examination was begun in 1996, prior to the effective date of the burden of proof rule provided by the section. In any event, the provisions of section 7491(a) would not help petitioners’ case. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. __ (June 6, 2001). - 8 - To reflect stipulated adjus
Section 7491(a), a new provision created by Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 685, 726, places the burden of proof on respondent with regard to certain factual issues. Section 7491 applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. See RRA 1998 sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat.
al capacity, in performing a ministerial act. See sec. 6404(e)(1).14 An error or delay by the Commissioner can be taken into account only (1) If it occurs after the Commissioner has contacted the taxpayer in writing with respect to the deficiency 13 Sec. 7491(a) serves to shift the burden of proof if, inter alia, the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B. In general, in
In certain circumstances, if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, then section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner.
c)(1); Foster v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 51, 53 (2012). When the taxpayer constructs a residence, the date ofpurchase ofthe residence is "the date the taxpayer first occupies such residence". Sec. 36(c)(3)(B). 3Petitioner argued for the application ofsec. 7491(a), which, subject to certain conditions, shifts the burden ofprooffrom the taxpayer to the Commissioner with respect to "any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability for any taxpayer for any tax imposed" by various provisions o
the year at issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We decide this case without regard to the allocation of the burden of proof. We therefore need not decide whether petitioners satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a). See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2003-212; Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188-189 (2008). We question the timing of respondent’s constructive dividend adjustment. TWC advanced p
7491(a); Rule 142(a) (2). Respondent alleges that "petitioners did not even attempt to substantiate the great majority of the [disallowed] expenses" as required by section 7491(a) (2) (A). We need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to the material factual issue in these consolidated cases (the viability of Robucci P.C. and Westsphere)
Because we do not decide this case by reference to theplacement of the burden of proof, we need not and do not decide whether petitioners have met the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and meets other requirements, the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to that factual issue. Neither party addressed the burden of proof. Because we decide this case on the basis
Black's estate and trustee of the marital trust, (b) a'$1,150,000 fee paid to the law firm of MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton LLP (MacDonald Illig), and (c) $980,625 paid to Black LP as reimbursement for expenses incurred in connection with a secondary offering of stock Black LP held (together, the fee deductibility issues) ; (6) whether under, section 7491(a) respondent bears the burden of proof with respect to all factual issues (the burden of proof issue) .
Black's estate and trustee of the marital trust, (b) a'$1,150,000 fee paid to the law firm of MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton LLP (MacDonald Illig), and (c) $980,625 paid to Black LP as reimbursement for expenses incurred in connection with a secondary offering of stock Black LP held (together, the fee deductibility issues) ; (6) whether under, section 7491(a) respondent bears the burden of proof with respect to all factual issues (the burden of proof issue) .
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and meets other requirements, the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to that factual issue. Because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, we nee
rden of proof or the effect of a failure of proof . Rule 122(b) ; Borchers v. Commissioner, 95 T .C . 82, 91 (1990), affd . 943 F .2d 22 (8th Cir . 1991) . The parties disagree over whether the burden of proof in this case shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . We need not, and we shall not, address that disagreement . That is be- cause resolution of the issues presented here does not depend on who has the burden of proof . Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to dispute the und
We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance of evidence on the record .
t after the resolution of this case. That petition will describe what happened here, and only then will he ask the probate court to approve distributions to the beneficiaries. We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) because the case is mostly determined by applying the law to undisputed facts. Where there were disputed facts, both parties met their burden of production, and findings were based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Deskins v. Commi
ess otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 3 The parties also disagree regarding the application of sec. 7491(a) to this case. If applicable to a factual issue, sec. 7491(a) would cause the burden of proof on that issue to shift from petitioners to respondent. See Rule 142(a). We need not decide whether sec. 7491(a) applies herein because we resolv
However, the burden of proof with respect to a factual issue relevant to the liability of a taxpayer for tax may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer has produced credible evidence relating to the issue, has met his substantiation requirements, maintained records, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable requests for documents, witnesses, and meetings .
a taxpayer to substantiate deductions through secondary evidence where the underlying documents have been unintentionally lost or destroyed. Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 320-321 (2004); 6 Petitioners do not contend, nor have they shown, that sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in some circumstances, applies to this case. - 12 - Malinowski v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1120, 1125 (1979); Furnish v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-286; Joseph v. Commissioner, T.C. M
owed under this chapter except as provided in this section." In the case of 9 Generally, a taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). However, under sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner in certain situations. Petitioner contends that sec. 7491(a) requires respondent to bear the burden of proof.. We need not decide this issue because our findings and analysis in this cas
6 (9th Cir. 1988), affg. Dister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-217; Gale v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-54. In such cases, taxpayers have a duty to reasonably inquire into the 5 Petitioners contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). We need not decide which party bears the burden of proof because the outcome in this case does not depend on the burden of proof. - 13 - validity of the tax benefits. See Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1422-1423 (9th Cir. 1984),
7491(a) was added to the Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, effective for court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Sec. 7491(a)(1) provides that the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner in specified circumstances. We n
se Advance Leasing's financial situation improved dramatically from 1996 to 1997. Advance Leasing reported $29,663 of taxable income before net operating loss 6 The estate contends that the burden of proof in this case is shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a). We need not decide that issue because we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance of evidence without regard to the burden of proof. - 12 - deductions on its 1997 income tax return. However, that return is not consistent with
OPINION Although respondent must have commenced respondent’s exami- nation of petitioner’s return for the year at issue after July 22, 1998, the parties do not address section 7491(a).16 In any event, we need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under that section.
tions and to the general public that an institution meets established criteria or standards. We separately discuss whether petitioners may deduct $175 of this amount they paid for Mishna classes. See Opinion par. A-5, below. Petitioners contend that sec. 7491(a) requires respondent to bear the burden of proof on all factual issues in the case. We need not decide the point because our findings and analysis in this case do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof. The record also sugges
that a property right for which their corporation claimed no deduction and which can be used only in the future does not result in a constructive dividend to them in 1999.2 2 We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. See sec. 7491(a). - 5 - We disagree. A shareholder receives a constructive dividend to the extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits if the corporation pays a person
7491(a)(1) and (2)(B). In this case, we need not decide whether petitioners have complied with the requirements of section 7491 because the resolution of this issue does not depend on which party has the burden of proof. We resolve this issue on the preponderance of the evidence in the record. Under the terms of the termination agreement, peti
OPINION We presume that respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1998 return, petitioners’ amended 1998 return, and petitioners’ 1999 return began after July 22, 1998, and that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
he law. In reaching our holding herein, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we conclude that they are irrelevant or without merit. 3 We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. - 5 - To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent.
80F(d)(4); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.280F- 6T(b), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 42713 (Oct. 24, 2 We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) because petitioner failed to comply with respondent’s reasonable requests for information. In any event, we decide this case on the basis of the preponderance of evidence on the record. 3 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are
ed under Rule 155. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the applicable year. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We need not decide whether the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a), because the issue is one of law. See sec. 7491(a). Respondent concedes that these expenses are unreimbursed employee expenses for 2000. Sec. 62 provides, in pertinent part: SEC. 62. ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINED. (a) General Rule. — For
It seems likely respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1997 return and amended 1997 return began after July 22, 1998, and that section 7491(a) would apply to the case at hand.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether - 5 - section 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case.
Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, although petitioners have introduced evidence substantiating some losses–- and respondent has conceded some losses--petitioners have failed to introduce credible evidence, as required by section 7491(a), 7(...continued) petitioners fail this requirement, having failed to produce any documents to substantiate their gambling winnings and losses after receiving from respondent a December 1998 letter regarding the examination of their 1996 Federal tax
oner Petitioner, a dentist, resided in Los Angeles, California, when he filed the petition. Traci Rae Pontello and Wendi Lyn Iannaccone are petitioner’s adult daughters, and Frank James Pontello is petitioner’s son-in-law. 1 Petitioner contends that sec. 7491(a) requires respondent to bear the burden of proof on all issues in the case. We need not decide petitioner’s contention because our findings and analysis do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof. - 3 - B. Petitioner’s Family
n 170(f)(8) and section 1.170A-13(f)(6), Income Tax Regs. Thus, petitioners may not deduct their contributions to NHF of $36,285 in 1997 and $36,000 in 1998. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent. Petitioners contend that sec. 7491(a) requires respondent to bear the burden of proof on all issues in the case. We need not decide petitioners’ contention because our findings and analysis do not depend on which party bears the burden of proof. Petitioners possess rights in
n question are not deductible.3 Petitioner retired from his position as a drilling manager for Atlantic Richfield during 1987 and after that time was paid on one occasion during 1991 for consulting in connection with his 3 We need not decide whether sec. 7491(a) affects the placement of the burden of proof here, because we resolve the issues on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence in the record. - 6 - preretirement expertise. Other than the $7,710 consulting fee earned during 1991, petit
. 374, 386 (2001). Respondent determined that sections 162 and 274 do not entitle petitioner to deduct its expenses related to the Centurion. In order to prevail, petitioner must prove that determination wrong.5 Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 5 Sec. 7491(a) was added to the Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, effective for court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. (continue
with petitioner’s contention that the circumstances in this case are similar to those in Selfe. 2 Petitioners do not contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491. Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that the requirements under sec. 7491(a) are met. H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. 105-174, at 45 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 581. - 6 - The taxpayer in Selfe borrowed funds in her individual capacity and pledged her personal assets as collater
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with respondent, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence on the factual issue.
Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. The estate has not argued or established that section 7491(a) applies, and therefore the burden ofproofremains on the estate. II. The Private Annuity Transaction A. Federa
Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to a relevant factual issue if the taxpayer introduces “credible evidence” and “has maintained all records required under this title” with respect to the relevant factual issue, among other requirements. See § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B). Petitioner has not sought to shift th
7 Section 7491(a) provides that the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner on a factual issue if, among other requirements, the taxpayer “introduces credible evidence with respect to [that] issue” and “has maintained all records required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the [Commissioner] for witnesses, informati
In order to shift the burden of proof as to a factual issue under section 7491(a), taxpayers must, among other things, introduce credible evidence as to the factual issue and maintain required records.
Petitioners contend that they meet the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Conversely, respondent contends the burden has not shifted because petitioners failed to introduce credible evidence necessary for the burden to shift. The resolution of these issues is decided on the preponderance of evi
ct to such issue." See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they have presented credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue under section 7491(a). - 12 - [*12] In cases involving failure to report income, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which any appeal in these cases would ordinarily lie, see sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) and (B), has held that the Commissioner must in
Petitioners allege that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) because they introduced "credible evidence, in the form ofreceipts, that clearly documents all expenses, with respect to the issues in this case", "substantiated all items with respect to all such expenses", and "kept all meetings with Respondent[] and fully Cooperated with production and examination ofDocument[s] and other request[
Petitioner contends that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) and thus the burden ofproofshifts to respondent regarding the fair market value ofhis gifts.
BAI would normally have the burden ofproving its entitlement to the disputed deductions, see Rule 142(a), but at trial we shifted that burden to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) because we found that BAI had cooperated with the Commissioner's requests for information on this issue and had produced credible evidence to substantiate its deductions.
ments, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2). In addition, for the burden to shift, the taxpayer must introduce credible evidence with respect to the issue. See sec. 7491(a)(1). A taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that he or she has met the requirements of section 7491(a). See H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 105-599, at 239 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. No. 105-174, at 45 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 581. Petitioner does not contend that she met the requirements ofsection 7491(a) for shifting the - 6 - burde
However, under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayers comply with all substantiation requirements in the Internal Revenue Code, introduce credible evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining their liability, and cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for information, documents, and mee
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner where the taxpayer has presented credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the correct tax liability ofthe taxpayer. Section 7491(a) also requires that the taxpayerhave substantiated all appropriate items, maintained records as required under the Code, a
BAI would normally have the burden ofproving its entitlement to the disputed deductions, see Rule 142(a), but at trial we shifted that burden to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) because we found that BAI had cooperated with the Commissioner's requests for information on this issue and had produced credible evidence to substantiate its deductions.
Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer must prove his entitlement to any deductions claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 - 5 - U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Taxpayers are obligated to maintain sufficient records to substantiate expenses underlying their claimed deductions. Sec. 6001; see also Hradesky v. Commissio
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
wo occasions the Court imposed a $10,000 sec. 6673(a)(1) penalty. Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-189; Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. No. 6368-05L (Feb. 2, 2006) (order and decision); Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-215. 3Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofbecause he failed to introduce credible evidence. See Rule 142(a). - 4 - [*4] not reasonable cause. See sec. 6654. Finally, petitioner persistently asserted frivolous contentions and is therefore liable
Burden ofProof Under section 7491(a) the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies certain requirements.
isfies other conditions, then the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner. Sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2)(A) and (B). At trial petitioner conceded that he had the burden ofproof, but on briefhe argued that the burden ofproofhad shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). However, petitioner has not established that he complied with the requirements of - 12 - section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent's reasonable requests. Therefore, the
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence on any factual issues and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).° "Credible evidence is the quality ofevidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary eviden
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence on any factual issues and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)." "Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evide
The taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence on any factual issues and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)." "Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evide
Nwabasili does not assert, and the record does not demonstrate, that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met. Therefore, the burden ofproofremains on Nwabasili. Section 162(a) allows a deduction for expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in carrying on a business. The IRS concedes that Nwabasili carried on an event-promoti
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) 2 The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary ofthe Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term "or h
ported dog breeding business, dependency exemption deductions for his two minor daughters, and gross income adjustments for health insurance of$24,000 and alimony of$27,900. The evidence herein does not establish that the burden of proofshifts under section 7491(a). Petitioner's documentation regarding some claimed deductions was submitted in his January 13, 2016, nine-page fax sent to respondent's counsel and filed with the Court. The first document is an invoice from Dr. Arthur James Mowery, a
Credible evidence for this purpose "is the quality ofevidence which, after critical - 11 - analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evidence were submitted". Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
Lizardo do not argue that the burden should shift, and they have not met the requirements under section 7491(a) for shifting the burden.
Petitioner does not contend that he met the requirements ofsection 7491(a), and the record confirms that he did not do so.
Section 7491(a), however, shifts this burden ofproofto the Commissioner on each fact issue whenever "a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * [the] factual issue". In support ofhis entitlement to a dependency exemption deduction for Ms. Napoleone, petitioner has produced and respondent has stipulated into evidence a document en
tiation ofany item and cooperation with the Govemment's requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2). The taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that he or she has niet the requirements of section 7491(a). Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), aff'd, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). It is unclear from petitioner's briefs whether he has asserted burden shifting under section 7491(a). However, petitioner has not demonstrated that
3), aff'g Davies v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-438. 5Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 835-837 (1974); Taylorv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-67. - 6 - [*6] ascertaining the taxpayer's liability, the burden may shift to the Commissionerunder section 7491(a). Credible evidence is "'evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficientupon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evidence were submitted'".6 However, the burden will shift only ifthe taxpayerhas
he FPAAs. We therefore havejurisdiction to determine whether the payments were guaranteed payments for services and whether the accuracy- related penalty applies.7 II. Burden ofProof We now consider whetherthe burden ofproofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a). The Commissioner's adjustments in an FPAA are generally presumed correct, and a party challenging an FPAA has the burden ofproving that the Commissioner's adjustments are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (
- 20 - [*20] requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been satisfied.
The burden ofproofwith respect to a factual issue may be placed on the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding that issue and establishes that the taxpayer complied with the requirements to substantiate items, maintain records, and fully cooperate with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
7491(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). As shown below, petitioner did not introduce credible evidence regarding the tax character ofthe income in issue that merited a shifting ofthat burden to respondent. After consideration ofsections 6201(d) and 7491(a), the burden ofproofremains with petitioner. Gain from the sal
he FPAAs. We therefore havejurisdiction to determine whether the payments were guaranteed payments for services and whether the accuracy- related penalty applies.7 II. Burden ofProof We now consider whetherthe burden ofproofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a). The Commissioner's adjustments in an FPAA are generally presumed correct, and a party challenging an FPAA has the burden ofproving that the Commissioner's adjustments are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (
nt's requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). The taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that he or she has met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), aff'd, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). Because we decide the factual issues in the instant case on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. See
7491(a); Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-255. Petitioner has not complied with the substantiation requirements ofsection 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Nor has petitioner cooperated in this matter such that the burden of production would shift to respondentto produce information. See sec. 6201(d). The burden
In an exceptionto the general rule, section 7491(a) imposes the burden ofproofon the IRS with respectto a given factual issue where a taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue, (2) meets all applicable substantiation requirements, (3) complies with all recordkeeping requirements, and (4) cooperates with any reasonable requests for information.
The taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
e STN.Com stock it held on the valuation date was $4.3 million. Respondentnow asserts that the fair market value ofthe stock was $26,341,030. I. Burden ofProof During the trial the estate filed a motion to shift the burden ofproofto respondent under section 7491(a). In an order entered on December 6, 2012, the Court foundthat the estate's substantially inconsistent positions regardingthe valuation ofthe STN.Com stock demonstrated a failure to meetthe requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2) andtherefor
Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproving that respondent's determinationis incorrect, unless they demonstra e that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a)., Howe er, the record shows that petitioners did not meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
7491(a)(1.); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 441 (2001). Credible evidence is evidence the court would find sufficientupon which to base a decision on the issue in favor ofthe taxpayer ifno contrary evidence were submitted. Reridall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-174, aff'd, - 12 - [*12] 535 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2008); see Hi
Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence.with respect to any relevant factual issue and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2). Section 7491(a)(2)requires a taxpayer to demonstrate that he (1) complied with requirements under the.Code to substantiate any item, (2) maintaine
Section 7491(a) may, in certain limited circumstances, operate to shift the burden ofproof to the Commissionerwith respect to any factual issue relevant to determining the 20Because petitioners John J. and Charla Crimi's 2005 tax year is not before the Court, we do not include them as claiming entitlement to a refund for 2005. - 39 - [*39] taxpaye
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). In addition, ifthe Commissioner raises a new issue or seeks an 16The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary ofthe Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term "or his delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency ofthe Treasury Department duly authorize
We find that petitioners have not shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to the remaining relevant factual issues.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Accordingly, petitioner bears the urden ofproofwith respect to all disputed factual issues. . . . . II
933). As discussed in detail below, petitioners did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlementto any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); I
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.5 The burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer has complied with the necessary substantiation requirements and has maintained all records and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews.
Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2). Section 7491(a)(2) requires a taxpayer to demonstrate that he (1) complied with requirements under the Code to substantiate any item, (2) maintaine
However, section 7491(a)(1) and (2) shifts the burden ofproof to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if(1) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such issue, and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses, informati
Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a) for any other issue or year, nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met for any of the other determinations at issue.
7491(a) the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produced credible evidence to support the deduction or position, the taxpayer complied with the substantiation requirements, and the taxpayer cooperated with the Secretary with regard to all reasonable requests for. information. Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a)
However, section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations if the taxpayer raises the issue, introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, and demonstrates compliance with the applicable requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
7491(a); Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-255 (citing H. R. Conf. Rept. No. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 994-995). Respondent challengedthe claimed charitable contributions and medical and dental expenses in the deficiency notice. Petitioner has not complied with the substantiation requirements ofsection 7491(a) with res
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that all ofthe section 7491(a) requirements have een satisfied.
The taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that all ofthe section 7491(a) requirements have been satisfied.
Petitionérs argue that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) because theyproduced credible evidence and satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).7 Respondent concedes that petitioners cooperated wit the Secretary with regard to all reasonable requests for i ' information.
Under section 7491(a), ifth taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofrests on the IRS as to that factual issue. The Weatherlys have no established their compliance with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). They bear the bur
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record does not permit us to conclude that she satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproving that respondent's determinations are erroneous. II. Adjust
Petitioner does not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a), nor has she shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe determinations at issue.
- 14 - [*14] Petitioners argue that pursuantto section 7491(a) the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent and that uncertainty on any issue in this case should be resolved in their favor.
Section 7491(a) therefore applies and shifts the burden of proofto respondent with respectto Rukan/Wheeler's cash contribution. B. Whetherthe Cash Contributions Were "Contributions or Giftà" Under Section 170(c) A cash paymentto a qualified organizationmay be deductible under section 170 ifthe payment is a "contribution or gift" under section 170(c
The burden ofproofmay shift in some cases to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) only iftaxpayers introduce credible evidence at trial to support their position, and only ifthey can establish that they: (1) complied with all substantiation requirements under the provisions ofthe Code and the regulations; (2) maintained books and records required by the Code and the regulations; and (3) cooperated with reasonable
Section 7491(a) (1) imposes the burden of persuasion on the IRS if the taxpayer satisfies the conditions of section 7491(a) (2) and introduces credible evidence on factual issues relevant to the taxpayer's liability for a tax under subtitle A or B of.the Internal Revenue Code. A taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the conditions in section 74
(cid:0)570hbeu'rden ofproofwith resþect to a factual issue may be placed on the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding that issue and establishes that the taxpayér complied with the requirements to substantiate items, maintain records, and fully booperate with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
The burden ofproofwith respect to a factual issue may be placed on the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence - 4 - regarding that issue and establishes that the taxpayer complied with the requirements to substantiate items, maintain records, and fully cooperate with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
7491(a); see also Hiabee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record does notpermit us to conclude that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2). Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproving that he properly claimed the FTHBC on his return. 7The term
Petitionerhas not argued that section 7491(a) applies in this case, and the record does not support a conclusion that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability "for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B" m y shift to the Commissioner.
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence.with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayerto the Commissioner as to that factual issue. HP has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies or established its compliance wit
ontention thë.t petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements of section 17C (f) (11). Accordingly, An appropriate order will be issued granting respondent's motion for partial summary judgment. s(...continued) 142(a) (1). In certain circumstances, sec. 7491(a) may operate to shift to the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability. As one precondition for shifting the burden of proof, however, the taxpayer must have c
However, under section 7491(a), if ·the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden of proof shifts from·the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
Section 7491(a) (1) applies only if the taxpayer complies with the relevant substantiation requirements in the Code, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner with respect to witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B). The taxpayer bears the burden of provin
Petitioners moved for a section 7491(a) (1) burden shift in their pretrial memorandum.
See Rule 142 (a) .2 However, section 7491(a) shifts t he burden to the Commissioner when a taxpayer introduces 2 U less otherwise indicated, all section referencès are to the Internal Revenue Code in Áffect for the date of Adelina Van's death, a id Rule references ar to the Tax Court ,Rules of Practice and Procedure .
7491(a); see ralso Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) (1) applies, and the record does not permit us to conclude that petitioner satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) (2). Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden of pro ing that he.properly deducted the cash charitable
Section 7491(a) (1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner with respect to that issue. Credible evidence is evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to
Section 7491(a) (1) shifts the burden of proof to the IRS if the taxpayer satisfies the conditions in section 7491(a) (2) and introduces credible evidence on factual issues relevant to the taxpayer's liability for a tax under subtitle A or B. A taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the conditions in section 7491(a) (2) are satisfied. See Higbee
the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or 4Petitioners contend that they have met the prerequisites for a shift in the burden of proof to respondent with respect to all factual issues under sec. 7491(a). For the burden of proof to shift to respondent, petitioners are required to cooperate with all reasonable requests for documents. See sec. 7491(a) (2). Petitioners did not produce the farming ledger or any other documents respondent req
umed correct, and generally taxpayers bear the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a) (1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S., 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners argue that the provisions of section 7491 apply and that the burden of proof is on respondent. .Because.petitioners have not met all the requirements of section 7491(a) (2), the burden of proof does not shift to responden
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), in ce tain circumstances, the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability "for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B" may shift to the Commissioner.
nay marked “paid in full”, along with a letter confirming that the $70,300 payment had fulfilled Vinay’s obligation to the Foundation. OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners argue that respondent bears the burden of proof in this proceeding pursuant to section 7491(a). However, the burden of proof has no practical consequence in this case, as there is no evidentiary tie. Our findings with respect to all factual issues are based upon a preponderance of the evidence. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394
ustments in the notice of deficiency are computational, and their resolution will depend upon our resolution of the bad debt deduction issue. Under certain circumstances the burden can shift to respondent with respect to factual disputes pursuant to section 7491(a). However, Mr. Dagres does not contend that the burden has shifted under this section. The amended answer also asserted an increased deficiency due to unreported interest income in 2003. This additional deficiency is clearly a new matt
Under section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability and the taxpayer has satisfied certain conditions. Accordingly, petitioners argue that the burden of proof should be placedeupon resp
ule 142;, New Colonial Ice Co . v. Helvering, 292 U.S . .435,e 440 (1934)., 'Pursuant. to section 7491 (a) ,' ,;the ;burden. of .proof as to- factual matters shifts-to the Commissioner under-certai n circumstances . Mrs . Ajah neither :alleged that .section 7491(a) . applies nor`established,her compliance, with . the. substantiation and recordkeepingrequirements . See sec . 7491(a)(2)(A) .and (B) . Mrs . Ajah, .therefore, bears the burden of proof . See"Rule 142 (a) .. Section 469 Losses From Re
However,'pursuant to¯ section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof as-to.a factual issue that affects the taxpayer's tax liability'may be shifted to the Commissioner.
7491(a).(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may þhift to the • Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces chedible evidence with respect to * * * such issue,." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with aþplicable substantiation requirements and "cooperated with re
7491(a)(2)(A),and .(B The taxpayer bears .the burden of proving compliance .with the , conditions of section 7491(a) (2) .:(A) and (B) .
We reject categorically Smith's assertion that he has-satisfied the conditions for shifting to respondent the burden of proof under section 7491(a), because petitioners have not introduced credible evidence,' did not substantiate deductions, did not maintain required records, and did not cooperate with reasonable requests for information and documents.
of In general, determination of a taxpayer's tax liability is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determination is improper. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (19.33)." "Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer.introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue.." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer
Under section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability and the taxpayer has satisfied certain conditions. Accordingly, petitioners argue that the burden of proof should be placedeupon resp
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners have not introduced credible evidenc e for purposes of section 7491(a), and the burden of proo f therefore remains-with petitioners .
OPINION Burden of Proof Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues may shift from a taxpayer to respondent where a taxpayer complied with substantiation requirements, maintained records, cooperated with respondent's reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews, and introduced credible evidence .
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden of_proof to the Commissioner, that section is not applicable where, as here, a taxpayer has failed to satisfy the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements of the Code .
Burden of Proof The parties disagree as to whether the-burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) .3 The Commissioner's determinations in the deficiency notice are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the „Commissioner's-determinations are in error .
liability of the taxpayer and (2) comply with the applicable requirements of section 7491(a) (2) .' Although section 7491(a) does snot define the term "credible evidence", the legislative .
Additionally, section 7491(a) requires that the taxpayer cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner fo r "witnesses,.
However, section 7491(a) may in specific circumstances place the burden on the Commissioner with regard to any factual issue relating to the taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to that issue and meets the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) .
s of his business activities, that he is not entitled to reconstruct records which never existed, and that the documents he introduced are not sufficient to prove his claimed business expenses . The f - 9 - burden does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a) . Petitioners, therefore, retain the bu rElen of proving they are entitled to the deductions claimed . NEOPCO, Inc . v. Commissioner, 503 U.S . 79, 84 (1992) . III . Underlying Tax Liability A . Schedule C Deductions 1 . Legal Principl
In respondent's pretrial memorandum, respondent referred-to section 7491(a) and asserted that petitioner had failed to, produce any evidence that he was an employee and not an .independent contractor of Boyle,Energy.
onomic substance; 2) the assignment of income doctrine applies; or 3) the grantor trust provisions apply. We agree with respondent on the first theory. Burden of Proof Petitioners bear the burden of proof in these cases, and it has not shifted under section 7491(a). See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners did not cooperate during IRS examinations but obstructed them by refusing to produce certain documents or to answer questions. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). Petitio
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to a factual issue relevant to the liability of the taxpayer for tax if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue and establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary's reasona
However, section 7491(a) may in specific circumstances place the burden on the Commissioner with regard to any factual issue relating to the taxpayers' liability for tax if the taxpayers produce credible evidence with respect to that issue and meet the requirements found in section 7491(a)(2) .
However, section 7491(a) may in specific, circumstances place the burden on the Commissioner with regard to any factual issue relating to the taxpayer's liability for, tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to that issue and meets' the requirements found in section 7491(a)(2) .
Furthermore, section 6201(d), as pertinent here, provides that in any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item of income reported on an information return (such as a Form 1099 filed by a third party) and the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner
urden of proving error in the determi- nations in the notices for petitioner’s respective taxable years 1998 and 1999 that remain at issue, see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), unless that burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). The parties disagree over whether the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determinations in the respective notices shifts to respondent under that section.14 On the record before us, we find that 13Respondent showed in the
vely, and additions to tax under section SERVED MAR 1 2 2008 - 2 - 6651 (a)(1)' of $205,028 .25 and $592 .50, respectively, for 1997 and 1999 . After concessions,2 the issues for decision are : (1) Whether respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a) . We hold that respondent does not ; (2) whether petitioner Joseph Dunne was a shareholder of FRC International, Inc . (FRC), in 1997 and whether petitioners must pay income tax on FRC's income under section 1366 . We hold that Mr . Du
The burden of proof with respect to the deficiency respondent determined remains with petitioner because he has neither taken a position as to whether the burden should be shifted to respondent nor established that he has complied wit h the requirements of section 7491(a) . 4 3( . . .continued) that petitioner' s business was a sole
However, petitioners contend that section 7491(a) and Rule 142(a) are applicable with respect to the increases in the deficiencies pleaded in respondent’s answer.
However, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such [factual] issue" .
Petitioner has not claimed entitlement to a shift in the burden of proof under section 7491(a); she would in any event not be eligible for the benefits of that section in light of her failure to cooperate with reasonable requests of respondent for information and other matters respecting this case.
The Hunters have neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that they complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2). The Hunters therefore bear the burden of proof. Section 55 imposes, in addition to all other taxes imposed by subtitle A, an AMT on noncorporate taxpayers. The - 14 - determination of a noncorpo
However, a taxpayer can shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer satisfies the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) .10 Because the record does not support a finding that In Touch or its TMP maintained required records and substantiated the items claimed on its 2000 return, we conclude that petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of section 7491(a) .
Although petitioners claimed that section 7491(a) applies, they failed to introduce sufficient evidence to shift the burden to respondent .
rden of proof or the effect of a failure of proof . Rule 122(b) ; Borchers v. Commissioner, 95 T .C . 82, 91 (1990), affd . 943 F .2d 22 (8th Cir . 1991) . The parties disagree over whether the burden of proof in this case shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In order for the burden of proof to shift to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under that section, the taxpayer must (1) provide credi- ble evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to - 13 - determining the tax liabili
Section 7491(a) provides for the burden of proof on respondent if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertain her liability, has complied with substantiation requirements , has maintained all records required, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, mee
- 7 - Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner as to any issue upon which the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and which is relevant to the taxpayer's tax liability . However, for the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, the taxpayer must comply with the substantiation and record-keeping requirements of the Interna
Section 7491(a) provides for the burden of proof on respondent if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertain her liability, has complied with substantiation requirements, has maintained all records required, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meet
However , pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer' s tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such [factual] issue" .
However, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue”.
ensive . Mr . Kramer understood that Zane had a cattle breeding activity separate from the dairy operation . OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners, for the first time on brief, raise the issue of whether the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Under that section the burden of proof may shift to the - 28 - Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the taxpayer's liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such a factual is
ies disagree over whether the burden of proof in 'The record does not disclose the capacity in which or the method by which Mr . Eyler paid the $5,066 of premiums for Mr . Eyler's Wellmark health policy . - 6 - this case shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In order for the burden of proof to shift to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under that section, the taxpayer must (1) provide credi- ble evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant t o determining the tax liability of th
The Hunters have neither argued that section 7491(a) applies nor established that they complied with the requirements of section 7491 (a)(2) .
a minimal factual foundation."). If the Commissioner introduces some evidence that the taxpayer received unreported income, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the deficiency was arbitrary 3 Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters affecting liability for tax shifts to respondent under certain circumstances. Petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491(a) applies nor established his compliance with the requirements of sec.
ibits annexed thereto, are so found and made part hereof. Petitioners resided at Katy, Texas, at the time the petition was filed. Carlos H. Gonzalez (petitioner) is a senior petroleum engineer for Conoco, Inc. (Conoco), a major oil company in 2Under sec. 7491(a), where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not produced credible evidence with
Section 7491(a) imposes the burden of proof on respondent if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue and complies with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate all items at issue, maintain required records, and cooperate with reasonable requests of respondent . We find it unnecessary to d
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissïoner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). For the burden to shift, howev
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of 2We interpret the quoted language as requiring the taxpayer’s evidence pertaining to any factual issue to be evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue in favor of the taxpayer.
Although not raised by the parties, under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue will shift to respondent if petitioner ' s testimony with respect to the issue is credible .
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-443 (2001). To shift the burden, the taxpayer must also have complied with requirements to cooperate with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2). The taxpayer has the burden to prove the requirements have been met
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the present case.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of 3We interpret the quoted language as requiring the taxpayer’s evidence pertaining to any factual issue to be evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue in favor of the taxpayer.
7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Secretary with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the tax liability of the taxpayer if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and has (1) complied with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code to substantiate any item, and (2) maintained all records
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in this case.
nterview with Rod, as executor of the estate. Agent Puntenney's request was not satisfied. OPINION I. Burden of Proof The estate contends that the burden of proof with respect to the factual issues in this case has shifted to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a). We disagree. To be eligible for the burden-shifting benefits of section 7491(a), a taxpayer must show that the prerequisites set forth in section 7491(a)(2) have been satisfied. Allnutt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-239; Oatman v.
Generally, under section 7491(a)., the burden of proof.
7491(a) (1), with respect to audits commencing after July 22, 1998, the burden of proof shifts to respondent where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the tax liability. The burden of proof, however, does not shift where the taxpayer fails to comply with requirements for substant
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). For the burden to shift, howev
OPINION Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof on any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to such factual issue .
Burden of Proof Petitioners argue that, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof “has shifted to” respondent with respect to all of the factual issues.
However, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer has produced credible evidence - 5 - relating to the tax liability at issue, has met his substantiation requirements, maintained records, and cooperated with the Secretary’s reasonable requests for documents, witnesses, and meetings.2 In this case, petitioner bears the burden of proof because he did not: (1) substan
- 21 - Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner when the taxpayer has satisfied certain requirements. Section 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(1), 112
t to establish the amount of any deduction claimed . Sec . 6001 ; sec . 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs . It is petitioners' position that the burden of proof with respect to the claimed gambling loss deductions at issue has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . That is because, according to petitioners, they "introduced credible evidence that they suffered extensive gambling losses in 1999" .5 It is respon- dent's position that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent under sectio
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). For the burden to shift, howev
Accordingly, we find that the estate has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and we stand by our ruling at trial that respondent has the burden of proof.
We also decide this case after weighing the evidence, using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, not on the basis of the initial allocation of proof. - 6 - but include “the identification of services performed over a period of time and the approximate number of hours spent performing such services during such period, based
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner has failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(1) and (2), and therefore the burden of proof remains on him to prove that he is entitled to the deductions and credits claimed on his return and disallowed in the notice of deficiency.
, 112 Stat. 727, regarding - 10 - effective date. Section 7491 is applicable here in that examination of the estate tax return began after July 22, 1998. With respect to the deficiency determinations in dispute, the operative rules are contained in section 7491(a). The estate seems to make the assertion, for the first time on reply brief, that·the burden of proof as to factual issues shifts to respondent under the credible evidence proviso. The Court, however, concludes a shift is not appropriat
Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other information .
rty would be an undue burden on the Court. See Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 693, 705 (1985), affd. without published opinion 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986). - 15 - Petitioners bear the burden of proof in these cases, and it has not shifted under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not present credible evidence that the trusts had economic substance, and the credibility of the evidence that they did produce was undermined by their implausible claims. Petitioners did not cooperate with respondent’
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). On this record, petitioner has not wholly satisfied that requirement; therefore, the burden has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 4 - are required to maintain records sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine their correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Higbee
Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they have met the requirements of sec. 7491(a). H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. 105-174, at 45 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 581. Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies in this case. - 32 - 678 (5th Cir. 1964); DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858,
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances.
We hold that neither the Lenzens nor RAF has shown that section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
- 9 - Respondent satisfied his burden of production under section 7491(a)(1) because the record shows that petitioner substantially understated his income tax for 2000.
OPINION Burden of Proof Generally, under section 7491(a), the burden of proof relating to factual issues relevant to an individual’s tax liability may shift from the taxpayer to respondent where the taxpayer: (1) Has credible evidence to substantiate the item in question; (2) has maintained appropriate records relating - 14 - thereto; and (3) has cooperated with reasonable requests by re
7491(a) applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, and therefore applies to this case involving tax years 1999 and 2000. - 10 - petitioner has met the cooperation and substantiation requirements, but argues that petitioner has not met the credible evidence requirement. We disagree. Credible evidence means the quality of evidence t
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies in this case. - 12 - C. Whether Petitioner May Carry Forward a Capital Loss From 1997 to 1998 Petitioner contends that he may carry forward to 1998 a $15,547 capital loss from 1997. We disagree. Petitioner reported on his 1997 return that he had a $15,547 net operating loss carryo
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the case at bar.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the 2We interpret the quoted language as requiring the taxpayer’s evidence pertaining to any factual issue to be evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue in favor of the taxpayer.
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if, inter alia, the taxpayer has: (a) Complied with substantiation requirements under the Internal Revenue Code, sec. 7491(a)(2)(A); (b) maintained all records - 9 - requir
Obot audaciously argues that the burden of proof in this case should shift to the Commissioner. We disagree. Though neither the Code nor the regulations define "credible evidence", the legislative history helps us: Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon whi
ited States his or her home. Dawson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 264, 268 (1972). An alien who lives in the United States and has no definite intention as to his or her stay is a resident for purposes of the income tax. Id. at 268 n.3. 10(...continued) Sec. 7491(a). Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies. 11 In deciding petitioner’s residence for 1979, we consider the law then in effect. Sec. 7701(b) was enacted in 1984 effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1984. Deficit
Petitioners contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a) for all other issues as well.
Petitioners do not contend and have not established that section 7491(a) applies in this case.
OPINION Respondent acknowledges that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent, nor have they established they met the requirements of section 7491(a)(2).6 Therefore, the burden of proof remains with petitioners.
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to a factual.issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax shifts from the. taxpayer to the Commissioner if, inter alia, the taxpayer has: - 7 - (a) Complied with substantiation requirements under the Internal Revenue Code, sec. 7491(a)(2)(A); (b) maintained all records requi
ranteed payments because there was no proof that payment had been incurred or paid in 1996, or that, if payments had been incurred or paid, they were deductible as ordinary or necessary expenses pursuant to 7 Petitioner and Handler do not argue that sec. 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof to respondent. 12 section 162(a). Alternatively, respondent determined that each of the withdrawing partners received taxable guaranteed payments in accordance with the partnership return filed by W&R
petitioners’ claim that we lack jurisdiction with respect to any aspect of this case. Burden of Proof Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown entitlement to a shift in the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue pursuant to section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burdens of proof and production with respect to all issues in this case, except as provided in section 7491(c). See Rule 142(a). Judicial Officer Compensation Respondent determined that the amounts M
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) applies in this case. They did not substantiate their deductions, keep records of their income and expenses, or cooperate with respondent’s agents. Thus, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. - 6 - Respondent’s determinations are presumed correct, and petitioners bear the bu
Burden of Proof Petitioners contend that, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof has shifted to respondent with respect to all outstanding issues.
ited States his or her home. Dawson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 264, 268 (1972). An alien who lives in the United States and has no definite intention as to his or her stay is a resident for purposes of the income tax. Id. at 268 n.3. 10(...continued) Sec. 7491(a). Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies. 11 In deciding petitioner’s residence for 1979, we consider the law then in effect. Sec. 7701(b) was enacted in 1984 effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1984. Deficit
ave attempted to satisfy their burden of proof in this case through certain testimonial and documentary evi- dence. 18(...continued) losses. See supra note 3. 19See supra note 15. 20See supra note 15. 21The parties do not address the application of sec. 7491(a) in the instant case. In any event, on the record before us, we find that petitioners did not introduce credible evidence with respect to the factual issues presented. On that record, we further find that petitioners have failed to carry t
Section 7491(a), however, shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the tax liability of a taxpayer who meets certain preliminary conditions. Petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent, and he did not claim that section 7491(a) applies. Accordingly, section 7491(a) 2 Respondent disallowed $20,279 i
ed that the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent because the notice of deficiency failed to adequately describe the basis for the tax deficiency as required by sec. 7522(a). In response to an inquiry of the Court, respondent concedes that sec. 7491(a) applies in the present case because the examination of petitioner’s 1999 return began after July 22, 1998, the effective date of the statute. Respondent also concedes that petitioner has complied with the substantiation and cooperation r
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). For the burden to shift, howev
OPINION Although respondent must have commenced respondent’s exami- nation of petitioner’s return for the year at issue after July 22, 1998, the parties do not address section 7491(a).5 On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry its burden of establishing that it satisfied the applicable require- ments of section 7491(a)(2).
7, regarding effective date. Section 7491 is applicable here in that examination of petitioner’s 1996, 1997, and 1998 tax years began after July 22, 1998. With respect to the deficiency determinations in dispute, the operative rules are contained in section 7491(a). Petitioners make the assertion, apparently for the first time on opening brief, that the burden of proof as to factual issues shifts to respondent because “Petitioners have produced credible testimony and documents, most especially r
Petitioners do not contend and have not established that section 7491(a) applies in this case.
We hold that neither the Lenzens nor RAF has shown that section 7491(a) applies to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Section 7491(a) provides a taxpayer with the opportunity to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner under specific circumstances. To shift the burden of proof, a taxpayer must have complied with all the requirements in section 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001); E.J. - 13 - Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Me
However, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer has produced credible evidence relating to the tax liability at issue and has met his substantiation requirements, maintained required records, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable requests for documents, witnesses, and meetings.
Under certain circumstances, however, section 7491(a) -7- shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner provided the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests.
Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent, and petitioner bears the burden to 1°This burden may shift to the Commissioner to disprove entitlement to a claimed deduction if the taxpayer introduces "credible evidence" complete with the necessary substantiation and documentation sufficient to fulfill the sec.
any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. 1. Deficiency Determined in the Notice of Deficiency Petitioner did not appear at trial. We previously ruled that the burden of proof did not shift to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a). Petitioner bears the burden of proof for the deficiency determined in the notice of deficiency. See Rule 142(a). Petitioner failed to produce any evidence to rebut the deficiency determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency. A
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if, inter alia, the taxpayer has: (a) Complied with substantiation requirements under the Internal Revenue Code, sec. 7491(a)(2)(A); (b) maintained all records required by t
rocedures and that this Court lacked jurisdiction in their prior case before this .Court and in this case. Petitioners ask that we vacate the decision in their prior case and that we remand this case to respondent.¹ 1 Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies in this case and have not established that they met the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). - 6 - Respondent contends that petitioners are collaterally estopped from alleging irregularities in the assessment of their tax liabilities
In the present case, the burden of proof remains on petitioners because they have not established that they have complied with the requirements of section 7491(a). In any event, the disposition of this case does not depend upon the burden of proof. Petitioners assert that the Iranian revolutionary government expropriated the propertie
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). On this record, petitioners have not wholly satisfied that requirement; therefore, the burden has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 10 - passenger automobiles, cell phones, and other similar telecommunications equipment under section 280F(d)(4)(A), section 274(d) i
7491(a).5 Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) applies to this case. In addition, petitioner has not established that the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) have been satisfied. Consequently, we hold that petitioner has the burden of proof as to any disputed factual issue. See Rule 142(a). Although section 7491(c) does not alter th
er mother. Although Tymiesha’s grandmother occasionally brought her gifts, petitioner was 3 Generally, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. Rule 142(a)(1). The burden of proving facts relevant to the deficiency may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a) if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests. Prior to trial, petitioner
urden of production under section 7491(c) as to the additions to tax under section 6651(a) for failure to file for 1994, 1996, and 1997, and under section 6654 for failure to pay 5 Petitioners do not contend and have offered no evidence showing that sec. 7491(a) applies in this case. Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they have met the requirements of sec. 7491(a). H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. 105-174, at 45 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 581. - 7 - esti
calculations and a supplemental report prepared by P-H. Held: Ps are not required to use the actuarial method and may use the percentage method to determine the portions of the monthly service fees that are allocable to medical care. Held, further: Sec. 7491(a), I.R.C., places the burden of proof on R in certain situations. R concedes that Ps have satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2), I.R.C. Ps submitted credible evidence under sec. 7491(a)(1), I.R.C., with regard to the factual issue
h v. Helvering, supra at 115. This includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). In some cases, however, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of section 7491(a), section 7491 does not place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to the claimed deductions. Under section 7491(c), respondent has the burden of
entary evidence or other corroboration that he 3 We treat petitioner as bearing the burden of proof because the record does not show that the examination commenced after July 22, 1998, and petitioner does not contend and has offered no evidence that sec. 7491(a) applies in this case. 8 had purchased those items. Third, petitioner’s testimony lacked credibility in other areas, such as his testimony that he neither bought nor sold equipment or tools, which, as discussed above, was inconsistent wit
urden of proof on whether the 6-year period of limitations under sec. 6501(e)(1)(A) applies with respect to petitioners Thomas E. and Sara Anne Connell’s 1995 and 1996 returns. We conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a) with respect to the remaining issues. The record in this case establishes that the examinations of the 1995 and 1996 returns commenced before July 22, 1998, rendering sec. 7491 inapplicable to those years. See Internal Revenue Service Re
urden of proof on whether the 6-year period of limitations under sec. 6501(e)(1)(A) applies with respect to petitioners Thomas E. and Sara Anne Connell’s 1995 and 1996 returns. We conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a) with respect to the remaining issues. The record in this case establishes that the examinations of the 1995 and 1996 returns commenced before July 22, 1998, rendering sec. 7491 inapplicable to those years. See Internal Revenue Service Re
Respondent asserts, without reference to any particular, that petitioners have neither asserted nor established that section 7491(a) applies in -9- this case to place upon respondent the burden of proof as to the deficiency.
This rule, however, is subject to the provisions of section 7491(a), under which the burden of proof may, under certain circumstances, be shifted to the Commissioner.
With respect to the income adjustments at issue, petitioner has not met the prerequisites of section 7491(a)(2) for placing the burden on respondent.
However, as stated in Petitioners' post-trial brief, 26 USC §7491(a) provides that "[i]f, in any courtproceeding,ataxpayerintroducescredibleevidencewithrespecttoanyfactualissuerelevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposedby subtitle A or B, the Secretary shallhavetheburdenofproofwithrespectto suchissues." Forth
ke Cars in 1998. In the absence of any evidence directed toward business operations during the particular year in issue, the Court concludes that petitioners - 11 - have not made a prima facie case sufficient to shift the burden to respondent under section 7491(a). With respect to the delinquency addition to tax, the Commissioner satisfies the section 7491(c) burden of production by “[coming] forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty” but “
§ 7491(a) in the present case does not resolve the merits of the deficiency issues. On the record before us, we cannot determine whether the Commissioner has met his burden of proof. It is not sufficient to summarily conclude that the outcome is the same regardless of who bears the burden of proof; if that were the case, § 7491(a) would have no mea
Burden of Proof The Gouveias argue that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent with respect to all other issues.
With respect to section 7491(a), respondent maintains that petitioner has not introduced credible evidence under section 7491(a)(1) or complied with the applicable require- ments of section 7491(a)(2).
Burden of Proof: Section 7491(a) At the conclusion of the trial, petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the burden of proof shifting to respondent pursuant to section 7491(a).
7491(a) applies with respect to examinations that are commenced after July 22, 1998. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. The record does not disclose when the examinations commenced in this case; however, with respect to at least some of the tax years in issue, we assume that examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. - 7 - Section 7491 do
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner for cases in which the examination began after July 22, 1998, if, inter alia, the taxpayer has: (a) Complied with substantiation requirements - 11 - under the Internal Revenue Code, sec. 7491(
urden of proof on whether the 6-year period of limitations under sec. 6501(e)(1)(A) applies with respect to petitioners Thomas E. and Sara Anne Connell’s 1995 and 1996 returns. We conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a) with respect to the remaining issues. The record in this case establishes that the examinations of the 1995 and 1996 returns commenced before July 22, 1998, rendering sec. 7491 inapplicable to those years. See Internal Revenue Service Re
LKHP properties as follows: Property Value West Collins $1,285,000 Enterprise 1,093,787 North Main 975,000 University property 1,074,131 Manzanita 2,261 Crescent Bay 265,176 Railroad 115,711 Total $4,811,066 OPINION Burden of Proof Generally, under section 7491(a), in any court proceeding, if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue, the burden of proof is shifted to respondent.
Burden of Proof The Gouveias argue that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent with respect to all other issues.
urden of proof on whether the 6-year period of limitations under sec. 6501(e)(1)(A) applies with respect to petitioners Thomas E. and Sara Anne Connell’s 1995 and 1996 returns. We conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a) with respect to the remaining issues. The record in this case establishes that the examinations of the 1995 and 1996 returns commenced before July 22, 1998, rendering sec. 7491 inapplicable to those years. See Internal Revenue Service Re
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code. We found petitioner’s testimony to be evasive, vague,
OPINION Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). Respondent concedes that section 7491 is applicable to this case. Respondent argues that petitioners have neither introduced credible evidence, pursuant to section 7491(a)(1), nor satisfied the prer
bears a presumption of correctness, and the burden of proving that determination is incorrect rests with the taxpayer. See Rule 142(a). However, in certain circumstances, the burden of proof as to that determination shifts to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a). Petitioners do not argue that sec. 7491(a) applies, and the record does not disclose the date the examination commenced. 17Mr. Heebink prepared four reports for this case. He determined the fair market value of HII shares as of Nov. 11,
Section 7491(a) applies only if an individual taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains required records, and cooperates fully with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2). Credible evidence has been described as “‘the quality of evide
er statutory requirements for relief under sec. 6015(b), it is unnecessary to reach this issue, and we do not. 7 Effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, if certain requirements are met, sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(a), 112 Stat. 726. Petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491(a) applies nor established that the preconditions to its applicability have been met. Moreover, because s
With respect to section 7491(a), respondent maintains that petitioner has not introduced credible evidence under section 7491(a)(1) or complied with section 7491(a)(2) and that therefore the burden of proof with respect to respondent’s - 9 - deficiency determinations for the years at issue does not shift to respondent.
Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) applies to this case. - 9 - 111, 115 (1933). Failure to produce evidence, in support of an issue of fact as to which a party has the burden of proof and which has not been conceded by such party’s adversary, may be a ground for deciding the issue against that party. Rule 149(b). Furthermor
7491(a), in certain instances, places the burden of proof on respondent with respect to examination of returns commencing after July 22, 1998. The examination of petitioner's return may have commenced after July 22, 1998. However, for the burden to be placed on the Commissioner, the taxpayer must comply with the substantiation and record keepi
er statutory requirements for relief under sec. 6015(b), it is unnecessary to reach this issue, and we do not. 7 Effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, if certain requirements are met, sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(a), 112 Stat. 726. Petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491(a) applies nor established that the preconditions to its applicability have been met. Moreover, because s
With respect to section 7491(a), respondent maintains that petitioner has not complied with section 7491(a)(2)(B) and that therefore the burden of proof with respect to respondent’s deficiency determination for the year at issue does not shift to respondent.
spondent’s examination of petitioner’s taxable year 1993 began. Assuming arguendo that that examination began after July 22, 1998, we find that petitioner’s burden of proof relating to the deficiency determination does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). That is because petitioner has not complied with the substantiation and record-keeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Accordingly, assuming arguendo that respondent’s examination of the year at issue began after July 2
Pursuant to section 7491(a), if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax, the burden of proof is placed on the Commissioner with respect to that issue.
In certain circumstances, if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax, section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner.4 See sec.
We will define those - 20 - factual issues and apply section 7491(a) to each on the basis of the circumstances involved.
In addition, section 7491(a) requires that taxpayers cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for “witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews”.
We presume that respondent’s examination of those returns began after July 22, 1998, and that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
7491(a), which is titled “Burden Shifts Where Taxpayer Produces Credible Evidence”, was added to the Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726. Sec. 7491(a) applies with respect to examinations that are commenced after July 22, 1998. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(c), 11
7491(a), I.R.C.; Rule 142(a). Held, further, pursuant to sec. 104(a)(2), I.R.C., before its amendment by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA), Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1605, 110 Stat. 1838, the May 1996 payment is excludable from income for 1996. Held, further, pursuant to sec. 104(a)(2), I.R.C., as amended by the SBJPA, P is not
Section 7491(a), which applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues. The - 35 - examination in the instant case commenced after July 22, 1998; accordingly, we consider whether respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a). Section 7491(a)(1)
ade subject to the will and control of the taxpayer and can be, except for his own action or inaction, reduced to actual possession”. 5 While the examination commenced after July 22, 1998, petitioner does not meet the burden shifting requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 5 - Furstenberg v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 755, 791 (1984) (citing Loose v. United States, 74 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1934)). We hold that the distribution income was available to petitioner and, except for his own inaction while in alc
7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent in this case because petitioner has not presented credible evidence concerning the support of his sons and has failed to provide substantiation of his claims of payments for their support and benefit. Sec. 7491(a)(1). - 5 - At the calendar call, petitioner had been warned to have his wi
Court allowed him to do so. 4Respondent acknowledges that the examination of petition- ers’ taxable year 1996 began after July 22, 1998. With respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, under sec. 7491(a) the burden of proof shifts to respondent in specified circumstances. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. As detailed in respondent’s trial memorandum and
7491(a) provides that the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner in specified circumstances. Petitioners make no argument that sec. 7491 applies to this case. Accordingly, we conclude it does not. -7- expenses. Hartless Linen Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1026 (1959). Petitioners claimed charitable contribution deductions on their Sc
iefs in this case; Mr. Stoddard did not. However, our findings and conclusions herein shall apply to both Ms. Stoddard and Mr. Stoddard. 7With respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, under sec. 7491(a) the burden of proof shifts to respondent in specified circumstances. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. The record in this case does not establish the date on whic
to which such party has the burden of proof, and such decision shall be treated as a dismissal for purposes of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Rule. ¹ Because petitioner failed to introduce any credible evidence, he failed to meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining liability for the tax deficiency in issue. As to the addition to tax and accuracy-related penalty, we find that resp
7491(a), (c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other
7491(a), (c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other
ers to those entities. Generally, it is the burden of the taxpayer to establish his basis in the S corporation under section 1366(d).9 Estate of Bean v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 2001), affg. T.C. Memo. 9Petitioners do not argue that sec. 7491(a) applies, and it is otherwise unclear when the examination by respondent commenced. We find sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. - 18 - 2000-355; Parrish v. Commissioner, 168 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C. Memo. 1997-
Whether respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a) as to the items of income and deduction disallowed in the notice of deficiency.
7491(a), (c); rule 142(a). A. The Deficiencies As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, t
7491(a), (c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other
Section 7491(a) does not change the burden of proof where petitioner has failed to substantiate her deductions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient records to establish the amounts of the deductions. Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Because petit
The parties agree that, pursuant to section 7491(a), petitioners have introduced credible evidence, and respondent shall have the burden of proof, relating to the valuation issue.
OPINION As a preliminary matter, petitioner contends that, pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof should be on respondent.
685, 727, regarding effective date.] Although the record in this case does not reveal when the examination of petitioners’ 1996 return began, respondent asserts that the burden is not placed on him under section 7491(a) with respect to the income adjustments at issue and that respondent has met his burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to the penalties.
The parties agree that, pursuant to section 7491(a), petitioners have introduced credible evidence, and respondent shall have the burden of proof, relating to the valuation issue.
Accordingly, respondent, pursuant to section 7491(a), does not have the burden of proof as set forth below.
. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 685, 727 (providing that sec. 7491 is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commenced after July 22, 1998); sec. 7491(a), (c). A. The Deficiencies As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides t
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with regard to any fact issue will be placed on respondent if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, cooperated with respondent, and introduced during the court proceeding credible evidence with regard to the fact issue. The specific relevant language of secti
termina- tions in the notice are erroneous.19 See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). With respect to the deduc- 19With respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, under sec. 7491(a) the burden of proof shifts to respondent in specified circumstances. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. The record in this case does not establish the date on whic
Under section 7491(a), Congress provided that if a taxpayer presents credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with regard to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B. Because petitioners failed to appear and present credible evidence, t
. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 685, 727 (providing that sec. 7491 is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commenced after July 22, 1998); sec. 7491(a), (c). A. The Deficiencies As a general rule, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the Commissioner's deficiency determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a), however, provides t
Thermal does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) as to any issue.
Thody does not contend, nor does the evidence show, that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to any factual issue.
Petitioners have neither alleged nor established that they meet the requirements of section 7491(a) as necessary to shift the burden of proof to respondent on any factual issues.
Mr. Gyarmati does not contend that he has met the requirements for shifting the burden of proof, and the record does not indicate that he has. Thus, the burden of proof for all factual issues remains with Mr. Gyarmati. II. The Commissioner’s SFR We note at the outset that this case involves a challenge to the 2015 SFR prepared by
ears the burden of proving error in the determinations. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Mr. Pesarik does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Accordingly, Mr. Pesarik bears the burden of proof for the issues in dispute. B. Recordkeeping Taxpayers must maintain records adequate to substantiate their income, deductions, credits, and other tax attributes. See I.R.C. § 6001. T
Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Norwich does not contend that it has met the requirements for shifting the burden of proof, and the record 12 Norwich’s Petition in Docket No. 3639-19 did not assign error to (1) the increased 2014 installment sale gain, (2) the disallowed 2014 recourse reserve deduction related to that installment sale, or (3) the disallowed busi
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified condi- tions.
Petitioner has not claimed or shown that it meets the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
11 Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to certain factual issues relevant to a taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer meets certain conditions.
courts of appeals and section 7491(a)(1) and (2).
7 Section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain defined circumstances. Petitioner does not contend, nor does the record suggest, that it does so here. Therefore, the burden remains with petitioner. 5 [*5] 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). A taxpayer must substantiate deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate rec
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2). Additionally, the Commissioner has the burden of proof with respect to any “new matter” he raises. See Rule 142(a). When each party has satisfied its burden of production, then the party supported by the weight of the evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden of proof has real significance only in the event of an e
6 Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue of fact, nor has she established that she has met the requirements for shifting the burden of proof.
4 Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax if the taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442–43 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes tha
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified conditions.
Definition of Alimony Section 215(a) allows a deduction to the paying spouse for the alimony or separate maintenance payments made during the paying spouse’s tax year that are includible in the recipient spouse’s gross income under section 71(a).5 See § 215(b); see also 62(a)(10).
Paladino does not contend that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491, and there is no evidence in the record that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his or her liability and satisfies the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner with respect to that issue.
7 [*7] Petitioners contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) or (b) with respect to certain factual issues underlying the IRS’s determinations that Mr.
In cases of unreported income, “the Commissioner must establish a ‘minimal evidentiary showing’ connecting the taxpayer with the alleged income-producing activity,” Walquist v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 61, 67 (2019) (quoting Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1991-636), “or demonstrate that the
The Westons do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2). The Roots do not seek, and the record does not support, a shift in the burden of proof here. II. Net Operating Loss Carryover Deductions Section 172(a) allows as a deduction for a taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to that year and (2) the net operating loss carrybacks to the
Under section 7491(a), if a taxpayer provides credible evidence concerning a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner on the factual issue.16 The resolution of the issues presented in these cases does not turn on which party has the bur
§ 1.6001-1(a); see also Treas.
Although section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain defined circumstances, Mr.
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified conditions.
Hampton does not contend, nor does the record indicate, that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), which applies in certain cases when a taxpayer has introduced credible evidence with respect to a factual issue.
ficiency are presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden of showing the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove his or her entitlement to a deduction or credit. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (193
Under section 7491(a), if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper income tax liability, and if certain conditions are met, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner. See Rule 142(a)(2). Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 74
7 Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue of fact, nor has he established that he met the requirements for shifting the burden of proof.
Entries on the logs indicate that petitioner traveled 35 miles each way between petitioners’ residence and the rental property several days just about every week 3 Petitioners do not claim, and the record does not otherwise demonstrate, that the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not.
§ 1.6001- 1(a); see also I.R.C.
Petitioners have neither claimed, nor introduced credible evidence sufficient to show, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. See id. Therefore, the burden of proof remains with them. III. Theft loss Section 165(a) permits a deduction for losses sustained during the taxable year and not comp
Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof rests with the Commissioner. II. Cost of Goods Sold, Business Deductions, and Capitalization Because the Commissioner disallowed the exclusions of the Asset Purchase Agreement Payments at issue in these cases on the basis that they were not costs of goods sold, we briefly discuss
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2). When each party has satisfied its burden of production, then the party supported by the weight of the evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden of proof has real significance only in the event of an evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do not
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified condi- tions.
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified condi- tions.
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer provides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under 49 RMS is not
2 Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of section 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not.
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2).17 When each party has satisfied its burden of production, then the party supported by the weight of the evidence will prevail; and thus a shift in the burden of proof has real significance only in the event of an evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. 16 The P
the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Republic Plaza Props. P’ship v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 94, 104 (1996). Petitioner did not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Disguised Sale In general, partners may contribute capital to a partnership tax free and may receive a tax-free return of previously taxed profits through distributions to the extent that a distribution does not exceed adjusted b
As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayer to s
nt no further discussion here, and we sustain respondent’s determinations with respect to the deficiency in 3 Petitioner does not contend, nor has he demonstrated, that he is entitled to any shift in the burden of proof as to any factual issue under section 7491(a). 5 [*5] tax. See Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498 (2011). II. Section 6662(a) Accuracy-Related Penalty Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for an accuracy
er Mr. Tuma’s primary argument—that respondent incorrectly adjusted petitioners’ income on the basis of benefit amounts that were not reported in the information returns 8 Petitioners contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Petitioners, however, have failed to demonstrate that they meet the requirements for such a shift, and the burden of proof remains with them. See § 7491(a)(1) and (2); see also Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010) (“A taxp
§ 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). The Spiezios, therefore, bear the burden of proof. II. NOL Deduction A. General Requirements Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2).10 When each party has satisfied its burden of production, then the party supported by the weight of the evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden of proof has real significance only in the event of an evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do no
But that section applies only if the taxpayer (among other things) “introduces credible evidence” and “has maintained all records required under this title.” See § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B).
Unreported Income Gross income means “all income from whatever source derived.” § 61(a); see also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429– 31 (1955). The definition of gross income includes gross income derived from business. § 61(a)(2). Generally, under section 111 and the regulations thereunder, if State income tax wa
Petitioner does not contend, nor does the evidence estab- lish, that the burden shifts to respondent as to any issue of fact. III. Alimony Deduction A. Statutory Background Payments incident to divorce commonly fall into one of two cate- gories: alimony or property settlements. In general, alimony is a divi- sion of income, and a prop
In certain circumstances section 7491(a) may shift to the Commissioner the burden of proof on factual issues, but Mr.
§ 7491(a); Estate of Turner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2011-209, supplemented by 151 T.C. 160 (2018); Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. Nevertheless, we do not perceive an evidentiary tie in this case and need not determine whether petitioners have s
Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Petitioners have neither claimed, nor introduced credible evidence sufficient to show, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue. Therefore, petitioners generally bear the burden of proof. II. Unreported Income “[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived,”
See §§ 11, 831(a); see also Syzygy, 117 T.C.M.
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). A taxpayer bears the burden to prove that she is entitled to the deductions claimed on her return. See id. A taxpayer must substantiate deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate records to enable the Commissioner to determi
a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence 2 Respondent concedes the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty. 3 does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). In cases involving unreported income, the Commissioner must establish an evidentiary foundation connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing activity or demonstrate that the taxpayer actually received income. Walquist v. Commissi
Ottuso does not contend, nor does the evidence show, that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to any factual issue.
This burden requires the taxpayer 3 Petitioners do not claim, and the record does not otherwise demonstrate, that the provisions of section 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) so as to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Schedule C deductions A. Applicable law Deductions are a m
12 Petitioner has not argued or otherwise established that the burden shifting provision of section 7491(a)(1) applies.
claimed $3,360 in total for phone expenses, the Commissioner disallowed the remaining $2,352. 6 Ms. Chappell does not contend, and the record does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner as to any factual issue under section 7491(a). 6 Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 544. The Court may not use the Cohan rule to estimate expenses covered by the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d), which apply to most transportation expenses. Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T
iency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of showing the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not allege that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). For the presumption of correctness to apply in cases concerning unreported income, the Commissioner must provide some reasonable foundation connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing activity. Pittman v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d
Likewise, the Commissioner’s determination does not receive a presumption of correctness if the determination is shown to be arbitrary and capricious. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935); 9 [*9] Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959), remanding T.C. Memo. 1957-172. At trial and in a Motion filed February 22,
mmissioner the burden of proof with respect to a factual issue relevant in ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability. But that section applies only if the taxpayer (among other things) “introduces credible evidence with respect to [that] factual issue.” § 7491(a)(1). Pe- titioners have adduced no credible evidence substantiating their 2 The report explained that “[a]ll of the questioned and known signatures [of Mr. Diaz] contain stylization, where features of individual characters are not discern- i
iciency are presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden of showing the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove his or her entitlement to a deduction. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). A taxpa
section 7491 may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. But that section applies only if the taxpayer (among other things) “introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the [taxpayer’s] liability.” § 7491(a)(1). The question presented—whether petitioner wife is treated as having received Social Security benefits that were offset by 4 The IRS also selected petitioners’ 2018 return for examination, and it timely issued them, on August 9, 2021, a s
Under section 7491(a), if a taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and meets other requirements, the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to that factual issue. The Giambrones do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of
2 Petitioners do not claim, and the record does not otherwise demonstrate, that the provisions of section 7491(a) apply here, and we proceed as though they do not.
3 Petitioners claimed a moving expense deduction of $13,800 on their Schedule 1, but no testimony or other evidence was presented to support the expense. We deem this issue abandoned and conceded by petitioners, and we do not address it further. 4 Because Mr. Lucas did not sign the Stipulation, and he otherwise disputes the Court’s grant
84 (1992). Carrying that burden requires the taxpayer to “substantiate the nature, amount, and purpose of a claimed deduction.” Sezonov v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-40, at *4. In limited situations, the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The record does not support shifting the burden to the Commissioner. Mr. Simpson did not establish his entitlement to any deductions for 2013 beyond those allowed in the Commissioner’s First Amended Answer to Second Amended Petition.
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer provides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. The Wrights do not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a
Section 7491 provides that the burden of proof on a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer satisfies specified condi- tions.
Section 41(a)(1) provides that the research credit is equal to 20% of the excess of the taxpayer’s qualified research expenses (QREs) over the base amount.17 QREs are limited to the amounts “paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.”18 §§ 41(b)(1), 7701(a)(25).
med correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a)(1). I. Schedule C Deductions As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Com
lbeit the bulk of it as nontaxable distributions. Thus, respondent has satisfied the presumption of correctness of his determinations. In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift back to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). However, petitioner has not argued nor shown that she meets the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Taxability of Retirement Distributions Section 61 broadly defines gross inc
In his posttrial Opening Brief petitioner argued that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) with respect to substantiating the existence of the NOL.
The Estate does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
See § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B). Peti- tioner does not contend that he met these requirements. 4 [*4] C. Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” In cases involving unreported income, the Commissioner must establish an evidentiary foundation connecting the taxpayer to the income-producing act
§ 7491(a)(1) and (2). When each party has satisfied its burden of production, then the party supported by the weight of the evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden of proof has real significance only in the event of an evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do not
4 [*4] respondent under section 7491(a), nor has she established that the requirements for shifting the burden of proof have been met.
4 Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to certain factual issues relevant to a taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer meets certain conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440–43 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he es
s whether those payments are taxable to the Gerhardts. As to the annuity payments, the Gerhardts have not alleged, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof as to any factual issues before us has shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden remains with the Gerhardts to prove the Commissioner’s determinations are erroneous. H. Application to the Gerhardts As we have already discussed, distributions from a CRAT typically are taxable in the hands o
3 Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to certain factual issues relevant to a taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer meets certain conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440–43 (2001). Petitioner did not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he est
tion 24(e) provided: “No credit shall be allowed under this section to a taxpayer with respect to any qualifying child unless the 12 Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof with respect to factual issues should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). 8 [*8] taxpayer includes the name and taxpayer identification number of such qualifying child on the return of tax for the taxable year.” Because petitioner’s original returns did not include taxpayer identification numbers for his c
. 435, 440 (1934). Because respondent determined that petitioner did not engage in the Ovium activity for profit, petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. For-Profit Business Section 162 generally allows deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business. 7 [*7] An activity must be conducted with continuity and regularity and with th
As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayer to s
However, in certain circumstances, if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner.
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
II. Gross Receipts “[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .” I.R.C. § 61(a); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–31 (1955). Taxpayers must maintain books and records sufficient to establish their income and expenses. I.R.C. § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001- 1(a). If they fail to do so, th
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden to the Commissioner, however, with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability where the taxpayer, inter alia, provides credible evidence. “Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue if no
803, 813 (1968) (“Where a debtor is relieved of his obligation to repay the loan, his net worth is increased over what it would have been if the original transaction had 5 Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden of proof as to any matter should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden of proof under that section have been met.
Petitioners have neither alleged nor established that they meet the requirements of section 7491(a) as necessary to shift the burden of proof to respondent on any factual issues.
shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.” Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioner has not presented credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue under section 7491(a). We now turn to the burden of production. Petitioner argues that respondent must produce evidence that the APTC payments were made on his behalf. Respondent disagrees and contends that nothing in the Code places the burden on him to p
We also note that petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden of proof as to any matter should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden of proof under that section have been met.
Governing Legal Principles Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). A taxpayer must substantiate deductions claimed by keeping and producing adeq
While the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if certain conditions are met, Ms.
The 2 Petitioner does not claim, and the record does not otherwise demonstrate, that the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not.
iciency are presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden of showing the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner did not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove his or her entitlement to a deduction. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). A taxpa
Although section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain defined circumstances, Mr.
Deductions for expenses attributable to travel (“including meals and lodging while away from home”), entertainment, gifts, and the use 4 Petitioner does not claim, and the record does not otherwise demonstrate, that the provisions of section 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not.
Petitioners have neither claimed, nor introduced credible evidence sufficient to show, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue.
See § 7491(a)(1) and (2). Petitioners have not sought to shift the burden with respect to any factual issue. Gross income means “all income from whatever source derived,” including “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” § 61(a)(3). In general, a taxpayer must realize and recognize gains on a sale or other disposition of appreciated property. See
The Villas do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
4 The burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a), but petitioners do not allege, nor does the evidence suggest, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
But that section applies only if the taxpayer (among other things) “introduces credible evidence” and “has maintained all records required under this title.” 8 [*8] § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B).
See, e.g., § 7491(a) (providing that the burden of proof in a gift tax setting such as here may shift to the Commissioner as to discrete factual issues if certain conditions are met); Helvering v.
med correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a)(1). II. Whether petitioners are entitled to the cost of goods sold shown on the Schedule C No. Little else really need be said on the point. Petitioners did not suggest, much less establish, that they may reduce the gross receipts show
84 (1992). Carrying that burden requires the taxpayer to “substantiate the nature, amount, and purpose of a claimed deduction.” Sezonov v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-40, at *4. In limited situations, the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The record does not support shifting the burden to the Commissioner. The Commissioner reconstructed Mr. Di Giorgio’s income using the bank deposits method. Taxpayers must maintain books and records sufficient to establish their incom
r cu- riam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does 9 [*9] not establish, that the burden of proof as to any issue of fact shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Governing Legal Principles Section 170(a)(1) allows as a deduction any charitable contribu- tion made within the taxable year. If the taxpayer makes a charitable contribution of property other than money, the amount of the contrib
II. Unreported Income “[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived,” including compensation for services such as wages and salaries, gross income derived from business, and dividends, among others. I.R.C. § 61(a); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–31 (1955); see Durland v. Commissioner, T.C. Me
Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
See § 7491(a)(1), (2)(B). Peti- tioner does not meet these requirements. III. Gross Income “[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived,” including capital gains and dividends. § 61(a)(3), (7). Gross income like- wise includes distributions from a qualified retirement plan. See §§ 61, 72(a)(1), 408(d)(1). Such distributions are taxable
Although section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioner makes no argument that those conditions were met in the present case.
Additionally, the Commissioner always bears the initial burden of production with respect to any asserted penalty against an individual. I.R.C. § 7491(c). Accordingly, the Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is at least prima facie appropriate to impose the penalty. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438,
The taxpayer generally bears the burden of proof (and therefore must prove the relevant facts by the preponderance of the evidence), except when the conditions of section 7491(a) are satisfied.
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayers comply with all substantiation requirements in the Internal Revenue Code, introduce credible evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining their liability, and cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for information, documents, and
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to respondent if petitioner produces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491. In any event only legal issues remain, so the burden of proof is irrelevant
- 19 - [*19] The burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a) but the evidence here does not establish that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
4 Petitioner does not claim, and the record does not show, that the provisions of section 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not.
Petitioners have not shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) have been met as required to shift the burden of proof to respondent.5 As a result, the burden remains on petitioners to prove that respondent’s determinations are in error with respect to all issues.
Petitioners argue that the burden of proof has shifted to the Commissioner because they have met the requirement of section 7491(a)(1) to “introduce[] credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer”.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer establishes that he or she complied with the requirements of section 7491(a) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests.
Legal Background A. Business Expense Deduction This case centers on deductions of unreimbursed employee business expenses claimed by the Harwoods on their 2015–17 federal income tax returns. As a general matter, section 162(a) allows the deduction of “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Mr. Williams does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). He thus bears the burden of proof with regard to the deficiency. To the extent Mr. Williams challenges the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1), the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to that addition to tax.
Dependency exemption deduction Section 151(a) and (c) allows a taxpayer a deduction for each individual who is a dependent of the taxpayer as defined in section 152.
In certain circumstances, if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to respondent.
Petitioner does not contend that she has satisfied the requirements of section 7491 for shifting the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains on her on all factual issues. II. Petitioner’s Unreimbursed Business Expense Deductions A taxpayer may deduct unreimbursed employee expenses as ordinary and nec
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed nor shown that they have met the specifications of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must
In certain circumstances, if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner.
Trusts are not ‘I’, and so 3 Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to certain factual issues relevant to a taxpayer’s tax liability if the taxpayer meets certain conditions.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer establishes that 21 he or she complied with the requirements of section 7491(a) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests.
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have neither shown nor claimed that the burden of proof should shift to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Accordingly, the burden of proof remains with petitioners. II. Section 280E Generally, section 162(a) allows a
An employee business expense is not “ordinary and necessary” if the employee is entitled to reimbursement from his or her employer but fails to seek 4 Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not.
17 [*17] 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively, which he does not dispute. Mr. Clemons also received bank deposits in excess of his reported income in 2007 through 2009. The Commissioner characterized the deposits as gross receipts from Mr. Clemons’s Schedule C businesses: $5,076, $66,328, and $43,544 for 2007, 2008, and 2009,
Petitioner made an oral motion at trial to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a), paragraph (1) of which provides in pertinent part that if “a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for [the federal income tax], the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.”5 Paragraph (2)(B) further provides that t
Whether an 9 Section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain defined circumstances.
Petitioner has not introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue in dispute.
3 Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not.
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” In cases of unreported income, the Commis- sioner must establish an evidentiary foundation connecting the tax- payer to the income-producing activity, Weimerskirch v.
deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 4 Petitioner contends, without elaboration, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Because we have concluded that petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence to substantiate the items in dispute, the burden of proof is not shifted to respondent under section 7491. 7 Under section 162(a), a deduction is allowed
Petitioner has not introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue in dispute.
111, 115 (1933).3 3 Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not.
71, 78 3 The burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a), but petitioner does not allege, nor does the evidence suggest, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
12Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue of fact, nor have they established that they met the requirements for shifting the burden of proof.
Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not suggest any basis for a shift.
Section 217(a) allows as a deduction “moving expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an employee or as a self-employed individual at a new principal place of work.” Section 217(b) generally defines the term “moving expenses” as the reasonable expenses of moving h
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
come cases such as this, the Commissioner must establish “some evidentiary foundation” connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing (continued...) - 5 - [*5] must present credible evidence to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners failed to do so. At trial petitioner husband sought to have a 2011 deposit of $710,000 for account number 8023 treated as nontaxable. Respondent’s counsel identified this deposit in the list of deposits already accounted f
Under section 7491(a)(1), “[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.” See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). P
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, see Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 313 (2004), and section 212(1), which, in general, allows a 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 7 - deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income. An expense is deductible under section 1
ule C Income Burden of Proof In general, the Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving otherwise.7 In limited situations, the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Mr. Clark does not argue that the Commissioner should bear the burden, and we find the facts do not warrant such a shift. Accordingly, Mr. Clark bears the burden of proof. In cases involving unreported income, the Commissioner must c
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he meets the specifications of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must
Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived unless otherwise excluded by the Code.
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he has introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of - 7 - [*7] proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue.
Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant issue of fact, nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden of proof have been met.
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
ect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability and satisfies certain other requirements. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner has neither alleged nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a); therefore, the burden of proof remains on petitioner. - 4 - [*4] SEC. 72(t). 10-Percent Additional Tax on Early Distributions from Qualified Retirement Plans.-- (1) Imposition of additional tax.--If any taxpayer receives any amount from
ule 142(a). Here, all of the material allegations set forth in the petitions in support of the assignments of error have been denied in respondent’s answers. Petitioners have not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden of proof under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, the burden of proof generally rests with petitioners concerning any error in the deficiency determinations. As we have noted, Mr. Kramer agreed to the deficiencies determined for 2004 and 2005. Se
burden of proving that the Commissioner’s determinations are erroneous.4 Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner has not contended and the record does not show that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioner therefore bears the burden of showing that the settlement proceeds represent what she claims. See Milenbach v. Commissioner, 318 F.3d 924, 933 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’g on
Petitioner does not argue and the record does not show that he has introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue.
The Warques do not contend, nor does the evidence establish, that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
ee Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 - 11 - [*11] T.C. 438, 441-442 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they have presented credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue under section 7491(a). During these proceedings petitioners either raised new deductions or recharacterized the amounts and the nature of the expenses for which they claimed deductions. Even though the newly alleged deductions were not directly addressed in
7491(a)(1) and (2). Petitioners do not contend that they have satisfied the requirements of section 7491 for shifting the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a)(2). Thus, the burden of proof for all factual issues remains with petitioners. B. Petitioners’ Substantiation Petitioners contend that they are entitled to deduct various expenses reported o
Heston does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
ed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).5 5Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 7 - Schedule A Deductions As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to
Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not suggest any basis for a shift.
7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax if the taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the (continued...) - 6 - Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 11
But petitioners introduced little (if any) “credible evidence,” and they did not “maintain[] all records required” by the Code. See sec. 7491(a)(1), (2)(B). They thus bear the burden of proof on all issues.4 II. Petitioners’ Entitlement to Deductions and Credits A. Governing Legal Principles For 2010-2014 petitioners claimed substanti
Under section 7491(a)(1), “[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.” See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). P
Filler does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not suggest any basis for a shift.
to establish the amount of the deduction, the Court may sometimes estimate the amount allowable as a deduction. Cohan v. 4Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). -6- Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). There must be sufficient evidence in the record, however, to permit the Court to conclude that a deductible expense was paid or
Petitioner does not contend that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491 for shifting the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains on him on all factual issues. II. Analysis Section 170 allows as a deduction any contribution made within the taxable year to a charitable organization. Sec. 170
Although section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain defined circumstances, Ms.
Petitioners have not introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue.
OPINION The main issue for decision is whether petitioners’ horse activity during 2010-2013 was not engaged in for profit within the meaning of section 183.
Geiman does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a)(1) as to any issue of fact.
, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayer to substantiate expenses underlying deductions 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine the taxpayer’s correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T
7491(a); Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). For the presumption of correctness to attach to the notice of deficiency in unreported income cases, however, the Commissioner must establish some evidentiary foundation connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing activity or demonstrating that the taxpayer actually rece
to an exclusion from gross income. See Simpson v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. 331, 338-339 (2013), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 241 (9th Cir. 2016). Ms. Blum has not contended and the record does not show that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). In any event, the burden of proof does not affect our analysis -7- [*7] because the parties have agreed on all relevant facts. See, e.g., Nis Family Tr. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 538 (2000). II. Analysis A. Legal Background Gros
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.
deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 8 - incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connec
Under section 7491(a) the burden of proof on factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer satisfies certain requirements. 4 In his posttrial brief respondent urged that Eric cannot deduct horse-related losses in any event because he did not “materially participate” in Bluestone. See sec. 469. But the notice of deficiency issued to Eric
Section 7491 has no application to a case such as this, which involves petitioner’s liability for an excise tax determined under subtitle D. See Paschall v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 8, 17 (2011); Repetto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-168, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1895, 1900. Petitioner thus bears the burden of proving that respondent’s de
s rub off. OPINION Burden of Proof Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct and taxpayers bear the burden of proving otherwise.4 In limited situations, the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Mr. Max does not argue that the Commissioner should bear the burden, and we find the facts do not warrant such a shift. Accordingly, Mr. Max bears the burden of proof. 4Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). - 27
n v. United States, 329 F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2003); Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1962) (“Transactions between persons in a close family group, whether or not involving partnership interests, 10(...continued) met the requirements of sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. -19- [*19] afford much opportunity for deception and should be subject to close scrutiny.” (quoting H.R. Rept. No. 82-586, at 33 (1951), 1951-2 C.B. 357, 381));
siness expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business. Sec. 162(a). In general a taxpayer may not deduct expenses associated with activities not engaged in for profit, such as activities carried on primarily as a sport or hobby or for 3Sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if the taxpayers establish that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commiss
ct to such issue." See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they have presented credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue under section 7491(a). - 12 - [*12] In cases involving failure to report income, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which any appeal in these cases would ordinarily lie, see sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) and (B), has held that the Commissioner must in
ncome for the years at issue regardless ofwhich party bears the burden ofproof. Accordingly, we will deny petitioner's motion to shift the burden ofproof. Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a) have been met. - 24 - [*24] The record shows, and we have found, that petitioner founded Number One Foundations and that since its founding an
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. At trial petitioners orally moved to shift the burden of proof. We resolve these cases on the basis ofa preponderance ofthe evidence in the record. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340; Sch
gislative grace, and the burden ofshowing entitlement to a claimed deduction is on the taxpayer. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). 2Petitioners have not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 4 - [*4] Taxpayers may claim deductions for certain business and investment expenses under sections 162 and 212. However, any deduction for a "passive activity loss" for a taxable year is disallowed, and the disallowed loss is carried
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Richmond has neither shown nor claimed that it meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Accordingly, the burden of proofremains with Richmond. II. Deductions Deduction
er, respondent asserted an increased deficiency of $2,824,102 for tax year 2007; respondent bears the burden ofproofas to the $240,728 increase. See Rule 142(a). ¹#The burden ofproofas to persuasion generally does not shift unless the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) are met. See Rule 142(a)(2). - 27 - [*27] Generally, gross income means all income from whatever source derived. Sec. 61(a). When a taxpayerreports his income under the cash basis method of accounting, the taxpayer must report income for
Petitioner makes briefreferences to section 7491(a) and urges that she "has introduced credible evidence before this Court with respect to a theft loss deduc- tion." But she has not pleaded or argued that she satisfied all ofthe requirements set forth in section 7491(a)(2) as conditions for shifting the burden ofproof.
Petitioner does not contend, nor does the evidence establish, that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue in this case. C. Whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction because his FERS annuity benefits were reduced by his receipt ofSSDI Petitioner contends that the reduction ofhis FERS annuity was a los
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Commissioner shall have the burden ofproofwith respect to that issue.
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. I. Foreign Earned Income Exclusion We first address respondent's determina
Petitioners allege that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) because they introduced "credible evidence, in the form ofreceipts, that clearly documents all expenses, with respect to the issues in this case", "substantiated all items with respect to all such expenses", and "kept all meetings with Respondent[] and fully Cooperated with production and examination ofDocument[s] and other request[
r fiscal years 2011 and 2012. According to the Linds and Reliable, these amounts constitute either COGS or deductible trade or business expenses 7The Linds and Reliable do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 11 - under section 162. Respondent contends that the Linds and Reliable have not substantiated these expenses. Section 162 allows a taxpayerto deduct all ordinary and necessar
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. At trial petitioners orally moved to shift the burden of proof. We resolve these cases on the basis ofa preponderance ofthe evidence in the record. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340; Sch
espect to such issue." Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they have presented credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue under section 7491(a). The Commissioner may bear the burden ofproofwith respect to "[a] new theory that is presented [by him] to sustain a deficiency". Wayne Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 500, 507 (1989); see also Rule 142(a)(1) (stating that the
When each party has satisfied its burden ofproduction, then the party supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden ofproofhas real significance only in the event ofan evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do not perceive a
The Abregos do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
r fiscal years 2011 and 2012. According to the Linds and Reliable, these amounts constitute either COGS or deductible trade or business expenses 7The Linds and Reliable do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 11 - under section 162. Respondent contends that the Linds and Reliable have not substantiated these expenses. Section 162 allows a taxpayerto deduct all ordinary and necessar
Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived." Section 408(d)(1) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out ofan individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee." Section 408(d) provides several exceptions to this rule--e.g., for rollover contributions, transfers incident to divorce, and distributions for charitable purposes.
When each party has satisfied its burden ofproduction, then the party supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden ofproofhas real significance only in the event ofan evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do not perceive a
dequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine the taxpayer's correct liability.¹² Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001). ¹²Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a) as to any relevant issue offact, nor have they established that they met the requirements for shifting the burden ofproof. - 22 - [*22] The Commissioner bears the burden ofproduction with respect to accuracy- related penalties under sect
to the alimony paid during the taxable year to the extent it is includible in the recipient spouse's gross income under section 71(a). Whether a payment 5 Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). - 6 - [*6] constitutes alimony is determined by reference to section 71(b)(1), which defines "alimony" as any cash payme
ces. Id. During the audit for the years at issue RA Johnson determined that petitioners had additional wage income from Wilshire totaling $44,524, $47,535, "Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), nor have they established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met. Accordingly, the burden ofproof remams on petitioners. - 19 - [*19] and $107,768 for 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. She used the specific
ny claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 8 - [*8] burden requires the taxpayerto substantiate expenses underlying deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
- 7 - Brzyski does not contend, nor does the evidence establish, that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
s, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course ofhis trade or business; or (C) in the case ofa separate structure which is not 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. S_e_e Flying Hawk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-139. Ifthe taxpayer's residence serves as
Some dollar amounts and the acreage ofland parcels are rounded. 2Petitioner contends that it has produced credible evidence regarding the deductibility and the value ofthe easement contribution and the burden ofproof has shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a)(1). We decide the issues here on the basis ofthe record and the preponderance ofthe evidence and find the sec. 7491 issue moot. - 3 - [*3] (3) for negligence or disregard ofrules or regulations, a substantial understatement ofincome tax,
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
he distribution to another IRA or other retirement account. Because the stipulations establish that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of 2Petitioner has neither alleged nor proven that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 4 - [*4] paragraphs (1) and (3) ofsection 408(d), petitioner has not proven that the distribution was not taxable. Accordingly, we conclude that the entire distribution is includible in gross income. II. Additional Tax Section 72(t)(1
Under section 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden ofproofwith respect to such issue." See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Peti
deduction is generally allowable for "qualified residence interest", which includes "acquisition indebtedness" with respect to any qualified residence 3Petitioner does not contend and the record does not establish that he has met the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. -7- [*7] ofthe taxpayer. Sec. 163(h)(2)(D), (3)(A)(i). Acquisition indebtedness is defined as debt that is used to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a
or gift to or for the use of" a charitable organization. Sec. 170(c). Such a deduction is allowable "only ifverified under regulations prescribed by the ¹³By motion petitioners contended that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Under sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2), ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his Federal income tax liability and meets certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the
However, under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer complies with all substantiation requirements in the Internal Revenue Code, introduces credible evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining their liability, and cooperates with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for information, - 14 - [*14] d
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
The Simpsons do not argue for, and the record does not support, shifting the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a), and theybear the burden of proofon those issues.
When each party has satisfied its burden ofproduction, then the party supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail, and thus a shift in the burden ofproofhas real significance only in the event ofan evidentiary tie. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. We do not perceive a
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have neither shown nor claimed that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Accordingly, the burden of proofremains with petitioners. Generally, an S
Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived unless otherwise excluded by the Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners have not claimed and the record does not establish that the conditions ofsection 7491(a) have been met to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any factual issue.
Social Security Benefits Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived".
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Petitioners do not contend that they have satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) for shifting the burden ofproof.
relates has been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aB, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. 4Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 5 - Mortgage Interest Section 163(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." This general rule is si
That's Kurdziel, so we find for the Commissioner on these disputed amounts. Tax-preparationfees: A taxpayermay deduct the cost ofpreparing his tax returns. See sec. 1.212-1(1), Income Tax Regs. Kurdziel claimed this expense was $800 on Schedule A ofhis 2010 return. Kurdziel said at trial that his proofwould be in evidence, but all we
In order to shift the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a), taxpayers must, among other things, introduce credible evidence as to any factual issue and must have maintained required records.
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. At trial on December 13, 2017, petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. On April 6
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). The record establishes, and - 4 - [*4] petitioner concedes, that he received withdrawals from retirement accounts he held at Fidelity and Merrill Lynch, and he does not dispute the amounts reported on the Forms 1099-R. He also does not dispute respondent's determination as to the Fidelity withdrawal. Rather, he disput
That's Kurdziel, so we find for the Commissioner on these disputed amounts. Tax-preparationfees: A taxpayermay deduct the cost ofpreparing his tax returns. See sec. 1.212-1(1), Income Tax Regs. Kurdziel claimed this expense was $800 on Schedule A ofhis 2010 return. Kurdziel said at trial that his proofwould be in evidence, but all we
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. At trial on December 13, 2017, petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. On April 6
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that she has met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove his
tantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or 4As best we can determine, there was no valid S election made for WTA until 2015. 5Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 9 - incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connec
Respondent's Motion To Strike Rule 52 provides that the Court can strike from any brief"any insufficient claim or defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, frivolous, or scandalous matter." Respondent requests that we strike from petitioners' 6 We address each ofpetitioners' and respondent's motions to reopen the record with respect to our
Section 911(a)(1) provides that, "[a]t the election ofa qualified individual * * * , there shall be excluded from the gross income ofsuch individual * * * for any taxable year * * * the foreign earned income ofsuch individual," subject to - 6 - limitations set forth in subsection (b)(2).
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not satisfied the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. 6 Petitioners amended their 2009 tax return at least twice before 2012. The amendments made in t
However, section 7491(a) imposes the burden ofproofon the IRS as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifcertain conditions are met.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Expense Deductions Generally, an S corporation shareholder determine
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden - 30 - [*30] ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that it meets the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any factual issue. II. Section 183 Generally, section 162 allows a taxpayerto deduct ordinary
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. At trial on December 13, 2017, petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. On April 6
ction with operating a trade or business. Sec. 162(a); Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 313 (2004). Generally, the performance ofservices as an employee 4Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 10 - constitutes a trade or business. Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970). To be ordinary the expense must be ofa common or frequent occurrence in the type ofbusi
pondent, petitioners are not entitled to any deduction greater than the amounts already allowed because they failed to substantiate the claimed deductions. 2Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. -9- Section 170 allows deductions for contributions made during a taxable year to qualifying organizations. Cash contributions must be substantiated by: (1) canceled checks or (
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
roofwith respect to the section 183 issue. - 21 - [*21] As for respondent's determinations set forth in the notice ofdeficiency, petitioners suggest (only in passing in their answering brief) that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his Federal income tax liability and meets certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpa
7491(a)(1) and (2). Because we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. M Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188-189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. Petitioners testified that their plan required Mr. Jain to physically move to Durban, South Africa, as opposed to conductin
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not satisfied the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. 6 Petitioners amended their 2009 tax return at least twice before 2012. The amendments made in t
Respondent's Motion To Strike Rule 52 provides that the Court can strike from any brief"any insufficient claim or defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, frivolous, or scandalous matter." Respondent requests that we strike from petitioners' 6 We address each ofpetitioners' and respondent's motions to reopen the record with respect to our
must be consumed in the earliest year for which there is income available to be offset by the loss. See sec. 172(b)(2). Any excess NOL that is not consumed in one year is 2Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - carried to the next earliest year. R An NOL generally must first be carried back 2 years and then carried forward 20 years. See sec. 172(b)(1)(A). A taxpayerwho makes an electio
440 (1934). This includes the burden ofsubstantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). 3Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 5 - I. Dependency Exemption Deduction For 2015 a taxpayerwas allowed a deduction for "each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152) ofthe taxpayer for the tax
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a); had he advanced this contention, it would lack merit.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. The resolution ofthis issue does not depend on which party 5 Mr. Meggs mistakenly reported a greater amount oflong-term capital gains for 2006 on his Form 1040X than was correct because he based his calculations on an incorrect origination d
42(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The estate asserts that it provided complete and conclusive documentation and credible testimony ofa correct valuation ofthe interests in SJTC and SSC sufficient to shift the burden ofproof under section 7491(a). Under section 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secr
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. At trial on December 13, 2017, petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. On April 6
ned all records required by the Internal Revenue Code, and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for information, documents, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2). A taxpayerbears the burden ofproving that he or she has met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). See H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 105-599, at 239 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. No. 105-174, at 45 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 581. Petitioner does not contend and the record does not establish that he meets the requirements ofsection 7
In order to shift the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a), taxpayers must, among other things, introduce credible evidence as to any factual issue and must have maintained required records.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioner filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. We resolve this case on the basis ofa preponderance ofthe evidence in the record. S_e_e Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340; Schank v. Co
7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper income tax liability, (continued...) - 10 - [*10] II. Constructive Dividends Respondent determined that petitioner received from Good Thinking constructive dividends attributable to personal expenses that Good Thinking pai
However, under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions.
2015-42; see also Graev v.
BCO and petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
The burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) when a taxpayer comes forth with credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability.
new issue or seeks an increase in the deficiency, the Commissioner has the burden ofproofas to the new issue or the increased deficiency. Rule 142(a)(1). Petitioners contend that the burden ofproofon all amounts in dispute shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). We need not consider the burden ofprooffurtherbecause no fact is in dispute relating to petitioners' claim. -7- [*7] B. Section 71(b) "Alimony or separate maintenance payment" is defined in section 71(b) as any payment in cash if(1)
- 9 - [*9] not contend, nor does the evidence establish, that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Section 408(d)(1) provides that any amount paid or distributed out ofan IRA is included in the gross income ofthe payee or distributee as provided under section 72.
They have not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof.
to any claimed deduction.3 Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must further subst
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived".
7491(a)(1) and (2). Credible evidence is that which the Court would find sufficient upon which to base its decision ifno contrary evidence were submitted. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). A taxpayerwho provides only self-serving testimony and inconclusive documentation does not provide credible evidence. See id. at 445-446. Pe
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. At trial on December 13, 2017, petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden ofproof. On April 6
BCO and petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
ioner filed a first amendment to answer asserting accuracy-relatedpenalties under section 6662. The Commissioner therefore bears the burden ofproofwith respect to those penalties. In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Siemer did not argue that the burden should shift, and we find 4Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 5Rule 142(a); Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183, 190 n.10 (1999). - 18 - [*18] that the facts do not suggest t
Petitioners have not established that the section 7491(a) requirements are met.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Expense Deductions Generally, an S corporation shareholder determine
ice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving them erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). In any event, because only legal issues remain, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. See N_is Family Tr. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 538 (2000). 4Neither party contends that any ofthe partnerships was subject to the audit procedures o
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner, including unreported income identified on information returns. See sec. 6201(d); Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128, 1133-1134 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'g in part, rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 1990-68. Petitioner has acknowledged that he receive
7491(a)(1) and (2). The burden ofproofis on the Commissioner with respect to any new matter raised in his answer or amendment - 7 - [*7] thereto. Rule 142(a); see Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188-189 (2008), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2007-340. II. Section 183 Taxpayers may generally deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses
Dependency Exemption Deduction Section 151(a) and (c) allows taxpayers an annual exemption deduction for each "dependent" as defined in section 152.
The - 8 - [*8] evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof to respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Expense Deductions Generally, an S corporation shareholder determine
Petitioner contends that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
7491(a)(1) and (2). Because we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. M Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188-189 (2008). Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in evaluating a taxpayer's profit objective, such as: (1) the manner
es paid in connection with operating a trade or business. Sec. 162(a); Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 313 (2004). Generally, the performance ofservices as an employee 5Petitioners do not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - constitutes a trade or business. Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970). Section 274(d) imposes strict substantiation requirements for travel, entertainment, gift, an
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. 331, 338-339 (2013), aff'd, 668 F. App'x 241 (9th Cir. 2016); Barbato v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-23, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1097, 1098 n.7. Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). In any 3Petitioners do not dispute that, ifthe SSDI payments are includible in gross income, the IRS correctly applied the statutory formula to compute the taxable amount as $25,733. - 5 - [*5] event, the parties have agreed on all r
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Mr. Fiedziuszko's Employment Status The income tax treatment ofa taxpaye
Petitioners do not contend--and could not plausibly contend--that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
g on the IRS. See Weber v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. at 356- 357; sec. 301.6402-3(a)(6), Proced. & Admin. Regs. 8Petitioners contend for the first time in a posttrial submission that they are entitled to a shift in the burden ofproofto respondent under sec. 7491(a). However, a taxpayer's entitlement to such a shift requires that he have substantiated all items. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). Petitioners have not done so. - 13 - [*13] du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.
He has neither claimed nor shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
g on the IRS. See Weber v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. at 356- 357; sec. 301.6402-3(a)(6), Proced. & Admin. Regs. 8Petitioners contend for the first time in a posttrial submission that they are entitled to a shift in the burden ofproofto respondent under sec. 7491(a). However, a taxpayer's entitlement to such a shift requires that he have substantiated all items. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). Petitioners have not done so. - 13 - [*13] du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met.
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
He has not maintained that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and there is no evidence in the record that would support such an assertion.
Petitioner does not con- tend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived".
bears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect.7 Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 6(...continued) concerning his interest in Vicis. 7 Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). - 7 - [*7] U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer ordinarily bears the burd
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
As one exception to this general rule, section 7491(a) places the burden ofproofon the IRS with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax ifthe taxpayermaintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the IRS, and introduced credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
143 T.C. 376, 389 (2014), aff'd in part, 616 F. App'x 391 (10th Cir. 2015). ¹7Graev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. __, __ (slip op. at 14) (Dec. 20, 2017), (continued...) - 47 - [*47] In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners do not argue that the burden should shift, and we find that the facts do not suggest that it should. Accordingly, the burden does not shift under section 7491(a) on the remaining items. II. Debt vs. Gift The Commissioner ar
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent in accordance with the provisions ofsection 7491(a)(1), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so.
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Section 162 Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer must
eductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofas to any issue offact should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Unreported Income Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived," including income derived from business. Exclusions from gross income are narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 32
Compare section 7491(a), which does not serve to effect any burden-shifting in the present case given petitioner's failure to raise the matter, much less demonstrate that the prerequisites for the application ofthe section have been satisfied. Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproofin this case. - 6 - II. Dependency Exemption Deductions In comput
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Because we decide this case on a preponderance of the evidence, the burden ofproofdoes not affect the result and we need not further consider it. See sec. 7491(a); Estate ofTurner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012). B. The Treaty Article 18 ofthe Treaty, titled Students, Trainees, Researchers, provides as follows: - 8 - 1. An
Therefore, we need not consider whether section 7491(a) would apply.
Governing Statutory and Regulatory Framework Section 1366(a)(1) generally provides that the shareholders ofan S corpora- tion are taxed currently on its items ofincome, losses, deductions, and credits, re- gardless ofactual distributions.
Petitioner has not satisfied the conditions for shifting the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a) because he failed to maintain required records or to present credible evidence that he was entitled to these deductions.
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Reserve does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to an issue offact. Both parties presented experts to support their respective positions. We focus on the degree to which experts' opinions are suppo
71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); see also Power v. Commissioner, at *14-*15. 4 Petitioner asserts that he has provided complete and conclusive documentation and credible testimony to substantiate his NOL deduction sufficient to shift the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a). Under sec. 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
t allowed, however, for personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a). Whether an expenditure satisfies the requirements 5Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). -6- for deductibility under section 162 is a question offact. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). When a taxpayer establishes that he paid or incurred a deductible expense but fails to establish the amount ofthe ded
A case's submission under Rule 122 does not alter the burden ofproof, or the requirements otherwise applicable with respect to adducing proof, or the effect ofa failure ofproof. Rule 122(b). Under section 61(a), gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived". All gains are covered except those specifically exempted. C
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Taxpayers generally bear the burden ofproving their entitlement to all deductions claimed. INDOPCO, Im, 503 U.S. at 84. Although the burden ofproofon factual questions may some- times shift to the Commissioner, sec. 7491(a), petitioner does not contend that this provision applies here. -29- II. Charitable Contribution Deductions for Conservation Easements A. Governing Statutory Framework Section 170(a)(1) allows a deduction for any charitable contribution m
Petitioner has not satisfied the conditions for shifting the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a) because he failed to maintain required records or to present credible evidence that he was entitled to these deductions.
Taxpayers are entitled to deduct losses resulting from theft. Sec. 165(a), (c), (e). The taxpayermust establish three elements to substantiate a theft loss deduction: the occurrence ofa theft, the quantifiable loss, and the date that the taxpayer discovered the theft. Gerstell v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 161, 175 (1966); Monteleone v. Co
Petitioners have not provided "credible evidence" on the relevant factual issues, and they have not maintained all records required by the Code. See id. paras. (1), (2)(B). The burden ofproof thus remains on them. I. Deductibility ofFlow-through Loss Individual taxpayers may generally deduct, under sections 162 and 212 re- spectively,
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
The burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer establishes that it complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
t neither materially add to the value ofproperty nor appreciably prolong its life but keep the property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. See sec. 1.162-4, Income Tax Regs. In 3Petitioner filed a motion to shift the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a). The Court will deny petitioner's motion in an order released concurrentlywith this opmlon. - 7 - [*7] contrast, section 263 requires taxpayers to capitalize costs incurred for permanent improvements, betterments, or restorations to prop
Section 274(d) prescribes more stringent substantiation requirements to be met before a taxpayer may deduct certain categories ofexpenses, including travel expenses, meals and entertainment expenditures, and expenses related to the use of listed property as defined in section 280F(d)(4)(A).
eductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofas to any issue offact should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Unreported Income Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived," including income derived from business. Exclusions from gross income are narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 32
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
ommissioner to determine the taxpayer's correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), 6Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). -7- aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to a st
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived".
- 10 - [*10] generally had positive current and stabilized values, and the properties they held retained value. Although the Partnerships generally incurred losses, petitioner did not submit any evidence relating to the values ofthe Partnerships or the underlying properties which would indicate that his interest in each ofthe Partner
143 T.C. 376, 389 (2014), aff'd in part, 616 F. App'x 391 (10th Cir. 2015). ¹7Graev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. __, __ (slip op. at 14) (Dec. 20, 2017), (continued...) - 47 - [*47] In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners do not argue that the burden should shift, and we find that the facts do not suggest that it should. Accordingly, the burden does not shift under section 7491(a) on the remaining items. II. Debt vs. Gift The Commissioner ar
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
To determine whether Andrew held his savings account as the Hamiltons' nominee, we look first to State law. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999). Utah courts use the following six factors to determine whether a nominee relationship exists: (i) the taxpayer exercises dominion and control over the property while the propert
siness. Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970). However, an employee business expense is not deductible as "ordinary and necessary" ifthe employee is entitled to 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - reimbursement from his or her employer. See Podems v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 21, 22-23 (1955); Noz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-272, at *22. Ifan employee is entitled to rei
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent in accordance with the provisions ofsection 7491(a)(1), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so.
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
he paid or incurred a deductible expense but fails to establish the amount ofthe deduction, the Court normally may estimate 6Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 9 - the amount allowable as a deduction. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543- 544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). There must be sufficient evidence in the record, however, to permit the Court
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
vities for that year. Sec. 469(d)(1). A passive activity is any activity that involves the conduct ofa trade or business or the expenses ofwhich are deductible 6Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is no support in the record for doing so. Therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioners. See Rule 142(a). - 7 - under section 212, in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Sec. 469(c)(1), (6)(B). A rental a
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
7491(a); Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). 7Further, Bell Cove's $420,253 ofaccumulated losses exceeded its $383,900 ofappreciation. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(4), Income
that petitioners failed to report Mr. Dasent's IRA distributions as income because petitioners agree that Mr. Dasent received this income, see supra note 5. Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a) as to any relevant issue of fact, nor have they established that they met the requirements for shifting the burden ofproof. - 9 - [*9] II. Section 162 Deductions Section 162 allows a taxpayerto deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. The estate has not claimed or shown that it meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. The burden ofproofremains with the estate. The estate concedes that decedent re
ous. With respect to deductions, the taxpayer almost always has that burden. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Ifsection 7491(a) had been raised, the lapses in petitioners' recordkeeping would seem the primary impediment to shifting the burden ofpersuasion. The burden remains on petitioners. II. Section 183 Under section 183(a), ifan activity
l Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1975), § T.C. Memo. 1972-133. Petitioner has not satisfied the conditions under which the burden of proofwould shift to respondent. See generally sec. 7491(a). Respondent has the burden ofproduction under section 7491(c) for the additions to tax. Respondent presented evidence,justifying the additions to tax assessed under section 6651(a). Petitioner has presented neither evidence nor argument
as to the unreported income, the burden ofproofshifts to petitioner to show that respondent's determination in this regard was arbitrary or erroneous.¹³ ¹³Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), nor have they established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met. Accordingly, the burden ofproof remains on petitioners. - 15 - [*15] III. Business Income Adjustment A taxpayer's gross income includes "all in
Petitioners have neither alleged nor shown that they satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a); therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioners.
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have neither shown nor claimed that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Accordingly, the burden of proofremains with petitioners. II. Schedule A D
- 8 - Discussion In general, the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.3 While the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain conditions are met, the Shermans have not claimed that the burden should shift and the record in this case does not support shifting the burden.
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived".
ring, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). - 20 - [*20] Petitioner asserts that it has provided complete and conclusive documentation and credible testimony to show Champions Retreat's compliance with section 170(h) sufficient to shift the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a). Under section 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secr
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Deductions Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer m
Dependency Exemption Deduction Generally, taxpayers may claim dependency exemption deductions for their dependents (as defined in section 152).
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
62 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'g, 67 T.C. 672 (1977).5 5 Petitioners assert that they have provided complete and conclusive documentation and credible testimonyto substantiate their income and claimed deductions sufficientlyto shift the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a). Under sec. 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary
rden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). ¹² Mr. Kwit's 2012 Form 1040 was filed after the notice ofdeficiency was issued for the 2012 taxable year. - 19 - Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto re
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
7491(a); Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). 7Further, Bell Cove's $420,253 ofaccumulated losses exceeded its $383,900 ofappreciation. See sec. 1.183-2(b)(4), Income
eductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofas to any issue offact should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Unreported Income Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived," including income derived from business. Exclusions from gross income are narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 32
Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Petitioners contend that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent. Conversely, respondent contends the burden has not shifted because petitioners failed to introduce credible evidence necessary for the burden to shift. The resolution ofthese issues does not depend on which party has the bur
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442- 443 (2001). 4For ease ofdiscussion the Court will refer to the period from May 15, 2009, through April 22, 2011, as the pe
7491(a)(1) and (2). Because we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. M Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188-189 (2008). Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in evaluating a taxpayer's profit objective, such as: (1) the manner
Under section 7491(a), the bur- den ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evi- dence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Pe- - 49 - [*49] titioners contend that they maintained all required records, presented credible evidence at trial, and cooperated with respondent and hence that resp
O, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax 4Petitioners do not claim and the record does not demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 8 - return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has b
7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the Secretary when the taxpayerproduced credible evidence at trial, satisfied substantiation and record-keeping requirements, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable discovery requests). Petitioners have not met the requirements ofsec. 7491. - 27 - [*27] II. Whether Watchman Is a Sham Respondent a
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove
- 10 - [*10] generally had positive current and stabilized values, and the properties they held retained value. Although the Partnerships generally incurred losses, petitioner did not submit any evidence relating to the values ofthe Partnerships or the underlying properties which would indicate that his interest in each ofthe Partner
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
ous. With respect to deductions, the taxpayer almost always has that burden. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Ifsection 7491(a) had been raised, the lapses in petitioners' recordkeeping would seem the primary impediment to shifting the burden ofpersuasion. The burden remains on petitioners. II. Section 183 Under section 183(a), ifan activity
7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners did not establish that sec. 7491(a) should apply to the instant case. - 14 - [*14] new matter when the
urden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1993). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent. II. Loss Deductions Section 165(a) allows a deduction for any loss sustained during the taxable year and n
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they have met the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove
ting the amounts ofclaimed deductions. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner does not contend, and he could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Subject to various limitations, a deduction is allowed for contributions to an IRA for the taxable year. Sec. 219(a). Section 408(o)(1) also permits "designated nondeductible contributions" to an IRA. The maximum amount ofa nondeduc-
Unreported Income Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived".
t allowed, however, for personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a). Whether an expenditure satisfies the requirements 5Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). -6- for deductibility under section 162 is a question offact. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). When a taxpayer establishes that he paid or incurred a deductible expense but fails to establish the amount ofthe ded
, in addition to such information return. We sustain respondent's determination ofunreported income because petitioner agrees that he received this income. Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a) as to any relevant issue offact, nor has he established that he has met the requirements for shifting the burden ofproof. - 10 - [*10] Form 1040 he submitted in 2015 to respondent (but which respondent neither accepted nor processed).8 W
Section 72(t) imposes an additional 10% tax on early distributions from a qualified retirement plan (as defined in section 4974(c)(4)).
d by a third party and the taxpayer meets certain other requirements, the Commissioner bears the burden ofproducing reasonable and probative evidence, 3 Petitioner has not shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofto respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). - 6 - [*6] in addition to the information return, concerning the deficiency attributable to the income item. Petitioner argues that we should set aside the notices ofdeficiency b
In these cases, we need not address whether under section 7491(a) the burden of proofhas shifted from petitioners to respondent because, first, petitioners have not so contended, and second, these cases having been submitted under Rule 122, there are no outstanding factual issues relevant to ascertaining petitioners' tax - 28 - [*28] liability--the only issues that remain are legal ones as to whi
Taxability ofRetirement Distribution Section 402(a) provides that "any amount actually distributed to any distributee by any employees' trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be taxable to the distributee, in the taxable year ofthe distributee in which distributed, under section 72 (relating to annuities)." It is und
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). This case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section 7491(a
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
7491(a); Rule 142(a). Petitioner does not contend that either provision applies here. He thus bears the burden ofproving that he is entitled to the deductions he claimed. I. Governing Legal Principles Section 170(a)(1) allows a deduction for any charitable contribution made within the tax year, subject to the annual limitations discussed previ
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(1). Petitioners do not contend that this provision applies here, and they thus bear the burden ofproof. A. Taxability ofSettlement Proceeds Section 61(a) defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever source derived." This definition has broad scope, and exclusions from gross income must - 10 - [*10] be narrowly cons
Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Section 61(a) provides that gross income means "all income from whatever source derived".
Petitioner does not contend, and he would have no basis for contending, that the burden of proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay 2 Petitioner questions why respondent continues to challenge the same issue, but we do not read petitioner to be arguing that respondent is estopped from challenging petitioner's tax treatment merely because respondent agreed that the Court enter stipulated decisions for those prior y
t further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90. 3 Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). - 6 - [*6] III. Schedule A Deductions A. Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses Petitioner claimed a deduction of$17,65
Petitioner has not shown and does not contend that section 7491 applies. Thus, petitioner bears the burden ofproving that respondent's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are in error. See Rule - 6 - 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Respondent bears the burden ofproofwith respect to the items raised in his
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that she meets the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Schedules C Expenses Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a tax
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproof should shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has she established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met.
urden ofproving that the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances under section 7491(a). Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection - 9 - [*9] 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. I. Foreign Earned Income Exclusion We first address respond
te that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. 4Petitioners do not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - A. Car and Truck Expenses Section 162 generally allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets certain preliminary conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). This case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section 7491(a
In this case, the evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). The parties disagree about whether the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). We need
yerbears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Under certain circumstances, the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Inasmuch as the facts that are relevant to the disposition ofthis matter are not in dispute, we conclude that the placement ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. Unless a specific income exclusion applies, a taxpayer is required to incl
. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). The Court must, however, have evidence sufficient to provide a basis upon which 23Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) as to any issue offact. - 15 - [*15] an estimate can be made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). There is no doubt that petitioner carried on a business and incurred expenses pertaining to it during 2009. But petitione
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Respondent bears the burden ofproofwith respect to the 6Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 14 - increased deficiencies and section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties asserted in the amendments to answer. See Rule 142(a)(1). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Feder
- 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Under certain circumstances, the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because there is no dispute as to any fact that is relevant to the disposition ofthis case, however, the placement ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. In 2008 petitioner borrowed $22,000 to provide operating funds for NCPH. She repaid
323, 328 (1995); see also Graves v.
Petitioner has not asserted that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so.
Section 402(a) provides that "any amount actually distributed to any distributee by any employees' trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be taxable to the distributee, in the taxable year ofthe distributee in which distributed, under section 72 - 11 - (relating to annuities)." T
t he had paid any mortgage interest or that he held any ownership interest in the property. Id. The claim petitioner makes here, however, is with respect to tax year 2013. 3Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 5 - In general, section 163(h)(3) and (4) allows a deduction for interest paid or accrued on certain indebtedness, including acquisition indebtedness on a qualified residence. The
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.4 In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), but there is not enough information in the record to conclude that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and the Hardys do not argue that it should.
They have not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof.
expenditure satisfies the requirements for deductibility under section 162 is a question offact. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). 3Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for doing so. - 8 - I. Section 183 Under section 183(a), ifan activity is not engaged in for profit, then no deduction attributable to that activity is allowed except to the extent provided by
Because we decide the issues in this case on the preponderance of 6(...continued) to a former spouse other than Ms. Williams of$32,000 did constitute alimony under sec. 71 and therefore was deductible by petitioner. - 7 - [*7] the evidence, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. See, e.g., Estate ofTurner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309
a question offact. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). 4The amended tax return is not part ofthe record. 5Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 5 - When a taxpayer establishes that he paid or incurred a deductible expense but fails to establish the amount ofthe deduction, the Court normally may estimate the amount allowable as a deduction. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540,
in a notice ofdeficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving them erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). In any event, only legal issues remain, so the burden ofproofis irrelevant. See, e.g., Nis Family Tr. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 538 (2000). The parties agree that petitioner during 2012 was a nonresident alien, i.e., a person wh
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.6 In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), but there is not enough information in the record here to conclude that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and Mr.
The settlement agreement between petitioner and Agency does not provide any indicia as to whetherthe $40,000 payment, or any portion thereof, was made pursuant to a claim ofpersonal physical injuries or physical sickness. Further, notwithstanding her testimony, petitioner has not satisfied her burden of introducing objective and cr
tever source derived", including "[c]ompensation for services". Self-employment income is income arising from the performance ofpersonal services where an 3Petitioner does not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a) as to any relevant issue offact, nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met. - 6 - [*6] employer-employeerelationship does not exist between the payor and the payee. Secs. 1401 and 1402. Sec
than one-halfofsuch taxable year; (3) meets certain age requirements; and (4) has not provided over one-halfofsuch individual's own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year ofthe taxpayerbegins. 5(...continued) that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - Respondent takes the position that H.O. cannot be treated as petitioner's qualifying child because petitionerhas failed to show that he provided more than one-halfofH.O.'s
Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not establish, that we ought shift to respondent the burden as to any issue offact. We therefore decline to do so. B. Section 741 or Section 165? Generally, section 741 requires that taxpayers recognize as capital all gains or losses realized in the sale or exchange ofa partnership in
Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) and, ifthey had ad- vanced this contention, it would lack merit.
d producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine the taxpayer's correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. 5Petitioner has not asserted that the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), and there is no justification on this record for doing so. - 8 - Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a deduc
Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Section 1366(a) gener- ally provides that an S corporation's shareholders are taxed currently on the cor- poration's income regardless ofdistributions; its items ofloss, deduction, and credit are likewise passed through to them.
Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are satisfied, petitioners have not alleged that the section applies, and the record does not support its applicability.
eimbursement from his or her employer generally is not considered "necessary" and thus is not deductible under section 162. Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d 5Petitioners do not otherwise contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), nor have they established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met. Accordingly, except to the extent ofthe increase in the deficiency, the burden ofproofremains on petitioners. See sec. 7491(a)(2). - 9 - [*9]
pal place ofabode as the taxpayer for more than one-halfofthe taxable year. See sec. 152(c)(1)(B). M.R.S. resided with Ms. Lutz during all of2013. Thus, M.R.S. did not have the same principal place ofabode as petitioner for more than one-halfofthe 3 Sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioner does
Petitioners claim they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent regarding the section 162 deductions.
.C. 511, 520 (1975). 2Petitioner does not dispute that DSNB discharged indebtedness in the amount it reported on Form 1099-C. Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not reflect, that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a). -7- Section 108(a)(1)(B) excludes discharge ofindebtedness income from gross income ifthe discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent. A taxpayer is insolvent if, immediately before the cancellation ofdebt, her liabilities exceeded t
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(1). Petitioners do not contend that this provision applies here, and they thus bear the burden ofproof. Section 61(a) defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever source derived". This definition has broad scope, and exclusions from gross income must be narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or - 6 - [*6] shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Evidentiary Issues During the trial petitioners produced no cont
6). The parties agree that petitioner received a $30,290 loan from his retirement account in 2012. Fidelity Investments provided a letter to Appeals confirming that 2Ifvarious conditions are met, the burden ofproofcan shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a). Petitioner does not contend those conditions have been met here, and it is apparent from the record they have not. - 6 - [*6] petitioner defaulted on the loan in 2013 when $26,954 remained outstanding. Respondent has therefore satisfied
Petitioners claim they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent regarding the section 162 deductions.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer must prove his
erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).2 Credits, like deductions, are a matter of 2Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 5 - legislative grace, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction or credit claimed. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). I. Earned Income Tax
mprovements. United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 559 (1993); sec. 1.167(a)-5, Income Tax Regs. In making this allocation, section 1.167(a)-5, Income Tax Regs., provides: 2Petitioners do not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) apply here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 7 - In the case ofthe acquisition on or after March 1, 1913, ofa combination ofdepreciable and nondepreciable property for a lump sum, as for example, buildings and land, the basis for d
ioner satisfies his burden, the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving error in the determinations. See, e.g., Garavagliav. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-228. 9Petitioners have not claimed and are not entitled to any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). To be eligible for such a shift, a taxpayermust have complied with all substantiation requirements of, and maintained all records required by, the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 7491(a)(2). Petitioners have not done so. ¹°Because any appea
Petitioners have not provided "credible 3Petitioners filed their petition as a small tax case. M sec. 7463(a); Rule 171. By order dated January 18, 2017, we removed the "S" designation. - 7 - [*7] evidence" on the relevant factual issues, and they have not "maintained all records" required by the Code. See id. para. (1), (2)(B). The
Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden ofproofis immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). -6- [*6] returns were prepared by professionals. There is no evidence, however, that the preparers had sufficient expertise tojusti
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets - 4 - [*4] certain preliminary conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioners have not shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden
The settlement agreement, however, provides that Mrs.
Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are satisfied, petitioner has not alleged that the section applies, and the record does not support its applicability.
7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). The parties disagree about whether the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). We need
e inferences point to another conclusion, the proponent must fail.").4 4 Petitioners assert that they have provided complete and conclusive documentation and credible testimonyto substantiate a theft loss sufficientlyto shift the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a). Under sec. 7491(a)(1), "[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability ofthe taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary
7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that they hav
7491(a)(1) and (2). Because we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the burden of proofis irrelevant. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005), T.C. Memo. 2003-212; Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 188- 189 (2008). Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides a nonexclusive list of
Maren does not contend the exceptions apply to her case. Nor does the record indicate that the exceptions are applicable. The deficiency is attributable to two items on Maren and Jason'sjoint return for the tax year 2007. First, there is a loss of$251,323 passed through from the 2007 partnership return for Conrad & Associates. Second,
eininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943). Personal, living, and family expenses are generally not deductible. Sec. 262. 4Petitioners do not assert and the record does not establish that the requirements have been met to shift the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 6 - [*6] The taxpayerbears the burden ofsubstantiating expenses underlying claimed deductions by keeping and producing records sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine the correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; INDOPCO, Inc. v. C
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
- 4 - 1. The source oftwo $5,000 contributions to Kevin Harris' IRAs Kevin Harris funded the four IRAs in part through a contribution of$5,000 in 2006 and a contribution of$5,000 in 2007. As to the source ofthese two $5,000 contributions, Kevin Harris testified as follows: (cid:16)042His father had died in 2002 owning an IRA; (cid
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayer meets certain conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner has not shown that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent. Accordi
They have not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproof.
Because we decide the QTDP program recapture tax issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the burden ofproofis irrelevant. See, e.g., Estate ofTurner v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 306, 309 (2012). Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not establish, that they are entitled to a shift in the burden of -9- [*9] proofwith rega
eductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofas to any issue offact should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Unreported Income Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source de- rived," including income derived from business. A taxpayermust maintain books and records establishing the amount ofhis or her gross inc
In these cases, we need not address whether under section 7491(a) the burden of proofhas shifted from petitioners to respondent because, first, petitioners have not so contended, and second, these cases having been submitted under Rule 122, there are no outstanding factual issues relevant to ascertaining petitioners' tax - 28 - [*28] liability--the only issues that remain are legal ones as to whi
Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not establish, that we ought shift to respondent the burden as to any issue offact. We therefore decline to do so. B. Section 741 or Section 165? Generally, section 741 requires that taxpayers recognize as capital all gains or losses realized in the sale or exchange ofa partnership in
wo occasions the Court imposed a $10,000 sec. 6673(a)(1) penalty. Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-189; Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. No. 6368-05L (Feb. 2, 2006) (order and decision); Blair v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-215. 3Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofbecause he failed to introduce credible evidence. See Rule 142(a). - 4 - [*4] not reasonable cause. See sec. 6654. Finally, petitioner persistently asserted frivolous contentions and is therefore liable
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayerto the Commissioner as to that factual issue. Our conclusions are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the alloc
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioners have not established that they meet the requirements under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Home Loans for 2011 and (2) cancellation of indebtedness income of$4,916 for 2013. Petitioner also concedes the sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for 2012. 3Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 10 - Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connection with operating a trade or business. Sec. 162(a); Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 313 (2004). G
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerprovides credible evidence concerning any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and complies with certain other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner as to the factual issue. Our conclusions here are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe b
Under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper income tax liability, and ifcertain conditions are met, the burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner. See also Rule 142(a). With respect to the issues addressed below,7 petitioner does 7In his briefs, petitioner argues t
DOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not con- - 5 - tend, and they would have no basis for contending, that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). A. Charitable Contributions Section 170(a) allows as a deduction contributions made within the taxable year to churches, charities, and other specified entities. See sec. 170(c)(2). Chari- table contributions are allowable as deductio
tions are a matter oflegislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving that they are entitled to any claimed deductions. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). 5Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - A taxpayer is generally allowed deductions for certain business and income- producing expenses. See secs. 162, 212. Section 469(a) generally disallows for the taxable year a de
eininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943). Personal, living, and family expenses are generally not deductible. Sec. 262. 4Petitioners do not assert and the record does not establish that the requirements have been met to shift the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 6 - [*6] The taxpayerbears the burden ofsubstantiating expenses underlying claimed deductions by keeping and producing records sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine the correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; INDOPCO, Inc. v. C
To do so, the taxpayermust introduce credible evidence with respect to that issue. Id. Because we do not decide this issue, petitioner's assertion is moot. We also note that we resolve this case on a question oflaw rather than a question offact. - 8 - [*8] 2016); Hampers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-27 (applying New Hampshire law
Under section 7491(a) in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or - 6 - [*6] shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Evidentiary Issues During the trial petitioners produced no cont
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(1). Peti- - 6 - [*6] tioner does not contend, and the record does not demonstrate, that this provision applies here. Section 61(a) defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever source derived." This definition has broad scope, and exclusions from gross income must be narrowly construed. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515
e expense was paid or incurred in at least the amount allowed. Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). 4Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Section 274(d) prescribes more stringent substantiation requirements to be met before a taxpayer may deduct certain categories ofexpenses, including travel expenses, meals and entertainment expenditures, and expenses related to the
ing the amounts ofclaimed deductions. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner does not contend, and he could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). However, respondent does bear the burden ofproofas to the "increase[] in deficiency" and also as to the accuracy-related penalty, which constitutes a "new matter * * * pleaded in the answer." See Rule 142(a)(1). A. The eBay Sales Busi
Because section 72(t) imposes an "addi- tional tax" as opposed to a "penalty" or an "addition to tax" within the meaning of section 7491(c), Jeremy bears the burden ofproduction.
- 12 - [*12] Section 7491(a)(1) provides that ifa taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability, the Commissioner shall have the burden ofproofwith respect to that issue.
d by a third party and the taxpayer meets certain other requirements, the Commissioner bears the burden ofproducing reasonable and probative evidence, 3 Petitioner has not shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofto respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). - 6 - [*6] in addition to the information return, concerning the deficiency attributable to the income item. Petitioner argues that we should set aside the notices ofdeficiency b
The burden ofprooflikewise falls upon the Commissioner with respect to any new matter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer. Rule 142(a). Because the standard of proofin this case is the preponderance ofthe evidence, and the preponderance of the evidence favors respondent, we decide the case on the w
Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are satisfied, petitioners have not alleged that the section applies, and the record does not support its applicability.
le in income for 2010; he argues that he is not liable for the section 72(t) additional tax because he and, ifonly by implication, his former spouse were over 59-1/2 years 4Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. Sees. 7491(c) and 6751(b) do not apply to sec. 72(t). See El v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. 140 (2015). - 7 - ofage at the time the distributions were made to each ofthem. Relying upon al
In closing argument the (continued...) - 12 - the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are met, the Beckeys have not claimed that the burden has shifted, and the record does not support shifting the burden to the Commissioner.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer - 5 - [*5] to the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that she meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Schedule C Deductions Deductions are a matter oflegislative gra
Furthermore, section 7491(a) (entitled "Burden Shifts Where Taxpayer Produces Credible Evidence") implies that the taxpayer generally has the burden ofproofand explicitly provides that the burden sometimes "shifts"--i.e., that the IRS "shall have the burden ofproof" in certain circumstances.
not put them on notice that anything they did during 2003 was a prohibited transaction. Petitioners' primary argument is flawed in that it rests on the proposition that petitioners' disclosure ofthe rollovers as tax-free is sufficient to put "Under sec. 7491(a), the burden ofproofas to factual matters may shift to the Commissioner in certain circumstances. Neither at trial nor in their opening briefdid petitioners mention sec. 7491(a), and we understand petitioners to have agreed at trial that
7491(a)(1) (requiring taxpayerto introduce credible evidence), (2)(A) (requiring taxpayerto substantiate), (B) (requiring taxpayerto maintain records). The Coateses do not contend, nor does the evidence show, that these requirements have been met. - 30 - [*30] adjustment is to increase the basis by the cost incurred to develop the property. S
However, section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain situations ifthe taxpayer raises the issue, introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, complies with all substantiation requirements, maintains required records, and cooperates with - 17 - [*17] reasonable
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) and, ifhe had advanced this contention, it would lack merit.
Urve Moyer does not contend that the conditions set forth in section 7491(a) for shifting the burden ofproofto the IRS have been satisfied.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
on, he must file with his return "a concise statement setting forth the amount ofthe net operating loss deduction claimed and all material and pertinent facts relative 3Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of sec. 7491(a) have been met. - 6 - [*6] thereto, including a detailed schedule showing the computation ofthe net operating loss deduction." Sec. 1.172-1(c), Income Tax Regs. Moreover
scussion The Court decides the disputed issue in this case on the basis ofthe evidence and without regard to the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); cf sec. 7491(a). Section 25A authorizes an American Opportunity Tax Credit2 equal to (1) 100% ofso much ofthe qualified tuition and related expenses paid by the taxpayer during the taxable year for education furnished during any academic period beginnin
Burden ofProof In general, the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.3 Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are met, Mr.
7491(a)(1) (shifting burden to IRS ifcertain conditions are met, none ofwhich are met by the Ogambas). There are three areas in which the -15- [*15] Ogambas dispute the amounts oftheir income-tax liabilities: (1) dependency-exemption deductions, (2) capital losses, and (3) income from canceled debts. We discuss each area below in parts 1.a an
Section 151 provides as a deduction an exemption from taxable income ($3,700 for 2011) for each "dependent" as defined in section 152.
7491(a)(1); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). We decide this case, as it relates to the amount ofthe deficiency, on a preponderance ofthe evidence. Therefore, we need not determine who bears the burden ofproof. S_e_e Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008). The issue before the Court concerns the tax consequences ofth
Moreover, petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. The burden ofproofremains with petitioner. - 4 - [*4] U.S. individual citizens
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Dependency Exemption Deduction The Internal Revenue Code allows as a deduction an
ers ifthe 2008 Federal income tax liability ofpetitioner and Mr. McKinley were before us, but it is not. Before us are 3See infra p. 9. 4Because the resolution ofthe issues in this case is made upon the preponderance ofthe evidence, the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) need not be taken mto account. - 7 - the deficiencies determined in petitioners' 2010 and 2011 Federal income tax. Petitioners' suggestion that the act offiling ajoint Federal income tax return for one yearprecludes the application ofsec
ave met the record retention, cooperation, and introduction ofcredible evidence requisites for a shift ofthe burden ofproof. Respondent argues to the contrary. Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the burden should be shifted under section 7491(a). As will be detailed infra, the crux ofthe parties' disagreement as to the outcome ofthese cases lies not in different views as to what took place but in different positions as to what standard or test should be applied in analyzing wh
The estate claims that it meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent regarding the value ofdecedent's property bequeathed to the foundation.
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability. Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491 applies, nor did she introduce the requisite evidence to invoke that section. Therefore, the b
e this prima facie case, the taxpayerbears the burden ofshowing that the deposits made into his or her account represent nontaxable income. See 4 at 869. The taxpayermust present credible evidence to shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner failed to do so. Petitioner failed to provide respondent's revenue agent with any records that documented his income. The bank records show that petitioner had over $100,000 ofdeposits in 2008 and over $46,000 in 2011. We
Petitioners contend that respondent bears the burden ofprooffor two reasons: (1) they have satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) for shifting the burden ofproofand (2) respondent raised a "new matter" in his answer.
ave met the record retention, cooperation, and introduction ofcredible evidence requisites for a shift ofthe burden ofproof. Respondent argues to the contrary. Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the burden should be shifted under section 7491(a). As will be detailed infra, the crux ofthe parties' disagreement as to the outcome ofthese cases lies not in different views as to what took place but in different positions as to what standard or test should be applied in analyzing wh
antiate expenses underlying deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner 6Petitioners concede this adjustment. 7Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 9 - to determine the taxpayer's correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v.
Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor have they established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met.
Petitioner does not con- tend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) and, ifshe had advanced this contention, it would lack merit.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden of proofhave been met.
Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Section 61(a) provides that gross income means "all income from whatever source derived".
he sole owner ofapproximately 25.8533 acres ofland on Greenspring Valley Road in Lutherville, Maryland (subject property).4 The subject property consists oftwo parcels, primarily ofopen pastureland and woodland, and is part ofthe Green 3Pursuant to sec. 7491(a) the burden ofproofon factual issues may shift to the Commissionerwhere the taxpayercomplies with certain requirements. Petitioners argue that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent. Respondent argues that petitioners did not meet th
However, under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofrests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
7491(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners argue that the Barnhart brothers, and not BRC, owned all the cattle during the years in issue and, thus, that they properly reported the income and expenses ofthe cattle operation on their own returns--just as their father had previously done for decades. They have
Although petitioners argue that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent, they have not proven that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) or established their compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements.
that the borrowing did not qualify as a primary obligation or economic outlay by petitioner. On the matter ofBrenda Hargis' basis, however, petitioners' evidence is not sufficient to prove her basis or to shift the burden of proofto respondent under section 7491(a). Generally, petitioners bear the burden ofproving that the adjustments set forth in respondent's notice ofdeficiency were erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Specifically, petitioners must prove their
- 10 - [*10] No single factor is controlling. Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 493. However, the ultimate question is whether there was a genuine intention to create a debt, with a reasonable expectation ofrepayment, and whether that intention comported with the economic reality ofcreating a debtor-creditor relation
Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements. Petitioners did not argue for a burden shift under section 7491(a), and the record does not establish that the prerequisites for a burden shift have been met; therefore,
Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifcertain requirements are satisfied, petitioner has not alleged that the section applies, and the record does not support its applicability.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a - 4 - taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). This case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that ifa taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability, the Commissioner shall have the burden ofproofwith respect to that issue.
Section 408(d)(1) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out ofan individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee".
riam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not show that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 10 - that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutoryprovision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. Se
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a), nor has he established that the requirements for shifting the burden ofproofhave been met.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
lvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1935)); - 7 - [*7] Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986). Petitioners do not contend, and they could not plausibly contend, that the burden ofproofas to any issue of fact should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Unreported Income Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source de- rived," including income derived from business. A taxpayermust maintain books and records establishing the amount ofhis or her gross incom
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence on any factual issues and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).° "Credible evidence is the quality ofevidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary eviden
7491(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners argue that the Barnhart brothers, and not BRC, owned all the cattle during the years in issue and, thus, that they properly reported the income and expenses ofthe cattle operation on their own returns--just as their father had previously done for decades. They have
fproof. See 3 The record does not include a completed Schedule L for the Form 1120 for CODES, Inc. for its FYE June 30, 2010. - 6 - Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); c[ sec. 7491(a). Petitioners contend that their advances to CODES, Inc. constitute loans to the corporation. Petitioners further contend that the advances are deductible on their individual income tax returns (on Schedules C) as business expenses. In con
novo, we must reject an erroneous view ofthe law). We base our resolution ofall factual issues upon a preponder- ance ofthe evidence, so that assignment ofthe burden ofproofis unnecessary. See, e.g., McLaine v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 228 (2005); c[ sec. 7491(a). A. Governing Statutory Framework Sections 6320 (pertaining to tax liens) and 6330 (pertaining to levies) estab- lish procedures for administrative andjudicial review ofIRS collection action. 6Compare, e.g., Jordan v. Commissioner, 134 T
II. Partnership Income Partnerships are not subject to Federal income tax. Sec. 701. After items of income and expense are determined at the partnership level, "[e]ach partner is re- quired to take into account separately in his return his distributive share, whether or not distributed, ofeach class or item ofpartnership income, ga
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the - 7 - requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Mortgage Interest Expense Deductions Petitioners did not make any p
Peti- tioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
for tax years 2009 and 2010: Expense 2009 2010 Rent or lease ofother business property $13,200 $15,600 Interest (other) 16,300 1,300 Utilities 4,590 5,160 4Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - for deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine the taxpayer's correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Com
obile activity was a business, and his primary objective was to make a profit. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to deductions on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, relating to his automobile and patent businesses.3 Section 3Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofunless he introduces credible evidence relating to an issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the
Section 408(d)(1) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out ofan individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee".
r, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. 3Petitioner does not claim and the record does not demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 11 - Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connection with operating a trade or business. Sec. 162(a); Boyd v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 305, 313 (2004). To be
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Payments From Cigna Section 61(a) requires a taxpayerto include "all incom
Arizona Materials to cause Arizona Materials to supply concrete to petitioner during times ofshortage at favorable prices. Third-party testimony--to the effect "Petitioner did not claim, or show entitlement to, any shift in the burden of proofunder sec. 7491(a) with respect to the factual issues relevant to this deduction. - 28 - [*28] that petitionerwas able to obtain concrete in 2004 at times when other concrete contractors could not--corroborates the brothers' account. Moreover, Bruce and Do
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to re- spondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the - 7 - specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. I. WPL We must determine whether WPL properly claimed its deductions f
7491(a); Longoria v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-162. The settlement agreement between ANICO and petitioners does not allocate the payments to a claim ofpersonal physical injury or physical sickness. The agreement does not specify any particular claim motivating the settlement. Petitioners did not present objective and credible evidence that
Burden ofProof In general, the Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are presumed correct, and a taxpayerbears the burden ofproving otherwise.2 Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if certain requirements are met, Mr.
CO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 9 - tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates h
ot shift to 5Petitioners maintain that ifthe Court sustains respondent's determination disallowing deductions for other unreimbursed employee business expenses, they would be entitled to a deduction for a home office for 2012. -12- respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayergenerally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); IN
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact; ifhe had advanced that contention it would be unpersuasive because he did not "introduce[] credible evidence" with re- spect to the relevant factual issues.
ave met the record retention, cooperation, and introduction ofcredible evidence requisites for a shift ofthe burden ofproof. Respondent argues to the contrary. Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the burden should be shifted under section 7491(a). As will be detailed infra, the crux ofthe parties' disagreement as to the outcome ofthese cases lies not in different views as to what took place but in different positions as to what standard or test should be applied in analyzing wh
es has been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In the event that a taxpayer establishes that a 3Petitioner does not claim and the record does not show that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - deductible expense has been paid but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, we generally may estimate the amount ofthe deductible expense, bearing heavily against the ta
on his Schedules C with what his partnership taxable income from A&G was for those years. See Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d at 11. ¹³Respondent treats petitioner's contention concerning a shift in the burden ofproofto respondent as an invocation ofsec. 7491(a). However, petitioner has nowhere cited that section or shown that he is entitled to a shift in the burden of proofpursuant to it. Instead, petitioner relies on Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1959), remanding T.C. Memo. 1957-
cy in the case ofunreported income only when the Commissioner establishes a minimal evidentiary foundation demonstrating that the taxpayer 7Petitioners have not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofto respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 28 - [*28] received unreported income. See Palmer v. U.S. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312- 1313 (9th Cir. 1997); Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982). Once such a foundation is established, the burden shifts to the ta
actitude is ofhis own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). 3With the exception ofcertain Schedule C deductions discussed infra, petitioner has not claimed or shown entitlement to a shift in the burden ofproofto respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Section 274(d) overrides the Cohan rule with regard to certain expenses and imposes stricter substantiation requirements for deductions oftravel and meals and entertainment expenses. Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827-828 (
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a)(1) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that they did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Consequently, petitioners bear the burden ofproofas to any disputed factual issue. See Rule 142(a). I
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact; ifhe had advanced that contention it would be unpersuasive because he did not "introduce[] credible evidence" with re- spect to the relevant factual issues.
determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.8 Allowing foreign tax credits is an act oflegislative grace, and taxpayers must prove that they have met all the conditions to be entitled to any credit.° In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), but there is insufficient information in the record to conclude that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and Mr.
Petitioners have not satisfied any ofthe conditions for shifting the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a) and (b).
They have not contended that the conditions set forth in section 7491(a) (shifting the burden ofproofto the IRS) have been satisfied.
- 10 - [*10] No single factor is controlling. Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 493. However, the ultimate question is whether there was a genuine intention to create a debt, with a reasonable expectation ofrepayment, and whether that intention comported with the economic reality ofcreating a debtor-creditor relation
Section 262 provides that no deduction is allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
7491(a); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners argue that the Barnhart brothers, and not BRC, owned all the cattle during the years in issue and, thus, that they properly reported the income and expenses ofthe cattle operation on their own returns--just as their father had previously done for decades. They have
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence on any factual issues and satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2). Petitioner did not argue for the applicability ofsection 7491(a) and has not shown that he meets the requirements to shift the burden; therefore, the burden ofproofremains h
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact; ifhe had advanced that contention it would be unpersuasive because he did not "introduce[] credible evidence" with re- spect to the relevant factual issues.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). This case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section 7491(a). See Rule 142(a). The AOTC is a modified version ofthe Hope Scholarship Credit. Sec. 25A(i). It provides for a credit for qualified tuition and related exp
deral income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutoryprovision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid 4Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) apply here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 6 - or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965); sec.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that he has not satisfied that section's requirements. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden ofproofas to any disputed factual issue. See Rule 142(a). 6 The term
r" because determining whether ¹°The cases cited for these principles, Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645-646 (1994), and Estate ofMason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 657 (1975), affd 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977), did not considerthe effect ofsec. 7491(a), which was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1998. - 33 - [*33] the four deposits were unreported income requires evidence different from the evidence related to the adjustments in the notice ofdeficiency. So the IRS has the burden of
3). As discussed in detail below, petitioner has not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements, nor has she maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc
Petitioners contend that respondent bears the burden ofprooffor two reasons: (1) they have satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) for shifting the burden ofproofand (2) respondent raised a "new matter" in his answer.
Although section 7491 may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioner here has not established that he meets the requisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
r fact, the taxpayer must prove the fact by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Estate ofGilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 51 (1987). Although the burden ofproofcan be imposed on the Commissioner regarding the deficiency ifcertain conditions are met, sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2), the conditions have not been met for any ofthe issues in this case related to the deficiency. The burden ofproof therefore rests on petitioner regarding the deficiency. In addition to the burden ofproof, by which in this cont
Petitioners do not contend and the record does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayerbears the burden ofproofto establish entitlement to any claimed deduction.2 Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. 2Petitioner does not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Respondent bears the burden ofproofwith respect to the increased deficien
ers ifthe 2008 Federal income tax liability ofpetitioner and Mr. McKinley were before us, but it is not. Before us are 3See infra p. 9. 4Because the resolution ofthe issues in this case is made upon the preponderance ofthe evidence, the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) need not be taken mto account. - 7 - the deficiencies determined in petitioners' 2010 and 2011 Federal income tax. Petitioners' suggestion that the act offiling ajoint Federal income tax return for one yearprecludes the application ofsec
- 7 - [*7] (1933).5 Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden may shift to the Commissioner.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise." The burden with respect to a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayerhas introduced credible evidence regarding the issue, has complied with the necessary substantiation requirements, has maintained all records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, informati
interest-bearing loan repayable through increases to a taxpayer's otherwise due Federal income tax for subsequent periods than it did a credit. See sec. 36(f)(1). 3Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a shift in the burden ofproof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). However, because our resolution ofthis case is based on the preponderance ofthe evidence rather than the allocation ofthe burden of (continued...) - 6 - Section 36(a) allows a credit for a first-time homebuyer ofa principal residence. A
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. A taxpayer may deduct certain unreimbursed employee expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1
The burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer establishes that he or she complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
umed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. I11, 115 (1933).2 2Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is nojustification on this record for (continued...) -7- Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayergenerally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Com
7491(a); Rule - 7 - [*7] 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In unreported income cases, the IRS has the burden ofgoing forward with some evidence linking the taxpayerto the income-producing activity, but the burden ofproofremains on the taxpayerto show that the IRS determination was arbitrary or erroneous. See Hardy v. Comm
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. - 9 - [*9] Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayermust
tten statement, perhaps because their relationship remained acrimonious after their divorce. - 6 - 181-182 (2000), and, on the record presented, without regard to the burden of proof, see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); £ sec. 7491(a). In so doing, the Court is mindful ofthe fundamental principles articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court that deductions are a matter oflegislative grace and a taxpayer must therefore be entitled under law to any deduction claimed on a tax r
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. The burden ofproofremains with petitioners. Section 162(a) allows a deduction f
Petitioners have not satisfied any ofthe conditions for shifting the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a) and (b).
7491(a); ge Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). A prolonged discussion ofburden ofproofis unnecessary . because we decide this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008) ("In a case where the standard of proofis preponderance ofthe evidence and the preponderance ofthe evide
Petitioner has not argued or otherwise demonstrated that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent, and accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproving that respondent's determination is incorrect. II. Early Distribution Froin Retirement Account Section 72(t)(1) imposes a 10% additional tax on a taxpayer who receives an early distribu
ly presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving them erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to _ respondent under section 7491(a). II. Qualifying Child Under Section 152(c) Petitioner's entitlement to claim Mrs. Saenz and DS as qualifying children for purposes ofthe section 32 earned income tax credit and claim DS as a qualifying child forpurposes ofthe section
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Petisioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofpdoofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
es, pursuant to sec. 7491, under certain circumstances not present in this case. Petitioners have not asserted such a shift, and petitioners have not maintained the required records nor cooperated with reasonable requests ofrespondent as required by sec. 7491(a)(2) to trigger the application ofthis burden-shifting provision. - 10 - The breadth ofsection 162(a) is tempered by the requirement that any amount reported as a business expense must be substantiated, and taxpayers are required to mainta
ofthe three moves. Palmer has the burden of proofregarding all factual issues underlying the deductibility ofthe moving expenses. See Tax Ct. R. Prac. & Proc. 142(a) (generally imposing burden of proofon taxpayer in Tax Court proceedings); see also sec. 7491(a)(1) (ifspecific conditions are met--none ofwhich Palmer met-the burden ofproofis on the IRS). Section 217(a) allows a deduction for moving expenses paid or incurred during the taxable yearby an individual taxpayer in connection with the co
Burden ofProof Taxpayers generally have the burden ofproof.6 In limited situations the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), but there is insufficient information in the record to conclude that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and Mr.
mination Taxpayers generally bear the burden ofproving that the Commissioner's determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a);² Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners argue generally that the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). Ifa taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item ofincome reported on a third-party information return and the 2Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). The parties have not raised the question ofthe burden ofproof. - 6 - Section 215(a) and (b) allows as a deduction to the payor an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments made during the payor's taxable year that are includible in the recipient's gross income un
7491(a)(2)(A); Gagliardi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-10. Ifthe taxpayer substantiates items underlying the deductions claimed, this satisfies the taxpayer's burden ofproofunder Rule 142. -7- Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a deduction for advertising expenses of$16,841. Respondent argues that petitioners are entitled to a ded
7491(a)(2) a taxpayermust comply with the requirements to substantiate any item. As discussed below, petitioners did not substantiate the interest deduction. Thus the burden does not shift under sec. 7491 with respect to the interest deduction. - 19 - [*19] that enable the Commissionerto determine the taxpayer's correcttax liability. Sec. 600
- 8 - does not allow the deduction ofstartup and preopening expenses, it may be possible to deduct them overtime. Sec. 195; Hardy v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. at 687-693. Whether a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business for purposes ofsection 162(a) depends on the facts and circumstances ofeach case. Woody v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
ns. INDOPCO;Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to - 6 - [*6] respondent under section 7491(a). Petitioners thus bear the burden ofproving their entitlement to the claimed noncash charitable contribution deductions. II. Charitable Contributions A. Statutory Framework Section 170 allows as a deduction any contribution made within
come tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to a statutory provision and must further 4Petitioners do not contend, and the record does not otherwise suggest, that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). _9_ substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90. When a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a deductible expense, but fai
We decide this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence and accordingly need not address whetherthe 2(...continued) activity. - 7 - [*7] burden ofproofhas shifted. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. Petitioner's Farming Activity Section 469(a)(1) limits the deductibility oflosses from certain passive a
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Petitioners argue that under section 7491(a), the burden has shifted to respondent. Conversely, respondent contends the burden has not shifted because petitioners failed to introduce credible evidence necessary for the burden to shift. However, we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence after trial and, theref
o the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other conditions, including maintaining required records. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioners have not established their compliance with section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Taxpayers are allowed deductions for certain business and investment expenses; however, section 469(a) generally disallo
ayerwho does not elect to itemize deductions is allowed to deduct a standard amount--knownas a standard 2Petitioner does not contend, nor has he demonstrated, that he is entitled to a shift in the burden ofproofas to any disputed factual issue under sec. 7491(a). 3The exemption amount begins to phase out when a taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, which was $166,800 for petitioner for 2009. See sec. 151(d)(3); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, sec. 3.19(2), 2008-2 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1107, 1
ions for certain business and income- producing expenses. See secs. 162, 212. Section 469(a) generally disallows for the taxable year any passive activity loss. A passive activity loss is the excess of 4Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - the aggregate losses from all passive activities for the taxable year over the aggregate income from all passive activities for that year. Sec. 469(d)(1). A passive activity is
ency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise ¹4 A taxpayer is required to maintain sufficient records to "show whether or not such person is liable for tax".'s The burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayerhas complied with the necessary substantiation requirements and has maintained all records and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissionerregarding information and documents.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.6 The burden may shift to the Commissionerunder section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayerhas complied with the necessary substantiation requirements and has maintained all records and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissionerregarding information and documents.
mal evidentiary showing (which he has done) for the presumption ofcorrectness to attach.3 And where there is a reasonable dispute with respect to an item reported on an information return, the Commissioner has the burden ofproducing reasonable and probative information (which he has done).4 Even then, the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue, has 2Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.6 The burden may shift to the Commissionerunder section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayerhas complied with the necessary substantiation requirements and has maintained all records and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissionerregarding information and documents.
Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Section 61(a) provides that gross income means "all income from whatever source derived." Citizens ofthe United States are taxed on their worldwide in- - 8 - [*8] come unless a specific exclusion applies.
ance of the evidence, that the determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are erroneous. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues is imposed on the IRS under section 7491(a). Abdi has not claimed, and the record does not suggest, that section 7491(a) imposes the burden ofproofon the IRS with regard to any factual issue. -Accordingly, Abdi bears the burden ofproving, by a preponderance ofthe evidence, that
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
ction, see sec. 6201(d); Del Monico v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-92, or the burden ofproof, see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1991-636; c£ sec. 7491(a). Generally, interest received by the taxpayer constitutes gross income and is fully taxable. Sec. 61(a)(4); sec. 1.61-7(a), Income Tax Regs. (providing in general that interest received by or credited to a taxpayerconstitutes gross incom
- 14 - However, under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence¹° with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofrests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
However, under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofrests on the Commissioner as to that factual issue.
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Section 61(a) provides that gross income means "all income from whatever source derived." Citizens ofthe United States are taxed on their worldwide in- - 8 - [*8] come unless a specific exclusion applies.
Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent on any relevant factual issues.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.3 The burden with respect to a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue, has complied with the necessary substantiation requirements, has maintained all records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information,
Statutory Background The Code provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) * * * [a]nnuities." Sec.
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.3 The burden with respect to a factual issue may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue, has complied with the necessary substantiation requirements, has maintained all records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information,
Alimony Payments Section 71(a) provides that "[g]ross income includes amounts received as alimony or separate maintenance payments." Section 71(b) defines the term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" to mean "any payment in cash" that satisfies four specified conditions.
roper. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Although sec. 7491 may shift the burden ofproofin specified circumstances, petitioners did not argue, and in any event have not established, that they meet the prerequisites under sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift. - 20 - [*20] question before the Court was whether, in connection with the exchange, the taxpayer should be required to recognize as income the appreciation in the property transferred. See id. at 68. Under D
Transfer Incident to Divorce Section 1041(a) provides that no gain or loss is recognized on the transfer of property from one spouse to another or to a former spouse, but only ifthe transfer is incident to divorce.
The evidence does not establish that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the - 6 - [*6] requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Section 469 Taxpayers are allowed deductions for certain busin
come equals $150,000. Petitioners do not dispute that they are precluded from taking advantage ofthis exception because ofthe phaseout rules ofsec. 469(i)(3). 6Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a), and there is no support in the record for doing so. Therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioners. See Rule 142(a). - 11 - claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine the taxpayer's c
Taxability ofIRA Distributions Section 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived." Section 408(d)(1) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out ofan individual retirement - 5 - [*5] plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee." Section 408(d) provides several exceptions to this rule--e.g., for rollover contributions, transfers incident to divorce, and distributions for charita
the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutoryprovision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid 3Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable here, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. I. Schedule C Deductions Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and neces
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitionerhas not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. The burden ofproofremains withpetitioner. I. Professional Gambler The parties disa
See generally Estate of Sanders v.
61(a) and (b), 72(a)(1), (e), 408(d)(1); see also Arnold v.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the - 4 - [*4] burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Where, as here, the record allows the Court to decide a case without regard to the burden ofproof, we need not opine on which party bears the burden ofproof. See, e.g., Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 186-189 (2008). Instead, we may decide the case on the preponderance ofthe evidence. See, e.g., id. We decide this case on the p
- 11 - [*11] Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, a taxpayer's self-serving declaration is not a sufficient substitute for records. Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17. Section 274(d) imposes strict substantiation requireme
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Taxability ofRetirement Account Distributions Sectioh 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived." Section 408(d)(1) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out ofan individual retirement plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee." Section 408(d) provides several exceptions to this rule--e.g., for rollover contributions, transfers incident to divorce, and distributions for char
- 11 - [*11] Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, a taxpayer's self-serving declaration is not a sufficient substitute for records. Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17. Section 274(d) imposes strict substantiation requireme
d correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving them - 7 - [*7] erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Section 162(a) allows a taxpayerto deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business". A necessary expense is one that is "appropriate and helpful" to the tax
eir entitlement to any deductions they claim. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproof should be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Nonrecognition ofIRA Transfer As a general rule, no gain or loss is recognized on a transfer ofproperty from an individual to his or her former spouse ifthe transfer is incident to divorce. Sec. 1041(a). In accord with this propo
Section 6501(c)(3) provides that, "[i]n the case offailure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection ofsuch tax may be begun without assessment, at any time." The estate does not contend that Edward filed a gift tax return reporting the 1972 transfer or that the period of limitations ha
amount ofsuch expense and allow a deduction to that extent. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). However, in order for the Court to estimate the amount ofan expense, there must 4Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) apply here, and we proceed as though they do not. - 7 - be some basis upon which an estimate may be made. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). Otherwise, any allowance would amount to unguided largesse. Williams v. Unite
The burden may shift to respondent under section 7491(a)(1) and (2), but petitioners did not satisfy conditions for that shift, particularly the substantiation requirements and maintenance ofall required records.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that she meets the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Schedule C Section 162(a) permits a taxpayerto deduct ordinary and necessa
Burden ofProof Under section 7491(a) the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Pe- titioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
2009 and 2010, respectively, which according to respondent represents the portion ofthe car and truck expenses attributable to petitioner's attendance at continuing professional education conferences. 3Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction
The burden may shift to respondent under section 7491(a)(1) and (2), but petitioners did not satisfy conditions for that shift, particularly the substantiation requirements and maintenance ofall required records.
(2). However, the rental activity ofa taxpayer is not treated as per se passive ifthe taxpayer satisfies the requirements ofsection 469(c)(7)(B).4 Sec. 469(c)(7)(A)(i). Ifa taxpayer is 3Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are not applicable. 4There is an additional exception for rental real estate activity losses ofa (continued...) - 7 - described in that section (sometimes that taxpayer is referred to as a "real estate professional"), then section 469(c)
expense but fails to establish the amount ofthe deduction, the Court normally may estimate the amount allowable as a deduction. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 6Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). _9_ 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicekv. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). There must be sufficient evidence in the record, however, to permit the Court to conclude that a deductible expense was paid or incurred in at least t
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
The burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a)(1) and (2), but petitioner did not satisfy conditions for that shift, particularly the substantiation requirements and maintenance ofall required records.
Section 163(h)(1) provides that, "[i]n the case ofa taxpayer other than a corporation, no deduction shall be allowed * * * for personal interest paid or accrued during the taxable year." Nondeductible "personal interest" is defined to exclude several categories ofinterest, including "any qualified residence interest." Sec.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitionerhas not claimed or shown that he meets the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Petitioner's Schedule A and Schedule C Deductions Section 162 permits a taxp
Peti- tioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
435, 445 (1987); see also sec.
7491(a)(2) a taxpayermust comply with the requirements to substantiate any item. As discussed below, petitioners did not substantiate the interest deduction. Thus the burden does not shift under sec. 7491 with respect to the interest deduction. - 19 - [*19] that enable the Commissionerto determine the taxpayer's correcttax liability. Sec. 600
However, under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner in certain circumstances.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed or shown that it meets the requirements - 6 - [*6] ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden.ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. The burden ofproofremains with petitioner. II. Section 162 Deductions
Peti- tioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of - 13 - [*13] proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
7491(a)(1) and (2). Petitioner asked that we shift to respon- dent the burden ofproofwith respect to West Side's 2003 tax liability. We de- cline this request. Petitioner introduced no "credible evidence" concerning the $42,480,622 bad debt deduction that generated West Side's 2003 deficiency. In any event, it does not matter who bears the bur
Alimony Payments Section 215(a) provides that "[i]n the case ofan individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance - 5 - [*5] payments paid during such individual's taxable year." Section 71(b)(1) defmes "alimony or separate maintenance payment" as any payment in cash if-- (A) such payme
In addition, petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto respondent, nor does the record establish that petitioner satisfies the section 7491(a)(2) requirements.
-6 - [*6] Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other requirements.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and there is no support in the record for doing so.3 It follows that petitionerbears the burden ofproofin this case.
Burden ofProof Petitioner argues that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) because petitioner produced credible evidence and satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2) with respect to the issue ofwhether - 9 - [*9] petitioner is entitled to use the mark-to-market accounting method for his 2007 trading loss.
Peti- tioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of - 13 - [*13] proofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Petitioners do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden ofproofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue of fact.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in a notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.2 The burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayerhas complied with the necessary substantiationrequirements, maintained adequate records, and cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews.
espondent determined that TFT Galveston Portfolío is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for its failure to file Forms 940 and 941, for employmenttaxes, for the period at issue and under section 6651(a)(2) for failure ¹²In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shiftingthe burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability ofa "taxpayer." - 42 - to pay the amount oftax shown on the SFRs. Section 6651(a)(1) impos
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioner has not claimed to meet and has not shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. II. Mortgage Interest Deduction Deductions are a matter oflegis
ect tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 6Although petitioner has not asserted that the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a), respondent bears the burden ofproving that petitioner is not entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for ML. See Rule 142(a) (respondent shall bear the burden ofproofin respect ofany new matter or increases in the deficiency). - 8
The burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayers establish that they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Some monetary amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar. Petitioner does not contend, nor has he demonstrated, that he is entitled to a shift in the burden of proof as to any disputed factual issue under sec. 7491(a). The exemption amount begins to phase out when a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, which was $166,800 for petitioner for 2009. See sec. 151(d)(3); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, sec. 3.19(2), 2008-2 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1107, 11
cano, Melinda Ruiz, Anita Jones, and Bobby Harris, respondent concedes that they were not petitioner’s employees during the period at issue and payments made to them did not subject TFT Galveston Portfolio to employment tax liabilities. In contrast, sec. 7491(a), which provides the general rule for shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies in ascertaining the liability of a “taxpayer.” The addition to tax is equal to 5% of the amount of the tax required t
the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that 2The $10,646 was the amount deducted after the sec. 67(a) reduction of miscellaneous itemized expense deduction by 2% ofadjusted gross income. - 4 - petitioners have not argued or shown that they have met the req
- 7 - [*7] respondent determinedthat an additional $114.66 ofthe cost ofgoods sold had been substantiated. The only documentary evidence petitioners offered into the record for 2009 was incomplete bank statements. Further, Mr. Nguyen failed to provide any testimonyregarding specific expenditures related to flooringjobs for which dedu
credit claimed. Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Petitioner does not contend thatthe burden ofproof should shift to respondent in accordance with the provisions ofsection 7491(a)(1). II. Head ofHousehold Filing Status Section 1(b) provides a special tax rate for an individual who qualifies for head ofhousehold filing status. Section 2(b)(1) generally defines a head of household as an individual taxpayerwho: (1
Although section 7491 may shift the burden ofproofin specified circumstances, petitioners have not establishedthattheymeet the prerequisites, under section 7491(a)(1) and (2), for such a shift.
. Rept. No. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 994-995). 6The term "Secretary" means the Secretary ofthe Treasury or his delegate. Sec. 7701(a)(11)(B). - 6 - [*6] Petitioner contends that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). However, the record shows that petitioner did not meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, the burden ofproof remains on petitioner. II. Involuntary Conversion Income A. Petitioner's Gain From the Involuntary C
Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent on any relevant factual issues.
However, section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain situations ifthe taxpayerraises the issue, introduces credible evidence with respect - 18 - to any factual issue relevant to ascertainingthe propertax liability, and demonstrates compliance with the applicable requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
ive activity" is any activity which involves the conduct ofany trade or business iri which the taxpayer does not materially participate.4 Sec. 469(c)(1). 3Petitioners have not claimed or shown entitlementto any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). 4In general, a taxpayÈr ''materiallyparÉicipates" in a trade or business ifthe taxpayer is involved.in the operations ofthe trade or business on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis. Sec. 469(h)(1). Congress authorized the Secre
7491(a); Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In unreported income cases, the IRS has the burden ofgoing forwardwith some evidence linking the taxpayerto the income-producing activity, butthe burden ofproofremains on the taxpayerto show that the IRS determination was arbitrary or erroneous. See Williams v. Commissioner, 9
111, 115 (1933).5 Section 61(a) provides that gross income means "all income from whatever source derived".
Under section 7491(a), ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayerto the Commissioner as to that factual issue. The notice ofdeficiency contains an explanation ofadjustments which states: "To be
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown thatthey complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). II. General Rules Section 41(a)(1) allows a taxpayer a credit against income taxes in an amount equal to 2
Our resolution is based on apreponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not considerwhether sec. 7491(a) would apply. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). -14- [*14] or its regulations. See, e.g., New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161,
Section 165(d) provides that "[1]osses from wagering 2The burden ofproofon factual issues may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respectto * * * such issue." Sec.
item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2). The taxpayerbears the burden of - 6 - [*6] proving that the taxpayerhas met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), a_fff'd, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). Petitioner did not argue that the burden should shift, and he failed to comply with the substantiation and cooperation requirernents. Accordingly,
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). With one exception,7 this case is 6 Mr. Anderson passed away in 2009. 7 Petitioners argue that they have introduced credible evi
iate the amounts of claimed deductions. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner does not contend that the burden of - 7 - [*7] proofas to any factual issue should shift to respondentunder section 7491(a). He thus bears the burden ofproving his entitlementto the noncash charitable con- tribution deductions claimed on his amended 2009 return. II. Charitable Contributions A. StatutoryFramework Section 170 allows as a deduction any charita
-4- [*4] OPINION Petitioner has the burden ofproofas he has not provided any credible evidence to support his positions, nor has he otherwise met the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent on any relevant factual issues.
We base our resolution ofthis case on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not consider whether section 7491(a) would apply. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. First-Time Homebuyer Credit As pertinent here, section 36 provides a refundable tax cre
7491(a)(1) and (2). - 8 - Other than copies ofprior yearreturns, petitioners did not produce any documentary evidence or testimonythat substantiated their prior years' losses. Although petitioners' prior year returns are in evidence, without substantiation they are not credible evidence with respect to the factual issues concerning the losses
Gross Income in General Section 61(a) provides that gross income means all income from whatever source derived.
the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioner has not argued or shown that she has met the requirements ofsection 7491(a) and the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 6 - Section 162 generally allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary
1933). As discussed in detail below, petitioner did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and has not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlementto any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); IN
, 115 (1933). Because, as discussed below, petitioners have not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); I
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). Petitioner does not contend that the burden should shift to respondent, and she has not shown satisfaction ofthe section 7491(a) requirements in any event. The burden ofproof thus remains on her. kg Rule 142(a). II. Mortgage InterestDeduction A taxpayer is generally allowed a deduct
the taxpayer has the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioners have not argued or shown that they have met the requirements of section 7491(a)(1). Therefore, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. Respondent issued a notice ofdeficiency to petitioners de
d the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respectto relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioner has not argued or shownthat he has met the requirements ofsection 7491(a), and the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. Deductions are strictly a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayer bears
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden of proofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayermust prove his o
Iftaxpayers cannot produce records ofactual expenditures, we may estimate the amounts ofexpenses ifthey provide credible evidence that provides a factual basis for the estimate. Sg Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). Petitioners increased their basis in the Claremont property by $245,150 for improvement costs they cl
We decide this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence and accordingly need not address whether the burden ofproofhas shifted. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. Section 183 Taxpayers may generally deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year in carrying on
hifted to the Commissionerwhere the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a)(1); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners argue that the burden shifts to respondentunder section 7491(a). Respondent disagrees and argues that petitioners have not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491. The party whose position is supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail regardless ofwhich party bore the burden ofpersuasio
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). Petitioner has neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondent nor shown that she complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden of proof, therefore, remains on petitioner. See Rule 142(a). II. Disallowed Rental Loss Deduction Taxpayers are allowed deductions for
The burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) ifthe taxpayer.has complied with the necessary substantiation'requirements and has 2Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Section 6651(a)(1) and (2) provides that a taxpayer shall be liable for additions to tax for failure to timely file a return and failure to timely pay tax, unless it is shown that such failure was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown thatthey complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). II. General Rules Section 41(a)(1) allows a taxpayer a credit against income taxes in an amount equal to 2
Section 61 provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived".
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
While section 7491(a) may place the burden ofproofupon the Commissioner in certain circumstances, the parties agree that it does not operate to shift the burden in this case, because Palmer Ranch exceeds the net worth requirement. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(C). Regardless, we need not considerthe burden ofproof, because the outcome ofthis case is determined on the
Section 1.170A-13(f), Income Tax Regs., provides that separate contributions ofless than $250 are not subject to the "contemporaneous written acknowledgment" requirement ofsection 170(f)(8) regardless ofwhether the sum ofthe contributions to a donee organization equals $250 or more.
rcise but testified that the bicycle could be set up on a stand in a hotel room and therefore provided a convenient means ofexercising during her travels. 3Petitioner has not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Section 213(a) as in effect for 2008 provided a deduction for expenditures for medical care ofthe taxpayernot compensated for by insurance or otherwise that exceed 7.5% ofadjusted gross income.4 "Medical care" is defined in sectio
Resolution ofall factual issues here is based on a preponderance ofthe evidence. Therefore, we need not considerwhich party has the burden ofproof. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). [*4] 215(a) is determined by reference to section 71(b)(1). A payment that does not meet the definition is deemed a disguise
Petitioners contend that, with respect to the $50,000 deposit from Sugarloaf to petitioners' individual bank account, the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(b), which provides that the burden shifts as to "any item of income which was reconstructedby the Secretary solely through the use of statistical information on unrelatedtaxpayers".
7491(a)(1) and (2). - 8 - Other than copies ofprior yearreturns, petitioners did not produce any documentary evidence or testimonythat substantiated their prior years' losses. Although petitioners' prior year returns are in evidence, without substantiation they are not credible evidence with respect to the factual issues concerning the losses
7491(a)(1) and (2). - 8 - Other than copies ofprior yearreturns, petitioners did not produce any documentary evidence or testimonythat substantiated their prior years' losses. Although petitioners' prior year returns are in evidence, without substantiation they are not credible evidence with respect to the factual issues concerning the losses
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioners have not established that they meet the requirements under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
hifted to the Commissionerwhere the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a)(1); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners argue that the burden shifts to respondentunder section 7491(a). Respondent disagrees and argues that petitioners have not satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491. The party whose position is supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail regardless ofwhich party bore the burden ofpersuasio
We decide this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence and accordingly need not address whether the burden ofproofhas shifted. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. Section 183 Taxpayers may generally deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year in carrying on
Petitionerhas not produced any credible evidence and has not shown that he meets the statutorycriteria for shifting the burden to respondent. Accordingly, petitionerhas the burden ofshowing that respondent's income tax deficiency determination is in error.3 3In addition, ifa taxpayerraises a reasonable dispute with respect to a third-
A further exception to the general rule is found in section 7491(a), which shifts the burden if"a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue"; and the Rpbinsons attemptto invoke this exception with respect to other issues in this case.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in certain circumstances. Petitioner does not assertnor has he proven that he is entitled to a shift in the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproofwith respect to respondent's determination that Seventeen Seventy's contribution ofthe interior
7491(a); s_e_e Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 - 4 - (2004). Petitioners have neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondentnor shown that they compliedwith the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden of proof, therefore, remains on petitioners. II. Exclusion ofSocial Security Benefits From Gross Income Petitioners contend t
e A. As discussed in detail below, however, they did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shiftto respondent under sec. 7491(a) in respect ofthat matter. See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). 8Because we decide on the preponderance ofthe evidence that no amount of Mr. Weiss' retired pay may be excluded from income, the
Carrying On a Trade or Business Section 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business".
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown thatthey complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). II. General Rules Section 41(a)(1) allows a taxpayer a credit against income taxes in an amount equal to 2
ect, and the taxpayer has the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court fmds that petitioners have not argued or shown that they have met the requirements ofsection 7491(a), and the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. Business Expenses Section 162(a) allows a deduction for all the ordin
Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent on any relevant factual issues.
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Although section 7491 may shift the burden ofproofin specified circumstances, petitioners did not argue, and in any event have not established, that they meet the prerequisites, under section 7491(a)(1) and (2), for such a shift.
the taxpayer has the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissionerunder section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioners have not argued or shownthat they have met the requirements of section 7491(a) and the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. "Points" Deduction for 2008 Interest is compensation for the use or f
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record does not permit us to conclude that they satisfied the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproving that respondent's determinations are erroneous. II. Vehicl
ynormally is presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a). In any event, because we decide the issues in dispute on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the allocation ofthe burden ofproof is immaterial. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008). Deductions are a matter oflegislative
Although section 7491 may shift the burden ofproofin specified circumstances, petitionerhas not established that he meets the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Petitioner - 7 - [*7] has not claimed or shownthat she meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
36(g) provides that a taxpayerwho qualified as a first-time homebuyer for a residence purchased betweenDecember 31, 2008, and December 31, 2009, may claim the credit on the taxpayer's 2008 tax return.
rally, a cash basis taxpayermay deduct a business expense for the taxable year in which the expense is paid upon a showing by adequate substantiationthat the expense was actually paid during that year. 2Petitioners do not claim thatthe provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. -7- Informed by these fundamental principles ofFederal income taxation, we turn our attention to the issues remaining in dispute. I. Disputed Deductions A. Schedule C Expenses 1. Adve
uctible losses are limited to losses incurred in a trade or business or in any transaction entered into for profit, or, in the case oflosses ofproperty not 7Petitioner has not claimed or shown entitlementto any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 8 - connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, losses that arose from casualty or theft. Sec. 165(c). In general, a loss is allowed as a deduction only for.the taxable year in which the loss is sustai
Petitioner has not shown and does not contend that section 7491 applies. Thus, petitionerbears the burden ofproving that respondent's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are in error. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). B. Effect ofBankruptcy Petitioner contends that her 2001 tax liability was discharg
Dabney has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondentwith regard to any factual issue.
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.4 Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), Vanney Associates does not clain that the burden has shifted to respondent, and likewise we do not find it appropriate to shift the burden to respondent.
OPINION The petitioner generally bears the burden ofproof(and therefore must prove the relevant facts by the preponderance ofthe evidence) except when the conditions ofsection 7491(a) are satisfied.
stablish the amounts ofthe items reported on his or her Federal income tax return. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner has not asserted that the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue should shift to respondentunder section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Hiebee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and, asjust indicated, the taxpayerbears the burden ofproving entitlementto any deduction claimed. Rule 1
ynormally is presumed correct, and the taxpayerbears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a). In any event, because we decide the issues in dispute on the preponderance ofthe evidence, the allocation ofthe burden ofproof is immaterial. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185, 189 (2008). Deductions are a matter oflegislative
Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent on any relevant factual issues.
Our resolution is based on apreponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not considerwhether sec. 7491(a) would apply. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). -14- [*14] or its regulations. See, e.g., New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161,
7491(a); see also Higbee v.
Petitioner also did not establish she satisfies the requirements ofthe statute to shift the burden ofproofto respondent. See sec. 7491(a)(2). We therefore find that the burden ofproofremains with petitioner as to any factual issue affecting her liability for the deficiency. - 5 - [*5] 61(b), 72(a)(1), 402(b)(2). Employees' trusts inc
s. 162(a), 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. The taxpayerbears the burden ofsubstantiation.² Hradeskyv. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), 2Petitioners do not claim, and the record does not suggest, that the burden- shifting provisions ofsec. 7491(a) should apply. - 4 - aff'd, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). As a general rule, no deductions are allowed for personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a). Ifa taxpayer establishes that deductible expenses were incurred but fails to est
and dental expenses; (2) a $9,820 deduction for charitable contributions; and (3) a miscellaneous itemized deduction of$143 after taking into account allowable unreimbursed employee business expenses. 4Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. -6- Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a d
7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). I. Section 183 Under section 183(a), ifan activity is not engaged in for profit, then no deduction attributable to that activity is allowed except to the extent provided by section 183(b). In pertinentpart, section 183(b) allows those deductions that would have been allo
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax ifthe taxpayermeets certain preliminary conditions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). This case is decided on the preponderance ofthe evidence and is not affected by the burden ofproofor section 7491(a)
e observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproofto establish entitlementto any claimed deduction.3 Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. 3Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. -7- Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayerto substantiate deductions claimed by keepi
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioners do not assert nor have they proven that they are entitled to a shift in the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a)(1). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproofwith respect to respondent's deficiency determination. ¹4The term "Secretary" means the Secretar
The Corteses have neither claimed nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioners have not establishedthat they meet the requirements under section 7491(a)(2) for such a shift.
The Corteses have neither claimed nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed or - 7 - shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden of proofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayermust pro
eived payments from retail purchasers ofcomputers. Accordingly, respondenthas satisfied his burden ofproviding evidence linking petitioner to the unreported income. 2Ifvarious conditions are met, the burden ofproofcan shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a). Petitioner does not contend those conditions have been met here, and it is apparent from the record they have not been met. - 11 - [*11] B. Unreported Income From Checks Cashed at K&A Respondent alleges petitioner omitted gross receipts
at provides a rational basis for our estimate. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). 4Petitioner does not contend and the record does not establish that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to respondent pursuantto sec. 7491(a). - 11 - 1. Insurance Expenses (Other Than Health Insurance) Petitioner contends that she is entitled to a $913 deduction claimed on her Schedule C for insurance expenses that she paid in 2004. Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitl
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the burden of proofshifts to respondentunder section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Resolving all factual issues here is based on a preponderance ofthe evidence. Therefore, we need not consider which party has the burden ofproof. S_e_e Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). 4The entire phrase is "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur." See Vt. Agency ofNatural Res. v. Unit
Moreover, petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
s. Respondent also determined accuracy-relatedpenalties under section 6662(a) for the years in issue. Discussion I. Burden ofProof As a preliminary matter, we consider petitioners' contentionthat the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondentpursuantto section 7491(a). Generally, the Commissioner's determination ofa deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving it incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a)(1) provides an exceptio
e GF property.8 Such sales, made to customers in the ordinary course of business, were frequent and substantial. Indeed, petitioners' actions from the time Glen Forest acquired the GF property, through the date ofthe Adrian transaction, 7Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shiftthe burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus
Petitioner does not contend, and the evidence does not establish, thatthe burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any issue offact.
Section 61(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided * * *, gross income means all income from whatever source derived".
may be established by any reasonable means. Sec. 1.469-5T(f)(4), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. Contemporaneous daily time reports or logs are not required. Id. 23Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a shift in the burden ofproof pursuantto sec. 7491(a). However, our resolution ofthis case is based on the preponderance ofthe evidence rather than the allocation ofthe burden ofproof, so we do not consider petitioner's claim. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)
Section 461(a) provides that a deduction must be taken for the proper taxable year under the taxpayer's method ofaccounting.
cted from her gross income in arri ing at adjusted gross income. Under her theory, the disputed deductions are, and were properly claimed on a Schedule C as, allowable under section 162(a). h sec. 62. 4Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and e proceed as though they are not. - 9 - Respondent, on the other hand, takes the positionthat the disputed deductions are taken into account by subtracting them from petitioner's adjusted gross income. According to re
In certain limited c rcumstances, section 7491(a)(1) shifts to the Commissionerthe burden ofproofwith respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining a taxpayer's ax liability.
EL Section 469(g) provides that passive losses that have been suspended as described above are generally allowed when the taxpayer "disposes ofhis entire interest in any passive activity".
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown thatthey complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). II. General Rules Section 41(a)(1) allows a taxpayer a credit against income taxes in an amount equal to 2
onal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a). Section 274(d) imposes strict substantiation requirements for expenses relating to, among otherthings, travel, entertainment, and "listed property", ¹We need not discuss the burden-shifting provisions ofsec. 7491(a) because, in this case, there is nothing to suggest that those provisions apply, and petitioner has made no claim that they do. -8- including automobiles and other property used as a means oftransportation. Sec. 280F(d)(4); sec. 1.274-5T(
Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.4 Although the burden may shift to the Commissionerunder section 7491(a) with respect to a relevant factual issue, the Kalapodises do not claim that the burden has shifted to respondent, and likewise we do not find it appropriate to shift the burden to respondent.
quires."). _ 9 _ [*9] OPINION I. Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.5 Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), Ms. Anyanwu does not claim that the burden has shifted to respondent, and likewise we do not find it appropriate to shift the burden to respondent. Income tax deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the burden of proving enti
In this case, the crucial fact is whether petitioner instructed Morley to establish revocable trusts at the time he told her to set aside $120,000 for their children. We need not accept petitioner's testimony and may reject it because ofthe many indicia ofunreliability. See Fleischer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1968
al, the Commissioner's determinations set forth in a notice of deficiency are presumed to be correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those determinations are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); cC sec. 7491(a)(1) (providing for burden shifting under prescribed conditions). However, we need not be overly concerned with such matters because, as discussed below, the preponderance ofthe evidence demonstrates that petitioner was an employee ofEver C
ependency exemption deduction only ifthe claimed dependent is a "qualifying child" or a "qualifying relative" as defined under section 152(c) and (d). Sec. 152(a). A qualifying child is defined as the 6Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. _ 9 _ taxpayer's child, brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, or a descendant ofany of them. Sec. 152(c)(1) and (2). The term "child" includes a legally adopted individual and a
quires."). _ 9 _ [*9] OPINION I. Burden ofProof The Commissioner's determinations in the notice ofdeficiency are generally presumed correct, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving otherwise.5 Although the burden may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a), Ms. Anyanwu does not claim that the burden has shifted to respondent, and likewise we do not find it appropriate to shift the burden to respondent. Income tax deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the burden of proving enti
We decide this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence and accordinglyneed not address whetherthe burden ofproofhas shifted. Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. Analysis Under section 469, individuals maynot deduct passive activity losses for the year in which they are sustained. A "passive activity loss" i
OPINION The petitioner generally bears the burden of proof (and therefore must prove the relevant facts by the preponderance of the evidence) except when the conditions of section 7491(a) are satisfied.
If taxpayers cannot produce records of actual expenditures, we may estimate the amounts of expenses if they provide credible evidence that provides a factual basis for the estimate. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). Petitioners increased their basis in the Claremont property by $245,150 for improvement costs th
Resolving all factual issues here is based on a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, we need not consider which party has the burden of proof. See Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). The entire phrase is “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur.” See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Uni
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioners do not assert nor have they proven that they are entitled to a shift in the burden of proof under section 7491(a)(1). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden of proof with respect to respondent’s deficiency determinations. II. Section 1235 Gain A. Whether a Ho
However, section 7491(a) shifts the burdén of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations if the taxpayer raises the issue, introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, and demonstrates compliance with the applicable requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
Under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability. Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not suggest any
In their posttrial brief, however, petitioners for the first time request the Court to shift the -14- burden ofproofto respondent under section 7491(a).5 We find that petitioners conceded this issue at trial and that their request made in the posttrial briefto shift the burden ofproofto respondent prejudices respondent and is untimely.
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence showing that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). I. Schedule A Deductions Deductions and credits are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bea
[*8] determinations because the petitioners have neither alleged that section 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to introduce credible evidence to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the IRS's reasonable requests.
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioner has not established that he meets the requirements under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Deductions and credits are a matter of legislativë grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that he or she is entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,1493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U S. 435, 440 (1934). Although these principles constitute black letter la
titioners have not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained or otherwise reconstructed all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to - 10 - respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); I
Thus Adams has the burden ofproofon all issues. - 16 - [*16] II. Whether Adams Engaged in a Valid Section 1031 Exchange A. The Parties' Positions Adams argues that the sale ofthe San Francisco house and the purchase ofthe Eurekahouse was a valid section 1031 exchange that qualified for nonrecognition treatment. He claims that both th
7491(a), which may serve to shift the burden of proofto the Commissioner ifthe conditions prescribed by such section are satisfied. - 5 - Deductions and credits are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that he or she is entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 4
7491(a); Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section -5- [*5] 7491(a) and, ifhe had advanced this contention, it would lack merit. As expláined below, petitioner has not complied "with the requirements under this title to substantiate" h
tion is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners have not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a);
n Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971); see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (the term "necessary" imposes 6 We interpret petitioners' argument on reply briefto be that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). However, petitioners have not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements, as discussed infra. Accordingly, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 7 - "only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate an
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and satisfies certain other requirements. Petitioner did not allege that section 7491 applies, nor did he introduce the requisite evidence t
ly prohibits 3Pursuant to sec. 469(i) respondent allowed petitioners' deductions for rental real estate losses of$4,779 for 2008 and $6,263.50 for 2009. 4Petitioners have not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden ofproofpursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 4 - individual taxpayers from currently deducting "passive activity" losses. A passive activity is, generally speaking, the conduct ofany trade or business in which the taxpayer does not "materiallyparticipate". Sec. 469(c)(1). In gen
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto the IRS with respect to a given factual issue where a taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue, (2) meets all applicable substantiation requirements, (3) complies with all recordkeelSing requirements, and (4) cooperates with any reasonable requests for - 8 - [*8] information.
omitted from gross income interest of$14. Respondent concedes that the taxable amount ofthe Social Security benefit petitioner received is only $7,579, which petitioner concedes is includible in gross 1Petitioner makes no argument that, pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden shifts to respondent. In any event, the record establishes that petitioner does not satisfy the preconditions found in sec. 7491(a)(2). - 3 - [*3] income. Respondent also concedes that petitioner is allowed on Schedule A, Ite
e year under section 162 ör section 212(1) or (2). Sec. 183(c). In the case ofan activity which consists in májor part ofthe breeding,. training, showing, or racing ofhorses, ifthe gross~income derivèd froin such 8Ms. Craig does not argue that under sec. 7491(a) the burden ofproofhas shifted to respondent with respectto the issue presented under sec. 183. - 14 - activity exceeds the deductions for any two ofseven consecutive taxable years, the activity is presumed to be engaged in for profit for
Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under section 7491(a), nor have - petitioners shown that the threshold requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met for any ofthe determinations at issue.
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welchv. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence to show that she satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioner bears the burden ofproof with respect to the issues in the notice ofdeficiency. .When a taxpayer fails
7491(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Johnson and Smith do not claim that the burden should shift to the IRS, and the record reflects that they did not meet their requirements ofrecordkeeping and substantiation. Thus, the burden of proofremains on Johnson and Smith. 1. The role ofpetitioner Smith On January 19, 2011, S
xpense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 6$ T.C. at 89-90; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. These principles apply with equal force regardless 3Nothing suggests that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 8 - ofwhether a deduction is claimed on an original or amended Federal income tax return or for the first time in a proceeding before this Court. The types ofexpenses underlying th
Burden ofProof Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any -4- [*4] factual issue.1 Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden ofproof.
Petitioner does not argue or provide evidence that the conditions of section 7491(a) are fully satisfied; therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner.
r, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in the answer", Tax Ct. R. Pract. & Proc. 142(a)(1), and with respect to any factual issue for which the taxpayerhas introduced credible evidence and met other - 35 - [*35] requirements, sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2). Our conclusions are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). 1. The Estate cannot deduct $71,4
2007, respondent did not request to change petitioner's filing status from single to married filing separately. See sec. 1(c) and (d). - 8 - records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc
. Petitioner has not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements and has not maintained or otherwise reconstructed all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under - 8 - section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions and credits are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction or credit c
Petitioner has neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondent nor shown that he complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains on petitioner. See Rule 142(a). II. First-Time Homebuyer Credit Generally, a refundable tax credit is allowed to a first-time homebuyer ofa principal residence i
They contend that under section 7491(a) respondent bears the burden ofprooffor going forward with the evidence.
sioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other conditions, including maintaining - 8 - [*8] required records. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioners have not established their compliance with section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Taxpayers are allowed deductions for certain business and investment expenses under sections 162 and 212; however, sectio
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any factual issue.
taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner has not asserted that the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue should shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). 6Petitioner clarified at trial that she erred in listing Beaverton, rather than the Portland office, as the point oforigin for her trips, and that she
ther conditions, including substantiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses and information, sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2). We note that there is no basis to shift the burden to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a). - 6 - often referred to as the Cohan rule. See, e.g., Estate ofReinke v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1995), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1993-197. I. Employee Business Expenses A. Car and Truck Expenses Certain expenses specified in se
* * * * * * * Petitioner has failed to meet the requirements ofSection 7491(a), and therefore, the burden ofproofremains on Petitioner.
However, section 7491(a)(1) provides that subject to certain limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax, the burden ofproofshifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner as to the factual issue.
Petitioners have not claimed or show that they met the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofpi·ooft respondent as to any relevant factual issue.
- 5 - United States, 5.19 U.S. 79 (1996); Commissionerv. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995). . - According to the petition, the "Form 1099-INT" and the "Form W-2" are "in error", but no allegations offacts in support ofthese assignments oferror are made in the petition. Petitioners' inartful pleading, their failure to submit a pretri
nd Google and received from these companies $75,825 and $860, respectively. See Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 360-362 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the Commissioner's determination relating to unreported income is presumed 2Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofunless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immate
7491(a)(1); Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 89, 102 (2003), aff'd, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2005); Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121, 123 n.2 (2002), aff'd, 93 Fed. Appx. 473 (3d Cir. 2004). II. The Workers' Legal Classification Employers and employees are subject to "employmenttaxes"
The taxpayer generall bears the burden ofproofunless the conditions in section 7491(a) are satisfied Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Dependency Exemption Deduction In general, a taxpayer may claim a dependency exemption deduction "for each individual.who is a dependent (as defined in section 152) ofthe taxpayer for the taxableyear." Sec.
Whether a payment constitutes alimony within the meaning of sections 71(a) and 215(a) is determined by reference to section 71(b)(1), which defines an "alimony or separate maintenance payment" as: any payment in cash if-- (A) such payment is received by (or on behalfof) a spouse under a divorce or separation instrument, 4The taxpayer generally bears the bur
Deductions and credits are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that he or she is entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). As discussed below, the Court is satisfied that peti
Under section 7491(a), in certain circumstances, the burden ofproof may shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner. Petitioners have not claimed to meet and have not shown that they meet the specifications ofsection 7491(a) to ' shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxp
7491(a); Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-255. Petitioners have not complied with the substantiation requirements ofsection 7491(a). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Nor have petitioners cooperated with respondent's reasonable requests for documents and information. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). The burden ofproof therefore re
933). As discussed in detail below, petitioners did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a);
r bears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 115. The burden ofproofon factual issues may shift to the Commissioner, however, where the taxpayer complies with all requirernents ofsection 7491(a). Neither petitioner nor the Elicks argue se::tion 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproof to respondent. And we find that neither petitioner nor the Elicks met the requirements for section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioner and the Elicks eac
the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some c:ases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioners have not argued or shown-thatthey have met the requirements of section 7491(a), and therefore the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. Section 162 allows deductions for all the ordinary and nec
his prima facie case the taxpayerbears the burden of showing that the deposits made into his or her account represent nontaxable income. See id. at 869. The taxpayer must present credible evidence to shift the burden ofproofto the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner failed to - 11 - [*11] do so. Respondent has the burden ofprooffor the increased deficiencies asserted in the answer. See Rule 142(a)(1). Respondent examined Federal income tax returns for the tax years in issue for petiti
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto the Secretary with regard to any factual issue.
- 17 - [*17] OPINION Preliminary Matters Generally, under section 7491(a), ifa taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue, the burden ofproofis shifted to the Commissioner.
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden ofproofmay shift from the taxpayerto the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue 6 Respondent has since conceded the accuracy-relatedpenalty for 2008. See supra note 3. - 7 - relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability and satisfies certain other requirements. Pe
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). In addition, ifthe Commissioner raises a new issue or seeks an 16The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary ofthe Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term "or his delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency ofthe Treasury Department duly authorize
, 115 (1933). - 8 - [*8] Because, as discussed below, petitionerhas not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements normaintained all required records, the burden of proofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). II. Petitioner's Alleged Fire Petitioner claims that a fire destroyed most ofhis 2006 tax records and for that reason he is unable to substantiate his S
In an exception to the general rule, section 7491(a) imposes the burden ofproofon the IRS with respect to a given factual issue where a taxpayer (1) introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue, (2) meets all applicable substantiation requirements, (3) complies with all recordkeeping requirements, and (4) cooperates with any reasonable requests for information.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Further, ifthe Commissioner raises a new issue or seeks an increase in the deficiency, the Commissioner bears the burden ofproofas to the new issue or increased deficiency. See Rule 142(a)(1). The U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal in this case
4(d). See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax llegs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). With respect 4Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. to deductions for these types ofexpenses, section 274(d) requires that the taxpayer substantiate either by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own
itioners are not entitled to deduct Schedule C expenses in excess ofthe amount respondent conceded. Contentions we have not addressed are irrelevant, moot, or meritless. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. 2Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus
The burden shifts under section 7491(a) only ifhe presents credible evidence.
le 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 3(...COntinued) cleaning and maintenance expenses, $2,765 for auto and travel expenses, and $100 for advertising expenses. 4Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant (continued...) - 5 - [*5] (1933). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayermust prove entitlement to claimed deductions. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commis
the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other conditions, including maintaining required records. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioners have not established their compliance with section 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden ofproof. See Rule l'42(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). This Court has previously noted that while the regulations are somewhat ambiguous concerning the recórds to be maintaine
rted income, see Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d at 1270- 1271. Accordingly, petitioners would bear the burden ofproving that respondent's determination is incorrect, unless they demonstrate that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Petitioners do not contend that they met the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(1) and (2), and the record confirms that they did not meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2). Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains on petitioners. - 10
ears the burden ofproduction under section 7491(c). 1°(...continued) 2006. See sec. 166(a)(2); sec. 1.166-3(a), Income Tax Regs. "Petitioner does not contend, nor does the record suggest, that the burden of proofshould be shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a). L -14- [*14] II. Section 166 bad debt deductions A. Bona fide debt A section 166 bad debt can arise only ifthe purported debt is a bona fide debt. Conversely, an advance that is a capital contribution or a gift is not a debt for purpose
Petitioner does not assert, nor would we find, that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) are met to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
ayer 3As discussed in detail below, petitioners did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). - 9 - claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to a statutory provision and must fur
Both parties have presented evidence and introduced expert witness reports. We decide this case based on the preponderance ofevidence. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (where both parties have satisfied their burden ofproduction, the party supported by the weight ofthe evidence will prevail regardle
7491(a)(1) and (2); see Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Credible evidence, for the purposes ofthis section, is the quality ofevidence which, after critical analysis, a court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision ifno contrary evidence were submitted. Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). The taxpa
This case involves application oflaw to essentially undisputed facts. Although petitioner quarrels with the methodology used to determine her actual flight times, the parties stipulatedthe percentages set forth in our findings offact. The burden ofproofdoes not affect our decision as to the deficiency. Foreign Earned Income Petitio
e claimed on his 2008 return for interest and penalties were in error, and he contendedthat he is entitled to deduct $46,308 for interest and $16,683 for penalties. 4 Petitionerhas neither claimed nor established that he satisfies the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any factual issue. - 5 - 1976). A taxpayermust substantiate amounts claimed as deductions by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is entitled to the deductions.
Petitioner does not argue section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto respondent. Nor do we find that petitioner met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Áccordingly, petitioner bears the burden of proof. . . 2Respondent also asserts that petitioner did not meet certain substantiation requirements. In particular, he asserts that petiti
In Evans, the Court found that the appraisal relied on by the taxpayers was qualified but that the taxpayers had not provided sufficient - 12 - [*12] credible evidence to shift the burden ofproofto the Commissionerunder section 7491(a) or to meet their burden ofestablishing entitlement to their claimed charitable contribution deduction.
Petitioners.have neither claimed nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
years at issue. Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayermust prove he is entitled to the deductions claimed.2, Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. 2Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent pursuanttö sec. 7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of (continued...) Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Section 162(a) allows a taxpayerto deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business
the taxpayer has the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court finds that petitioners have not argued or shown that they have met the requirements of - section 7491(a) and the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. 2The amount deducted after the sec. 67(a) reduction ofmiscellaneou
Petitioner has neither claimed nor established that he satisfies the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with regard to any factual issue.
Thus, under section 7491(a), the burden ofproofwill remain with petitioners.
Section 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including * * * (2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant
file a brief, we view his failure as an indication ofhis tenuous position with regard to the issues in question. See McGe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-308, 2000 WL 1434240, at *6. - 8 - [*8] proving that the taxpayer has met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), aff'd, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). Petitioner did not argue that the burden should shift, and he failed to comply with the substantiation and cooperation requirements. Accordingly, th
stipulation offacts, the parties stipulated that the $6,350 charitable contribution deduction allowed in the notice consists ofcontributions of$5,450, $400, and $500 toWMCF, CW, and EAM, respectively. 4Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - 87, 90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. I. Charitable Contribu
in detail below, decedent and Ms. Caraman have not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements, nor have they maintained all·required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO: In
Petitioner has not satisfied the conditions to shift the burden ofproofµnder section 7491(a)(2), and he has not proven that he was not subject to depreciation recapture for 2007 under sections 179(d)(10) and 280F(b)(2) because he failed ådequately to substantiate use ofthe vehicle möre than 50% for business during th year.
- 22 - [*22] not meet the requirements ofsection 7491(a) for shifting the burden ofproof to the IRS since, as discussed below, he failed to produce credible evidence, substantiate his deductions, and maintain adequate records.
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). Petitioner has neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondent nor 3Unless otherwise indicated, Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of P:actice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue Cjode, in effect for the year at issue. - 4 - [*4] shown
ReliefFrom Joint and Several Liability We begin with the general principles ofjoint returns. A married taxpayer may elect to file ajoint Federal income tax return with his or her spouse. Sec. 6013(a). Each spouse filing the return is jointly and severally liable for the entire tax shown on the return or otherwise determined to be
s generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is improper. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)." "Petitioner did not argue that the burden should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a)(2); however, we have decided this case on the preponderance ofthe evidence. - 19 - [*19] II. Reasonable Compensation Respondent contends that most ofthe compensation paid to Mr. Astor was not reasonable under section 162 for TYE 2004 and
See id.; see also Churchman v.
Section 7491(a) shifts to the Commissioner the burden ofproofwith respect to any factual issue ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence and has complied with substantiation requirements, has maintained required records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for witnesses, information, and documents. See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2). Petitioner
Petitioners do not contend that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should - 5 - shift to respondent under section 7491(a) and, ifthey had advanced this contention, it would lack merit.
); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). The burden ofproofon factual issues that affect a taxpayer's liability for tax may shift to the Commissioner where "a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioners have not argued that section 7491 applies and therefore bear the burden ofproofwith respect to the income tax adjustments (we address the burden ofproofon the constructive dividend issue below). II. Deductions Petitioners
- 4 - [*4] he performed nearly all ofthe work necessaryto run the business. Petitioner additionally used an unspecified number ofday laborers, whom it paid totals of $39,733 and $41,453 in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Following a downturn in the real estate and construction markets after 2005, petitioner's business began to experi
Under section 7491(a), if the taxpayerproduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the - 5 - [*5] burden ofproofrests on the IRS as to that factual issue. Our conclusions here are based on the preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofth
1-1(a), Income Tax Regs.; see Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); see also sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). - 17 - A taxpayer's self-serving declaration is no ironclad substitute for the records that the law requires. See Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17; see also Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034,
However, we decide the section 183 issue on the preponderance ofthe evidence and, therefore, the burden ofproofis not relevant. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). II. Section 183 For-ProfitRequirement Section 183 limits the section 162 trade or business expense deductions a taxpayermay claim for expenses at
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). Petitioner has neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondent nor shown that he complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden of proof, therefore, remains on petitioner. See Rule 142(a). II. Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Petitioner claims he is entitled to a
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden ofproof with respect to the issues in the notice ofdeficiency. Deductions and credits are a
the 6As discussed in detail below, petitioners did not comply with the Code's substantiation requirements and have not maintained all required records. Therefore, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). - 10 - deduction relates has been paid or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89-90. Under section 162(a), a deduction is allowed fo
ue has been raised by the parties concerning sec. 7491 or whether there has been a shift in the burden ofproofor going forward with the evidence. Accordingly, petitioner has not established his entitlementto any such shift in the burden ofproofunder sec. 7491(a) regarding his liability for the deficiencies.. - 6 - [*6] Through documentary evidence and testimony, petitionerhas shownthat of the $8,664 claimed, $2,265 represented attorney's fees to resolve issues related to the sale ofhis residence
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) should shift the burden here, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden ofproofas to any disputed factual issue. See Rule 142(a). Un
sioner, 56 T.C. at 941-943. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to the deductions at issue.3 Contentions we have not addressed are irrelevant, moot, or meritless. , To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. 2Pursuantto sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden ofproofunless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immateri
Section 7491(a) may, in certain limited circumstances, operate to shift the burden ofproof to the Commissionerwith respect to any factual issue relevant to determining the 20Because petitioners John J. and Charla Crimi's 2005 tax year is not before the Court, we do not include them as claiming entitlement to a refund for 2005. - 39 - [*39] taxpaye
Section 7491(a) may, in certain limited circumstances, operate to shift the burden ofproof to the Commissionerwith respect to any factual issue relevant to determining the 20Because petitioners John J. and Charla Crimi's 2005 tax year is not before the Court, we do not include them as claiming entitlement to a refund for 2005. - 39 - [*39] taxpaye
Petitioners.have neither claimed nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsection 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent.
- 12 - [*12] must provide a proper evidentiary foundation.' While the burden could shift to respondentunder section 7491(a), the Edems have failed to show that they met the requirements.
- 12 - [*12] must provide a proper evidentiary foundation.' While the burden could shift to respondentunder section 7491(a), the Edems have failed to show that they met the requirements.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Further, if the Commissioner raises a new issue or seeks an increase in the deficiency, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof as to the new issue or increased deficiency. See Rule 142(a)(1). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal in this c
2003-103, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1146, 1151 (2003). At trial, petitioners conceded that the burden of proof falls on them. In their posttrial brief, however, petitioners for the first time request the Court to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a). We find that petitioners conceded this issue at trial and that their request made in the posttrial brief to shift the burden of proof to respondent prejudices respondent and is untimely. See Dunne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-63,
ndings offact, which include detailed prop sed findings as to the sources and amounts ofpetitioner's unreported income. We deem petitionerto have waived any objections to these 'Petitioner does not claim and has not established that the conditions ofsec. 7491(a) have been met to shiftthe burden ofproofto respondentwith regard to any factual issue as to his tax liability. - 9 - proposed findings offact. See Rule 151(e)(3) ("In an answering or reply brief, the party shall set forth any objections,
tiation ofany item and cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings. Sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2). The taxpayerbears the burden of provingthat the taxpayerhas met the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), aff'd, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). Because we decide the factual issues in the instant case on the preponderance of the evidence, the allocation ofthe burden ofproofis immaterial. Se
1986-569; see also Hayden v.
esidence and a place of business may be deductible ifthe residence is the taxpayer's principal place of business. See Strohmaier v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 106, 113-114 (1999). 6Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. - 5 - Petitioners do not claim and the evidence does not suggest that their residence was Mr. Saunders' principal place ofbusiness or that he maintained a home of
We resolve the issues here on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation of the burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not consider whether sec. 7491(a) would apply. S_ee Estate ofBlackv. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340, 359 (2009). - 8 - when the relevant capital gains income was realized from the IA sale. A partnership is not subj
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that he satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioner bears the burden ofproof with respect to the issues in the notice ofdeficiency. Deductions and credits are a mat
Petitioner concedes that he earned the income that led to the notices ofdeficiency and objects only to respondent's denial ofdeductions. All deductions are a matter oflegislative grace. Taxpayers seeking deductions must be able to show that they come within the express provisions of the statute. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 2
statutory 4According to the notice, petitioners are not entitled to the recovery rebate credit for 2008 because ofother adjustments made in the notice. Otherwise, the record is incomplete on the point. 5Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 90; sec.
However, section 7491(a)(1) and (2) shifts the burden ofproofto "While we recognize that sec.
Petitioner argues that the burden ofproofshould shift to respondent under section 7491(a) because he produced credible evidence and satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2).
ioner bears the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a).'9 B. Underreported Income 1. Introduction The disagreed deposits for the years in issue are as follows: Year Amount 1994 $92,103 1995 141,790 1996 84,888 19Petitioner makes no argumentthat, pursuantto sec. 7491(a), the burden shifts to respondent. In any event, the record establishes that petitioner does not satisfy the preconditions found in sec. 7491(a)(2) for shifting the burden; e.g., he failed to maintain records and he failed to cooperate wi
Petitioner does not argue or provide evidence that the conditions of section 7491(a) are fully satisfied; therefore, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner.
n expenditure to be an ordinary and necessary business expense, the taxpayermust show a bona fide business purpose for the expenditure; there must be a proximate 7 Petitioners have neither claimed nor established that they satisfythe requirements ofsec. 7491(a). Accordingly, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 9 - [*9] relationship betweenthe expenditure and the business ofthe taxpayer. Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650, 660 (1962); Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879,
Section 151 provides that an individual is entitled to a deduction for his ör her dependents.
Therefore, the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a) is not relevant to the Court's decision.
ion claimed for the taxable year. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. at 84; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not allege that the burden ofproofshould be shifted under section 7491(a). Therefore, petitioner bears the burden ofproof. I. Casualty or Theft Loss The only reason listed for respondent's determination in the notice i
In her reply briefpetitioner asserts for the first time that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proofto respondent. Petitioner did not assert in her pretrial memorandum or at trial that respondent bears the burden ofproof. Generally, we will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time on brief. Estate ofAronsoñ v. Commis
ng a tax upon a taxpayerwho, while changing his form ofownership, is continuing the nature ofhis investment. Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 658 (1980). Under section 1031(d), the basis ofproperty acquired in a Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) should apply to shift the burden ofproofto respondent. In an otherwise qualifying like-kind exchange, a taxpayer's realized gain is recognized to the extentthe consideration received includes unqualified property (boot). Sec. 1031(b)j se
d to a deduction for home mortgage loan interest of$7,168, which is greater than the standard deductionto which respondent determined in the notice petitioner was entitled. 4Petitioner does not claim that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). In any event, he has failed to establish that he satisfies the requirements ofthat section. On the record before us, we find that the burden of proofdoes not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). -5- deductions for his taxable year 20
3In the notice ofdeficiency respondent determined that petitioners also received an additional $156 oftaxable dividends, $2,192 ofpassive income, and $183 ofretirement income. As stated above, respondent conceded the latter, and petitioners, by reporting the additional dividends and passive income on their amended return, conceded the
Petitioner has not contended, and we do not conclude, that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B)! A taxpayermay claim a dependency exemption deduction with respect to an individual who is either a "qualifying child" or a "qualifying relative". Secs. 151(c), 152(a). In general, to be a taxpayer's
Petitioner thus must prove that the determinations in the statutory notice are erroneous. See Rule 142(a). The Conseco Note Petitioner contends that the Conseco note had no value as of the date of death and relies on the January 2.005 brokerage statement that does not include a value for the Conseco note. Petitioner also contends
7491(a)(1) and (2)(A) and (B). Petitioners have neither asserted that the burden of proofhas shifted to respondent nor provided adequate substantiation ofthe expense deductions claimed on their 2006 Federal income tax return. Therefore, the burden ofproofremains with petitioners. Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayerbe
- 8 - claims he was owed for at least some ofthe years in issue, petitioner did not worry about and did not timely file Federal income taxreturns for 2002 through 2007. Petitioner compläins that respondent's audit and trial representatives steamrolled him and refused to accept the obvious business nature ofáll ofhis activities and
erminations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Com issioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84·(1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). n some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shi to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or presbnt evidence that they satisfied the - 6 - requiremeñts ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden ofproof with respect to the issués in the notices ofdeficiency. Deductions and credits
Section 7491(a) shifts to the Commissionerthe burden ofproofwith respect to a factual issue only ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence and has complied with substantiation requirements, has - maintained required records, "and has cooperated with reasonable requests * * * for witnesses, information, documents". Sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). Petitioner h
Our resolution is based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not lAll section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules ofPractice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. 4 consider whet
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). As petitioner did not argue or prove that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. I. Deduction for Alimony Paid Generally, alimony payments are taxable to the recipient and de
However, pursuantto section 7491(a), the burden ofproofon factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner in certain situations.
Petitioners have not proven or presented adequate evidence to shift the burden ofproofthat any ofthe material participationtests they rely upon are satisfied. As the sole owner ofthe micro-utility activity, petitioner claims he performed all "tasks, functions and services ofand for the business, including management and marketing",
d to keep their own records................................. 50 - 4 - b. Taxpayers are required to retain their records as long as they may become material for tax purposes. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2. Burden shift under section 7491(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3. Alleged animus . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4. New matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 B. Collateralestoppel .............
wever, must be associated with a trade or business that is functioning at the time the expenses are incurred. Hardy v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 684, 687 (1989), aff'd 5 Petitioner has neither alleged nor demonstratedthat he satisfied the requirements ofsec. 7491(a)(1) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent with respect to any factual issue in this case. 6 Respondent argues in the alternative that even ifthe expense claimed by petitioner are not startup expenditures, many ofthose expenses must be
the taxpayer has the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). As there is no factual issue in dispute, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. Alimony Deduction Under Section 215 "there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid
, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498 (2011). Accordingly, we conclude that the 3Ms. Rice has not contended, and the record does not suggest, that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 9 - [*9] requirements of 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692g do not govern respondent's collection activities. See also Busche v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-285. Additionally, Ms. Rice contends that she had no opportunity to contest her liability
Petitioners have not proven or presented adequate evidence to shift the burden ofproofthat any ofthe material participationtests they rely upon are satisfied. Petitioner argues that, as the sole owner ofthe micro-utility activity, he performed all "tasks, functions and services ofand for the business, including management" with the
n expenditure to be an ordinary and neces ary business expense, the taxpayer must show a bona fide business purpose for the expenditure; there must be a proximate 8 Petitioners have neither claime nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) for any of he issues remaining for decision. Accordingly, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 10 - [*10] relationship between the expenditure and the business ofthe taxpayer. Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650
itioner bears the burden ofproving that the determinations in the notice that remain at issue are erroneous.4 See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 4Petitioner does not claim that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). On the record before us, we find that that burden does not shift to respondent under that section. We turn first to the unreported gross receipts ofMPR that respondent deter- mined on the basis ofrespondent's bank deposits analysis and
d "cooperated with Respondent at every stage ofthese - 11 - proceedings, including the audit." WÑ are not persuaded, however, that petitioners c¢mplied with substantiation and recordkeeping requirements as necessary to shift the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a). As discussed in more detail below, although petitioners offered some documentary evidence and testimony, it is insufficient to establish their bases in Respira and thus their entitlement to losses, lVloreover, petitioners did not main
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden ofproofto, respondent, and the record does notpermit us to conclude that the requirements,of section 7491(a) are met.
esky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 .2 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In these cases the "statutory provisions" are section 162, which, in general, 4Under the circumstances, the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are clearly not applicable. - 7 - allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, and section 212, which, in general, allows a deduction for ordinary a
And while subsequent events generally are not considered in fixing fair market value, they may be considered to the extent that they were reasonably foreseeable on the date as ofwhich the value is fixed. Eg, Estate ofGifford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987). Mr. Argote testified that, "based upon what * * * [he] knew in 19
7491(a); Gaitan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-3. Petitioners have not shownthat they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). We now address whether certain wages FS paid to Mr. Shami and Mr. McCall qualify for the research credit. A taxpayer is allowed a cre
ssary for us t address the parties' disagreement and determine whet er the burden has shifted because the parties have provided suffi ient evidence for us to determine the value of .the conservation e sements and that determinatiori is unaffected by section 7491(a) . See Estate of Bongard v. - 18 - Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005); Trout Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-283. This Court has held that "In a situation in which both parties have satisfied their burden of production b
trate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutoryprovision and must further substantiate thatthe expense to which the deduction relates has beenipaid or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. 3Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 9 - Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965); sec. 1.6001- 1(a), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner does not contend that the burden ofproofshould be shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not suggest any basis for a shift.
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that she satisfied the - 5 - requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore,.petitioner bears the burden ofproof with respect to the issues in the notice ofdeficiency. Mortgage Payments Respond
tend that the entire retirement benefit is excludable.9 % disagree. SCD retirees were guaranteed an annual retirement allowance payable in 8Respondent does not challenge that the statute was in the nature ofa workmen's compensation act. 9Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitionershave the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus
7491(a); see Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, 168 (2004). Petitioner has neither claimed that the burden shifts to respondent nor - 6 - [*6] shown that he complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains on petitioner. See Rule 142(a). II. Expenses at Issue A. Travel We first turn to the claimed tra
111, 115 (1933). Because, as discussed below, petitioner has not complied with the Code's substantiation requirements and has not maintained all required records, the burden ofproofas to any relevant factual issue does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442-443 (2001). II. Unemployment Compensation Petitioner does not dispute receiving wages, interest income, and unemployment compensation from third-party payers as r
ank account over whic petitioner held sole signature authority and testimony ofindividuals that they r itted checks to petitioner, for pool cleaning services rendered during the y s in issue. In addition, petitioner makes no gument that, pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden shifts to respondent. In any eve t, the record establishes that petitioner does not satisfythe preconditions found in sec. 7491(a)(2). - 14 - [*14] To reconstruct petitioner's income for the years in issue under the bank depo
Under section 6201(d), however, the burden ofproduction may shift to the Commissioner where an information return, such as a Form 1099-MISC, 'In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence to show that he satisfied the requirements ofsec. 7491(a). Therefore, petitioner bears the burden ofproofwith respect to the issues raised by the notice ofdeficiency. - 5 - Miscellaneous Inco
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that if, in any court proceeding, the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to - 12 - ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for a tax, the burden ofproofwith respect to such factual issues will be placed on the Commissioner.
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did riot argue·or,present evidence that they satisfied the 7Petitioners were allowed additional Schedule C supplies expense deductions during the audit. - 8 - requirements'ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear th
es the amount realized as "the sum ofany money received plus the fair market value ofthe property (other than money) received." In this case, the adjusted basis would be petitioner's cost for the shares "Petitioner makes no argument that, pursuantto sec. 7491(a), the burden shifts to respondent. In any event, the record establishes that petitioner does not satisfy the preconditions found in sec. 7491(a)(2). - 16 - [*16] ofMacroPore stock. See sec. 1012. Gain or loss on the sale or exchange of ca
nection with such education, may be deducted as trade or business expenses ifthe education maintains or improves the skills required by a taxpayer in his or her employment or ifthe education meets the 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. We assume that petitioner did not appreciate or anticipate the consequences ofher decision to discard or destroy records relating to the deductions here in dispute. - 9 - express req
7491(a); Gaitan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-3. Petitioners have not shownthat they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). We now address whether certain wages FS paid to Mr. Shami and Mr. McCall qualify for the research credit. A taxpayer is allowed a cre
The burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayers establish that they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (cid:16)042 (B) to substantiate items, to maintain required records, and to cooperate fully with - 12 - [*12] the Commissioner's reasonable requests.
rsuch that he or she acquires beneficial ownership interest therein. See sec. 1.83-3(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. . 1°Petitioners do not assert, nor does the record establish, that the burden of proofas to fäctual matters should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 15 - Second, where the shares are substantiallyvested in the taxpayer such that they are transferable or not subject to a substantial risk offorfeiture. See sec. 1.83-3(b), Income Tax Regs. Where both conditions are met the taxpayermu
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden ofproof with respect to the issues in the notice ofdeficiency. Deductions and cre lits are a
Our resolution is based on a preponderance of the evidence, not on an allocation of the burden pf proof. Therefore, we need not consider.whether sec. 7491(a) would apply. See Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). "Congress codified the economic substance doctrine mostly as articulàted by the Court of Appeals for
2(t)(2). We must also determine whetherthe $413,156 claimed on Schedule C is deductible as a bad debt related to petitioner's trade or business. Nonbusiness bad debts are not deductible and are treated as short-term capital losses. Sec. 8Pursuantto sec. 7491(a), petitionerhas the burden ofproofunless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus the
7491(a); Gaitan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-3. Petitioners have not shownthat they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). We now address whether certain wages FS paid to Mr. Shami and Mr. McCall qualify for the research credit. A taxpayer is allowed a cre
al losses, respectively, for 2002. As we found supra section I.A.2. ofthis report, petitioners have failed to establish: (1) their entitlement to deduct the NOLs ofHolywell, MCC, MCLP, Chopin, MCJV, and "Petitioners make no argumentthat, pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden shifts to respondent. In any event, the record establishes that petitioners do not satisfy the preconditions found in sec. 7491(a)(2) for shifting the burden; e.g., they failed to maintain records and they failed to cooperate
n for filing a frivolous appeal that asserted that only residents ofWashington, D.C., and other Federal 3Petitioner does not contend and the record does not suggest that the burden ofproofas to any factual issue should shift to respondent pursuantto sec. 7491(a). - 8 - enclaves are citizens ofthe United States subject to Federal tax laws). Similarly lacking even colorable merit are petitioner's remaining arguments, including her argument that only gain from the sale ofcapital assets and property
Under section 7491(a),.ifthe taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any.factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax and meets other requirements, the burden ofproofrests on the IRS as to that factual issue. The Floods have not established their compliance with the requirenients ofsection 7491(a). They bear the bur
erminations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Com issioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84·(1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). n some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shi to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or presbnt evidence that they satisfied the - 6 - requiremeñts ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden ofproof with respect to the issués in the notices ofdeficiency. Deductions and credits
However,3 section 7491(a) (1) provides that subject to certain limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner with respect to such issue.
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Halata does not assert that the IRS bears the burden ofproof. -21- [*21] F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1975). A taxpayer must prove a theft occurred under applicable state law by only a preponderance ofthe evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. See Allen v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 163, 166 (1951) ("Ifthe reasonable inferences
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. In the case ofan activity not engaged in for profit, section 183 generally limits allowable - 6 - deductions attributable to an activity to the extent ofgross income generated by the
them are excludable from gross income as gifts under section 102. We will sustain respondent's determinations. 1°Petitioners do not allege, andthe record does not establish, thatthe burden ofproofas to factual matters should shiftto respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 13 - Taxpayers must keep sufficient recordsto enable the Commissionerto determine their correct Federal:income t x liability. Sec. 600.1; Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 -T.C. 661, 686-687 (1989). The Commissioner is simultaneously autho
etermining ' whether an activity is engaged in for profit. No single factor is determinative. These factors are: - (1) The manner in which "In their reply brief petitioners argue for the first time that respondent has the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Ordinarily, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a party's reply brief.. See Cordes v. Commissioner, T.C.; Memo 2002-124; see also Kansky v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-40. In any event,- our resolution of this issue
Burden ofProof Even though petitioner has argued for de novo review ofthe factual issue of whether a third party, in effect, paid his underlying 1999 tax liability (payment issue), he has not invoked section 7491(a) to argue that respondent bears the burden ofproofwith respect to that issue.
hedule C, except the 6The record does not establish the nature ofthe remaining $153 ofthe "Dues and Subscriptions" of$1,573 that petitioner claimed in his 2007 Schedule C. 7Petitioner does not claim that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). We conclude that the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent under that section. - 6 - expenses relating to travel, meals, and lodging that he claimed as part ofthose "Other expenses".8 It is respondent's position that petitioner is n
n expenditure to be an ordinary and neces ary business expense, the taxpayer must show a bona fide business purpose for the expenditure; there must be a proximate 8 Petitioners have neither claime nor established that they satisfy the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) for any of he issues remaining for decision. Accordingly, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 10 - [*10] relationship between the expenditure and the business ofthe taxpayer. Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650
vent that a taxpayer establishés that a deductible expense has been paid but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, we generally may estimatethe amount ofthe deductible expense, bearing heavily 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are ap'plicable, and we proceed as though they are not. . - 7 - against the taxpayerwhose inexactitude in substantiating the amount ofthe expense is ofthe taxpayer's own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).
7491(a); see also Hiabee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440- 441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requiremeiits. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden ofproofas to any disputed fáctual issue. See Rule 142(a). Under section 6201(d),
esky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 .2 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In these cases the "statutory provisions" are section 162, which, in general, 4Under the circumstances, the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are clearly not applicable. - 7 - allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, and section 212, which, in general, allows a deduction for ordinary a
Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 7 - The parties have reached agreement with respect to all deductions attributable to Rick's Roofing with the exception ofthe deduction claimed for materials expense. According to p
ater discharged or forgiven, generally has realized an accession to wealth. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 3Other adjustments made in the notice are computational and need not be discussed. 4Petitioners do not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 5 - U.S. 1, 3 (1931). Accordingly, when a taxpayer's obligation to'repay a debt is settled for less than the amount ofthe face value ofthe debt, the taxpayer ordinarily realizes in
They have not satisfied the conditions for shifting that burden to respondentunder section 7491(a); v 1 After an extensive examination ofpetitioners' records ofexpenditures during the years in issue and negotiations before and concessions after trial, respondent - 6 - [*6] has agreed to deductions based on use of 16% ofpetitioners' home as their business offices.
The burden ofproofmay shift to the Commissioner ifthe taxpayers establish that they complied with the requ renents ofsection 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, to maintam required records, and to cooperate fully with the Commissioner's reaso e requests.
tter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproofregarding the taxpayer's entitlement to any deductions claimed.3 Rule 142(a); see also INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - (1992); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). According to petitioner, the deduction here in dispute is attr
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden ofproofas to any disputed factual issue. See Rule 142(a). Under section 6201(d), i
, 52 T.C. at 745. In support ofhis determination, respondent cites Estate ofHuntington and Estate ofLazar, where the Court concluded that settlement payments to beneficiaries were not deductible. The estate contends that these cases are 4Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the estate has the burden ofproofunless it introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus th
employee or independent contractor. Boles Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 77 F.3d 236, 239- 240 (8th Cir.1996); Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 263, 268 (2001). The burden ofproofshifts to the Commissioner in certain situations under section 7491(a). Petitioners do not argue that the burden ofproofshifts to respondent and have not shown that the threshold requirements have been met. Therefore theburden ofproofremains with petitioners. Petitioners contend that Mr. Specks was an em
Thus, the conditions ofsection 7491(a) are not satisfied, and th burden ofproofremains on petitioner.
er's use ofthe property, relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the address listed on the taxpayer's tax returns and driver's license and the mailing address for bills and correspondence. Sec. 1.121-1(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. 4Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). . . . , 8Petitioner would not prevail under these facts in any event. The notice of deficiency was not arbitrary and capricious because it rightly identified petitioner, showed that deficiencies had been determined, stated the taxable years involved, and set forth the deficiency amounts. See Pasternak v. Commissioner, 99
Griffins contend, however, that their transfers to ACM were loans and ACM's payments oftheir personal expenses were loan repayments.5 4Respondent determined that ACM was liable for accuracy-relatedpenalties but has conceded this issue. 5Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden ofproofunless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, and thus
Claiped$25,000 Theft Loss A theft includes, but is not limited to, larceny, embezzlement, and robbery. West v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 152, 162-163 (1987); sec. 1.165-8(d), Income Tax Regs.; Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. In Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956), the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit explained
ax Regs. II. Adjusted Basis The first issue under consideration is whetherpetitioner is entitled to adjusted bases in both the Rayen property and the Amador property in excess of 'Petitioner has not claimed or shown that she meets the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any relevant factual issue. -5- [*5] the amounts respondent has determined. Under section 1001, the gain from the sale ofproperty is the excess ofthe amount realized over the adjusted basis
Section 6402(a) provides that the Commissioner may apply an.
2The sum of$2,798 plus $3,955 is $6,753. - 4 - Generally, taxpayers are required to include COI in gross income, sec. 61(a)(12); Hill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-101, and section 61(a)(12) specifically includes income from discharge ofindebtedness. Specific statutory exclusions or offsets from gross income are provided in sec
- 8 - Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden ofproving that he is entitled to any deductions claimed.5 Rule 142(a); see also INDOPCO, Inc.
An exception to this general rule is found in section 7491(a), which places the burden ofproofon the Commissioner ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining her liability, has complied with the substantiation requirements, has maintained all records required, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for.witnesses, information, docu
We resolve the issues here on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation of the burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not consider whether sec. 7491(a) would apply. See Estate ofBlack v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340, 359 (2009). -16- and the payments therefore are deductible as interest. We now turn to whether the advance was de
Petitioner did not argue that the burden should shift, and he failed to maintain required records or comply with the substantiation requirements. Accordingly, the burden ofproofremains on petitioner. V. Petitioner's Basis in 2115 India Street We note that petitioner did not submit any documentary evidence to the Court concerning his b
7491(a); Hiebee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). However, because our conclusions are based on the preponderance ofthe evidence, allocation ofthe - 21 - [*21] burden ofproofis immaterial here. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). B. Unreimbursed Employee Expenses Section 162 allows a taxpayert
ioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-163. Respondent has established a sufficient evidentiary foundation linking petitioner with the income-producing.activityby showing that petitioner 7 Petitioner has neither claimed nor shownthat he satisfied the requirements ofsec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondentwith regard to any factual issue affecting the deficiency in his tax. - 6 - held a 40% interest in Café Savannah in 2007. Thus, respondent's determination ofunreported income is entitled to the pre
gest that these arguménts have some colorable merit."). Petitioner's challenge lacks any substance, andthe underlying tax liabilities stand as assessed by respondent. ' 9 Petitionerhas neither claimed nor shown that he satisfieN the requiren ents ofsec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondentwith regard to any factual issue. Although the Court ordered petitionerto file a posttrial brief, he failed tò do so. - 11 - II. Collection Action Having established under a de novo review standardt
Section 61 provides that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived and, in section 61(a)(1), specifically lists compensation for services.
d to keep their own records................................. 50 - 4 - b. Taxpayers are required to retain their records as long as they may become material for tax purposes. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2. Burden shift under section 7491(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3. Alleged animus . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4. New matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 B. Collateralestoppel .............
Petitioners have not proven or presented adequate evidence to shift the burden ofproofthat any ofthe material participation tests they rely upon are satisfied. As the sole owner ofthe micro-utility activity, petitioner claims that he performed all "tasks, functions and services ofand for the business, including management and marke
010). Ofcourse, itemized deductions allowed in this proceeding would be in lieu of, rather than in additionto, the standard deductions claimed on petitioner's 2004 and 2005 Federal income tax returns. 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are applicable, andwe proceed as though they are not. - 12 - U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayerto substantiate deductions claimed by keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissionerto determine the
7491(a)(1) and (2); Hizbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). "Credible evidence" is evidence that, after critical analysis, would constitute a sufficient basis for deciding the issue in favor ofthe taxpayer ifno contrary evidence were submitted. Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 105, 114 (2009), aff'd, 613 F.3d 1360-
In the est te's view, once we do so, it becomes clear that the estate provided credible evid nce to shift the burden ofproofto respondent under section 7491(a) on the issue ofwhether Clyde Sr.
Our resolution is based on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation ofthe burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not consider whether sec. 7491(a) would apply. See Estate ofBongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). '4Congress codified the economic substance doctrine mostly as articulated (continued...) -17- Commission
Section 7491(a) (1) and (2) shifts the burden of proof to'the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if (1) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such issue and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, including cooperation with the Government's requests for witnesses, - 8 -
inations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements ofsection 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden ofproof with respect to the adjustments in the notice ofdeficiency. - 5 - I. Unreported Inco
e determinations are in error.2 Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and a taxpayermust prove entitlement 2Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden ofproofto respondent as to any factual issue relating to their tax liability. - 5 - to claimed deductions. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Taxpayers must keep sufficient records
As petitioner did not argue or prove that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met, the burden of pròof does not shift to respondent.
issues. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). However, petitioner has not argued that the -11 - [*11] burden ofproofshould shift to respondent, nor has he maintained all required records and cooperated with respondent's requests as required by section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Accor
esky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 .2 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In these cases the "statutory provisions" are section 162, which, in general, 4Under the circumstances, the provisions ofsec. 7491(a) are clearly not applicable. - 7 - allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, and section 212, which, in general, allows a deduction for ordinary a
the taxpayerhas the burden ofproving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden ofproofwith respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). As petitioners did not argue or prove that the requirements ofsection 7491(a) have been met, the burden ofproofdoes not shift to respondent. - 5 - Deductions are a matter oflegislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden ofproving t
d unreported taxable interest income of$158,615 for 2004 and that his filing status for 2002 is "married filing separately". 3Petitioner argues that respondent bears the burden ofproofwith respect to all factual issues in this proceeding pursuant to sec. 7491(a). However, the burden ofproofhas no practical consequence in this case, as there is no evidentiary tie. Our fimdings with respect to all factual issues are based upon a preponderance of the evidence. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d
Petitioner has not contended, and we do not conclude, that the burden of proofshould shift to respondent. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Respondent contends that petitioner had zero income during 2007 and was not engaged in the hair-braiding business. Instead, respondent contends, petitioner reported income on her tax return for the
tions are erroneous.. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, there is no burden shift under section 7491. - 7 - I. The 2003 Loss Claim and the 2004 and 2005 NOL Carryforwards Petit
Section 7491(a) (1) imposes the burden of persuasion on the IRS if the taxpayer satisfies the conditions of section 7491(a) (2) and introduces credible evidence on factual issues relevant to the taxpayer's liability for a tax under subtitle A or B of.the Internal Revenue Code. A taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the conditions in section 74
Section 7491(a) therefore applies and shifts the burden of proofto respondent with respectto Rukan/Wheeler's cash contribution. B. Whetherthe Cash Contributions Were "Contributions or Giftà" Under Section 170(c) A cash paymentto a qualified organizationmay be deductible under section 170 ifthe payment is a "contribution or gift" under section 170(c
d "cooperated with Respondent at every stage ofthese - 11 - proceedings, including the audit." WÑ are not persuaded, however, that petitioners c¢mplied with substantiation and recordkeeping requirements as necessary to shift the burden ofproofunder section 7491(a). As discussed in more detail below, although petitioners offered some documentary evidence and testimony, it is insufficient to establish their bases in Respira and thus their entitlement to losses, lVloreover, petitioners did not main
ssary for us t address the parties' disagreement and determine whet er the burden has shifted because the parties have provided suffi ient evidence for us to determine the value of .the conservation e sements and that determinatiori is unaffected by section 7491(a) . See Estate of Bongard v. - 18 - Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005); Trout Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-283. This Court has held that "In a situation in which both parties have satisfied their burden of production b
Section 7491(a) therefore applies and shifts the burden of proofto respondent with respectto Rukan/Wheeler's cash contribution. B. Whetherthe Cash Contributions Were "Contributions or Giftà" Under Section 170(c) A cash paymentto a qualified organizationmay be deductible under section 170 ifthe payment is a "contribution or gift" under section 170(c
7491(a); Gaitan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-3. Petitioners have not shownthat they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). We now address whether certain wages FS paid to Mr. Shami and Mr. McCall qualify for the research credit. A taxpayer is allowed a cre
7491(a); Gaitan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-3. Petitioners have not shownthat they complied with the requirements ofsection 7491(a). The burden ofproof, therefore, remains with petitioners. See Rule 142(a). We now address whether certain wages FS paid to Mr. Shami and Mr. McCall qualify for the research credit. A taxpayer is allowed a cre
We resolve the issues here on a preponderance ofthe evidence, not on an allocation of the burden ofproof. Therefore, we need not consider whether sec. 7491(a) would apply. S_ee Estate ofBlackv. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340, 359 (2009). - 8 - when the relevant capital gains income was realized from the IA sale. A partnership is not subj
In the estate’s view, once we do so, it becomes clear that the estate provided credible evidence to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) on the issue of whether Clyde Sr.
Our resolution is based on a preponderance of the evidence, not on an allocation of the burden of proof. Therefore, we need not consider whether section 7491(a) would apply. See Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 111 (2005). We now consider the relevant provision. Generally, a refundable tax credit is allowed to a first-t
nternet services were not available at the parents’ house. Pursuant to sec. 36(g), a taxpayer may claim an FTHBC on the taxpayer’s Federal income tax return for the calendar year preceding the year of purchase of the principal residence. Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of proof unless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and t
g which a retirement contribution was made. In subsequent years, this amount was increased to take into account cost of living adjustments. Respondent does not challenge that the statute was in the nature of a workmen’s compensation act. Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of proof unless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and t
And while subsequent events generally are not considered in fixing fair market value, they may be considered to the extent that they were reasonably foreseeable on the date as of which the value is fixed. E.g., Estate of Gifford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987). Mr. Argote testified that, “based upon what * * * [he] knew i
ayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering,s 290 U.S. 1141, 115 (1933).. In some cases the bugden of proof with respect to relevants factual issues may shift toa the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the - requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Capital GainiIncome. Petitioners argue that they relied on their ta
Under section 7491(a) (1), th,e burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect toiany factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability. Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491 applies, nor did they introduce a sufficiency of evidence to invoke that section; the
ns are erroneous. Rule 142:(a);- see* INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may- shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner3 did not argue or present - evidence that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) Therefore, petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to the issues in the notice:of deficiency. Deductions and credits are
In some instances, section 7491(a) imposes the burden of proof on the IRS." Kaider argues that the IRS has the burden of proving the checks were not loans because, he claims, he introduced credible evidence that the checks were loans..
n Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039-1040 (1939), affd. 113 F-.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940), the Board of Tax.Appeals held 2All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, as in effect for the years ät issue. 3Although sec. 7491(a) imposes the burden of proof on the IRS if certain conditions are met, the Kuntzes concede that they bear the burden of proof . that a ,married couple= could not deduct the cost of paying nannies to look after their child, even though the
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, nor does the record establish that petitioners satisfy the section 7491(a) (2) requirements.
Section 7491(a) (1) provides that if, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's proper tax liability, the Commissioner shall have the burden of proof with respect to that issue. Credible evidence is evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to
7491(a); Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. - 10 - Memo. 2001-255 (citing H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 994-995). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they complied with the substantiation requirements of section 7491(a). The burden of proof, therefore, remains on petitioners. See Rule 142(a). Petitioners cl
7491(a) (2) (A) and ()B). Petitioner does not argue nor do we find that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent. II. Taxation of Nonresident Aliens Under the Code We now consider how petitioner's endorsement income should be taxed in the United States. The United States generally taxes nonresident aliens only if they engage in a U.S. tra
ome and expenses both from his Respondent also made an adjustment increasing the amount of petitioner's self-employment tax. The adjustment is computational and presents no issue that we need further address. 2Petitioner has not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. We conclude that sec. 7491(a) does nót apply here because petitioner has not produced any evidence that he has satisfied the preconditions for its application. -
missioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965). 3Because of an inconsistency in the notice of deficiency, the amount respondent allowed/disallowed as a charitable contribution deduction for 2006 is unclear. "Petitidner does not claim that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. I. - 6 - Petitioner has failed to produce any substantiating documents to support any of the deductions here in dispute. According to petitioner, her records were stolen from a storag
f proving that those determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden of proof for factual matters may be shifted to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden of proof with respect to the issues in the notice of deficiency. Deductions and credits are
e not compensated for by insurance are deductible to the extent they are in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. See sec. 213(a). - 4 - cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). The Court, however, finds that petitioners have not met the requirements of section 7491(a), and the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Petitioners' Deductions As the Court must often state, deductions are strictly a matter
While section 7491(a) may place the burden of proof upon the Commissioner in certain circumstances, petitioner conceded at trial that petitioner has the burden of proof." II. Noncash Contribution A taxpayer is generally allowed a deduction for any charitable contribution made during the taxable year. Sec. 170(a) (1). A charitable contribution includes a
the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d) in order to bè deductible. See || sec. 274(d) (2); sec. 1.274-5T(b) (3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., sPetitioner has not shown entitlement t a shift in the burden of proof to respondent under sec. 7491(a) with respect to any factual issue. See H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239-242 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993-996 (taxpayer hÁs the burden of proving that he meets prerequisites for application of sec. 7491(a)). A prerequisite to a shift in the
7491(a) (1) and (2) (A) and (B). The Estate filed a motion to shift the burden of proof to respondent. After reviewing all of the evidence presented, we have found that resolving this case does not depend on which party bears the burden of proof. The parties adduced testimony and offered exhibits supporting their respective positions. Accordin
T.C. 9(...contin ed) reconstruct Mr. Gleason's income. However, because respondent relied on a second method, the unit and volume method, respondent must still establish an evidentiary foundation linking Mr. Gleason with Gleason Supply. °Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof onifactual issues that afféct the taxpayer's tax liability may shift to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." The burden will shift only if the taxpayer
7491(a) (1) and (2) (A) and (B). We find that petitioner failed to provide credible evidence and failed to substantiate the claimed theft losses for 2004. The burden of proof therefore remains on petitioner. In addition, the Court reviews any determination regarding the underlying liability de novo if a taxpayer's underlying liability is.prope
perty use include those for entertainment, including meals, or automobile use. Secs. 274(d) (2), (4), 280F(d) (4); sec. 1.274-2(b) (1), Income Tax Regs. 3Petitioner has not claimed or shown entitlement to any shift in the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). -5- Taxpayers must substantiate such expenditures or property use by adequate records made at or near the time of the expenditure or use of (i) the amount of the expense, (ii) the time and place of the entertainment or use of the proper
If an information return, such as a Form 1099-C, serves as the basis for the determination of a deficiency, section 6201(d) may apply to shift the burden of production to the Commissioner. Section 6201(d) provides that in any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to the income reported on an in
e basis for these determinations in the assorted papers in the administrative record, these determinations in. certain aspects appear contradictory or incomplete. "Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 8 - taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the .taxpayer liable for-any"unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6C15(f)(1). Rev..Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 (the revenue prccedure) , prescribes'
11, 115 (1933). Because the IRS disallowed their exclusion of the UFCW Pension Plan disability retirement benefits, the Zardos bear the burden of proving they are entitled to the claimed exclusion.3 We consider whether the SUnder some circumstances, sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the IRS. The Zardos have neither argued, nor adduced evidence, that the conditions of sec. 7491(a) have been det. Thus, the burden of proof has not shifted to the IRS on any issue. Even if the burden of proo
Section 7491(a) (1) shifts the burden of proof to the IRS if (i) the taxpayer satisfies the conditions set forth in section 7491(a) (2) and (ii) the taxpayer introduces credible evidence on factual - 10 - issues relevant to the taxpayer's liabi-lity for a tax under subtitle A or B. To satisfy section 7491(a) (2), the taxpayer must comply with the
ations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the.Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden of proof with respect to the issues in the notice of deficiency. Deductions and credits are
Dependency Exemption Deduction Section 151(a) and (c) allows taxpayers an annual exemption deduction for each "dependent" as defined in section 152.
expenses in 2007 were more than $55,000. - 4 - circumstances, it does not do so-here for at least three independent reasons: Petitioner failed to raise the matter; petitioner failed to comply with recordkeeping and substantiation requirements, see sec. 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B); and petitioner failed to introduce the requisite quality of evidence, see sec. 7491(a) (1). Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden of proof. Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer bears th
-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In the event that a taxpayer establishes that a deductible expense has been paid but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, we generally may estimate the amount of the 3Petitioner does not claim that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. deductible expense, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude in substantiating the amount of the expense is of the taxpayer's own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
The IRS's notice of deficiency made adjustments that were premised on the theory that the activities of MacLeisure Creations were not engaged in for profit within the meaning of section 183.
d correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determinations are erroneous. ule 142(a);4 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 115 (1933) . The Estate does not argue that the burden.of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). We therefore find that the burden of proof remains with the Estate. II. Interest Expense We now turn to whether the Estate may deduct the interest on the loan from the Walter Trust as an administration expense under section 2053. The
ner has supplied extensive documentation in the form of receipts and other materials reflecting his expenditure of various amounts for specific purposes. The 2No question was raised by either party regarding the shifting of the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). - 6 - question remains as to whether petitioner duplicated those expenditures in his return and/or whether they are otherwise deductible. We have carefully reviewed-the evidence and compared the various schedules and must conclude.and h
pursuant toisection 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's sThe circumstaNces leading to etit'ioner's divorce, which occurred in the gen ral timeframe.of 1995-97, are unclear.
Under section 7491(a), however, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax, but only if the taxpayer produces credible evidence to support his position, the taxpayer complied with the substantiation requirements, and the taxpayer cooperated with the Secretary? with regard t
re exceptions to this rule. For example, the IRS bears the burden of proof for (i) new matters, (ii) increases in deficiency, and (iii) affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer. Rule 142(a). But none of these issues are involved here. And although sec. 7491(a) can shift the burden to the IRS in cases involving liability for taxes imposed by subtit. A or B, subtit. C imposes the employment taxes at issue, so sec. 7491(a) cannot shift the burden here. See, e.g., Joseph M. Grey Pub. (continued...
1933) . A nedessary expense is one that is appropriate and helpful in carrying on "the trade or business. Id. at 113; Heineman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 538, 543 (1984) . An employee's trade or -business is the earning =of compensation, and generally Sec. 7491(a) (1) shifts the burden of proof to the • Commissioner under certain circumstances. Petitioners have neither alleged that this section applies nor established their compliance with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements . See se
4 (10th Cir. 1982). To be "ordinary:and necessary", expenses must be "reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of taxable income". Sec. 212; sec. 1.212-1(d), Income Tax Regs. sPursuant to sec. 7491(a), Mr. Van Wickler has the burden of proof unless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and
Petitioner does not contend, nor does the record allow us to conclude, that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.
Generally, the limitation amount is based on the amount of the taxpayer's earned income and whether the taxpayer has no qualifying children, one qualifying child, or two or more qualifying children, as defined in section 152(c).
se, nor do we find that he has fully cooperated with respondent.7 Accordingly, -petitioner bears the bur en of proof. 7Petitioner does not assert, nor would we conclude, that the burden of proof as to factual matters should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 10 - Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) * * * Compensation, for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items". Sec. 61(a) (1). Re
on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which" the deduction relates has *Petitioner does not claim that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as' though they are not. - 7 - been paid or incurred. See sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. In general, and subjebt to numerous conditions and limitations, a tax
Although the burden of proof is imposed on the IRS if the conditions of section 7491(a) are met, Anyanwu has not shown that these conditions have been met.
. v.. Commissioner, ,107 T.C. 194, 104 (1996) The burden of proof on factual issues :that affect a taxpayer'scliability for tax may be shi-fted to the Commissionér where, Ethe "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a) (1) . o Petitioner argues that the burden shifts to respor).dent under sectiono74913(a) . Respondent disagrees and arguesathat peti-tioner has .not: satisfied the requirements of section 7491. A shift in - 31 - the burden of persuasion "
ony and in fact tend to support respondent's determinations as to his gross receipts for 2005 and 2006.4 Taking into.account 3Petitioner does not contend and the record does not suggest that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). 'Petitioner's self-created profit and loss statements show gross receipts of $55,746 for 2005 and $56,338 for 2006. a number of inconsistencies in petitioner's testimony, we do not find it credible or plausible. Petitioner has failed to
g sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.). The determination of fair market value is a question of fact. Id. I. Value of Marital Trusts As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to whether the burden of proof has been shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). The burden-of proof is relevant only when there is equal evidence on both sides: "In a case where the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence and the preponderance of the evidence favors one party, we may decide the case o
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a) (11) (B), and the term "or his delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by
oner "is due negative adjustmentssto income ,(as computed by reference to the Notice) for 1997 and 1998 of $26,030.35 and.$12,058.00, respectively." The record is inadequate for the Court to replicate these calculations. "Pursuant to Rule 142(a) and sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden.of proof on.theser issues unless she introduces credible evidence so as to shift the burden to respondent. Because,our conclusions are based on a preponderance of the evidences, the allocation of the burden-of
Section.6201(d) provides that-in any court a .
taxpayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are-erroneous. See Rule 142(a),; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of.proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present sufficient evidence that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Petitioners argue that they should be able to deduct, as b
's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpAyer introduces credible evidence with respect to- * * * such issue." Sec. - 19 - 7491(a) (1). Petitioners have failed to establish that they have satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) (2). On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). II. Economic Substance Doctrine "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxe
Section.7491(a) (1) provides that, subject to certain - limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner with respect to sthat issue.
Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof is immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). 1. Introduction Each party called an expert witness to opine on the value of the 41.128-percent limited partner interest. Of
The estate argues that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491. Our resolution of the issue is based on the preponderance of the evidence rather than the allocation of the burden of proof; therefore, we need not address the estate's arguments with respect to the burden of proof. See Estate of Jorgensen v. Commissio
ounting, or photography-- and no further explanatory evidence is provided. Because petitioner has not maintained and submitted adequate records to substantiate his claimed expenses, petitioners do not qualify for a shift in the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a) (2). - 9 - Petitioner produced no* credible- documentation with regard to claimed gasoline purchases, car repairs expenses, and toll costs. Documentation petitioner produced in support of car and truck expenses, gifts a
om an established place of business. See Miller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 97, 101-103 (1981); Kemon v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1026, 1032 (1951); sec. (...continued) all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 2Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioner has the burden of proof unless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and thus
7491(a), (c); Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); cf. H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 995. of a different beneficiary who is a member of the original beneficiary's family. Sec. 529(c) (3) (C) (i). Petitioner does not deny that he requested·the three distributions or that he received a check for e
, 345 (1975). If a taxpayer establishes that a trade or business expense allowable as a deduction under section 162(a) has been paid or incurred, but has no records to substantiate the payment of the 2Petitioner does not claim that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. expense, we may approximate the amount of the allowable deduction if there is sufficient evidence to provide a basis for the estimate. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d -540, 543-544 (2
The parties agree that petitioner does not qualify for a shift in the burden of proof under section 7491 because of the net worth limitations of section 7491(a) (2) (C).
Section 7491(a) (1) and (2), however, provides an exception that shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as.to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if (1) the taxpayer * Respondent has stipulated that petitioner was not at the casino on the following dates: Apr. 17, Nov. 24, Nov. 26, Nov. 29, Nov. 30, ,Dec. 7, and Dec
3 The support order further provides that the custodial and noncustodial parents are to sign the Federal income tax dependency exemption waiver.
tivity with a profit objective.3 Rule 142(a). In deciding this question, regulations under section 183 set forth a nonexclusive list of nine factors which generally are 3Petitioners do not argue for a shift of the burden of proof to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 15 - considered and which we discuss below. Sec. 1.183-2 (b) , Income Tax Regs. Manner in Which the Activity Is Carried On Petitioners generally carried on their FHF horse activity in a reasonably businesslike manner. During the 1990s
But section 7491 (a) (1) imposes the burden of proof on the IRS if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and satisfies the conditions of section 7491(a) (2) .
has the burden of proving that those determinations are 'erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, ,290?U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some - 4 - cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). As there is no dispute as to a factual.issue in this case, section 7491(a) is not applicable. A taxpayer seeking a refund of overpaid taxes ordinarily mu t ile a timely claim for a refund with the IRS that meets the requirements of se
Under section 7491(a) (1), the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability. Petitioner did not allege that section 7491 applies, nor did he introduce the requisite evidence to invoke that section; therefore, t
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a) (11) (B), and the term "or his delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by
s assigned to payments by the parties or a divorce court are not determinative for Federal income tax purposes. Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 3Where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, we decide the case without regard to the burden of proof or sec. 7491(a). - 6 - 1275, 1283-1284 (1981). Moreover, State court.adjudications I retroactively redesignating payments as alimony and not child support (or vice.versa) are generally disregarded for Federal income tax purposes. See Gordon v. Commissio
unless the emotional distress is attributable to a personal physical injury or physical sickness, or (2) except to the extent the damages do not exceed amounts paid'for medical care attributable to.emotional distress. See .sec. 104 (a) (flush language); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1605, 110 Stat.
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, and the record does not permit us to conclude that the requirements of section 7491(a) are met.
Under section 7491(a), the burden of- proof shifts to respondent if petitioners :complied with; requir ments' to substantiate an item, maintained all required becords, and presented credible evidence as- to a factual issue. " Petitioners have not done so, and thus the burden has not hifted. For 2005 ·petitioners divided the real property casualty loss de
are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burde of proof with - 4 - respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that she.satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to the issues in the notice of deficiency. Deductions and credits are a
Section 215(b) defines alimony or separate maintenance as any "payment (as defined in section 71(b)) which is includible in the gross income of the recipient under section 71." Section 71(b) provides a four-step inquiry for determining whether a cash payment is alimony: SEC.
Section 7491(a), however, sometimes placess the burden of proof upon the Commissioner. The record allows us to decide-this case without regard to which party bears the burden of proof. We proceed to do so. We need not 'and do not decide which party bears the burden of proof. III. Section 199 A. Applicable Text Our substantive analysis begins with t
Accordingl , section 7491(a) is not applicable.
e basis for these determinations in the assorted papers in the administrative record, these determinations in. certain aspects appear contradictory or incomplete. "Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 8 - taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the .taxpayer liable for-any"unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6C15(f)(1). Rev..Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 (the revenue prccedure) , prescribes'
reported as "OTHER IN.I COME" in his 2005 return. As a result, respondent further determined in the 2005 notice to eliminate from petitioner's total income that $14,159. 3Petitioner does not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). On the record before us, we onclude that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under that section. See id. - 5 - ing, stamps, and other expenses associated with being a realtor.4 Respondent disagrees. Section 162(a) generally
itioners' bank account transactions evidencing income and . expenses of the 3Although sec. .7Ül(a) may shi t Èhe burden of proof to the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioners have fallen far short of satisfying the prerequisites under sec. 7491(a) (1) and (2) for such a shift. - 11 - construction business, as well as documentation felated to petitioners' real estate transactions. Conseque tly, respondent's determination is entitled to the pr sumption of correctness.4 . II. Limitati
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). The burden of proof on factual issues that affect a taxpayer's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a) (1). On the record before us, we do not need to reference the burden of proof to resolve this case as the facts are adequately presented. Therefore, we need not determine whether section 7491(a).(1) is applicable. II. Sale of Annuity Cont
7491(a) (1) and (2). As discussed infra, petitioners have failed to provide substantiation for required items. Accordingly, they are not entitled to-a shift in the burden of proof under 7491(a). II. Applicability of Section 183 to Petitioners' Amway Activity A. In General Under section 183 (a), if an activity is not engaged in for profit, then
ering, 290 U.:S. 111, 115 (1933) In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant'factual issues maÿ shift to the Commissioner under section 749I(à). Petitioners did -not 'argue ór present evidence that they sati'sfied the; requirements of'section 7491(a). Therefore, the-burden of proof does not' shift toerespondent . Other Inconie Section 6001 requirés a taxpayer to maintain sufficient a , records to allow for the determination of the taxpayer's cörrect tax liability. Petzoldt v. Comm
Petitioner neither claims nor shows that he satisfies the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden of proof. B. Schedule C Deductions Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers have the burden of showing that they are entitled to any deduc
However, NEA did not argue for a shift in the burden of proof, and the record does not suggest a basis for such a shift. - 15 - 511(a) (1) . One of the main purposes for taxing UBTI is to prevent unfair competition with taxable counterparts and to curb related abuses by otherwise nontaxable businesses. United States v. American Bar E
ions are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,.115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect-to relevant factual issues -may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . If an information return, . such as a' Form 1099-R, is the basis for the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency, section 6201
s the burden of showing that the deposits made into his account represent nontaxable income. See DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 868. As to income and deduction items, petitioner must present credible evidence to shift the burden to respondent under section 7491(a). He has not done so. - 14 - Of the deposits to petitioner's accounts the IRS uncovered during the audit, the following remain in issue for 1999: Source Amount 1964 Trust $19,650 1978 Trust 107,050 Unknown sources 43 , 400 The followin
7491(a); Rule 142(a) (2). Petitioners claim this is one of those cases. Respondent does not dispute petitioners' claim that the burden has shifted to respondent with respect to the validity of the formula clauses. Respondent argues only that petitioners bear the burden if they aspire to deduct more than $66,284,.57 in charitable contributions.
The 1(...continued) the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. -5- Burchfields have not presented credible evidence that any of the adjustments that produced the deficiency of $21,343 were incorrect. Thus, the Bur
Our conclusions here, however, are based on the preponderance of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof is immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). I. Caring for Foster Cats Was a Service to Fix Our Ferals. Section 170(a) allows a d duction for any "charitable contribut
Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). The burden of proof on a factual issue that affects a taxpayer's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect.to * * * such issue." Sec. 7491(a) (1). 'Peatitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they complied with the substantiation - 5 - requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, the burden of proof remains on petitioners. See Rule 142(a). Section 469 generally disallows an
r has -the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues - 7 - may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners argue that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent because they have met the requirements of section 7491. The Court, however, as discussed below, finds that petitioners have not met the requirements of section 7491(
ations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not argue or present evidence that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore, petitioners bear the burden of proof with respect to the issues in the notice of deficiency. Deductions and credits are
taxpayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). As petitioner did not argue or prove that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Capital Gain The gain from the sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the
the burden of showing that the deposits made into his account represent nontaxable income. See DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 868 . As to income and deduction items, petitioner must present credible evidence to shift the burden to respondent under section 7491(a). He has not done so. - 14 - Of the deposits to petitioner's accounts the IRS uncovered during the audit, the following remain in issue for 1999: Source Amount 1964 Trust $19,650 1978 Trust 107,050 Unknown sources 43,400 The following
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, nor does the record establish that petitioners satisfy the section 7491(a) (2) requirements.
4 (10th Cir. 1982). To be "ordinary:and necessary", expenses must be "reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of taxable income". Sec. 212; sec. 1.212-1(d), Income Tax Regs. sPursuant to sec. 7491(a), Mr. Van Wickler has the burden of proof unless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and
Petitioner does not contend, nor does the record allow us to conclude, that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.
7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). The term "Secretary" means "the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate", sec. 7701(a) (11) (B), and the term "or his delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by
se, nor do we find that he has fully cooperated with respondent.7 Accordingly, -petitioner bears the bur en of proof. 7Petitioner does not assert, nor would we conclude, that the burden of proof as to factual matters should shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 10 - Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) * * * Compensation, for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items". Sec. 61(a) (1). Re
Petitioner has not alleged, and we do not find, that the burden of proof should shift to respondent. See sec. 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B). 'At some point before trial petitioner found some records relating to his Schedule C activity. Also at some point before trial petitioner claimed entitlement to dependency exemption deductions and a m
However, NEA did not argue for a shift in the burden of proof, and the record does not suggest a basis for such a shift. Since the organization’s publication is a means of accomplishing its exempt purpose, the net profit resulting from the publishing activity is treated as income related to its exempt activity, not unrelated income. T
nt for charitable contribution deduction purposes. See Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440-441 (1934). Because petitioner did not present credible evidence of value, the burden of proof did not shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Although respondent’s experts determined a value less than that set forth in the statutory notice, respondent has not asked for an increased deficiency. We are persuaded by the evidence in the record that the highest and best use of
Section 7491(a), however, sometimes places the burden of proof upon the Commissioner. The record allows us to decide this case without regard to which party bears the burden of proof. We proceed to do so. We need not and do not decide which party bears the burden of proof. III. Section 199 A. Applicable Text Our substantive analysis begins with the
Our conclusions here, however, are based on the preponderance of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof is immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). I. Caring for Foster Cats Was a Service to Fix Our Ferals. Section 170(a) allows a deduction for any “charitable contribut
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Petitioner does not argue nor do we find that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent. II. Taxation of Nonresident Aliens Under the Code We now consider how petitioner’s endorsement income should be taxed in the United States. The United States generally taxes nonresident aliens only if they engage in a U.S. trade
l issues that affect a taxpayer’s liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue.” Sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioner argues that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). Respondent disagrees and argues that petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of section 7491. A shift in the burden of persuasion “has real significance only in the rare event of an evidentiary tie.” Blodgett v. Commissioner, 39
sporadic activi-ty, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not qualify. Id. Whether an individual is carrying on a 1 3The burden of proof with respect to a factual issue affecting a taxpayer.'s liability for tax may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a) if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue and establishes compliance with the requirements of sec. 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully, cooperating with the Secr
Bennett makes no argument that the burden should shift under section 7491(a), and the record shows no basis for such a contention .) When this case was originally called for trial on February 9, 2009, the Court observed that the evidence for the case was not in order, stated to Ms .
(,1934) Although section 7491(a) may serve to shift .
Petitioner does not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) - and has not shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) were met.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain . situations . Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) and have not shown that the threshold requirements of section 7491(a) were met . In any .event, we decide the issues involving whether petitioners may deduct the legal
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual , issue shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces .credible evidence with respect to that issue . Rule 142(a)(2) . Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown eligibility f.or .a shift in the burden of proof . I . Dependency Exemption Deductions Generally,. a taxpayer may cla
111, 115 (1933) .- In .certain circumstances, if'the taxpayer introduces credible, evidence with respect to`any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability for tax, section 7491(a) shifts the burden to the Commissioner but only if the taxpayer establishes,that he has complied with.
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to th'e Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting a taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section. Petitioner moved for a burden shift under section, 7491(a), contending -that she produced credible evidence and- met the other requiremen
Under section 7491(a) the .burden may shift to the Commissioner- regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner has neither produced credible evidence nor established his compliance with the other requirements of section 7491(a) . Petitioner therefore bears the burden of p
ubtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue . Petitioners allege that they have satisfied all the prerequisites to the application of section 7491 and, therefore, respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a) . with regard to each of the factual issues . Petitioners argue that these cases are similar to McWhorter v . Commissioner, T .C . Memo . 2008-263, and Forste v . Commissioner , T .C. Memo . 2003-103, where the burden of proof was shi
OPINION Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof a - 5 - to respondent .
In addition, petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, nor does the record establish that petitioner satisfies the section 7491(a)(2) requirements .
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters affec ing a taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section. Petitioner moved for a burden shift under section 7491(a), contendipg that she produced - 15 - credible evidence and met the other requir
90 .U.S . 1.11 ; 115 (193'3) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift(cid:127)tothe Commissioner under section .7491(a),. Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden-of proof with respect to the issues in the notice of deficiency does-not shift to respondent . ` Petitioner argues that he-is entitled to deduct the ordinary and necessary business expenses of his "research and
er has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 115 .(1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Business Expenses Section 162 generally allows a deduction for ordina
income. As respondent notes, there is a threshold question whether the simplified method applies, because it is unclear that the annuity payments in question were made from a 3Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any factual issue. 4Even if the annuity payments were not paid out of an IRA, they would still be taxable according to the sec. 72 rules, and our analysis would not be significantly differe
Dependency Exemptions A taxpayer may claim a dependency exemption "for each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer for the taxable year ." Sec .
OPINION Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
Commissioner , supra at 442 ("In order for section 7491(a) to place the burden of: proof on respondent , the taxpayer must first provide credible evidence .") .
taxpayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the. Commissioner under section 7491(a). Because petitioners have not satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. Section 162 generally allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during- the t
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting a taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section. In her pretrial memorandum, petitioner mentioned that she would move for a burden shift under section 7491(a), contending that she had pro
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner does not argue that she satisfied the elements for a burden shift, but even if she did, we need not and explicitly do not decide the issue because we resolve this
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift .to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section . - 5 - Petitioner has neither argued for a burden shift nor established his compliance with-the requirements of section 7491(a) . Petitioner, therefore, bears the burden of prov
Petitigner does not assert that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to-section 7491(a); but even if he did, we need not and do not decide the issue because we resolve the case on the preponderance of the evidence and not on an allocation of the burden of proof, rendering the issue of burden moot.
OPINION Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the IRS if a taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to a factual issue and meets other conditions. Among these conditions is, first, that the taxpayer met all substantiation requirements. Second, the taxpayer must have maintained all required records and complied with the IRS's requests for in
er has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 1 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner 2Petitioner'filed an amended return while residing in Arizona . 3The Schedule A lists home mortgage interest reported on Form 1098, Mortgage Interest Statement, of $3,030 and $8,651 paid to Mr . Chandrasekhar, a total of
objective and credible evidence that the Texas Health and Human Services Commission intended that any-part of petitioner's settlement proceeds be allocated to her medical expenses and therefore has not shifted the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) . In any event, the preponderance of the evidence is that the settlement was unallocated among multiple claims, many of which were not for physical injuries or physical sickness . We must conclude on the evidence that the settlement p
Burden of Proof and Production Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears .the burden 'of production with respect to 'the -liability.
9 - Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability.
burden to produce reasonable and probative evidence to verify the information return. Sec.. 6201(d) . Petitioner does not contend and the record does not suggest that the burden of proof as to any factual issue should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 4 - Petitioner testified that he disagrees with the taxable amount shown on the Form 1099-R because he "just did the math basically in my head" and he thinks New York Life's "mathematics are way off."2 These vague contentions do not r
s." See George v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-163. Respondent has established a sufficient evidentiary foundation linking petitioner with the income determined in the * Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue affecting the deficiencies in his tax. - 7 - notices of deficiency; i.e., the stipulations of fact establish that petitioner received the unreported income as de
sought a redetermination for their 2006 tax year in their petition to this Court. . Because the petition was not timely filed as to, that year, we dismissed that portion of the instant case for laok of jurisdiction. 4Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) should apply in the instant case to shift the burden of proof to respondent, nor did they establish that it should apply to the instant case. t 469(d) (1). A rental activity is generally treated as a per se passive activity regardless of
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof shifts to respondent if petitioners complied with requirements to substantiate an item, maintained all required records, and presented credible evidence as to a factual issue . Rental Expenses Petitioners claim expenses in 2004 and 2005 relating to their Lilac Place rental property beyond the amounts allowed in
.Section 7491(a) shifts the burden to the Commissioner where taxpayers can show that-they complied .with substantiation . requirements, maintained required records, and generally cooperated with the Commissioner . Petitioners did not provide documents or substantiation to respondent or the Court-in-support of their positions . . Because those : requ
and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determination is erroneous . Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, .290 U.S . ill, 115 (1933) . The _- 11 - Nelsons,do not argue that the burden .of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a)(1) . The particular matter that the Nelsons have the burden to prove is the character of payments made, a subject for which the books and records of the payor would naturally be consulted . Section 6001 requires that-- Every person lia
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting a taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section. Petitioner has neither argued for a burden shift nor established his compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a). Petitioner there
for tax may be shifted to the. Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Sec . 7491 ( a)(1) . Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he complied with the substantiation requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore , the burden of proof remains on petitioner . See Rule 142(a) . A . Real Estate Professional First we must decide whether petitioner elected for 2001 to treat his rental real estate activities as one activity under section
ns and credits are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a) (L); 2Petitioner has not claimed or shown that he meets the requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any factual issue relating to his liability for tax. In any event, the facts are not in disputé, and we decide the issues on the record before us. - 4 - Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493
Petitioner does not arguenthat section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances, applies, nor does the record permit us to, conclude that the requirements of section 7491(a) (2) are met.
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters affecting a taxpayer's liability for tax,if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets other requirements of the section. Petitioner moved for a burden shift-under section 7491(a), contending that she produced credible evidence and met the other requirements o
Although section 7491(a) may serve to shift the burden under certain circumstances, it does not do so here given petitioners' failure to raise the matter and to introduce credible evidence .
Dependency Exemption Deduction Section 151(a) and (c) allows taxpayers an annual exemption deduction for each "dependent" as defined in section 152 .
Under certain circumstances, section 7491(a) shifts tNe burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to'a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability.
In her pretrial memorandum, petitioner mentioned that she would move for a burden shift under section 7491(a) , contending that she had produced credible evidence and met the other requirements of the section.
under section 7491(a), and,the record suggests no basis for such-a shift . With respect to additions to .tax and penalties, the Commissioner bears the burden of production, and he must .produce sufficient evidence showing that it is appropriate to impose an addition to tax or penalty in a particular case . Sec . 749.1(c), ; Higbee .v . Commissioner,-.116
has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof wit} h respect to. relevant factual issues may shift to the` Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that he satisfied'the requirements of section 749L(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift .to respondent. - 4 i Petitioner and respondent agree that petitioner did not report
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of. proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability . Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491 applies, nor did they introduce th e .requisite evidence to invoke that section ; the
7491(a) (1) (applicable only if, inter alia, the taxpayer has both complied with the requirements to substantiate an item, sec. 7491(a) (2) (A), and maintained all records required under the Internal Revenue Code, sec. 7491(a) (2) (B)). Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer bears the burden of proving his or her
C.B. at 297, lists threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for equitable relief.under section 6015(f).* 7Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). "Before our decision in Porter v. Còmmissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009), this Court looked to Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, or the revenue procedure which it superseded, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, to decide whether the Comm
under section 7491(a), it has not done. so here because of the absence of. substantiation, the failure to maintain records or to cooperate with reasonable requests for information, and the .absence of credible testimony with respect to the specific factual issues in dispute . Petitioners have not complied with the requirements ,.applicable to'deductions
Petitioners do not assert that the burden of"proof shift s respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not allo w us to conclude that the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) are met .
Under section 7491(a), the burden may shift to the Commissioner with respect to factual matters if the taxpayer. produces credible evidence and meets several other requirements. The Commissioner also bears the burden of proof with respect to any new matter that is not raised in the notice of deficiency but that either increases the original deficiency or
ring , 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 ( a) . Petitioner did not argue. or present evidence that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore , the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Petitioner ' s evidence at trial was his testimony that the "loss was around about $40,000" . He added that "The proof for that is hard because we didn't keep good recor
on to show what he earned and what he spent, it is he who generally has the burden of proof . At least for tax years after 1998, the burden can shift to the Commissioner, but only if a taxpayer produces credible evidence meeting the requirements of section 7491(a) . * Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect for 2001, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. -8- But with few exceptions, it does h
The-estate has failed to satisfy the burden- shifting requirements of section 7491(a) because it has not introduced evidence relating to the 1997 gifts .
In his pretrial memorandum, petitioner mentioned that he would move for a burden shift under section 7491(a), contending that he.had produced credible evidence and met the other requirements of the section.
ted a sec. 6020(b) return. See Spurlock v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo..2003-124. - 5 - 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111; 115 (1933)., In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner underasection 7491(a). Petitioner did not argue or present evidence that she satisfied -the requirements of section 7491(a). Therefore; sthe burden of proof, does not shift to respondent. Trade or Business Expenses Section 162 generally allows a deduction f
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations . Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof 2All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure , unless otherwise indicated . 6 - shifts to
Under section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to that issue . Rule 142(a)(2) . Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown eligibility for a shif t in the burden of proof . Petitioner does not dispute that he received $29,000 from .. Vol Air i
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to a factual issue relevant to the liability of the taxpayer for tax if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regardfing the issue and establishes compliance with the requirements, of section I 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with,jthe Secretary's re
7491(a), nor have they shown that the threshold requirements of - 8 - section 7491(a) have been met for any of the determinations at issue.
Section 7491(a) shifts to the IRS the burden of proof on a given factual - - 11 - issue relevant to the taxpayer's liability if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence, has complied with applicable substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with reasonable information requests from the IRS. The taxpayer
Although section 7491(a) may serve to shift the burden of .
However, section 164(b)(5)(A) provides that a taxpayer may elect to deduct State and local general sales taxes in lieu of State and local income taxes .4 "The .term "general sales tax" means a tax imposed at one rate with respect to the sale at retail of a broad range of classes of items ." Sec .
Respondent objects that petitioner has failed both to introduce credible evidence under section 7491(a) (1) and to satisfy other preconditions for the application of that section.
Because we do not decide this case by reference to the placement of the burden of proof, we need not and do not decide whether petitioners have met the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Under section 7491(a) (1), ,the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability. -Petitioner did not allege that section 7491 applies, nor did he introduce the requisite evidence to invoke that section; stherefore
He did not satisfy any of the criteria under section 7491(a) for shifting the burden of proof to respondent as to any item of income or deduction .
us litigation by precluding the relitigation of any issue of fact or law that was actually litigated and that resulted in a final judgment. See Montana v. United States, 440 Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent as to any factual issue affecting their liability for tax. U.S. 147, 153 (1979) . Collateral estoppel may apply with respect to an issue if : (1) It is identical to one decided in prior litigati
See generally secs .
ubtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue . Petitioners allege that they have satisfied all the prerequisites to the application of section 7491 and, therefore, respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a) . with regard to each of the factual issues . Petitioners argue that these cases are similar to McWhorter v . Commissioner, T .C . Memo . 2008-263, and Forste v . Commissioner , T .C. Memo . 2003-103, where the burden of proof was shi
ons, see Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, supra at 774-777. The record is unclear whether the Dec. 6, 2004, assessment was abated before the notice of deficiency was sent on June 14, 2007. Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) should apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent, nor did he establish that it should apply to the instant case. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent the caselaw of the former Court of App
The parties disagree as to whether petitioners have met the requirements to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Because we do not decide this case by reference to the placement of the burden of proof, we need not and do not decide whether petitioners have met the requirements under section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to
Petitioners do not assert that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a), and the record does not allow us to conclude that the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) are met.
also sought a redetermination for their 2006 tax year in their petition to this Court. Because the petition was not timely filed as to that year, we dismissed that portion of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a) should apply in the instant case to shift the burden of proof to respondent, nor did they establish that it should apply to the instant case. A rental activity is “any activity where payments are principally for the use of tangible prope
Overview Petitioners argue that section 7491(a)(1) places the burde n of proof upon respondent with respect to the issues we decide herein.
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissione r regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner argued that he satisfied the elements for a burden shift ; however, he did not produce a copy of the June 17 ; 2004, Los Angeles court custody order and the clari
OPINION Petitioners have not claimed that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, that section is not applicable where, as here, a taxpayer has failed to satisfy the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements of the Code .
Discussion Teresa Johnson has neither claimed nor shown that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue : She therefore bears the burden of proof .
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to respondent if its requirements are met, applies, and petitioner has not produced evidence to show he h meets the requirements of section 7491(a) .
Petitioner has not satisfied the conditions for shifting the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a) because she did not comply with the requirements to substantiate deductions, - 8 - did not maintain all required records, and did not cooperate wit h reasonable requests for information , documents , meetings, and interviews .
Commissioner, 85 T .C . 527, 529 (1985) . Petitioner has not cited and we have not found any authority tha t 9Petitioner does not contend that sec . 7491 applies to this case, and he has not produced evidence to show he satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a) . 12 - would permit us to review respondent's denial of a request to settle a case-under a-settlement initiative . Moreover, we generally "will not look behind a deficiency notice to examine .the evidence used or the propriety of * * * [
Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to an addition to tax .
ffect a taxpayer's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner- where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect'to * * * such issue ." Sec . 7491(a)(1) . .. Petitioner does not claim that the, burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In any event,`' petitioner has failed,to establish that she has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) . On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a) . Respon
435, 440" (1934) Section 170(a) generally allows a taxpayer a deduction for any charitable contribution, as defined in section 170(c), made during the taxable year .
li - 8 - In this case however before we apply section 7491(a) we must first consider section 6201(d), because petitioner reasonably raised .
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Under section 7491(a), the burden may shift to the Commissione r regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces-credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner did not argue for a. burden shift and he did not fulfill the requirements of section 7491(a) ; therefore, the burden remains with him . To qualify an individual
Rice's entitlement to claim A G-R as a "qualifying child" for purposes of the section 24 child tax credit (and the additional child tax credit) and the section .32 earned income tax 3Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift from'the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability .
Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a)' applies, and he has-neithe r complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained al l .'In the alternative, petitioner referred to the settlement agreement as a child support, enforcement order, a court order, or a divorce order .
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's liability . Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491 applies nor otherwise satisfied the requirements of that section; therefore, the burden
358, 363 (2002) ; see also Higbee v .
Although section 7491(a) may serve :to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, that section', has no application to the present case in view of the fact that : (1) Petitioner has no t asserted its applicability; (2) petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she maintained all requisite records and that she cooperated fully with reasonable requests by
Under section 7491(a), the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding a factual issue if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section, including maintaining records required by the Internal Revenue Code and cooperating fully with the Secretary's reasonable requests for witnesses, information, documents, meet
Under' section 7491(a), the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters ifithe taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets .the other requirements of the section .L Petitioner did not argue for a burden shift, and he did not fulfill the requirements of section 7491(a) ; therefore, the burden,iremains with him . With respect to the ad
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof .may shift from the taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to 3 Respondent conceded the dependency exemption deduction on account of Mr . Dyer's oldest child .on the basis that she actually lived with petitioners throughout the entire
Petitioner has failed to convince us with its second argument that responden t 1 16 - bears the burden of proving that petitioner had a principal purpose of tax avoidance . Finally, petitioner argues that respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a)(1) . In pertinent part, Rule 142(a)(1) provides, as a general rule : "The burden of proo f shall be upon the petitioner" . In certain .circumstances, however, if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with . respect to any factual i
rden of proof on. the:Commissioner . Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491 is applicable, nor has he established compliance with the requirements of section 7491 (a) (2) (A) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift t o respondent under section 7491(a) . Under section 6201(d), the burden of production may shift to the Commissioner where an information return, such as a Form, 1099, serves as the basis for a deficiency determination . If a taxpayer asserts a "reasonable dispute" with
Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to an addition to tax .
ect a taxpayer's liability for tax may be - 24 - shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Sec. 7491(a)(1) . Petitioner does not claim that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) . On the record before us, we find that the .burden of proof does not shift to .respondent under section 7491(a) . III . Ec
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, and petitioner has'not established that he satisfies the section 7491(a)(2) requirements .
on to show what he earned and what he spent, it is he who generally has the burden of proof . At least for tax years after 1998, that burden can shift to the Commissioner, but only if a taxpayer produces credible evidence meeting the requirements of section 7491(a) . See also Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering , 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . But with few exceptions, it does him no good to argue that the Commissioner wasn't working with good information--the notice of deficiency puts issues in play
Under section 7491(a), the burden regarding factual matters may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner did not argue for a burden shift, and therefore the burden remains with him . The role of the judiciary in interpreting tax treaty provisions is to decide their u
Moore has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements o f section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with respect to any factual issue .
Under section 7491(a), the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioners did not argue for a burden shift and thus did not fulfill the requirements of section 7491(a) ; therefore, the burden remains with them . - 5 - A taxpayer may d
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if the taxpayer introduces .credible evidence and meets certain other'prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code .
111k, 115 (1933).° Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden .
Under section 7491(a), a taxpayer may shift the .burden to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces .credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner has not raised the burden of proof as an issue, and therefore, the-burden remains with petitioner . Deductions are a matter of legislative grace', an
, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 'U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Keith v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 605, 621 (2000); Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. 540 F.2d 2 Petitioner makes no claim that he qualifies for a shift in the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). 821 (5th Cir. 1976). A filed Federal income tax return does not establish a taxpayer's entitlement to the amounts reported thereon. Lawinger v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 428, 438 (1994); Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); R
To be carrying on a trade or business within the meaning of section 162(a), an individual taxpayer must .be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and with the objective of making a profit .
While section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden. of proof,to the Commissioner, that section is not applicable where, as here, petitioner. has failed to meet the recordkeeping and substantiation requirements of the Code . See sec . 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B) . B . Unreimbursed Employee Business Expense s Section 162(a) allows a taxpayer to deduct the unrei
at affect a taxpayer's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Sec .. 7491(a)(1) . Petitioner does not claim that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In any event,' petitioner has failed to establish that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) . . On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a) . Sectio
roving that the Commissioner's determinations are erroneous . Rule 142(a) ; Welch 3( . . .continued) judgment in 2008 . -9- - v. Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 11.5 (1933) . Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Petitioners also did not establish that they satisfy the requirements of section 7491('a)(2) . We therefore find that the burden of proof remains with petitioners . .III . Legal Expenses and Origin of the Claim Tes t We now turn to wh
Under section 7491(a) .the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the section . Additionally, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof with respect to any new matter. that departs from the determinations in the notice of deficiency . Rule 142(a)(1) ;.
, 290 U.S . 111, 115 ( 1933 ) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 (a) . Petitioner did not present evidence, or argument that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore , the burden of proof . does not shift to respondent . Petitioner contends that he is entitled to deductions of $2,886 for unreimbursed business travel expenses and $275 for unreimbursed meal expenses, or, in the alternativ
She concedes the AMT adjustment but asserts that $1,761 of her expenses reported on Schedule A should be recast as Schedule C business expense deductions .3 OPINION Petitioner,llhas neither claimed nor shown that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
of proof to the I Commissioner if the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)`are met , applies . Moreover, because this case is fully stipulated,'lthere are no disputed issues of fact that wo ld be affected by a r allocation of the burden of proof under section 7491(a) . I Section 61(a) includes in,gross income "all income fro m whatever source derived" unless exclud d by a specifics. provision of the Code . This section is construe broadly, whereas exclusions from gross income are construed narrowl
358, 363 (2002) ; see also Higbee v .
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and' meets the other requirements of the section . Petitioner does not argue that he satisfied the elements for a burden shift, but even if he did advance this argument, petitioner did not produce sufficient evidence to sup
Johnson has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the 'burden of `proof' to respondent with,regard to an factual issue .
er , 512 F .2d 882, 886'(9th Cir . 1975), affg . T .C. Memo . 1972-133 . Because of petitioner's failure to substantiate items or to maintain and produce required records, he has not satisfied the requirements for shifting the burden of proof under section 7491(a) . Recognizing the burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to penalties, respondent attached to the motion a certified transcript of petitioner's . account ; a certification of the substitute-for return prepared under se
had been made, then we would have concluded that the requirement s of section 7491(a)(2) have not been met, and so the burden of proof would not have been shifted .
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissione r regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other-requirements of the section. Petitioner does not argue that he satisfied the elements for a burden shift, but even if he did advance this argument, he did not produce sufficient evidence to support a bur
Generally, section 2031(a) provides that the value of the decedent's gross estate includes the value of interests described in sections 2033 through 2044 .
While section 7491(a) sometimes shifts the burden of. proof to the Commissioner, that section is not applicable where, as here, petitioners have failed to satisfy the recordk(cid:127)eeping and substantiatio n requirements'of the Coder -See sec . 74:91(a) (2) (A) and (B) . B . Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses Petitioners seek, to deduct unreimburs
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift do the t Commissioner regarding factual'matters if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of'the' section . Petitioner; did not argue that she satisfied the elements for a burden shift, but"even if she did, the . , consideration of a burden is moot here because no factual issu e
no claim nor showing that under section 7491(a), any shift in,the burden of proof .
In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) .
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissione r regarding a factual issue if the taxpayer produces credibl e evidence .and meets the other requirements of the section, i 6 - jib' including maintaining records required by the Internal Revenue Code and cooperating fully with the Sedretary's reasonabl e I requestls'~for witnesses, informati
yer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that the satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, he burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Unreported Schedule C Gross Receipt s Section 6001 requires a tax
payer's return, and we upheld the determination. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that before the Commissioner could make a determination that a taxpayer received unreported income, he Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if its requirements are met, applies, and the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that petitioner satisfies the sec. 7491(a) requirements. "This case is appealabl
7491(a) shifts the burden of proof in cases arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. RRA sec. 3001(c)(1), 112 Stat. 727. Because respondent’s examination of the Wieners’ returns began before July 22, 1998, (continued...) - 15 - Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Respond
Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner's requests for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews . Sec . 7491(a)(2) . The record shows that petitioner did not comply with the substantiation requirements . In addi
Under section 7491(a) a taxpayer may shift the burden to the Commissioner regarding a factual-issue if the taxpayer produces credible evidence and meets the other requirements of the, section . Under section 7491(a), a taxpayer must substantiate items, . maintain records ; and cooperate fully with the Secretary's reasonable requests for documents, inform
Dependency Exemption Deductions Section 151(c) allows taxpayers an annual exemption deduction for each "dependent" as defined in section 152 .
In these cases there is no such shift because petitioners neither alleged that section 7491 was applicable nor established that they fully complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) .
section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof-to respondent with regard to a y factual issue . 3 3 Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof on the issue in this case should be shifted to respondent under sec . 7491'. In any event, we-donot decide the issue on .the.burden of proof. Also, regardless of whether the $833 additional.-tax under s
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
Section 152(e)(1), however, further provides that if a child receives more than one-half of his support during the calendar year from parents who are divorced or legally separated, or who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year, and if the child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more than one-half of
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to a factual issue relevant to the liability of the taxpayer for tax if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue and establishes compliance with the requirements of section - 6 - 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary's
ntitlement to deductions cl~imed on a return . Rule 142(a)(1) ; INDOPCO, Inc . v . Commissioner 503 U .S . 79, 84 (1992) . Under certain circumstances the bur den of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to'~the Commissioner unde r section 7491(a) . The burden of proof many shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if t e taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B ) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully
In these cases there is no such shift because petitioners neither alleged that section 7491 was applicable nor established that they fully complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) .
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the tax liability of a taxpayer who meets certain preliminary conditions . This case is decided on the preponderance of the evidence and is not affected by section 7491(a) . Section 183(a) provides generally that if an activity is not engaged in
Section 7491 regarding the burden of proof is not applicable in this case because petitioners have failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(1) and (2) .
er has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helverinc, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issue s may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Unreported Schedule C Gross Receipt s Section 6001 requires a t
t a taxpayer's liability for tax may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue ." Sec . 7491(a)(1) . Petitioner does not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that he has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) . On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a) . Deduction
Accordingly, section 7491(a), regarding the shifting of the burden of proof with respect to the deficiencies in tax, is of little importance because if the taxpayer fails to substantiate an item, the burden of proof does not shift to the Commissioner .
Section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners failed to maintain records or comply with substantiation requirements as required by section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) . Where a taxpayer establishes that he incurred a business expense but cannot prove the amount of the expense, the Court may approximate the amount al
7491(a)(1) ; Rule 142(a)(2) . Petitioner did not argue that section 7491 is applicable, and he did not establish that the burden of proof should shift to respondent . Petitioner, therefore, bears the burden of proving that respondent's determination in the notice of deficiency is erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering , supra at 115
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioner has not established that he meets the requirements under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift .
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with - 5 - the Secretary's reasonable requests .
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) with respect to a factual issue relevant to the liability of the taxpayer for tax if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding the issue and establishes compliance with the requirements of section - 6 - 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary's
Discussion Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they : satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard .to any factual issue .
Petitioners have not met the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code .
Although section 7491(a) 11 may shift the burden of propf 'L e Commissioner in specified circumstances petitioner has notatisfied the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift .
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent, and petitioners have not established that they satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements .
yer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helverina, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Since the only issue raised with respect to the deficiency determination is a legal matter, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . - 4 - Reassignment of Petitioner's Deficiency Citing the "hold harmless" language in the
Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on he Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence ith respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertain her liabil ty, has complied with substantiation requirements, has maint fined all records required, and has cooperated with reasonable re q ests for witnesses, information, documents, meet
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
Rule .142(a) provides that-the "burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner" .
yer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that the satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Unreported Schedule C Gross Receipts Section 6001 requires a tax
Having failed to establish the applicability of section 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of establishing additional amounts of cost of goods sold over the amount respondent has determined in the notice of deficiency.
7491(a) (which does not effect any burden shifting given petitioner's failure to : (1) Raise the matter and (2) comply with all requirements of section 7491(a)(2)) . Section 162 allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business . Sec . 162(a) ; Deputy v .
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a)(2). Petitioners did not argue that section 7491 is applicable, and they did not establish that the burden of proof should shift to respondent. Petitioners, therefore, bear the burden of proving that respondent’s determinations as set forth in the notice of deficiency are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, s
Vehicle Insurance Section 274(d)(4) provides that no deduction shall be allowed with respect to listed property (as defined in section 280F(d)(4)) unless certain substantiation requirements are met .
7491(a) (which section does not serve to effect any burden-shifting in the instant case given petitioner's failure (1) to raise the matter and (2) to comply with all of the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)) .
ing, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to rel vant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7 91(a) . Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that the satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, he burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Unreported Schedule C Gross Receipts Section 6001 requires a taxpayer to maintain sufficient records to allow for the determination of the taxpayer' s correct tax liabilit
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
ns 2038 and 2035 in its notice of deficiency in this case, Respondent bears the burden with respect to its theories under those sections ; however, in any case the evidence will not support a decision in Respondent's favor . Neither party addresses section 7491(a) . We conclude that resolution of the issues presented under sections 2036(a), 2038(a)(1), and 2035(a) does not depend on who has the burden o f proof . 40With respect to sec . 2036(a), respondent asserts on brief : The burden of dispro
- 10 - to section 7491(a), the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue.” The burden will shift only if the taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation requirements pursuant to the Internal Revenue
Although section 7491(a) may shift the 5 Petitioner was allowed a standard deduction for 2004 in the notice of deficiency .
OPINION Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that the y satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all required records, and cooperates with the Commissioner's requests fo r witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews . Sec . 7491(a)(2) . The record shows that petitioner did not comply with the substantiation requirements or coope
- 5 - circumstances, shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's income tax liability .
e with respect to petitioners’ taxable years 1999 and 2000, the resolution of which flows automatically from the resolution of certain other determinations in the notice. 25Petitioners do not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). We conclude that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under that section. - 27 - T.C. 708, 724 (1981), that must be made as of the date of the purported sale, see id. at 723-724.26 In Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commission
yer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U .S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner did not present evidence or argument that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . Tax deductions are a matter of legislative grace with a taxpayer b
Petitioner did not present evidence or argument that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent .
Under certain circumstances, however, section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting liability for tax .
Purs ant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual m tters shifts to the Commissioner under certain circumsta ces .
aimed losses from both of these activities that respondent challenges. Petitioner has an M.B.A. degree from Harvard University and is a certified public accountant. Since 1983, he has been involved in various business ventures as an investment and 3 Sec. 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with regard to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability. Sec. 7491(a)(2) limits application of this rule to an issue or issues for which the taxpayer has complied
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
ted to determine the “intrinsic value” of the warrants. In sum, we find respondent’s expert’s report and testimony of no value.4 See Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986) (opinion testimony must be weighed in the light of the 4 Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of proof unless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and t
In addition, at trial petitioner submitted a statement in which he claimed a deduction for the "equivalent of lost medical insurance coverage ." - 7 - Discussion Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent .
Burden of Proof Petitioner argues that under section 7491(a), the burden of proof has shifted to respondent.
ted to determine the “intrinsic value” of the warrants. In sum, we find respondent’s expert’s report and testimony of no value.4 See Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986) (opinion testimony must be weighed in the light of the 4 Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of proof unless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and t
7491(a)(1) ; Rule 142(a)(2) . Petitioner did not argue that section 7491 is applicable in this case, nor did he establish that the burden of proof should shift to the respondent . Petitioner, therefore, bear the burden of proving that respondent's determination in the notice of deficiency is erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, s
mbiguously proved.”2 United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988). The statute and the regulations provide that compensation for services, including 2No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof or production under sec. 7491(a). - 8 - severance or termination pay, is expressly encompassed within the definition of gross income. See sec. 61(a)(1); sec. 1.61- 2(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. Section 104 provides for an exclusion from gross income for certain payments rece
overed over the period of the exhaustion of the property. The one who made the investment is entitled to its return ." Gladding Dry Goods Co . v . Commissioner, 2 B .T .A . 336, 338 (1925) . to The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a) if the taxpayer has produced credible evidence with respect to a factual issue relating to the tax liability at issue, has met substantiation requirements, maintained records, and cooperated with the Secretary's reasonable requests for d
ensive . Mr . Kramer understood that Zane had a cattle breeding activity separate from the dairy operation . OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners, for the first time on brief, raise the issue of whether the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Under that section the burden of proof may shift to the - 28 - Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the taxpayer's liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such a factual is
that petitioners reported in petitioners’ 2002 return as “Wages, salaries, tips, etc.” constitutes compensation income that petitioners properly reported in that return. 4Petitioners do not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). In any event, petitioners have failed to establish that they satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). 5Petitioners took the sa
ayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous . See Rule 142(a) ; Welch v . Helvering, 290 U.S . 111, 115 (1933) . In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) . Petitioner did not present evidence or argument that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) . Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent . 'Because of respondent's mathematical error, the statutory notice
Under certain circumstances, however, section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting liability for tax.
Collection Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining his liability for any tax imposed under subtitle A of the Code .
With respect to the remaining issues, petitioner has not argued that section 7491 applies, nor has petitioner established that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.39 Consequently, we conclude that section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent on the remaining issues.
Failing to introduce credible evidence to shift the burden of proof under section 7491(a), petitioner bears the burden of proving respondent's determination is incorrect .
ensive . Mr . Kramer understood that Zane had a cattle breeding activity separate from the dairy operation . OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners, for the first time on brief, raise the issue of whether the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Under that section the burden of proof may shift to the - 28 - Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the taxpayer's liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such a factual is
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue .
t, 308 U .S . 488, 493 (1940) . This includes the burden of substantiation . Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T .C . 87, 89-90 (1975), affd . per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir . 1976) . Petitioners do not assert that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a) . Therefore the burden of proof remains with petitioner . - 5 - In addition, taxpayers may fully deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year carrying on a trade or business . Sec . 162(a) . Ordi
However, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer has produced credible evidence relating to the tax liability at issue and has met his substantiation requirements, maintained required - 9 - records, and cooperated with the Secretary’s reasonable requests for documents, witnesses, and meetings.
Section 7491(a) shifts th burden of proof to the Commissioner, however, with respect t factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax under certain circumstances . The burden shifts to the Commission r if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and meets the other requirements of section . 4 7491(a) . ec. 7491(
Under certain circumstances, however, section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting liability for tax .
of profits and a constructive dividend. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1156 (1980). Petitioner bears the burden of proving the payments to Mr. Reeves were reasonable.11 See Rule 142(a). 11 Petitioner does not argue that sec. 7491(a) operates to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Even if petitioner had so argued, the burden of proof would not shift under sec. 7491(a) because petitioner has not shown it maintained all required records, nor has it shown it cooper
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue affecting the deficiencies in their tax .
With respect to the remaining issues, petitioner has not argued that section 7491 applies, nor has petitioner established that the requirements of section 7491(a) have been met.39 Consequently, we conclude that section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent on the remaining issues.
ensive . Mr . Kramer understood that Zane had a cattle breeding activity separate from the dairy operation . OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners, for the first time on brief, raise the issue of whether the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Under that section the burden of proof may shift to the - 28 - Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the taxpayer's liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such a factual is
he State law rules on placement of burden relevant in this case dovetail with the typical rule in tax litigation that the burden of proof rests on the taxpayer generally and on the party raising any new matter particularly. See Rule 142(a). Although sec. 7491(a) can effect a shift of burden in specified circumstances, the estate makes no argument that the statute has any application here and has not addressed the preconditions for its use. 5 The estate also directs the Court’s attention to a num
it factor method as a reasonable method to determine income from bookmaking activities. Robinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-382. Revenue Agent Johnson applied the profit factor method as described in Robinson 6This principle is not affected by sec. 7491(a) because neither petitioner cooperated with respondent’s reasonable requests during respondent’s examinations. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains with petitioners. -12- to reconstruct Mr. Paterson’s income us
Petitioner did not assert that the burden shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) and did not establish that she fully complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2) .
missioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-69. In cases involving unreported income, the Commissioner bears the initial burden of establishing “at least a ‘minimal’ factual predicate or foundation of substantive evidence linking the 4 Petitioner does not argue that sec. 7491(a) operates to shift the burden of proof to respondent. Even if petitioner had so argued, the burden of proof would not shift under sec. 7491(a) because petitioner has not shown he maintained any records, nor has he cooperated with the reas
deductions of $6,109, $8,969, and $9,773 for their taxable years 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, for "Self-Employed Health Insurance" because "you are allowed the deduction for self-employed health insurance premiums ." OPINION We first address section 7491(a) . The parties agree that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case . The parties disagree over whether the burden of proof has shifted to respon- dent under that section . We need not, and we shall not, address that disagreeme
However, section 7491(a)(1) applies with respect to an issue only if the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under the Code to substantiate any item, has maintained all records required by the Code, and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews .
The Court therefore cannot conclude that section 7491(a) effects any shift of burden in the instant case .
Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) (to shift the burden of proof to respondent).
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491 is applicable, nor did he establish that the burden of proof should shift to respondent. Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he engaged in his fishing activity for profit - 20 - during the taxable years in issue. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, supra. Sec
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in specified circumstances, petitioner has not established that he meets the requisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift .
ensive . Mr . Kramer understood that Zane had a cattle breeding activity separate from the dairy operation . OPINION Burden of Proof Petitioners, for the first time on brief, raise the issue of whether the burden of proof shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) . Under that section the burden of proof may shift to the - 28 - Commissioner with respect to a factual issue affecting the taxpayer's liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to such a factual is
In addition, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item of income reported on an information return filed with the Secretary by a third party and the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Secretary, the Secretary has the burden of producing reasonable and probative information, in addition to the information
k options are normally granted to employees, warrants are granted to the general public. They are typically options to purchase stock over a long period and are freely transferable instruments. Black’s Law Dictionary 1617 (8th ed. 2004). Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), petitioners have the burden of proof unless they introduce credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. See Rule 142(a). Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and t
But section 7491(a) lets him shift that burden to the Commissioner if he shows that he kept all the records required by the Code and cooperated with the IRS, and if he introduces credible evidence about the particular issue on which he is trying to shift the burden. Cipriano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-157, affd. 55 Fed. Appx. 104 (3d Cir. 2003).
3Under sec 7491(a), where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with r spect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner . There are no factual issues in this case . The sole; issue is a question of law ; consequently, this case is decided without regard to the burden of pro
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the present case.
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain limited circumstances .
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to the Commissioner under certain limited - 4 - circumstances.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the present case.
Section 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof of a factual issue to the Commissioner under certain limited circumstances . Section 7491 does not affect our analysis because our holding does not depend upon which party has the burden of proof ; the evidence in the record establishes the facts and the resolution of the disputed IRA deduction involves
7491(a); Rule 142(a). - 5 - Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Job Expenses and Other Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions Section 162(a) provides that a taxpayer may ded
In certain cases, section 7491(a) places the burden of proof upon the Commissioner.
t of petitioner’s wages without a reduction for the contributions made to the section 457 plan. Following the year 1996, petitioners engaged the services of a professional tax return 3In certain situations, the burden of proof is on respondent under sec. 7491(a). This case is decided without regard to the burden because, as reflected in the ensuing discussion, the facts are not in dispute, and the issue is essentially legal in nature. - 4 - preparer, and the preparer correctly omitted from incom
7491(a), which in some circumstances places the burden of production on respondent, is not applicable here as the Court decides the case without regard to the burden of proof. - 6 - The Court is satisfied that a genuine debtor/creditor relationship existed in this case between petitioners and their son, Michael. That conclusion is fortified b
Petitioners have neither argued that the burden of proof should shift nor satisfied the criteria that would cause the burden of proof to shift. Given the lack of documentation and information provided by petitioners in this case, we conclude that the burden of proof remains with petitioners. Omitted Interest Income Petitioners did
As to the sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, the burden of production is on respondent under sec. 7491(c). However, the burden of proof remains on petitioner to persuade the Court the imposition of the addition to tax is incorrect. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). - 5 - Section 1.104-1(b), Income Tax Regs., provide
With respect to the instant matter, petitioner has not raised an argument with respect to shifting the burden of proof under section 7491 . Further, petitioner has not shown that he complied with the threshold requirements thereafter . Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioner has not fully cooperated with respondent's
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Petitioners failed to - 6 - produce any evidence to substantiate the advertising and office expenses claimed by them. Therefore, respondent properly disallowed the advertising and office expense deductions in 2001. Section 6662(a) Accuracy-Related Penalty Section 6662(a) imposes a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percen
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the present case.
Moreover, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to the income reported on an information return and fully cooperates with the Commissioner (including providing access to an inspection of all witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer as reasonably requested by the Commissioner), then the
f legislative grace, and petitioners bear the burden of 2In the notice, respondent rounded to the nearest dollar the dollar amount of the disallowed job expense deduction. 3Petitioners do not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). In any event, petitioners have failed to establish that they satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 5 - proving entitleme
Petitioner has neither argued that section 7491 is applicable to shift the burden of proof to respondent nor established that he complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2). Therefore, the burden of proof remains with petitioner. II. Distributions of $15,322.69 and $7,000 A. General Section 408(d)(1) provides that any amount
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to the issue in the present case.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the present case.
Although neither party .alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of praof has not shifted to respondent with respect to the issue in the present case.
n as a taxable early distribution . Petitioner reported the distribution as income on his 2002 tax return but did not report the 10-percent additional tax on his 2002 tax return . Discussion We decide the instant case on the record without regard to section 7491(a) . Section 72(t)(1) imposes a 10-percent additional tax on early distributions from qualified retirement plans unless the distribution meets one of the exceptions enumerated in section 72(t)(2) . Petitioner was 45 years old as - 3 - of
n the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 that a portion of the employees’ contributions was attributable to an accident or health plan. Without evidence that the plan’s terms expressly provide for accident and health benefits attributable to employee 5 Sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner has provided no credible evidence regarding the terms of her retirement plan. Sec. 7491(a)(1). -7- contributions, we must presume that no employee contributions were use
S. 111 (1933). Moreover, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. INDOPCO, Inc. v. 2Petitioner does not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that he satisfies the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 6 - Commissioner, 503 U
- 12 - rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
7491(a);2 Rule 142(a). When the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer received unreported income, however, the Commissioner must establish “‘some evidentiary foundation linking the taxpayer’” to the income-producing activity or introduce substantive evidence “‘demonstrating that the taxpayer received unreported income’”. Krohn v. Commissione
employment with * * *[the Meadowlands]” in exchange for the settlement proceeds and his resignation as an employee of the Meadowlands. The settlement agreement also states that the Meadowlands and 3 In their brief, petitioners take the position that sec. 7491(a) is applicable, and the burden of proof on this issue rests with respondent. To the extent that it does, we find that respondent has met that burden. - 12 - petitioner were entering into the settlement agreement to avoid the costs of liti
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). On this record, petitioners have not wholly satisfied that requirement; (continued...) - 3 - Several concessions were made by the parties at trial. Some of these concessions are noted in the opinion and are particularized in respondent’s posttrial brief. Petitioner is a medical doctor. During the years at issue, he was
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, - 4 - and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual iss
- 3 - and the child care credit with respect to another child of Shane Nolan Lewis (petitioner).3 The child was born on November 4, 1993. Petitioner and the child’s mother (the mother) were never married. Petitioner and the mother shared joint legal and physical custody of the child. By court decree, the mother was declared custodial
7491(a), the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability. Under sec. 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift if the taxpayer has not complied with the substantiation requirements with regard to any item, nor do
ers' make and model. Discussion The Commissioner's determinations are presumed correct, and generally taxpayers bear the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a)(1). Petitioners have neither argued for nor met the requirements for the application of section 7491(a). Because section 7491(a) is not here applicable, the burden of proof does not shift to the Commissioner. Petitiongig' Charitable Gifts Respondent denied petitioners' deduction for $300 of cash gifts for lack of substantiation. Petitio
urt agrees with respondent.5 Section 162 allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses that are paid or incurred during the taxable year in 4Under sec. 7454(a), the burden of proof as to fraud is on the Commissioner. As to all other issues, sec. 7491(a), in some instances, shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner but only as to the examination of taxpayers’ returns that commenced after July 22, 1998. The examination in this case commenced in 1996; therefore, the Court does not nee
Their reply brief does, however, at several junctures offer to present further substantiating documents to respondent and to the Court, which at minimum suggests that all pertinent information may not have been - 13 - provided during the examination.4 The Court therefore cannot conclude that section 7491(a) effects any shift of burden in the instant case.
n on the Vernon property on August 7, 2001, and petitioners have offered no evidence that the bankruptcy estate abandoned the Vernon property before the foreclosure. Furthermore, the 6We note that petitioners have made no contentions with respect to sec. 7491(a). - 11 - bankruptcy trustee’s final report indicates that the Vernon property was not abandoned by the bankruptcy estate. As noted above, the court approved an application filed by the bankruptcy trustee to abandon remaining property, boo
In the instant case, section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners failed to maintain records or comply with substantiation requirements as required under section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) .
7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and satisfies the necessary substantiation and documentation requirements. Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations by the Commissioner commencing after July 22,
7491(a) (1); see also H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, - 11 - tax implications. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Markosian v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1235, 1241 (1980). However, where the creation of a trust lacks economic effect and has no other cognizable economic relationship, we may ignore the trust as a sham. See, e.g., Zmuda v.
ions). See, e.g., Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). 5 We decide this case on the basis of the evidence in the record without regard to the burden of proof. Accordingly, we need not and do not decide whether the burden-shifting rule of sec. 7491(a)(1) applies. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 6 - Head of Household Filing Status Section 1(b) grants a special tax rate for any individual who qualifies as filing as “head of household”. As pertinent here, “head of hous
7491(a)(1), which shifts the burden of proof to respondent, is not applicable here because petitioner failed to present credible evidence. - 5 - the fair market value of the property immediately before the theft. See secs. 1.165-7(b), 1.165-8, Income Tax Regs. The only documentary evidence submitted in support of petitioner’s contention was t
Accordingly, we find that the estate has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and we stand by our ruling at trial that respondent has the burden of proof.
We also decide this case after weighing the evidence, using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, not on the basis of the initial allocation of proof. - 6 - but include “the identification of services performed over a period of time and the approximate number of hours spent performing such services during such period, based
Accordingly, we find that the estate has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and we stand by our ruling at trial that respondent has the burden of proof.
- 4 - OPINION Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that.he satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a)3 to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue.
tion through the maintenance of books and records. Generally, in the event that a taxpayer establishes that he or she has incurred a deductible 3 Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown entitlement to any shift in the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 5 - expense but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, the Court may approximate the amount, bearing heavily if it chooses against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544
rinciples of tax litigation. First, as a general rule, the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these determinations are erroneous.4 Rule 142(a); see 4This principle is not affected by sec. 7491(a), because respondent initiated the examination of petitioners’ returns for the years at issue in October 1997, which is before the July 22, 1998, effective date of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). OPINION Although respondent must have commenced respondent’s exami- nation of petitioners’ respective returns after July 22, 1998, petitioners in each of these cases do not address section 7491(a). On the record before us, we conclude that petitioners’ burden of proof in each of these cases, see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), does not shift to respondent under section 7491(a) with respect to such peti
Burden of Proof Respondent argues that under section 7491(a), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent but remains with petitioners.
v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1979), revg. 67 T.C. 672 (1977), or demonstrate that the taxpayer received unreported income, Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982) (Commissioner's assertion of a 3 Pursuant to sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof as to factual matters shifts to respondent under certain circumstances. Petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 applies nor established her compliance with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to subs
s 2002 return, petitioner reported wages of $12,703.22, "Pensions and annuities" of $33,118.49, of which he claimed only - 7 - we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of estab- lishing that he satisfied the applicable requirements of section 7491(a)(2). On that record, we conclude that petitioner has the burden of proof with respect to the issues that remain in this case.5 See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner's Loans The Federal Thrift Savings
In this case, petitioner has not produced any credible evidence and has not shown that he meets the statutory criteria for shifting the burden to respondent. 4 Respondent has admitted that he has the burden of production with respect to the additions to tax and penalties. See sec. 7491(c). - 5 - Accordingly, petitioner has the burden
s determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).24 Respondent determined that Qwest’s cost allocation method was unreasonable, and petitioners bear the burden of proving this determination incorrect. 24 Under sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner in certain situations. Petitioners do not argue that the burden shifts to respondent. - 47 - A. The Reasonableness Standard of Section 1.263A-1(f)(4), Income Tax Regs. As found above, th
Although section 7491 may shift the burden of proof to respondent in specified circumstances, petitioner here has not established that he meets the requisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to factual issues where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence, the provision operates only where the taxpayer establishes that he or she has complied with all substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for wit
hing from these funds; they were simply paid to the attorney, Mr. Ober, 4Respondent also determined in the notice that petitioner is liable for 1994 for the addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(2). See supra note 2. SPetitioner makes no argument under sec. 7491(a) or (c). Respondent's records show that on June 29, 1998, a substitute for return was posted to the account that respondent maintained with respect to petitioner for her taxable year 1994. We find that respondent's examination of petition
Section 7491(a) imposes the burden of proof on respondent if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue, -7- and complies with the requirements of section 7491(a) (2)(A) and (B) to substantiate all items at issue, maintain required records,· and cooperate with reasonable requests of respondent. We find it unnecessa
7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue, if the taxpayer has complied with the requirements for substantiation of any item at issue, has maintained records with respect to such items, and has cooperated with reasonable requests by respondent for su
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). At trial, petitioner presented the letter from NKF and a computer printout from CarPrices.com showing the wholesale value of a 1986 Ford F250 SuperCab 4WD, taking the mileage on the truck into consideration, to be $2,960.24 and the retail value to be $5,540.47. Petitioner is claiming a $5,000 deduction for the donation o
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to a factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax, however, under certain circumstances. The burden shifts to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue, complies with substantiation requirements, maintains all requir
claims that, prior to the application of the two- percent floor imposed by section 67(a), he is entitled to deduc- tions for $8,782 of automobile expenses, $3,952 of meal 2Petitioner does not claim that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that he satisfies the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). On the record before us, we find that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 5 - expenses,3 a .$50 t
Petitioners do not contend that section 7491 applies. Thus, petitioners bear the burden of proving that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Before relying on this presumption to establish that the taxpayer has unreported income, the Commissioner must i
OPINION Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue.
7491(a) (2) (A) and (:B). Petitioners repeatedly failed to cooperate with respondent to prepare these cases for trial and were admonished by the Court when the case was called -for trial. Petitioners have therefore not met the requiremen,ts of section 7491(a) (2)(B), and the burden of proof remains with them. _9_ Income Tax Regs. .The phrase
Burden of Proof Respondent argues that under section 7491(a), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent but remains with petitioners.
Section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the - 10 - Commissioner in certain circumstances, but petitioner does not contend, nor has she shown, that she satisfies the prerequisites for the application of section 7491(a). In fact, as discussed infra, petitioner has failed to substantiate adequately many of the charitable contribution deductions at is
Burden of Proof Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues relevant to ascertaining liability for tax in the case of Court proceedings arising from examinations commenced after July 22, 1998.
7491(a)(1) and (2); Rule 142(a). Also, petitioners provided neither records nor any credible evidence.relating.to the $8,250 in additional itemized deductions claimed on their 2001 amended tax return. The burden of proof with respect thereto remains on petitioners. 2(...continued) as a deduction in computing adjusted gross income, with the res
7491(a) is applicable. Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof is immaterial. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16 (1998). - 5 - personal injuries or sickness incurred in the course of employment.” Simply put, title II of the Social Secu
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner with respect to factual issues where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence, the provision operates only where the taxpayer establishes that he or she has complied with all substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests for wit
By their terms, neither section 7491(a) nor section 7491(c) is applicable here.
Petitioners concede that they bear the burden of showing their entitlement to a conservation easement deduction. Conversely, respondent concedes that he bears the burden of production with respect to the section 6662 penalty. See sec. 7491(c). B. The Conservation Easement 1. Background Section 170(a)(1) allows a deduction for a charit
In certain cases, section 7491(a) places the burden of proof upon the Commissioner.
nces are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue, unless otherwise indicated, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We decide this case without regard to the burden-shifting rule of sec. 7491(a)(1) because the parties stipulated all the facts in dispute under Rule 122. The parties agree that petitioner received the distribution in 2002 from her IRA, which was a qualified retirement plan under sec. 4974(c)(4). Petitioner specific
his case, including whether petitioner was “away from home” for purposes of sec. 162(a), on the basis of the evidence in the record without regard to the burden of proof. Accordingly, we need not and do not decide whether the burden-shifting rule of sec. 7491(a)(1) applies. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Although the length of a workday is considered in determining whether a taxpayer actually needed sleep or rest, the “Revenue Act does not necessarily require as a prerequisite
As one - 4 - exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. The burden does not shift with respect to any factual issue relating to petitioners’ liability for the income tax deficiencies because petitioners neither alleged that section - 4 - 7491 was applicable nor established that they complied with the statutory s
Although section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations involving examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, as here, petitioners do not assert that section 7491(a) shifts the burden to respondent.
Although section 7491 may shift the burden to respondent in specified circumstances, petitioners here have not established that they meet the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
d for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly 4Generally, the burden of proof is on petitioner. Rule 142(a)(1). The burden may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491 if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests. Prior to trial, petitioners did communicate with respondent; however, they did not cooperate with respec
Petitioner has neither argued that the burden of proof should shift nor satisfied the criteria that would cause the burden of proof to shift. Given the lack of documentation and information provided by petitioner in this case, we conclude that the burden of proof remains with petitioner. Mileage Expense Section 162(a) permits a ded
books and records are maintained by the 3Sec. 7491 modifies this general rule and, in some instances, shifts the burden to the Commissioner. In this case, the burden does not shift to respondent because petitioner did not fulfill the requirement of sec. 7491(a)(2), which, among other requirements, requires that the taxpayer maintain records to substantiate expenses claimed. - 6 - taxpayer, a mere bookkeeping entry of the item does not suffice without proof of further substantiation. Consolidate
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for - 8 - tax if the examination of the taxpayer’s records for the subject year began after July 22, 1998, and the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner
Section 7491(a) is not applicable in this case because petitioner did not meet the substantiation requirements. Petitioner has the burden of proof. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Petitioner contends that no one had the right to control either the method or the means by which he played his cello. However, there is no question
7491(a), under certain circumstances, alters the burden of proof with respect to a taxpayer’s liability for taxes in court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Although this examination commenced after July 22, 1998, the issue does not fall within the scope of sec. 7491(a). Petitioner, therefore,
ommissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). The estimate, however, must have a reasonable evidentiary basis. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). 1 Petitioners do not argue that the burden of proof shifts to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a) and that the threshold requirements of sec. 7491(a) have been met. In any event, we decide the issue on the basis of the preponderance of evidence on the record. - 5 - Petitioners failed to provide substantiation for any of the claimed e
es for the years 1999 and 2000; and (6) whether petitioners are liable for a section 6651 addition to tax for the year 2000.2 2Generally, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. Rule 142(a)(1). The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491(a) if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests. Prior to trial, petitioners
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the case at bar.
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, is not applicable here because petitioners have not satisfied the substantiation requirements. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). - 6 - It is dubious at best to say that petitioner’s participation in this pyramid scheme was conducted with the continuity and regularity of a trade or business, and that the claimed expenses
In the present case, there is no dispute with respect to any factual issues, and therefore section 7491(a) is not applicable. The notice of deficiency reflects tax payments petitioner made for 1999 as withholding credits.3 Such payments are deemed to have been made as of April 15, 2000. See sec. 6513(b)(1). Since the withholding taxes
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, 2This amount was determined by the Form 1099-Misc, Miscellaneous Income, from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., which reported nonempl
Although section 7491 may shift the burden of proof to respondent in specified circumstances, petitioner here has not established that he meets the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the case at bar because petitioner has not complied with the requirements to substantiate the items in dispute.
Although neither party alleges the applicability of section 7491(a), we conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted to respondent with respect to any of the issues in the case at bar.
tory employee under section 3121(d)(3) is allowed to deduct expenses from gross income on Schedule C that otherwise would be 9 We render a decision on the merits based on the preponderance of the evidence, without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). 10 Rev. Rul. 90-93, 1990-2 C.B. 33, provides that an individual treated as a statutory employee under sec. 3121(d)(3) for employment tax purposes who would otherwise be characterized as an independent contractor is not considered an emp
The deductions that fall within section 274(d) include expenses “with respect to any listed property (as defined in section 280F(d)(4))”.
Under some circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491. That burden does not shift to respondent in this case because petitioner failed to maintain records and comply with the requirements of substantiation as required by sec. 7491(a)(2). - 4 - discussed infra, petitioner failed to establish her entitlement to head-of-household filing status under section 1.2-2(d), Income Tax Regs. Section 151(c) allows dependency exemption deductions for each dependent as defined in
s of the additional 10-percent tax. Secs. 72(t)(1), 4974(c)(4). The additional tax does not apply to distributions from an IRA used to pay for qualified higher education expenses. Sec. 72(t)(2)(E). Petitioners do not argue that any other exception 4 Sec. 7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on this case. The issue with respect to the computer, housewares, appliances, furniture, and bedding expenses is primarily one of law. Regarding the book expense, sec. 7491(a) is not applicable
7491(a); Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). - 6 - a taxpayer's “alternative minimum taxable income” over an exemption amount of $49,000. See sec. 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I), (b)(2), (d)(1)(A)(i). Section 55(b)(2) defines the term “alternative minimum taxable income”. As rel
7491(a); Rule 142(a). On her Federal income tax return, petitioner reported $46,520 as wage income. As noted earlier, petitioner claimed a deduction of $12,449 for moving expenses, all of which was disallowed in the notice of deficiency. Petitioner testified that the $12,449 she claimed consisted of $4,100 for transportation of her household g
d, revoke, or terminate the enjoyment by any person of the assets. See secs. 2036(a)(1) and (2), 2038(a). Respondent’s determination in the notice of deficiency is entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Rule 142(a). The parties do not address section 7491(a). The estate does not argue that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and it has failed to establish that it has complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2). Therefore, we conclude that the esta
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Nor would petitioners have qualified because they failed to present credible evidence, substantiate their claimed expenses, or maintain adequate books and records. - 8 - A. Deduction for the Value of the Contract for Deed Next, we address whether petitioners are entitled to deduct as alimony $29,000 for the value of a c
ductions here in dispute petitioners rely upon section 162(a). That section generally allows a taxpayer to deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business. 3 Petitioner does not claim that the provisions of sec. 7491(a) are applicable, and we proceed as though they are not. - 6 - In this case, specific substantiation rules come into play as the deductions here in dispute, although of a type generally allowable under section 162(a), are further described
Discussion Neither of the parties has addressed the applicability of section 7491(a) regarding the burden of proof.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. The burden does not shift with respect to any factual issue relating to the present cases because petitioners did not introduce credible evidence. Sec. 7491(a)(1). A court may look to various factors to determine intent to repay, but, once the taxpayer’s int
The burden of proof does not shift in this case, however, because petitioner failed to introduce credible evidence, maintain adequate records, satisfy substantiation requirements, or cooperate with respondent. Id. After carefully considering the facts, we conclude that petitioner has failed to prove that respondent’s deficiency determ
not proper; (4) the lien was premature; and (5) the conduct of respondent’s employee was fraudulent and subject to sanctions.1 We disagree because: (1) Petitioner had 1 Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a) in this case. - 8 - taxable income; (2) payment of Federal income tax is not voluntary; (3) respondent’s settlement officer verified that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures had been met; (4) the certified tr
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
s are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous.3 Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 3 We decide the issues in this case without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a) because the issues are essentially legal in nature. - 4 - A. Dependency Exemption Deduction A taxpayer may be entitled to claim a dependency exemption deduction for each individual who qualifies as the taxpayer’s dependent under sections
nses, including amounts expended for meals and lodging, that are paid or incurred while “away from home” in the pursuit of a 6 We render a decision on the merits based on the preponderance of the evidence, without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). 7 For 1999, respondent determined that petitioner substantiated payment of the deductions at issue. For 2000, we conclude on the basis of the record that petitioner substantiated all of the deductions claimed. Accordingly, substantiatio
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and introduced during the Court proceeding credible evidence with respect to the factual issue.
Section 2036(a)9 generally provides that if a decedent makes an inter vivos transfer of property, other than a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration, and retains certain enumerated rights or interests in the property which are 9SEC.
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner under certain circumstances. The burden does not shift with respect to any factual issue relating to the present cases because petitioners did not introduce credible evidence. Sec. 7491(a)(1). A court may look to various factors to determine intent to repay, but, once the taxpayer’s int
The facts are not in dispute in this case, and section 7491(a) has no bearing in this case.
In addition, respondent has no obligation under sec. 7491(c) to produce evidence that the secs. 6651(a)(1) and 6654(a) additions to tax are applicable because petitioner is deemed to have conceded the additions to tax by failing to assign error to the additions to tax in the petition. See Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 217-218 (2
In this case petitioner has neither argued that section 7491 is applicable to shift the burden of proof to respondent nor established that he complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2). The resolution of the issue presented does not depend on which party has the burden of proof. We resolve the issue on the preponderance of t
Discussion Because petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent in this case.
- 3 - Discussion Because petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent in this case on the issues of itemized and business expense deductions.
the petition was filed. Accordingly, the claimed deduction is considered by the Court as if properly raised by amendment to petition. - 5 - Discussion Petitioner did not assert or present evidence or argument that she satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a). We conclude that the burden of proof does not shift in this case. Petitioner failed to appear in this case to present any argument or evidence that the adjustments made in the notice of deficiency are incorrect. Further, petitioner pr
Under certain circumstances, section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the Commissioner.
However, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the 8Mr.
Petitioner does not contend that he meets the requirements of sec. 7491(a), however. - 7 - petitioner asserts that his deductions were reasonable; he must provide adequate proof. See Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 837 (1974) (a tax return does not establish the correctness of
In this case, petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if its requirements are met, applies, and petitioner has not produced evidence to show he meets the requirements of section 7491(a).
Because petitioner failed to show he satisfied these requirements, the burden of proof remains with petitioner. SAll section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect fo'r the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 7 - applies because the disallowed amount excee
The Court is satisfied that respondent has provided sufficient evidence linking petitioner to the income underlying the statutory notice of deficiency.6 Although section 7491 may shift the burden to respondent in specified circumstances, petitioner here did not satisfy the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491 applies. Thus, petitioner bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 2. Whether the Payments at Issue Are Taxable in the Years Received We next consider petitioner’s argument that, under the claim of right doctrine, petitioner is excused from
nt’s determination is presumed correct and petitioner bears the burden of proof on all issues in this case. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioner does not contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). - 5 - physical injuries or physical sickness. Id. To decide the purpose or purposes for which a payment was made, courts have considered, inter alia, the following: (1) The underlying complaint and the nature of the claims; (2) the sett
opkins’s S Corporation that petitioners claimed in petitioners’ Schedule E.13 Respondent further determined in the notice that petitioners are liable for 1999 for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). OPINION The parties do not address section 7491(a). Since the year at issue is 1999, we presume that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case. On the record before us, we find that petitioners have failed to carry their burden of establishing that they satisfy the applicable
cords besides the joint checking accounts in either 1995 or 1997. Petitioner did not issue a subpoena to his former spouse in an effort to obtain 10 Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown entitlement to any shift in the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioner retains the burden of proof with respect to all issues in this case except respondent’s determinations of fraud for the years in issue. See Rule 142(a) and (b). 11 The checking account records taken by petitioner
Burden of Proof Petitioners have not claimed or established that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent with respect to any factual issue.
OPINION Burden of Proof Generally, under section 7491(a), the burden of proof relating to factual issues relevant to an individual’s tax liability may shift from the taxpayer to respondent where the taxpayer: (1) Has credible evidence to substantiate the item in question; (2) has maintained appropriate records relating - 14 - thereto; and (3) has cooperated with reasonable requests by re
e did not abuse its discretion in determining that respondent may proceed with the proposed collection action. An appropriate order of dismissal and decision will be entered. 7Because petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent’s requests for information, documents, meetings, and interviews, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. See sec. 7491(a).
3-364 (2002). To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order of dismissal and decision will be entered. 3Because petitioner has not introduced any credible evidence with respect to any factual issue and has failed to cooperate with respondent’s requests for information, documents, and meetings, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. See sec. 7491(a).
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code. Additionally, section 6201(d) provides that if a taxpa
ned the joint petitions in which it was asserted that she was an innocent spouse as an affirmative defense and he did not timely inform Ms. McClelland before trial that he intended to oppose her request. See Rule 142(a). We believe that a taxpayer 2Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable here because it is only relevant in deciding whether the burden of proof shifts to the respondent. - 8 - seeking innocent spouse relief should generally bear the burden of proving entitlement thereto. However, as discuss
determination is presumed to be correct and petitioners bear the burden of proof on all issues in this case. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). However, respondent bears the burden of production under sec. 7491(c) as to the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a). - 8 - 2. Whether Western Used a Permitted Tax Year An S corporation may use only a permitted year as its taxabl
OPINION Burden of Proof Generally, under section 7491(a), the burden of proof relating to factual issues relevant to an individual’s tax liability may shift from the taxpayer to respondent where the taxpayer: (1) Has credible evidence to substantiate the item in question; (2) has maintained appropriate records relating - 14 - thereto; and (3) has cooperated with reasonable requests by re
ssioner, supra; Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1244, 1269 (1985), affd. 792 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1986). Petitioners bear the burden of proving the requisite intention. Rule 142(a). The parties do not argue that the burden shifts to respondent under section 7491(a). Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., sets forth a nonexclusive list of relevant factors which should normally be considered in determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit. The factors include: (1) The manner in which the
Burden of Proof Section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues involving examinations commenced after July 22, 1998.
Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491 applies. Thus, petitioner bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). - 8 - certificate signed by the general secretary of the Union Nationale des Mutuelles Retraite des Instituteurs et des Fonctionnaires de l'Education Nationale et de la Fonctio
once he has put forth some probative evidence linking petitioners with the income-producing activity. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), revg. 67 T.C. 672 (1977).4 4 Sec. 7491(a) was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, (continued...) - 12 - As a threshold matter, respondent must show some income source to support his determination. Weimerskirch
he amount of deductions claimed on the return. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. The Court need not accept taxp.ayer's self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present corroborative ¹°This principle would not be affected by sec. 7491(a) even if it applied to this case, which it does not because sec. 7491 applies to examinations begun post-July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. Sec. 7491
However, our findings are not affected by the burden of proof. - 21 - that decedent did not retain or have an implied or express agreement to retain the possession, enjoyment, or right to the income from the Padaro Lane property after it was transferred to Spindrift. 1. Whether There Was an Implied Agreement That Decedent Would Retai
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the examination of the taxpayer’s records for the subject year began after July 22, 1998, and the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and i
nal physical injuries or physical sickness”. Sec. 104(a)(2).4 Section 61, which mandates that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived absent a specific statutory exclusion, is to be broadly construed. Commissioner v. Glenshaw 3 Sec. 7491(a) was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726, effective for court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1
xpayer] rather than the form set forth by all the relevant documents.” Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 533, 541 (1986) (emphasis added). The Court will not 6 The estate does not argue that the burden of proof should be on respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). - 8 - restructure the transaction with the benefit of hindsight in applying the substance over form doctrine. Id. at 542; see also Commissioner v. Natl. Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) (“while a taxpayer is f
rty would be an undue burden on the Court. See Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 693, 705 (1985), affd. without published opinion 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986). - 15 - Petitioners bear the burden of proof in these cases, and it has not shifted under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not present credible evidence that the trusts had economic substance, and the credibility of the evidence that they did produce was undermined by their implausible claims. Petitioners did not cooperate with respondent’
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues - 5 - relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code. Additionally, section 6201(d) provides that if
cords besides the joint checking accounts in either 1995 or 1997. Petitioner did not issue a subpoena to his former spouse in an effort to obtain 10 Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown entitlement to any shift in the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Accordingly, petitioner retains the burden of proof with respect to all issues in this case except respondent’s determinations of fraud for the years in issue. See Rule 142(a) and (b). 11 The checking account records taken by petitioner
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).7 Here, both parties have presented evidence and introduced expert witness reports. We therefore decide the case based on the preponderance of evidence without regard to the burden of proof. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2005), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-212; Polack v. Commissioner, 366 F.3d 608, 613 (8
hat show the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Feldman v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 1128, 1132 (11th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-17. However, the burden of proof may shift to respondent under section 7491(a). Section 7491 applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. Information document requests in the record indicate respondent’s examination commenced on or before August 1997. - 31 - Therefore, section 7491 does not apply, and
Petitioner does not contend that he meets the requirements of sec. 7491(a), however. - 7 - petitioner asserts that his deductions were reasonable; he must provide adequate proof. See Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 837 (1974) (a tax return does not establish the correctness of
n dispute because those payments were capital expenditures made to defend or perfect petitioner's title to property. Sec. 1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs. 3 Petitioner argues that the burden of proof in this case should be shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a). On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the evidence presented at trial, we decide this case according to the preponderance of evidence without regard to the burden of proof. Respondent contends petitioner may not argue that she (i
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that petitioners’ evidence is not reliable and that they are not entitled to any deductions beyond those conceded by respondent. With respect to the medical expenses in issue, besides introducing incomplete and illegible documents, Ms. Jackson presented vague and uncertain testimony as to t
Because of their concession, it is unnecessary for us to make any findings concerning events occurring during the audit. Respondent does not dispute that petitioners would be entitled to offset against gross receipts any substantiated deductions attributable to Bioactive Kansas Trust. However, petitioners produced only Bonnie Stejskal
ecognized only to the extent that the taxpayer’s adjusted sales price (as defined in subsection (b)) of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer’s cost of purchasing the new residence. 12Petitioner has not established that he meets the requirements of sec. 7491(a), and, therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. 13Sec. 1034 applies to the sale or exchange of a principal residence occurring on or before May 6, 1997. Sec. 1034 was repealed by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L
in the payment and even . though he may be liable to restore its equivalent. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932); Vetrano v. Commissioner, supra. The record does not reflect that 4In this case, petitioners do not contend that sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if its requirements are met, applies, and petitioners have not produced evidence to show they meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a). The burden of proof, therefore, remains on petition
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).6 The burden does not shift to respondent under section 7491, however, because we find that petitioner failed to provide credible evidence, failed to substantiate the claimed expenses, and failed to maintain adequate records. The burden therefore remains with petitioner. Moreover, deductions are a matter of legislative gr
In addition, respondent has no obligation under sec. 7491(c) to produce evidence that the sec. 6651(a)(1) additions to tax are appropriate because petitioner is deemed to have conceded the additions to tax by failure to assign error to the additions to tax in the petition. See Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213 (2004); Swain v. Commis
The Burden of Proof The estate contends that the burden of proof should shift to respondent under the provisions of section 7491(a)3 on the issue considered by the Court.4 Section 7491(a)(1) provides: 3 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
Because of their concession, it is unnecessary for us to make any findings concerning events occurring during the audit. Respondent does not dispute that petitioners would be entitled to offset against gross receipts any substantiated deductions attributable to Bioactive Kansas Trust. However, petitioners produced only Bonnie Stejskal
- 7 - This burden, however, may shift to the Commissioner to disprove entitlement to a claimed deduction if the taxpayer introduces “credible evidence” complete with the necessary substantiation and documentation sufficient to fulfill the requirements of section 7491(a).5 To shift the burden, the taxpayer must also have complied with requirements to cooperate with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews.
determination is presumed to be correct and petitioners bear the burden of proof on all issues in this case. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). However, respondent bears the burden of production under sec. 7491(c) as to the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a). - 8 - 2. Whether Western Used a Permitted Tax Year An S corporation may use only a permitted year as its taxabl
of with respect to a taxpayer’s liability for taxes in court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Although this examination commenced after July 22, 1998, petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a). Not only did petitioner not produce credible factual evidence that she was not liable for the tax, but also she did not cooperate with respondent before trial. Therefore, petitioner bears the burden of proof at trial. - 5 - With respect
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).7 Here, both parties have presented evidence and introduced expert witness reports. We therefore decide the case based on the preponderance of evidence without regard to the burden of proof. See Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2005), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-212; Polack v. Commissioner, 366 F.3d 608, 613 (8
y under section 6015(f). II. Filing Requirement The Code imposes a Federal tax on the taxable income of every individual. Sec. 1. Gross income for the purpose of calculating taxable income is defined as “all income from 7 The parties did not address sec. 7491(a), and petitioner did not argue that the burden of proof shifted to respondent under sec. 7491(a). 8 Petitioner requested recovery of legal fees for her time in preparing for the instant case, in obtaining her divorce, and in filing her ba
deductible expenses greater than the amount of the standard deduction allowed by respondent. Thus, we have no basis to estimate the amount of his deductible expenses. 3 Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Citing Brenner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-202, petitioner contends that respondent routinely allows more than 50 percent of a taxpayer’s gross compensation for business expenses for a taxpayer in petitioner’s business and lo
Although section 7491(a) may shift the burden to the - 15 - Commissioner with respect to factual issues where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence, the provision operates only where the taxpayer establishes that he or she has complied with all substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records, and has cooperated with reasonable requests
n of the property in detail reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. Id. If the taxpayer claims a deduction BPetitioner does not contend that sec. 7491 applies to this case, and he has not produced evidence to show he meets the requirements of sec. 7491(a). 9Sec. 170(b)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part, that in the case of an individual, any charitable contribution to a church, educational organization, or other enumerated organization, meeting certain requirements "shall be allowed to th
- 7 - did not satisfy the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
d, revoke, or terminate the enjoyment by any person of the assets. See secs. 2036(a)(1) and (2), 2038(a). Respondent’s determination in the notice of deficiency is entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Rule 142(a). The parties do not address section 7491(a). The estate does not argue that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a), and it has failed to establish that it has 4The estate does not challenge respondent’s inclusion of the living trust property under s
Section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner respecting tax liability under certain circumstances. The burden does not shift in this case because petitioner neither alleged that section 7491(a) was applicable nor established that she fully complied with the statutory substantiation requirements of section 7491 as shown below. Sec.
that their petition was timely filed because it was mailed in accordance with the timely-mailing/timely-filing rule in sec. 7502, I.R.C., and the regulations prescribed thereunder. Ps further contend that because they satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a), I.R.C., the burden of proof shifts to R on the issue of whether Ps' petition was timely filed. R argues that the plain language of sec. 7491(a)(1), I.R.C., indicates it is not applicable to the issue of whether Ps' petition was timely fi
a result of those concessions, on brief respondent concedes that the amount of personal representative’s commissions that respondent deter- mined in the notice to allow as a deduction under sec. 2053 (continued...) - 13 - OPINION We first address section 7491(a). The parties agree that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case. The parties disagree, however, over whether the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a) with respect to the issue presented under section
Burden of Proof Petitioners have not claimed or established that section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to respondent with respect to any factual issue.
determination is presumed to be correct and petitioners bear the burden of proof on all issues in this case. See Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Petitioners do not contend that respondent bears the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). However, respondent bears the burden of production under sec. 7491(c) as to the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a). - 8 - 2. Whether Western Used a Permitted Tax Year An S corporation may use only a permitted year as its taxabl
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Nor would petitioners have qualified because they failed to present credible evidence, substantiate their claimed expenses, or maintain adequate books and records. Other requirements are that the alimony must be received by a spouse under a divorce or separation instrument, the payments cannot be designated in the divorc
Burden of Proof The estate argues that under section 7491(a) the burden of proof has shifted to respondent.
ceipts of zero, $5,037.70 in labor costs, car and truck expenses of $2,079.89, legal and professional service expenses of $13,580.37, rent or lease expenses for vehicles or - 4 - equipment of $2,148.69, and unnamed other expenses of $6,241.45, resulting in a net loss of $29,988.10.1 Discussion Because petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a), the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relevant to the deficiency does not shift to respondent.
Discussion Because petitioners failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent in this case.1 Losses may be deductible under section 165 to the extent "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." In the case of an individual, section 165(c)(3) allows a taxpayer to claim as a deduction any loss from theft or casualty sustained during the taxable year.
A corporation formed for legitimate business purposes is an entity separate from its shareholders, and the business of the corporation is separate and distinct from the business of its shareholders. Moline Props., Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-439 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 494 (1940). Consequently, a sharehold
tered his determination by offering an alternate computation to measure petitioner's total coupon and buy-down income. 6 With respect to the determination of underreported income, no question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). Even if petitioner had raised the issue, his failure to keep adequate records and substantiate items has not met the conditions for placing the burden on respondent. See sec. 7491(a)(2). - 10 - As a first step, respondent reviewed copie
7491(a) does not serve to place the burden of proof on respondent because petitioners failed to introduce credible evidence of an election to waive the carryback of the 1995 NOL. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). 4 For purposes of this case involving a 1995 net operating loss and a 1996 taxable year, we consider sec. 172(b)(1)(A
Discussion Because petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent in this case.1 Section 183(a) generally provides that if an activity engaged in by an individual is not entered into for profit, no deduction attributable to the activity shall be allowed, except 1Sec.
Discussion Because petitioners failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof does not shift to respondent in this case.
ness carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business * * * except that in computing such gross income and deductions * * *-- (1) there shall be excluded rentals from real 18Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable in the instant case. That is because respondent issued the notice to petitioners on Mar. 20, 1998, and a fortiori the examination of the years involved here would have commenced before July 23, 1998. See Internal Revenu
Because petitioners did not meet the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof remains on petitioners.
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a)(2). Credible evidence is “‘the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, * * * [a] court would find sufficient * * * to base a decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted.’” Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001) (quoting H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 99
nce to support his factual allegations. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. The first issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to head of household filing status. Section 2(b) 1 Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a); consequently, sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent. - 4 - provides that a taxpayer may be considered a head of household if the taxpayer is not married at the close of the taxable year and maintains as his or her
On the other hand, section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner shall have the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount.
Petitioner has not established that he complied - 4 - with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests.
aunt did not file tax returns for 1995 and 1996, and respondent’s summary of records indicates that she received total income of $13,075 in 1995 and $10,635 for 1996. 6 Given the lack of records and the lack of credibility in petitioner’s testimony, sec. 7491(a), pertaining to shifting the burden of proof, has no application here. - 7 - evidence that he had reasonable cause for the understatements or that he acted in good faith. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determinations.7 Reviewed and
Since petitioners did not meet the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of section 7491(a), the burden of proof remains on petitioners.
As the return for 2001 was filed after July 22, 1998, section 7491(a) is applicable.
disingenuous. Nonetheless, it does appear that an adjustment should be made. Respondent determined a deficiency of $1,341. That amount appears to include the mathematical error respondent determined 2 Petitioners do not satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 4 - in petitioners’ favor that respondent does not dispute and for which petitioners should be given credit. The deficiency, therefore, should be the amount of the AMT liability or $1,222. Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Smal
h is not includable in gross income under this section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215, (3) in the case of an 1 Because there are no disputes with respect to any factual issues in this case, we need not consider the application of sec. 7491(a). Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 4 - individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at the tim
Section 7491(a) does not affect the outcome because petitioner’s liability for the deficiency is decided on the preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner untimely filed his 1998 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, on October 15, 2002. Petitioner reported the $35,789 at issue on Schedule D, Capital Gains and Losses, attached to his return.
Section 7491(a) does not affect the outcome because petitioner’s liability for the deficiency is decided on the preponderance of the evidence. During taxable year 2000, petitioner owned 200 shares of Bell Canada Enterprise, Inc. (BCE). In May 2000, pursuant to a planned “Joint Arrangement” to distribute its Nortel Networks Corp. (Nortel) stock, BCE
taxpayer who does not file a joint return and who does not live apart from his spouse at all times during the taxable year, both 1 Because there are no disputes with respect to any factual issues in this case, we need not consider the application of sec. 7491(a). Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). 2 In this case, ignoring adjustments not relevant here, petitioner’s modified adjusted gross income equals his adjusted gross income. See sec. 86(b)(2). 3 Prior to 1984, certain disability be
at he is entitled to the deductions claimed. Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). The burden of proof has not shifted to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491 since petitioner has not complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 3 - allowance from the city for this purpose, which approximated the cost of three pairs of firefighter uniform pants and one uniform shirt, but other expenses were out of poc
7491(a)(2)(B); Rule 142(a).1 Petitioner contends that she is entitled to a section 166 bad debt deduction relating to the note. She also contends that in 1998, the first lien holder attempted to foreclose on the property, and that she attempted to collect on the note in that year. The note is a bona fide debt and became due in 1998 when Ms. Mo
owever I believe no penalty should be charged on any portion of the withdrawal. Discussion We decide the issues in this case without regard to the burden of proof because the facts are not in dispute and the issues are legal in nature. See generally sec. 7491(a); Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); New 4 The parties stipulated, however, that petitioners paid and incurred qualified higher education expenses of $15,716. Therefore, only $14,284 of petitioners’ early distribut
In the present case, the burden of proof remains with petitioner, because he has neither taken a position as to whether the burden of proof should be placed on respondent nor established that he has complied with the requirements of section 7491(a). Petitioner and his wife have a history of nonfiling and delinquent filing. A review of
By virtue of section 7491(a), the burden of proof may, under certain circumstances, be shifted to the Commissioner.
Section 7491(a) is therefore inoperative. Section 469 Passive Activity Loss Exemption If a taxpayer is an individual, the "passive activity loss" for the taxable year shall not be allowed. Section 469(a). The term "passive activity loss" means the amount by which "the - 6 - aggregate losses from all passive activities" exceeds "the aggregate incom
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(1). Section 61 provides that gross income generally includes all income from whatever source derived. However, section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income amounts received in damages, by suit or settlement, “on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness”. In determining whether damages received are excluda
taxpayer has the burden of proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In some cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant factual issues may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). Petitioners did not present evidence or argument that they satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and, therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent. - 4 - A. Unreported Income Petitioner contends that he was in
Because petitioners have not complied with the substantiation requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof as to facts relevant to the deficiency remains on petitioners.
Memorandum Opinion of this Court. The term “primarily” for purposes of section 1221 means “of first importance” or “principally.” See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966). 2No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). - 13 - In determining whether gains realized by JCLC from the 1998 sales of the Jackson Creek property were capital gains or income derived from the sale of the property in the ordinary course of business, we make three factual inquirie
Due to the fact that petitioners did not substantiate their deductions, section 7491(a) is not applicable.
Section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. Petitioners have neither alleged section 7491 applies nor established their compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and cooperate fully with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests. See sec. 7491(a)(2);
he amount of tax required to be shown on a return less the amount of tax actually shown on the return. 5 Petitioner bears the burden of proof because he does not contend and has offered no evidence that the burden of proof shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Secs. 6015(b)(3), 6662(d)(2)(A); Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 146 n.5. In this case, there is no understatement of tax because the amount of tax required to be shown on the return is the amount shown on the return. Thus, p
al Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, when petitioners were notified by letter dated July 16, 1997, that their application for tentative refund was under examination. We note that, had sec. 7491(a) applied, it would not have shifted the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners have not maintained adequate books and records and have not substantiated the amounts shown on their return. Sec. 7491(a)(2). The burden of proof re
, the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof - 4 - under section 7491(a). Barela v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004- 175. An S corporation’s loss flows through to its shareholders on a pro rata basis. Sec. 1366(a). Section 6037(c) requires consistent treatment between the S corporation and shareholder’s retur
Respondent, in a notice of deficiency dated October 16, 2001, - 4 - disallowed the head-of-household filing status, child tax credit, and dependency exemption deductions.1 Discussion As the return for 1999 was filed after July 22, 1998, section 7491(a) is applicable.
- 5 - In the case of a child of divorced parents, section 152(e)(1) provides that if a child receives over half of his support from parents who are divorced under a decree of divorce and the child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more than one-half of the year, then the child will be treated as receiving over half of his support from the parent having custody
7491(a); Rule 142(a).
Because petitioner has not complied with the substantiation requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof as to facts relevant to the deficiency remains on petitioner.
While section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner where the taxpayer presents credible evidence with respect to a factual issue, the burden remains on the taxpayer where the taxpayer failed to comply with all statutory substantiation requirements. Under certain circumstances, section 6201(d) may place the burden of production on the Co
pay in a divorce proceeding either as property solely of the servicemember or as property of the military retiree and his or her spouse in accordance with the law of the 8 We decide the issue in this case without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a) because the issue is essentially one of law. 9 The USFSPA reversed the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that a State court could not order a division of nondisability military retired pay as part of a distribution of communi
began after the statute’s effective date. However, legislative history makes clear that the burden will be shifted to the Commissioner under the statute only in cases where the taxpayer establishes that he or she meets the prerequisites set forth in section 7491(a)(2). H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239-242 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993-996. - 6 - With respect to the instant matter, petitioners have neither raised any argument with respect to a shift of burden under section 7491 nor shown that they c
In the present case, the burden of proof remains on petitioners, since they have neither taken a position as to whether the burden of proof should be placed on respondent nor established that they have complied with the requirements of section 7491(a). As such, petitioners have failed to meet their burden that they are entitled to any
The parties do not address the application of section 7491(a) or (c) in the instant case.
which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Sec. 469(c)(1). The term passive activity includes any rental activity regardless of whether the taxpayer materially 12 We decide the issue in this case without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a) because the issue is essentially one of law. - 10 - participates in the activity. Sec. 469(c)(2), (4). A rental activity is “any activity where payments are principally for the use of tangible property.” Sec. 469(j)(8). As relevant herein
Because petitioner did not meet the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof remains on petitioner.
xcept for the computational adjustments on the itemized deductions). The sole issue is whether petitioner is entitled to a $20,977 deduction for alimony under section 215(a).3 3 The Court decides this case without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a), since the facts are not in dispute and the issue is a question of law. - 5 - Section 215(a) provides generally that alimony payments are deductible by the payor spouse. Under section 215(b), "alimony" means any alimony, as defined in se
utational adjustment reducing the section 6428 rate reduction credit from $465 to $300. In his petition to this Court, petitioner challenges these adjustments.3 3 Sec. 7491, in some instances, places the burden of proof on respondent. However, under sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B), for the burden to shift, the taxpayer must comply with the substantiation and record-keeping requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner presented no documentary evidence to substantiate his claim for the depende
cases began on Aug. 5, 1999, for 1996 through 1998 and on Apr. 4, 2002, for 1999 through 2000, these cases were submitted fully stipulated. Therefore, no facts are in dispute, and we decide these cases without regard to the burden-shifting rule of sec. 7491(a)(1). 4These two cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and opinion in an order from this Court dated May 15, 2003. - 4 - shares of both corporations became property of his Estate at that time.5 Both corporations are calendar year cor
- 9 - While examination of petitioners’ 1999 tax return commenced after July 22, 1998, neither of the parties has addressed the applicability of section 7491(a) regarding the burden of proof.
7491(a); Rule 142(a); Underwood v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1932). But the IRS will generally accept certain proofs of expenditures as adequate substantiation. See Rev. Proc. 92-71, 1992-2 C.B. 437. Petitioner must in all cases provide evidence to establish a sufficient connection between the deduction and his trade or business. Gorm
In certain circumstances, however, section 7491(a)(1) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner.
Section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. Petitioners have neither alleged section 7491 applies nor established their compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and cooperate fully with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests. See sec. 7491(a)(2);
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying issue.
Moreover, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to the income reported on an information return and fully cooperates, then the Commissioner shall have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information in addition to such information return. Sec. 6201(d); Tanner v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 237 (2001), affd. 6
he year 2000. The parties did not address this adjustment at trial; consequently, the Court considers this item conceded by petitioner. With respect to the two contested issues, the Court decides this case without regard to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). - 3 - work assignments were exclusively in the repair, maintenance, construction, or rehabilitation of paper mills and power plants, which included nuclear, gas turbine, and coal-fired plants, engaged in either the generation of electri
Discussion Section 7491(a)(1)2 provides that the burden of proof may, under certain conditions, shift to the Commissioner.
With respect to factual issues and subject to enumerated limitations, section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in instances where the taxpayer has introduced credible evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proof remains on petitioner because he has neither taken a position as to whether the burden of proof should be placed on respondent nor - 5 - established that he has complied with the requirements of section 7491(a). Itemized Deductions Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to $243
Because petitioners did not meet the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the burden of proof remains on petitioners.
ng and related expenses and for the use of her automobile. Section 162(a) allows deductions for “ordinary and necessary expenses paid * * * in carrying on any trade or business”. Petitioner is in the 3 Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 4 - trade or business of being an employee. See Fogg v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 310 (1987). While we recognize that employee business expenses may be deductible, a taxpayer still must establish that such alleged expenses were made and a
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent on the issue of the reasonableness of the TMI expenses.29 Moreover, we note that we base our findings of fact on the preponderance of the evidence in the record and not upon any allocation of the burden of proof.
ouse, to pay for her son’s wedding, and to make payments on her credit cards. The evidence shows that none of the exceptions set forth in section 72(t)(2) apply in this case.2 We conclude that the early distribution 2 The parties do not contend that sec. 7491(a) is (continued...) - 4 - made by petitioner is subject to the additional 10-percent tax under section 72(t)(1). Accuracy-Related Penalty In the notice of deficiency, respondent imposed an accuracy- related penalty due to substantial under
Petitioner contends that the $89,840 is excludable from his income because such amount constitutes “proceeds from a lawsuit settlement petitioner received from a former employer for medical conditions of a permanent and dibilating [sic] nature.” Section 7491(a) does not affect the outcome because petitioner’s liability for the deficiency is decided on the preponderance of the evidence.
Although section 7491 may shift the burden to respondent in specified circumstances, petitioner here did not satisfy the prerequisites under section 7491(a)(1) and (2) for such a shift.
arily by construing the pertinent agreements. Id.; see also Redler Conveyor Co. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1962), affg. T.C. Memo. 1961-82. Petitioner asserts on brief that respondent bears the burden of proof for 1996 by virtue of section 7491(a). The parties, however, stipulated that petitioner bears the burden of proof as to both years. Because petitioner has not asked the Court to vacate this stipulation, and the record does not otherwise give us any reason to qualify, chan
Section 7491(a), however, provides that if a taxpayer introduces credible evidence and meets certain other prerequisites, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relating to the liability of the taxpayer for a tax imposed under subtitle A or B of the Code. - 5 - At calendar call, petitioner for the first time
ent was petitioner’s dominant motivation. Accordingly, petitioner made the loans in his trade or business of being an employee for purposes of section 166. Cf. id. 5 No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof or production under sec. 7491(a). - 7 - Respondent concedes that petitioner’s loans were bona fide debts that arose in the course of his trade or business of being an employee of KPS. The parties stipulated that petitioner made the loans to maintain his employment with
Although section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues involving examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, which this case was, petitioner does not assert that section 7491(a) shifts the burden to respondent.
ause both petitioner and Mr. Capehart owned the partnership interest in SGE, and petitioner participated in the 10Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491 applies to this case and has not produced evidence to show she satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 23 - joint investment. Respondent relies on Ellison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-57, to support his position. In Ellison, we held that the taxpayer failed to prove that the understatement of tax was solely attributable to the erro
In fact, the available evidence suggests that the interest was paid to petitioner. In the notice, respondent refers to 3 Forms 1099 INT issued by the bank, which list interest payments of $49, $99, and $131 as “paid to Ozie R. M. Quarterman”. In addition, the 1995 Form 1040, on line 8a and on Schedule B, line 4, lists $900 of taxab
Although section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues involving examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, petitioners do not assert that section 7491(a) shifts the burden to respondent, nor have petitioners complied with the substantiation and record- keeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2).
ent had the power to withdraw $5,000 from the principal of the inter vivos trust and that that power was a general power of appointment. Consequently, respon- dent increased decedent’s total gross estate by $5,000. OPINION The parties do not address section 7491(a). The estate filed decedent’s estate tax return on September 27, 1999. We presume that respondent’s examination of that return commenced after July 22, 1998, and that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case. The estate has fa
1947). We conclude that, in addition to the $27,415 in wage income not contested by petitioner, the $95,233 reflected by check No. 1546 is to be treated as wage income taxable to petitioner in 1998. 2 Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2) or the requirements of sec. 6201(d), under which, in some circumstances, a shift to respondent in the burden of proof or production may be available. - 8 - For lack of contrary evidence, we also conclude that the $6,893, the a
claimed for vehicle expenses. On his 1999 return, petitioner claimed $3,915 for employee business vehicle expense and $2,194 for his wife’s car and truck expenses. 5 No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof or production under sec. 7491(a). - 9 - Petitioner produced records at trial supporting a $5,498 deduction for his employee business vehicle expenses and $6,951 for his wife’s car and truck expenses. Based on petitioner’s substantiation offered at trial, respondent conc
ef that the disallowed compensation was neither reasonable nor paid for Beiner’s services. Respondent asserts that the disallowed compensation represented funds that petitioner did not need for its operation 6 Given this concession, we conclude that sec. 7491(a), which in certain circumstances places the burden of proof upon the Commissioner, is not applicable here. - 23 - and had to expend to avoid the accumulated earnings tax of section 531. Respondent asserts that Beiner performed minimal, no
t to section 1015(a), petitioners’ basis in that simulator for such purposes is SDC’s cost of, and thus its basis in, that simulator; and (4) SDC’s cost of, and thus its basis in, the computer simulator 3The parties do not address the application of sec. 7491(a) or (c) in the instant case. Petitioners filed petitioners’ 1997 return on or about Aug. 15, 1998, and petitioners’ 1998 return on or about July 16, 1999. We presume that respondent's examination of those returns began after July 22, 1998
spouse bears the burden of proving that she satisfies each requirement of section 6015(b)(1)."" See Rule 142(a). "Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491 applies to this case.and has not produced evidence to show she satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 24 - Respondent does not dispute that petitioner meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (E) of section 6015(b)(1) but contends that petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of subparagraphs (1B), (C), and (D) of section
i), Income Tax Regs. The total amount of support 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 4 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to his case. - 4 - provided by all sources for the relevant year must be established by competent evidence. Blanco v. Commissioner, supra at 514. To determine whether a taxpayer provided more than half of the support for a d
Distributions From Petitioners’ Business Entities Respondent determined that the Mansours received and failed to report dividend distributions from two C corporations: Micca in 1996 and Ava Anthony in 1998. Respondent also determined that the Mansours received and failed to report distributions from three S corporations: Mina of
As one exception to this rule, section 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relating to liability for tax if the examination of the taxpayer’s records for the subject year began after July 22, 1998, and the taxpayer maintained adequate records, satisfied the substantiation requirements, cooperated with the Commissioner, and i
le for all taxes due. Sec. 6013(d)(3). Under certain circumstances, however, section 6015 provides relief from this general rule. Except as otherwise provided in section 6015, petitioner bears the burden of proof.3 3 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case, nor is there evidence that the examination commenced after July 22, 1998. Also, we note that some documents in the record indicate that the examination began prior to July 22, 1998. - 4 - Rule 142(a); Jonson v
Distributions From Petitioners’ Business Entities Respondent determined that the Mansours received and failed to report dividend distributions from two C corporations: Micca in 1996 and Ava Anthony in 1998. Respondent also determined that the Mansours received and failed to report distributions from three S corporations: Mina of
ness carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business * * * except that in computing such gross income and deductions * * *-- (1) there shall be excluded rentals from real 11Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable in the instant case. That is because respondent issued the notice to petitioners on Jan. 22, 1998, and a fortiori the examination of the years at issue would have commenced before July 23, 1998. See Internal Revenue Ser
See sec. 162(a)(1). An expense is ordinary for purposes of this section if it is normal or customary within a particular trade, business, or industry. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). An expense is 4 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case. - 6 - necessary if it is appropriate and helpful for the development of the business. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943). A taxpayer may deduct payments for compensation if the amount paid
7491(a) was added to the Code by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, effective for court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Sec. 7491(a)(1) provides that the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner in specified circumstances. Peti
cludes that respondent did not raise new matters that would shift the burden of proof regarding the capital loss carryovers and the rental expenses to respondent. B. Section 7491 Alternatively, the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491(a). However, because petitioner failed to comply with the substantiation and record-keeping requirements of section 7491(a)(2) and to introduce credible evidence within the meaning of section 7491(a)(1), section 7491 does not place the b
On the other hand, section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner shall have the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount. Specifically, section 7491(c), which was enacted by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Respondent represented to the Court that the only issue under section 7491(a) was whether petitioners had presented credible evidence.
7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent here because petitioners have failed to produce any credible evidence with respect to the disallowed deductions. - 10 - We sustain respondent’s disallowance of each of the deductions at issue.5 Accuracy-Related Penalties Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for accuracy-rel
impossible, courts have allowed deductions based on a close approximation but bearing heavily against the taxpayer 3 It would be ludicrous to say that under these circumstances petitioner is entitled to shift the burden of proof to respondent under sec. 7491(a). To say the least, he did not maintain adequate records or present credible evidence. See sec. 7491(a). - 6 - “whose inexactitude is of his own making.” See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). In making such an ap
7491(a); Rule 142(a). - 9 - 1997 Bad Debt Deduction Petitioners claimed a $2,000 nonbusiness bad debt deduction on their 1997 joint Federal income tax return. In general, there is allowed as a deduction “any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.” Sec. 166(a)(1). It is axiomatic that such deductions, if otherwise allowable, are
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Taxpayers, however, must maintain sufficient records to establish the amount of claimed deductions. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Section 274(d)(4) imposes stringent s
eld the settlement award was not excludable under section 104(a)(2). Id. Similarly, petitioner did not allege physical injury or sickness in her complaints filed with the EEOC. Petitioner, however, argues that the $71,600 damage award represented 3 Sec. 7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issue. Respondent has satisfied the burden of production with respect to the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662. See sec. 7491(c). - 7 - compensation for her
7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). As we view the matter, the outcome of this case would be the same regardless of where the burden of proof lies. Further discussion on the point is, therefore, unnecessary. Theft Loss Deduction Subject to certain limitations, an individual is entitled to a deduction for a theft loss sustained during the taxable year and n
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests.
are related to the mental health field. Petitioners’ testimony and arguments concerning these activities can be summarized as follows: During each of the years in issue, petitioner was involved in an activity in which he sold videotapes related to 3Sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent in this case because petitioners have provided no credible evidence supporting a profit objective with respect to the rental activity. Sec. 7491(a)(1). - 8 - the mental health field. The t
Section 61 provides that all income, from whatever source derived, is includable in gross income unless specifically excluded by another provision.
uests relief only from the self-employment tax liabilities imposed as a result of Mr. Haggart’s business. When, as here, a joint return is filed, the liability for the self-employment tax of one spouse is a 5 Petitioners have not argued that either sec. 7491(a) or (c) applies to this case to shift the burden of proof and/or production. Sec. 7491 applies to court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998 (RRA)
Filing Status As the tax returns for 1997 and 1998 were filed after July 22, 1998, section 7491(a) is applicable.
e computed your tax liability in accordance with community property laws.” In their separate petitions, petitioners claimed that they were not married during the years in issue because the Texas State court had annulled their marriage. In reply to 8 Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-9. - 10 - petitioners’ allegation, respondent responded in his answers that petitioners should be treated as married during the years in issue for purposes of thei
(relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-- * * * * * * * (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by 6 No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof or production under sec. 7491(a). 7 The 1996 amendments added to sec. 104 by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1838, do not apply because the amendments are effective for amounts received after Aug. 20, 1996. - 16 -
Although section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner with respect to certain factual issues, the burden remains on the taxpayer with respect to an issue where the taxpayer (1) fails to introduce credible evidence with respect thereto, or (2) fails to comply with statutory recordkeeping and substantiation requirements.
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issue. - 5 - Dependency Exemption Sections 151 and 152 provide that a taxpayer is entitled to deduct an exemption for a minor dependent if the taxpayer provides over half of the support for the minor dependent. In the case of a minor dependent whose parents are
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issue. - 5 - Dependency Exemption Sections 151 and 152 provide that a taxpayer is entitled to deduct an exemption for a minor dependent if the taxpayer provides over half of the support for the minor dependent. In the case of a minor dependent whose parents are
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Taxpayers, however, must maintain sufficient records to establish the amount of claimed deductions. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Section 274(d)(4) imposes stringent s
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issue. - 6 - The settlement agreement does not reference whether the damage award was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 1991. However, Rockford clearly intended to pay petitioner a settlement in compensation of her emotional distress. The settlement agree
- 12 - Petitioners’ Amway activity has resulted in substantial losses. Losses that are incurred in the initial stages of an activity do not necessarily suggest the absence of an honest profit objective. However, losses that continue without explanation beyond that period typically required for an activity to become profitable may ind
Discussion Decedent having filed his 2000 return after July 22, 1998, section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a). Petitioner testified that he resided in an apartment during the year in issue with his two sons, with Ms. Clarke, and with Ms. Clarke’s mother. During this time and through the time of trial, however, petitioner used his father’s address as his own mailing address. He testified that he kept this as his mailing address
viduals or entities, and their characteristics are not necessarily the same as those of the donor and the donee. Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 218 (1990) (citing Estate of Bright v. 5 Petitioner does not raise the applicability of sec. 7491(a), which operates to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances. See Rule 142(a)(2). However, petitioner argues for the first time in his posttrial reply brief that, under general principles of Federal tax law,
n lieu of such prosecution.” Sec. 1.104-1(c), Income Tax Regs. The flush language of section 104(a) further provides that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of section 104(a)(2). “[T]he 4Sec. 7491(a) places upon the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if the taxpayer proves that she maintained adequate records, satisfied applicable substantiation requirements, c
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issues. - 5 - petitioner is not entitled to an EIC. See Briggsdaniels v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-321; Brignac v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-387. Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case Division. Decision will be entered for respondent.
ce of deficiency (i.e., Form 4549-CG-S, Income Tax Examination Changes; Form 886-A, Explanation of Items). Further, the notice of deficiency was issued on May 5, 2001. 4 Petitioner did not argue that the burden of proof should be shifted pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Further, we do not find that the resolution of this case depends on which party has the burden of proof. We resolve the issues on the basis of a preponderance of evidence in the record. - 5 - Dependency Exemption Deduction Section 151 a
- 3 - Discussion There has been no assertion, nor do we conclude, that petitioner has satisfied the requirements of section 7491(a), and, consequently, section 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof.
ons and credits. Often this results from advice given by tax return preparers who know better. This is a dangerous 2 Sec. 7491 dealing with the burden of proof has no application to this case because petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 8 - game, and we urge such taxpayers and their return preparers to be more circumspect. Not only do the taxpayers end up paying interest for the current year, they may be subject to penalties or the denial of otherwise allowable credit
ue less the $100,000 sales price). 4 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that they fully complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). - 7 - contributions (as defined in section 170(c)) made within the taxable year. In general, the amount of a charitable contribution made in property other than money is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contri
- 5 - individuals over half of whose support was received from the taxpayer during the taxable year in which such individuals are claimed as dependents. Eligible individuals who may be claimed as dependents include, among others, a son or daughter of the taxpayer. See sec. 152(a)(1). Section 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs., pro
Whereas section 7491(a) in certain cases shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, we conclude that this is not one of those cases. Among other things, we note that petitioner has neither asserted that respondent bears the burden of proof as to the issue at hand, nor disputed respondent’s assertions that the burden of proof lies with petitioner. Peti
ion based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.” Sec. 1.104-1(c), Income Tax Regs. Section 104(a) further provides that “emotional distress shall 3 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case. 4 The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1605, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996 amendment), amended sec. 104(a)(2) to narrow the exclusion for personal injury damages received pursuant to a j
ner, T.C. Memo. 2001-318. The Court is not required to accept petitioner’s uncorroborated or self-serving testimony. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). 2(...continued) Refund and Request for Abatement, for 1995 through 1998. 3 Although sec. 7491(a) may apply in specified circumstances to place the burden on the Commissioner, the examination of petitioner’s 1987 return began before the effective date of that section. See also Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 126 (2002) (a taxpa
Discussion Petitioners filed the 1999 tax return on April 15, 2000; accordingly section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
petitioner is whether petitioner has established that he provided more than half of the support for the children.2 2 Sec. 7491 dealing with the burden of proof has no application to this case because petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a). - 4 - It is axiomatic that in order to establish that petitioner provided more than half of the support of the children, he must establish the amount of the children’s total support and the amount of support that he provided. Here, peti
, he was married in 1998 because Maria resided with him only for approximately 4 months during 1998, and, therefore, he did not maintain “as his home a household which constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal place of abode of a child” as required by section 7703(b)(1).6 See also sec.
, he was married in 1998 because Maria resided with him only for approximately 4 months during 1998, and, therefore, he did not maintain “as his home a household which constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal place of abode of a child” as required by section 7703(b)(1).6 See also sec.
62-17(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., are satisfied. See Baugh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-70. Section 1.162-17(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., provides: 6 Because petitioners failed to introduce any credible evidence, they failed to meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining liability for the tax deficiency in issue. Accordingly, petitioners bear the burden of proof. - 7 - The employee nee
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a). Because petitioner has failed to substantiate the expenses, we sustain respondent’s disallowance of the deductions therefor. - 4 - Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case Division. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent.
le, 469 U.S. 241, 243 (1985). Petitioner argues that he failed to timely file his 1996 return because of the “emotional distress of my mother’s death, my father’s ongoing illness and stressful job resulting in 3 Petitioner has not argued that either sec. 7491(a) or (c) applies to this case. Additionally, the record does not indicate that respondent’s examination commenced after July 22, 1998. Because sec. 7491 applies only to court proceedings arising from examinations commencing after July 22,
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). 10 As relevant to the present case, a “qualified retirement plan” includes an individual retirement account (IRA) and a qualified pension or profit sharing plan. Sec. 4974(c)(1), (4). - 9 - the date on which the taxpayer attains the age of 59-½ are not “early” and therefore
7491(a)(1);2 Rule 142(a); Ruidoso Racing Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 502, 507-508 (10th Cir. 1973), affg. in part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1971-194 (“With regard to unreported income, the taxpayer must prove that the determination is arbitrary or erroneous, and if it does so the Commissioner must satisfy the court as to
at his income was $600 per week. It would seem reasonable that he took at least 2 weeks of vacation for which he was not paid. While the notations on the company check register indicate that petitioner was paid more, it is undisputed that Treu Air 2 Sec. 7491(a), concerning the burden of proof, is inappli- cable because petitioner has not satisfied its requirements. - 5 - reimbursed petitioner for his expenses and for purchasing equipment. Furthermore, it is unlikely that petitioner received $10
. 507 (1935).2 Accordingly, while the parties executed a stipulation of facts, there are, unfortunately, gaps in the record that are sometimes crucial. 2 Petitioners have not satisfied the requirement to shift the burden of proof to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 3 - Background 1. 1997 Income Petitioner owned a condominium in Garden Grove, California. On October 30, 1997, she sold the condominium to the Corps under the Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP). Petitioner’s mortgage debt at that tim
FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991). It is beyond dispute that gross income includes income from the discharge of indebtedness. Sec. 61(a)(12); sec. 1.61-12(a), Income Tax Regs. As explained by the United States Supreme 2 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case, nor is it. - 5 - Court, the general theory is that to the extent that a taxpayer has been released from indebtedness, the taxpayer has realized an accession to income because the cancellation of indebtedness e
her [Ms. Stone’s] death is * * * included in Mrs. Stone’s gross estate.” In addition to the foregoing substantive disputes regarding sections 2036(a)(1) and 2044, the parties disagree over whether the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). The parties’ disagreements under section 7491(a) relate to the application in the instant cases of the term “credible evidence” in section 7491(a)(1) and the factual issue or issues with respect to which Mr. Stone’s estate and Ms. Sto
eturn is not presumed to be correct. 7 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that she fully complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2) with respect to any of the issues before the Court. - 9 - Wilkinson v. Commissioner, supra at 639; Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 837; see also Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034, 1051 (1957) (a taxpayer’s inco
Whereas in certain cases section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, we conclude that this is not one of those cases.
OPINION As the return for 2000 was filed after July 22, 1998, section 7491(a) is applicable.
. 507 (1935).2 Accordingly, while the parties executed a stipulation of facts, there are, unfortunately, gaps in the record that are sometimes crucial. 2 Petitioners have not satisfied the requirement to shift the burden of proof to respondent under sec. 7491(a). - 3 - Background 1. 1997 Income Petitioner owned a condominium in Garden Grove, California. On October 30, 1997, she sold the condominium to the Corps under the Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP). Petitioner’s mortgage debt at that tim
of the taxable year. In addition, petitioner’s contention is not supported by the record. Kim Lake 3 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner has not established that he complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. In any event, deciding who has the burden of proof is not determinative of the outcome of this case. - 5 - testifi
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 if the taxpayer establishes that he introduced credible evidence and complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the Secretary’s reasonable requests.
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). - 7 - special circumstances. Such absence will not prevent the taxpayer from being considered as maintaining a household if (i) it is reasonable to assume that the taxpayer or such other person will return to the household, and (ii) the taxpayer continues to maintain such h
4 Petitioner also introduced a copy of a hotel receipt from a hotel in Alpharetta, Georgia, with the written notation “Show Atlanta (16-18) - May - (Took vacation from work to go)”. The notation is contradicted by petitioner’s testimony that Holt reimbursed her for travel to trade shows. 5 We note that petitioner was in Buffalo,
7491(a)(1) and (2)(B); see Rule 142(a)(2).4 In the instant proceeding, petitioner introduced no evidence--much less credible evidence--to support his case. Accordingly, for this reason if for no other, section 7491 does not shift to respondent the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determinations contained in the notice of deficien
1999-332.3 Discussion Petitioner filed his 2000 tax return on April 15, 2001, accordingly section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
The facts of this case do not demonstrate to the Court that the burden of proof shifted to respondent. - 6 - permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown by such person in any return of such tax".
d mortgage. Petitioner, however, was unable to provide any substantiation for this second 1Where petitioner has failed to provide the required substantiation, as discussed in detail below, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a) and instead remains on petitioner. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A); Rule 142(a). - 4 - mortgage or for the alleged payments made with respect thereto. While we accept petitioner’s testimony that at some point in time he obtained a second mortgage on
ner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Respondent determined that petitioners failed to substantiate the claimed deductions and/or to show that they were incurred in a trade or business.2 2 No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof under sec. 7491(a). - 6 - A taxpayer is required to maintain sufficient records to establish the amounts of income and deductions. Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001); sec. 1.6001- 1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners have failed to p
7491(a)(1);2 Rule 142(a); Ruidoso Racing Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 502, 507-508 (10th Cir. 1973), affg. in part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1971-194 (“With regard to unreported income, the taxpayer must prove that the determination is arbitrary or erroneous, and if it does so the Commissioner must satisfy the court as to
When a taxpayer fails to keep records, but a court is convinced that deductible expenditures were made, the court - 4 - “should make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.” Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930). We cannot est
respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining the tax liability of the taxpayer shifts to the Commissioner. The Court finds that the burden of proof does not shift to respondent because petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of section 7491(a). Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, unless specifically excluded from income under the exclusion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 61; Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 334 (1984). Section 6
ified, and our evaluation of his overall testimony in the light of the record as a whole, we reject petitioners' argument on brief that Mr. Huff's testimony constitutes "credible evidence" sufficient to shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a). Mr. Huff during his testimony had a selective loss of memory; for example, he could vividly recall specific facts that supported his case but generally had no recollection as to many other facts which could have been detrimental to hi
7491(a), concerning burden of proof, has no bearing on the underlying substantive issues. - 5 - Earned Income Credit Section 32(a) generally provides eligible individuals with an EIC against their income tax liability. An “eligible individual” is defined as an individual who has a “qualifying child” for the taxable year. Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i).
Section 163(a) allows a deduction for interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. It is well settled that the indebtedness upon which such interest is paid or accrued must be that of the taxpayer taking the deduction. Smith - 3 - v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 889, 897 (1985), affd. without published opinion 805
7491(a); Rule 142(a). - 5 - taxpayer. Sec. 24. An individual is a qualifying child of the taxpayer for purposes of the child tax credit if, in addition to other requirements, the taxpayer is entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for the individual. Sec. 24(c). As discussed above, petitioner is not entitled to a dependency exemption ded
7491(a)(1); Rule 142(a). Petitioner has failed to show that he was Robert’s custodial parent during 1998, and petitioner did not attach to his return a written declaration signed by Ms. Mentzel. Thus, he is not entitled to the dependency exemption deduction pursuant to the special rules of - 8 - section 152(e). Furthermore, assuming arguendo
of a deficiency for the taxable year 1999, which is a postbankruptcy Federal tax liability, and not the 6 sec 7491 does. not apply in this case to shift the burden sec 1 was appl cable nor es ab i hed that they 11y complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a) (2) . Sec. 451(a) requires- e taxab e year of receipt unless the taxpayer' s gross income inod wÄdd Properly assign the income to taxpayer' s accounting me cash basis taxpayers, payments a different taxable Perio . ts are included in inc
- 8 - A taxpayer’s failure to proceed as required by the Court’s Rules, unexcused failure to appear at a trial, and failure to participate in any meaningful way in the resolution of the case can result in a dismissal of the action against him or her for lack of prosecution. Long v. Commissioner, 742 F.2d 1141, 1142- 1143 (8th Cir.
7491(a)(1) and (2)(B). Neither petitioner nor any authorized representative of petitioner appeared at the hearing on October 9, 2002, on respon- 7(...continued) 2 and 21 of the Internal Revenue Code in States of the Union? (26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)(A)) 5. What order, agreement, contract or other such legal document or device does the Internal Re
s gross income is erroneous.3 See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 61(a) provides the following sweeping definition of the term "gross income": "Except as otherwise provided in this 3Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable in this case. Even if petitioner had advanced such a contention, he has not established that he has complied with the applicable requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). Under the circumstances pre- sented in this case, we conclude
h permanent records as are sufficient to substantiate the amount and the purpose of any deductions. Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440 (2001); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner did not 3 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case. - 7 - provide the Court with records of any sites visited, dates or hours worked, or mileage traveled by his father in order to establish the validity of the $30,000 consulting fee payment and the correspondin
Whereas in certain cases section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, we conclude that this is not one of those cases.
the benefit of a deduction must show that every condition which Congress has seen fit to impose has been fully satisfied.’”5 5 For the first time in the reply brief, the estate raises the issue of respondent’s bearing the burden of proof pursuant to sec. 7491(a), as amended. Generally, we will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time on brief. See Foil v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 376, 418 (1989), affd. 920 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1990); Markwardt v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 989, 997 (1975).
- 5 - and those losses carried over to 1999. Under section 1212(b)(1)(A) and (B), net short-term and net long-term capital losses realized in one year are treated, respectively, as short- term or long-term capital losses in the succeeding tax year. Thus, the net short-term and net long-term carryover losses from petitioners' 1998 tax
value of the leased fee estate as determined by an independent appraiser using a discounted cashflow analysis. 4 Effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, if certain requirements are met, sec. 7491(a) shifts to the Commissioner the burden of proof with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining the tax liability of the taxpayer. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 300
- 8 - A taxpayer’s failure to proceed as required by the Court’s Rules, unexcused failure to appear at a trial, and failure to participate in any meaningful way in the resolution of the case can result in a dismissal of the action against him or her for lack of prosecution. Long v. Commissioner, 742 F.2d 1141, 1142- 1143 (8th Cir.
SFIS are merely uncorroborated assertions, not evidence of any activity. Apart from the generic description in the parties’ stipulation, the only evidence in the record concerning the purported activities is petitioner’s cursory testimony, which we 3Sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent in this case because petitioners have provided no credible evidence with respect to the activities of SFIS. Sec. 7491(a)(1). - 13 - do not find to be reliable.4 Petitioners did not produce
Moreover, petitioner has neither argued that section 7491 is applicable to shift the burden of proof to respondent nor established compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(C) (the net worth limitation).
omplaint to include a claim for physical injury, and that the reason the case was able to settle was because a payment was going to be made and received on that basis.” In this case, petitioners have neither argued that section 7491 is applicable to shift the burden of proof to respondent nor established that they complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).
e computed your tax liability in accordance with community property laws.” In their separate petitions, petitioners claimed that they were not married during the years in issue because the Texas State court had annulled their marriage. In reply to 8 Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-9. - 10 - petitioners’ allegation, respondent responded in his answers that petitioners should be treated as married during the years in issue for purposes of thei
to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining whether the deter- minations in the notice are erroneous. We find that petitioner has the burden of proving that those determinations are wrong. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); sec. 7491(a). Petitioner proffered no evidence and advanced no argument establishing that respondent’s determination that he had wage income for 1997 totaling $26,690 is in error. Indeed, petitioner concedes in the parties’ stipulation of facts in th
OPINION The parties do not address section 7491(a).2 Since the years at issue are 1999 and 2000, we presume that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
With respect to factual issues and subject to enumerated limitations, section 7491(a) may shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner in instances where the taxpayer has introduced credible evidence.
cks written to WPA.14 Mr. Jesus Flores (Mr. Flores) prepared petitioners’ 1995 and 1997 returns. Petitioners’ 1996 return was prepared by American Tax Professional. Mr. Sowards never mentioned WPA or STL to Mr. Flores. OPINION A. Burden of Proof and Section 7491(a) Mr. Sowards15 argues that respondent bears the burden of proof with respect to factual matters because: (1) The 14Ms. Sowards testified that her husband lost his contract with STL. 15Ms. Sowards did not advance any argument concerning
(d / 4 wlÊther section 7491(a) serves to shift 'the burden of proof from.
111, 115 (1933), of proving error in respondent’s determinations relating to his net profit for each of the years at issue from his washing machine repair business, his pension income for 1997, and the 10-percent additional tax under section 72(t)(1) has shifted to respondent - 6 - under section 7491(a), respondent maintains that that burden has not shifted.
ith respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, from the activity; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or recreation. This list is 6 The parties do not argue the applicability of sec. 7491(a). - 15 - nonexclusive, and the number of factors for or against the taxpayer is not necessarily determinative, but rather all facts and circumstances must be taken into account, and more weight may be given to some factors than to others.
- 8 - A taxpayer’s failure to proceed as required by the Court’s Rules, unexcused failure to appear at a trial, and failure to participate in any meaningful way in the resolution of the case can result in a dismissal of the action against him or her for lack of prosecution. Long v. Commissioner, 742 F.2d 1141, 1142- 1143 (8th Cir.
on pursuant to section 166,5 4Sec. 7491 does not apply in the instant case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that they fully complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). 5Sec. 166. BAD DEBTS. (a) General Rule.-- (1) Wholly worthless debts.-–There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year. (2) Partially worthless debts.-–When satisfied that a debt is reco
C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Goertler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-136 (Commissioner’s position was substantially justified as taxpayers had failed to substantiate deductions for personal exemptions); see also sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). A taxpayer’s self-serving declaration is no ironclad substitute for the records that the law requires. See Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17; see also Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034, 1051 (
The burden of proof respecting a factual issue may be placed on the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding that issue and establishes that the taxpayer complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests.
her [Ms. Stone’s] death is * * * included in Mrs. Stone’s gross estate.” In addition to the foregoing substantive disputes regarding sections 2036(a)(1) and 2044, the parties disagree over whether the burden of proof has shifted to respondent under section 7491(a). The parties’ disagreements under section 7491(a) relate to the application in the instant cases of the term “credible evidence” in section 7491(a)(1) and the factual issue or issues with respect to which Mr. Stone’s estate and Ms. Sto
es of RBI stock, on a controlling-interest basis, was $25,900,000. He determined a $12,900,000 aggregate value for RBI stock after allowing a 17- 7(...continued) with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, if certain requirements are met under sec. 7491(a), the burden of proof shall be on the Commissioner as to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the tax liability of the taxpayer. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 S
Spaid, made two oral motions: (1) To shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a), claiming that petitioner had cooperated at all levels; and (2) for imposition of a penalty on respondent under section 6673(a)(1), on the ground that respondent, by not offering petitioner an Appeals Office conference before issuing the statutory notice, had deprived petitioner of administrative remedies.
t he is liable for additions to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1) in amounts to be determined for 1989 and 1990, and respondent concedes that petitioner is not liable for the civil fraud penalty under sec. 6663 for such years. 5 Under certain circumstances, sec. 7491(a)(1) shifts the burden of proof to respondent. Sec. 7491 applies to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, the date of enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Ac
led return for 1998 to respondent. OPINION Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer has the burden of showing that he is entitled to any deduction claimed.3 Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. 3 Mr. Maher does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case. - 7 - Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Mr. Maher’s testimony was credible, and the testimony of other witnesses and documentary evidence corroborated his testimony. Under the circumstances presented here,
ype rights; and (2) on account of personal injuries or sickness. Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 333; Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 416 4 Respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1994 returns commenced before July 22, 1998. Consequently, sec. 7491(a), which in some circumstances may place the burden of proof on the Commissioner, has no application here. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. - 15 - (1995), affd.
cks written to WPA.14 Mr. Jesus Flores (Mr. Flores) prepared petitioners’ 1995 and 1997 returns. Petitioners’ 1996 return was prepared by American Tax Professional. Mr. Sowards never mentioned WPA or STL to Mr. Flores. OPINION A. Burden of Proof and Section 7491(a) Mr. Sowards15 argues that respondent bears the burden of proof with respect to factual matters because: (1) The 14Ms. Sowards testified that her husband lost his contract with STL. 15Ms. Sowards did not advance any argument concerning
oner did not maintain a household that constituted Frankie’s or Avery’s principal place of abode for more than one-half of the taxable year. In fact, during the entire year, Frankie and Avery resided 5Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of sec. 7491(a), and, consequently, sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent. 6According to sec. 2(b)(1), a taxpayer “maintains” the household if the taxpayer contributes over half of the household maintenance costs. - 5 - in the ho
e computed your tax liability in accordance with community property laws.” In their separate petitions, petitioners claimed that they were not married during the years in issue because the Texas State court had annulled their marriage. In reply to 8 Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-9. - 10 - petitioners’ allegation, respondent responded in his answers that petitioners should be treated as married during the years in issue for purposes of thei
Section 7491(a) generally provides that the burden of proof shall be on the Commissioner with respect to any factual issue relevant to the taxpayer’s liability for tax where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any such issue. The burden is not placed on the Commissioner unless a taxpayer has complied with requirements to subst
1073 (1978). Education expenses are considered ordinary and necessary business expenses if the education maintains or improves skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or meets the express requirements of an 7 The parties do not argue that sec. 7491(a) is applicable. 8 The education expense regulation here relevant was promulgated in 1967. It replaced a regulation that had been promulgated in 1958. The 1958 regulation embodied a subjective “primary purpose” test. The 1967 regulation rep
7491(a), shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances, is not applicable here because the examination of Indeck’s return commenced prior to July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(1), 112 Stat. 726. - 23 - shares and the arbitrator’s award of
Section 7491(a), which applies to examinations commenced after July 22, 1998, places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues. The - 35 - examination in the instant case commenced after July 22, 1998; accordingly, we consider whether respondent bears the burden of proof under section 7491(a). Section 7491(a)(1)
n of proving that those determinations 4The parties agree that the notice incorrectly indicated that petitioner was in bankruptcy on the date respondent issued that notice. - 4 - are wrong. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); sec. 7491(a). Petitioner alleges no facts and advances no arguments establishing error in respondent’s determinations for 1999 that petitioner had unreported income for 1999 totaling $51,417 and that petitioner’s filing status for that year was marrie
We presume that respondent’s examination of that return began after July 22, 1998, and that section 7491(a) is applicable in the instant case.
The burden of proof respecting a factual issue may be placed on the Commissioner under section 7491(a) if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence regarding that issue and establishes that the taxpayer complied with the requirements of section - 4 - 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the Commissioner’s reasonable requests.
5 (1933). As relevant to the present case, petitioner asserts that the settlement agreement provided for 3 This amount comprises Form 1099 income of $25,766 from American, $175 from Capitol, and $797 from Life USA. 4 Petitioner does not contend that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to this case. Sec. 7491(a) is in any event inapplicable because of petitioner’s failure to comply with the substantiation and recordkeeping requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2) or to introduce credible evidence within the meanin
e computed your tax liability in accordance with community property laws.” In their separate petitions, petitioners claimed that they were not married during the years in issue because the Texas State court had annulled their marriage. In reply to 8 Sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-9. - 10 - petitioners’ allegation, respondent responded in his answers that petitioners should be treated as married during the years in issue for purposes of thei
3001(c)(1), 112 Stat. 727. As referenced in our findings of fact, the additions to tax not included in the default motions (collectively, the remaining additions to tax) pertain to examinations commenced after July 1998. - 21 - 142(a); cf. current sec. 7491(a) (shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain circumstances). E. Discussion 1. Petitioners’ Forms 1040 and 1040EZ Respondent contends that the Forms 1040 and 1040EZ filed by petitioners with respect to the years at issue do
elvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).3 3 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that she fully complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). - 7 - A. Schedule C Deductions Section 162(a) allows a taxpayer deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Deductions, however, are a matter of legisla
(relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-- * * * * * * * (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by 6 No question has been raised with respect to the burden of proof or production under sec. 7491(a). 7 The 1996 amendments added to sec. 104 by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1838, do not apply because the amendments are effective for amounts received after Aug. 20, 1996. - 16 -
Whereas in certain cases section 7491(a) shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, we conclude that this is not one of those cases.
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests.
7491(a), effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Petitioners do not contend that their examination began after July 22, 1998, or that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to their case. - 6 - (2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade
The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 if the taxpayer establishes that he complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the Secretary’s reasonable requests.
en of proof on all issues in this case. Rule 142(a)(1). Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that he complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 5 - purposes of section 152(a)(9), it is not necessary that the dependent be related to the taxpayer but it is n
ax. Rule 142(a)(1). Sec. 7491 does not shift the burden of proof to respondent with respect to the underpayments of tax because petitioners have neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 13 - March 31, 1992 and 1993, respectively. Those amounts were not reported on the returns for those years. We a
uotation marks and brackets omitted)).2 It is no bar to application of the doctrine of harmless error that the agency error complained of is the omission of a statutory prerequisite. See, e.g., Hydro Engg., Inc. v. United 2 In certain circumstances, sec. 7491(a) imposes on the Commissioner the burden of proof in connection with factual issues relevant to determining the liability of the taxpayer for any income, estate, or gift tax. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Even if sec. 7491(a) is applicable to the d
Furthermore, petitioner failed to introduce any credible evidence; thus, he failed to meet the requirements of section 7491(a), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant in ascertaining liability for the tax - 5 - deficiency in issue.
ld receives over half 4 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that he fully complied with the substantiation requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). - 7 - of his support during the calendar year from divorced parents, and such child is in the custody of one or both parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, then such child is treated for purposes of section 152(a) as
In those situations, the statute provides that if a child receives over one-half of his or her support from his or her parents, and if the child is in the custody of one or both of his or her parents for more than one- half of the calendar year, then the child is treated for purposes of section 152(a) as receiving over one-half of his or her su
7491(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the burden of proof shifts to respondent if the taxpayer: (1) Has complied with substantiation requirements under the Internal Revenue Code; (2) has maintained all records required by the Internal Revenue Code and has cooperated with all reasonable requests by respondent for information, documents, meeting
The burden of proving facts relevant to the deficiency may shift to the Commissioner under section 7491 if the taxpayer establishes compliance with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) by substantiating items, maintaining required records, and fully cooperating with the Secretary’s reasonable requests.
7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent in this case because petitioner has provided no credible evidence with respect to the nature of the benefits he received. Sec. 7491(a)(1). Furthermore, sec. 6201(d) does not impose any evidentiary burden on respondent because petitioner has admitted receiving the item of income at issue.
. 61(a). A taxpayer is 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to place the burden of proof on respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that he fully complied with the substantiation requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). -- 55 -- required to maintain records sufficient to establish the amount of his or her income. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. In the absence of adequate books and records, the Commissioner may reconstruct a tax
intain records sufficient to establish the amount of his or her income and deductions. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs.2 2 We note that sec. 7491(a) does not affect the burden of proof where a taxpayer fails to substantiate a deduction. Higbee (continued...) - 6 - Section 170 allows as a deduction any charitable contribution actually paid during the taxable year. Sec. 170(a)(1); sec.
nd petitioner bears the burden of proving that respondent’s determination is erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).2 2 Because petitioner failed to introduce any credible evidence, he failed to meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining liability for the tax deficiency in issue. As to the accuracy-related (continued...) - 6 - Unreported Income Gross i
t plan under section 401(k) is generally taxable in the year of receipt. See sec. 402(a)(1). Section 402(a)(5)(A) and (C), however, provides: 5 The facts concerning the retirement plan distribution and the unreported interest are not in dispute, and sec. 7491(a), concerning the burden of proof with respect to factual issues, is not pertinent to the resolution of these issues - 4 - (A) General rule.-–If-– (i) any portion of the balance to the credit of an employee in a qualified trust is paid to
Petitioners have neither alleged that section 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests.
ax. Rule 142(a)(1). Sec. 7491 does not shift the burden of proof to respondent with respect to the underpayments of tax because petitioners have neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 13 - March 31, 1992 and 1993, respectively. Those amounts were not reported on the returns for those years. We a
ons. We first discuss the requirements of section 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners have neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and cooperate fully with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 4 - 213 and then consider the particular claims made by petitioners. Certain expenses paid during the taxable ye
ustomarily engaged prior to the disability. Sec. 1.72-17(f)(1), Income Tax Regs. By petitioner’s own testimony, he was able to 3 Because petitioner failed to comply with requirements to substantiate his illness, he failed to meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining liability for the tax deficiency in issue. - 7 - work in 1997 at an activity comparable to the one in which he
7491(a)(2); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, sec. 4002(b), 112 Stat. 2681-906; Rule 142(a). As previously stated, the examination in this case began on December 17, 1997. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which appeal in the instant case would normally lie, has indicated
ons. We first discuss the requirements of section 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioners have neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and cooperate fully with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 4 - 213 and then consider the particular claims made by petitioners. Certain expenses paid during the taxable ye
13. Additionally, the 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to place the burden of proof on respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that he fully complied with the substantiation requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). - 6 - expenditure must be “directly connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer’s trade or business”. Sec. 1.162-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, if a claimed business expense is deductible, but the taxpayer is unable to fully su
erally applies only if the individual maintains a household which is the principal place of abode of at least one child or stepchild for whom the individual is entitled to a dependency exemption deduction. Secs. 2(c), 32(d), 151(c)(3), 7703(b)(1).3 2Sec. 7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof in this case because petitioner has not presented credible evidence concerning the support of the children and payment of their expenses. Sec. 7491(a)(1). 3Further exceptions apply, but petitioner does
.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. The total amount of support for each of the 4 The burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner under sec. 7491 if the taxpayer establishes that he introduced credible evidence and complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with the Secretary’s reasonable requests. Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to Court proceedings arising in connection with examinations by the Commissi
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 685, 726. Here, respondent’s examinations of Beech Trucking’s 1995 and 1996 Fede
mmenced after July 22, 1998. Nevertheless, the burden of proof with respect to the items of deficiency did not shift to respondent. Petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that he complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Moreover, even if respondent carries the burden of proof, the Court is satisfied that such burden has been met. - 9 - Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Cas
7491(a)(2); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-441 (2001). Here, neither party contends that sec. 7491 is applicable, and the record indicates that at least the examination for 1996 began before July 22, 1998. Moreover, petitioners in any event have not satisfied the aforementioned prerequisites. Sec. 7491 thus has no bearing on our ana
Petitioner is an S corporation within the meaning of section 1361(a)(1).
7491(a) does not shift the burden of proof to respondent in this case because petitioner has provided no credible evidence with respect to his investment in the annuity. Sec. 7491(a)(1).
ld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-237. Thus, any loan effectively would have been 2 There is no credible evidence in the record to rebut the presumption of correctness which would attach to respondent’s determination. Therefore, the provisions of sec. 7491(a), placing the burden of proof on respondent, do not apply. - 5 - made by petitioner to himself. Furthermore, even if there had been a separate entity to which a loan could have been made, petitioner has not provided any reliable evidence o
e’s support. We conclude that Ms. Payne did not have 1 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that she complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) and substantiated items, maintained required records, and fully cooperated with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 7 - petitioner’s apartment as her principal place of abode under section 152(a)(9), and the claimed depende
tioner was not entitled to dependency 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent on these issues because petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that he complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 7 - exemption deductions and head-of-household filing status. These are new matters for which respondent bears t
t against Chevron was brought for 2 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent on these issues because petitioners have neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 8 - wrongful discharge, intimidation, coercion, and harassment under Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 440.205, which is a wo
Section 274(d) requires a taxpayer to substantiate the business use of listed property, as defined in section 280F(d)(4), which includes a pickup truck, by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s own statement.
Respondent disallowed all of petitioner’s Schedule C expenses because he had not established that he was in a trade or business and that the expenses were expended for the purposes designated. Section 162(a) allows a deduction for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
a descendant of the taxpayer. Sec. 32(c)(3)(B)(i)(I). 3 Sec. 7491 does not apply to shift the burden of proof to respondent because petitioner has neither alleged that sec. 7491 is applicable nor established that he complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. - 4 - The taxpayer must have identified the child on his return under the identification rule of section 32(c)(3)(
7491(a) ; Int rnal Revehue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. t In the instant case, the parties asree that relief is not available to petitioner under section 6015 (b) or (c) , thereby satisfying section 6015 (f) (2) 2° We turn first to a dispute between the parties as to the scope of t
was filed in May 1997. 3 Sec. 7491 does not apply in this case to place the burden of proof on respondent because petitioner neither alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that he fully complied with the substantiation requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). -- 55 -- of his or her income. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. In the absence of adequate books and records, the Commissioner may reconstruct a taxpayer’s income by any reasonable method. See sec. 446(b); Hollan
2(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Segel v. Commissioner, - 18 - supra; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); see also sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). A taxpayer’s self-serving declaration is no ironclad substitute for the records that the law requires. See Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17; see also Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1034, 1051 (1
7491(a), effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Petitioners do not contend that their examination began after July 22, 1998, or that sec. 7491 is applicable to their case. - 17 - activity; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or recreat
have some basis upon which to make the estimate. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). Without such a basis, any allowance would be sheer unguided largesse. Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). 3 We note that sec. 7491(a) does not affect the burden of proof where a taxpayer fails to substantiate a deduction. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 443 (2001). - 17 - At trial, petitioner did not introduce a single piece of documentary evidence in support of
U.S. 435 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). If petitioner fails to establish LFI’s entitlement to the deductions under 13The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, wh
N We must decide whether petitioners are taxable in 1997 on their receipt of the remaining $200,000 of IRA funds.4 4 Our decision does not depend on which party has the burden of proof. We note in passing, however, that petitioners do not argue that sec. 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner here. We also note that Mr. Anderson was of a permissible age to receive the distribution without a tax. Sec. 72(t). Thus, respondent did not determine that Mr. Anderson was subject to the 1
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491(c) operates to place the burden of production on respondent in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of the taxpayer for penalties and additions to tax. Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenu
7491(a), effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Petitioner does not contend that his examination began after July 22, 1998, or that sec. 7491(a) is applicable to his case. In any event, we do not find that resolution of this case depends on which party has the burden of proof. We
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. The examination in the instant case began after July 22, 1998. Petitioners
ctors and of ZSI’s worth yielded a value nearly half that which respondent’s appraisal yielded.8 The parties identified, and the Court 7The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, wh
respondent’s burden to connect petitioner to the income determined in the statutory notice. See Johnston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-315 (and cases cited therein). He did not present credible evidence that would affect the burden of proof under section 7491(a). In addition, the evidence presented by respondent satisfied respondent’s burden of production with respect to the penalties. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-449 (2001). The burden is on petitioner to prove
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491(c) operates to place the burden of production on respondent in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of the taxpayer for penalties and additions to tax. Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenu
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Decedent’s estate does not contend that sec. 7491 applies in this case. - 31 - In the case herein, respondent’s notice of deficiency increased the value of decedent’s interest in the Turner Partnership from $875,811, as reported on the return, to $1,717,977, and increased the value of decedent’s interest in the Thomps
7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. The examination in this case commenced in January 1997; thus, sec. 7491 is not applicable. - 9 -
ribed by law, then reasonable cause exists. Sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. “Willful neglect” means a “conscious, intentional failure 3 Because petitioner failed to introduce any credible evidence, he failed to meet the requirements of sec. 7491(a), as amended, so as to place the burden of proof on respondent with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining liability for the tax deficiency in issue. As to the additions to tax under secs. 6651 and 6654, we find that respon
9th Cir. 1975), affg. T.C. Memo. 1972-133. He failed to do so and has not shown that respondent’s determination is in any way erroneous. Because he failed to present any credible evidence, he is not entitled to have the burden of proof shifted under section 7491(a). The stipulated facts also satisfy respondent’s burden of production with respect to the penalties in issue. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-449 (2001). Respondent, however, recomputed the addition to tax u
7491(a), effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Petitioners do not contend that their examination began after July 22, 1998, or that sec. 7491 is applicable to their case. - 17 - activity; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or recreat
the cash expenditures method to recompute income is well settled. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517 (1943); 3 The notice of deficiency was issued on Apr. 6, 1998. Where, as here, respondent’s examination was commenced before July 23, 1998, sec. 7491(a) does not operate to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner regarding the deficiencies, nor does sec. 7491(c) place on the Commissioner the burden of production respecting the penalties. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and R
U.S. 435 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). If petitioner fails to establish LFI’s entitlement to the deductions under 13The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, wh
The stipulated facts satisfy respondent’s burden of production with respect to the penalties. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-449 (2001). Petitioner’s Motion to Recuse, as well as the various other motions filed shortly before or at the calendar call, were patently designed to delay and obstruct the determi
ners do not contend that the compensation for the 15 days is excludable from income. 2 Petitioners do not contend that the burden of proof is on respondent under sec. 7491, nor have petitioners established that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a) (2) (A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent's reasonable requests. _ 4 _ Disability benefits are excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(3)3 or section 105(c)4 if certai
AMTI here means petitioner's taxable income determined with the adjustments provided in section 56. 2There are no factual issues in dispute that are relevant to ascertaining the tax liability of petitioner in this case and the Court therefore finds sec. 7491(a) to be inapplicable. - 6 - Petitioner reads the flush language following section 55(b)(2)(B) to mean that no adjustments provided by section 56 may be made to his taxable income to determine AMTI. The flush language states that if a taxpa
7491(a)(1) and (2). Section 7491 applies to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations beginning after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. Petitioner contends that the examination began after July 22, 1998, and.he points out that he was incarce
Court allowed him to do so. 4Respondent acknowledges that the examination of petition- ers’ taxable year 1996 began after July 22, 1998. With respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998, under sec. 7491(a) the burden of proof shifts to respondent in specified circumstances. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727. As detailed in respondent’s trial memorandum and
imony: (1) The amount of the expenditure or use based on the 1Petitioner has made no argument that the burden of proof shifting provisions of sec. 7491 apply to this case, nor has he offered any evidence that he has complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). - 5 - appropriate measure (mileage may be used in the case of automobiles), (2) the time and place of the expenditure or use, (3) the business purpose of the expenditure or use, and (4) the business relationship to the taxpayer of ea
entitled to deductions. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975), affg. T.C. Memo. 1972-133. It is apparent from the record in this case that petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the burden of proof provisions of section 7491(a). They have failed to respond to reasonable requests for information, documents, meetings, and interviews, and they have failed to comply with Court orders that they produce documents and answer questions. They have not presented any s
oss of $249,149 for 1993 (for which he is entitled to net operating loss carryback deductions in 1990, 1991, and/or 1992, or to net operating loss carryforward deductions for years subsequent to 1993). 18Petitioners do not argue the applicability of sec. 7491(a), and the record does not otherwise show whether the examination was commenced after the effective date of that Code section. We find sec. 7491(a) is not applicable to this case. - 23 - 999 (10th Cir. 1993). The question whether a debt is
Petitioners have not argued that either section 7491(a) or (c) applies to this case.
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. Petitioners do not contend, nor is there evidence, that their examination comme
At the beginning of the second day of trial, petitioner, through his counsel, made two oral motions: (1) To shift the burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a), claiming that petitioner had cooperated at all levels; and (2) for imposition of a penalty on respondent under section 6673(a)(1), on the ground that respondent, by not offering petitioner an Appeals Office conference prior to issuance of the statutory notice, had deprived petitioner of administrative remedies.
g factor.” Cordes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-377 (citing Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 419 13(...continued) Rule 142(a). The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 685, 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, whe
g factor.” Cordes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-377 (citing Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 419 13(...continued) Rule 142(a). The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 685, 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, whe
We note that petitioner ignores the following additional language from Tex. Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, 307 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1962): Even though an absence of control is shown, and this as we have noted has not been done, the force of the factor is diminished to near de minimis by the fact that * * [the service provider] himsel
g factor.” Cordes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-377 (citing Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 419 13(...continued) Rule 142(a). The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 685, 726, added sec. 7491(a), which is applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Under sec. 7491, Congress requires the burden of proof to be placed on the Commissioner, subject to certain limitations, whe
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 685, 726. Here, respondent’s examinations of Beech Trucking’s 1995 and 1996 Fede
Petitioners have neither alleged that section 7491 is applicable nor established that they complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests.
Accordingly, section 7491(a), a new provision created by Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub.
ng, Decision will be entered for respondent as to petitioner John Awadallah, and an order of dismissal and decision will be entered as to petitioner Susan Malaty. 2 Petitioner contends that the burden of proof should rest with respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2), such as maintaining records. Therefore, the burden of proof remains with petitioner. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. __ (2001).
7491(a) (applicable generally to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998). Second, the fact that a taxpayer reports a deduction on the taxpayer’s income tax return is not sufficient to substantiate the deduction claimed on the return. Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633, 639 (1979); Roberts v
h of its contents), affd. 175 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1949). At trial, petitioner did not introduce a single piece of documentary evidence in support of any of the deductions in issue. Likewise, petitioner did not offer testimony in support 2 We note that sec. 7491(a) does not affect the burden of proof where a taxpayer fails to substantiate a deduction. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001); Caralan Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-241. - 6 - of any of those deductions. Therefore, even if
ng, credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed under subtitle A or B. Sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2).1 Respondent contends that petitioners do not meet the requirements of section 7491(a). Petitioners do not contend otherwise. We treat this as petitioners’ concession that they bear the burden of proof on the farm loss and rental property issues.2 B. Whether Petitioner Operated His Farm for Profit The first issue for dec
Section 7491(a) does not change the burden of proof where taxpayers have failed to substantiate their deductions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient records to establish the amounts of the deductions. Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally,
Section 7491(a) does not change the burden of proof where petitioner has failed to substantiate his deductions. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient records to establish the amounts of the deductions. Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, ex
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. The undisputed facts indicate that respondent's examination of petitioners' 1995 Federal income tax return commenced before July 23, 1998. Accordin
Accordingly, respondent does not on account of section 7491(a) bear the burden of proof with respect to either Shirleys’ liability for tax.
y expenses paid or incurred during the 1 The examination commenced after July 22, 1998; accordingly, we considered the applicability of sec. 7491. Petitioners did not assert, nor did they present evidence, that they complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) to substantiate items, maintain required records, and fully cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests. Accordingly, the burden of proof remains with petitioners. - 8 - taxable year in the production or collection of i
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof shifts to 8Although the parties stipulated that the Castros’ tax return for 1996 was in evidence, the exhibit attached to the stipulation of facts was a copy of the Castros’ 1995 return. Our factual findings regarding the Castros’ 1996 returns are based on respondent’s notice of deficiency and the Castros’ 19
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Sec. 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. Petitioner does not contend, nor is there evidence, that his examination co
The Court of Appeals has not explained its reason for burdening the Commissioner with the obligation to show his basis for charging the taxpayer with unreported income. It cannot be that a taxpayer is without resources, through discovery or otherwise, to determine that the Commissioner had no such basis (if, indeed, he did not). Pr
Furthermore, we pause to observe that section 7491(a)(3) provides that the burden-shifting provisions referenced above do not apply “to any issue if any other provision of this title provides for a specific burden of proof with respect to such - 15 - issue.” Section 6015(b)(1)(C) expressly requires the spouse electing relief to establish that he or she did not know or have reason to k
7491(a), effective for court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. (continued...) - 16 - Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides a list of factors to be considered in the evaluation of a taxpayer's profit objective: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the exper
Accordingly, respondent does not on account of section 7491(a) bear the burden of proof with respect to either Shirleys’ liability for tax.
0 seized from Ps was unreported taxable income for 1997. Ps contend that it was not taxable income because P-H had a cash hoard in that amount on Dec. 31, 1996. Ps moved at trial to shift the burden of proving the amount of the cash hoard to R under sec. 7491(a), I.R.C. Ps offered evidence relating to the amount of P’s cash hoard, but a substantial amount of that evidence was not credible. - 2 - Held: Ps bear the burden of proving the amount of the cash hoard. Held, further, P-H had a $40,000 ca
7491(a); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 685, 727; Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001). Thus, while the record in the instant case does not indicate when the examination - 11 - of petitioner’s returns began, petitioner has failed to present any evidence and so could
Accordingly, respondent does not on account of section 7491(a) bear the burden of proof with respect to either Shirleys’ liability for tax.
7491(a)(1); Interim Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising from examinations commenced after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 685, 726. Gil Akers is the revenue agent who was assigned to examine both the tru
Under section 7491(a)(1), the burden of proof shifts to 8Although the parties stipulated that the Castros’ tax return for 1996 was in evidence, the exhibit attached to the stipulation of facts was a copy of the Castros’ 1995 return. Our factual findings regarding the Castros’ 1996 returns are based on respondent’s notice of deficiency and the Castros’ 19
Accordingly, respondent does not on account of section 7491(a) bear the burden of proof with respect to either Shirleys’ liability for tax.
7491(a); Rule 142(a)(2). Section 7491 is effective with respect to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. RRA 1998 sec. 3001(c)(2), 112 Stat. 726. The undisputed facts indicate that respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1995 Federal income tax return commenced before July 23, 1998. Accordin
Section 7491 does not add to respondent’s burden as the movant for judgment on the pleadings in these cases because, in part, the burden on the movant is to show that there are no material facts in dispute. See, e.g., Abrams v. Commissioner, supra; see also Enron Oil Trading & Transp. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir.
Section 7491 does not add to respondent’s burden as the movant for judgment on the pleadings in these cases because, in part, the burden on the movant is to show that there are no material facts in dispute. See, e.g., Abrams v. Commissioner, supra; see also Enron Oil Trading & Transp. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir.
Section 7491 does not add to respondent’s burden as the movant for judgment on the pleadings in these cases because, in part, the burden on the movant is to show that there are no material facts in dispute. See, e.g., Abrams v. Commissioner, supra; see also Enron Oil Trading & Transp. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir.