§9

46 (specifying how a partner in a partnership may make a deposit of tax or interest upon the issuance of the FPAA), superseded by Rev.

98-32, supra, was modified and superseded by Rev.

Commissioner, supra, was "in effect overruled by Helvering v.

In summary, the 2017 amendments to section 482 and section 936(h)(3)(B) added a third sentence to section 482 and altered the section 936(h)(3)(B) definition of intangible property. These amendments had prospective effect only and therefore did not affect the 2006 tax year at issue in this case. The 2018 amendment to section 482 changed the cross-reference in the definition of intangible property to the section 367(d)(4) definition of intangible property. But the 2018 amendment does not apply re

Unlike section 951, various other Code sections expressly characterize certain types o items as distributions or dividends.

We disagree.14 14 We distinguish Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.

The court distinguished the Florida statute in Summerlin from Hawaii's UFTA on the basis that the latter contained an extinguishment provision for a State-created cause of action whereas the former imposed a limitations period on an action arising out of a Federal statute (the Act of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat.

We are not convinced'that petitioner's payment in 2001 is deductible.

But we disagree with the Commissioner’s insistence that a “matching” is required and that the unrealized gain is allocated solely to the distributee partners.

We disagree with respondent’s position for two reasons.

Section 9 provides that the agreement contains the entire understanding ofthe parties and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations.

Section 9 provides that the agreement contains the entire understanding ofthe parties and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations.

Section 9 provides that the agreement contains the entire understanding ofthe parties and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations.

Section 9 provides that the agreement contains the entire understanding ofthe parties and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations.

For each ofthe tax years in issue Reserve elected to be treated as a domestic insurance company pursuant to section 953(d).

Pursuant to section 9.3 ofthe SPA, CI LLC was required until January 10, 2012, to (a) own directly at all times cash, cash equivalents, or marketable securities with an aggregate fair market value ofat least $10 million; and (b) maintain a positive net worth at all times ofat least $40 million.

* * * [Tucson] acknowledges and agrees that the value ofthe Charitable Contribution is $6.00 per cubic - 11 - [*11] yard which is the same price as it is paying for Acceptable Material pursuant to Section 9.1.

Principles of Creditability Pursuant to section 9:01(a) ` and (b)(1),' a domestic corporation may, claim a foreign tax credit against its Federal income tax .liability for :`the amount °of .any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes:paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign.

Anderson must therefore recognize a pro rata share of Gold & Appel's so-called subpart F income pursuant to section 951 .

o by CBM ACQUISITION PARENT CO., a Delaware corporation, as the sole member (the “Initial Member”), LEXIS, INC., a Delaware corporation, as the initial manager of the Company (the “Initial Manager”), and THE TIMES MIRROR COMPANY, in its corporate capacity and as the manager of the Company appointed pursuant to Section 9(b) (“TMC”).

9-12-312(b), 9-12-315; Rudder v. Hurst, 337 S.W.3d at 572-575; see also Kelly v. Kelly, 381 S.W.3d 817, 824 (Ark. 2011) (stating that trial courts must consider the debts ofdivorcing parties in deciding questions ofalimony). Second, petitioner has not shown that the allocation ofhis and Kelley's marital debt was based on the primary and secondary factors considered for an alimony award. In fact, in the alimony section ofthe amended divorce decree, the circuit court referenced the alimony factors

Laws section 9- 21-10 (1997). This totals $137,437.50. The jury award of $75,000 is 54.57 percent of $137,437.50. The statutory prejudgment interest of $62,437.50 is 45.43 percent of $137,437.50. C. The Settlement Following the judgment, Allied Fence moved for a remittitur or amendment of the verdict on comparative negligence or, in the alternative, for

Laws section 9-21-10 (1985). This totals $161,079. The award of $115,000 is 71.39 percent of $161,079. The statutory prejudgment interest of $46,079 is 28.61 percent of $161,079. On June 19, 1990, the Danises filed a motion to vacate the judgment. On January 23, 1991, the trial court denied the Danises' motion. The Danises appealed the denial of their m

Laws section 9-21- 10 (1997) to Jacquelyn's award, totaling $2,088,000. The jury award for Jacquelyn of $1.2 million is 57.47 percent of $2,088,000. The statutory prejudgment interest of $888,000 is 42.53 percent of $2,088,000. The clerk of the court added statutory prejudgment interest of $88,800 as required by R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-21-10 to the Woo

The parties, however, agree and we so find that as a secured loan, under New York Uniform Commercial Code (N.Y.U.C.C.) section 9-504(2) (McKinney 1990), this loan is to be treated as made on a recourse basis.

9-21-10 (1985), the court added statutory prejudgment interest to the awards. On May 18, 1992, Dr. Glod filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the judgment. On August 19, 1992, the trial court ordered a new trial, solely on the issue of damages, unless Mrs. Rozpad agreed to remit all of the jury's verdict in exc

25-1-61 - 14 - (1972).2 Section 9-1-23 of the Mississippi Code provides that only circuit and county judges and chancellors must reside within their respective districts and counties; there is no mention of such a requirement for Supreme Court Justices.

Section 9.3 of the Plan is entitled “Disability”, and provides: A participant who becomes totally and permanently disabled prior to his Normal Retirement Date shall be vested one hundred percent (100%) in his Accrued Benefit. The determination of the Committee based upon competent medical advice which shall include the opinion of a licensed physici

He indicated in his letter tendering his resignation that he was resigning pursuant to section 9.2 of the partnership agreement.

9-102(b)(1) (Law. Co-op 1984), contends that the time at a which title passes is governed by the provisions of Massachusetts law embodying - 37 - article 9 of the U.C.C., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 106, secs. 9-101 to 9-507. (Law. Co-op 1984) (article 9). Respondent, relying on Mass Ann. Laws ch. 106, sec. 9-203 (Law. Co-op 1984), contends that a wr

This is particularly true as to the assessed section 9 [*9] 6651(a)(2) and 6654 additions to tax that were not listed or addressed in the Stipulated Decision entered in Docket No.

xecutive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power. 14 For context, this Court was not established until 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336. 15 The Revenue Act of 1862 § 9, 12 Stat. at 435, also introduced several criminal fraud penalties which were tried before an Article III court. 13 Id. at 339 (emphasis added).16 The Court further noted: As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the Unite

To remedy this, Congress enacted section 9 In Brockamp, the Supreme Court found noteworthy the fact that the statute setting forth the deadline at issue also “sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits.” Brockamp, 519 U.S.

Section 9.1 of the September 2010 Newport Furniture lease required Newport Furniture to maintain the leased premises, including the mechanical systems. However, section 9.1 limited Newport Furniture’s responsibility for repairing the leased premises to $50,000 per “instance” of repairs. The September 2010 Newport Furniture lease required Newport Fu

(The termination provision of the 2007 Agreement appears as section 14(a).) In addition, section 9 of the 2007 Agreement states: “The 5 YA Global entered into the 2005 Agreement under its former name, Cornell Capital Partners, LP.

§ 9.1 (2023).5 5 For the organization structure publication for the years at issue, see Office of the Federal Register, The United States Government Manual 2009/2010, at 327–30, 332 (2009); Office of the Federal Register, The United States Government Manual 2011, at 289–90, 295–302 (2011); Office of the Federal Register, The United States Governmen

ld be renewed for another 28 years by the composer--not the publisher. Penguin Grp., 537 F.3d at 197. However, -89- [*89] because of several amendments, these works can again be renewed for 19 years, and then again for 20 years. See Nimmer, supra, sec. 9.11[B][1]. See generally Penguin Grp., 537 F.3d at 197. The structure is a bit different for songs written during or after 1978. Under the current Copyright Act, the duration of a copyright is the life of the author plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C. sec.

Section 7.3(d) provides: “Whenever the Property is encumbered with a mortgage or deed of trust, nothing contained in this Section shall jeopardize the prior claim, if any, of any Lender to the insurance proceeds.” Section 9.7 of the easement deed acknowledges the deeds of trust that encumbered the Building and further provides: Concurrently herewith, each of GMAC, the City and the Agency have agreed, by separate instrument (in the forms set forth in Exhibit C, Exhibit D, and Exhibit E attached h

See also Matter of Peart, 277 A.D.

9 The Appeals Office issued a supplemental notice of determination in March 2020 that determined that petitioner was not liable for TFRPs for certain tax periods outside the periods at issue. - 7 - [*7] 6672(b)(1); Mason v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301, 322 (2009). A Letter 1153 satisfies this preliminary notice requirement. See Mason v. Commis

¹5Petitioner concedes that the UBS account was not an IOLTA client trust account. Therefore, we discuss only the requirements ofnon-IOLTA client trust accounts under California law. - 29 - [*29] Regardless ofthe type ofclient trust account, with very limited exceptions, a lawyer must not deposit funds belonging to the lawyer in

Section 9.1 ofeach deed provides that, ifcircumstances should arise that render the conservation purpose impossible to accomplish, the easement "can only be terminated or extinguished * * * byjudicial proceedings in a court ofcompe- tentjurisdiction." Ifthe land is sold following suchjudicial action, "[t]he amount ofthe proceeds to which the Grante

Judicial Extinguishment Provisions Ifcircumstances should arise in the future that render the conservation pur- poses impossible to accomplish, section 9.1 ofthe Easement Deed states that the easement "can only be terminated or extinguished * * * byjudicial proceedings in a court ofcompetentjurisdiction." Ifthe Property is sold following suchjudicial - 9 - action, "[t]he amount ofthe proceeds to which the Grantee shall be entitled, after the satisfaction ofprior claims, * * * shall be the

This apportionment requirement created constitutional problems with an income tax, see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), so the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913 to except a Federal income tax from that apportionment requirement. The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and

Section 9.2 provided that partners in the partnership were allowed to make only permitted transfers oftheir interests. Permitted transfers were transfers - 6 - [*6] (1) to any member ofthe transferor's family, (2) to the transferor's executor, trustee, or personal representative to whom his or her interest passes at death or by operation oflaw, or

No amendment has ever overtumed Article 1, Section 9 ofthe constitution allowing direct taxes.

ofthe APA, the IRS will not contest the application ofthe -126- [*126] TPM to the subject matter ofthe APA, and the taxpayerremains otherwise subject to U.S. income tax laws. See Rev Proc. 96-53, sec. 10.02, 1996-2 C.B. at 383; Rev. Proc. 2004-40, sec. 9.02, 2004-2 C.B. at 61. Ifa critical assumption has not been met, the APA director and the taxpayerwill discuss revising the APA; if an agreement cannot be reached, the APA will be canceled. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, sec. 11.06, 1996-2 C.B. at 385; R

Section 9.4.1 ofthe Petromaxx SPA provided: "Immediately after notification that the erection and installation ofthe * * * [refinery site] has been properly performed and completed, BASIC shall Supervise * * * [Petromaxx's] personnel in Commissioning ofthe Facility." After successful commissioning, a qualified engineer would conduct performance tes

Clause 4 ofthe Constitution and did not invalidate it. Although it is difficult to follow the logic ofpetitioner's argument, similar arguments have been advanced numerous times without success and rejected as a -8- [*8] reason for not including or reporting income. See, e.g., Briggs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-86, at *10 (and cases

Second, Section 9.2 ofthe stock purchase agreement required TS3 to pay the transaction costs ofthe Seller (i.e., Makric) and the Owners (i.e., Makric's shareholders) described on Schedule 9.2 ofthe stock purchase agreement to the - 23 - [*23] extent that Makric and Makric's shareholders set forth the amounts ofthese costs on Schedule 9.2. Any such costs d

certificate identifying the execu- tive officers ofthe Company; (d) The professional fees ofthe Sellers up to $20,000; and (e) A Certificate ofExistence from the Indiana Secre- tary ofState. * * * * * * * ARTICLE IX. INDEMNIFICATIONS. * * * * * * * Section 9.2. Indemnification Obligation ofthe Purchaser. After the Closing, the Purchaser will reimburse, indemnify, defend and hold harmless Sellers and their heirs, legal representatives, suc- cessors or assigns (an "Indemnified Seller Party") agai

Section 9.01 Division ofRemaining Nonexempt Trust Property My Trustee shall divide the remaining nonexempt into shares as follows: - 30 - [*30] Name Relationship Share CRAIG PLASSMEYER Nephew 40% BRUCE PLASSMEYER Nephew 40% DORIS KAMINSKI Niece 20% * * * * * * * Schedule AD°1 Ten Dollars Cash At no time did Mr. Beyer amend the Living Trust agreeme

Section 9 ofOak Capital's limited partnership agreement provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement or a separate written document executed by all ofthe Partners, the General Partner, or any one (1) ofthem shall receive reasonable compensation for managing the affairs ofthe Partnership." A separate written document was not introduced as evidence o

certificate identifying the execu- tive officers ofthe Company; (d) The professional fees ofthe Sellers up to $20,000; and (e) A Certificate ofExistence from the Indiana Secre- tary ofState. * * * * * * * ARTICLE IX. INDEMNIFICATIONS. * * * * * * * Section 9.2. Indemnification Obligation ofthe Purchaser. After the Closing, the Purchaser will reimburse, indemnify, defend and hold harmless Sellers and their heirs, legal representatives, suc- cessors or assigns (an "Indemnified Seller Party") agai

9-471(L) (2008). Here, the land use would have been less. But Arizona law also says that a later rezoning must be done in accordance with applicable procedures. Id. sec. 9-462.04(A)(5). This would require formal notice ifa rezoning involves a reduction in allowable uses, which we find it more likely than not the Robinsons never received. On th

Section 9.3 ofthe partnership agreement provided that a limited-partner interest could be transferred only to another limited partner (or to a trust for the benefit ofanother limited partner) unless the transfer was approved by the general partners. A dissolution provision in the partnership agreement, section 12.2, provided that iftwo-thirds ofthe

certificate identifying the execu- tive officers ofthe Company; (d) The professional fees ofthe Sellers up to $20,000; and (e) A Certificate ofExistence from the Indiana Secre- tary ofState. * * * * * * * ARTICLE IX. INDEMNIFICATIONS. * * * * * * * Section 9.2. Indemnification Obligation ofthe Purchaser. After the Closing, the Purchaser will reimburse, indemnify, defend and hold harmless Sellers and their heirs, legal representatives, suc- cessors or assigns (an "Indemnified Seller Party") agai

Under section 9 thereof, Mickey, Sumner, NAI, and Edward each released all claims in considera- tion ofthe other parties' reciprocal release ofclaims. Petitioner has supplied no reason to believe that the releases that he, Mickey, and NAI provided to Edward were less valuable than the releases that Edward pro- vided to them. For example, Mickey originall

9.01, 1999-2 C.B. at 736. Consent granted automatically remains revocable for cause. Petitioners' theory would effectively shift the Commissioner's powerto grant automatic consent to the taxpayer. The taxpayer would determine, after filing a complete and accurate Form 3115 along with the relevant return, whether or not to follow through on his

As we stated in Frank Sawyer II, we are convinced that the Trust lacked actual or constructive knowledge ofthe postclosing activities Fortrend had planned. Consistentwith that holding, we believe the Trust acted in good faith. Accordingly, Massachusetts law limits respondent's recovery to $13,495,070, the amount the Trust received in exc

imilar point: "The most common situation in which courts have found waiver is where the client claims that he acted on the 'good faith' beliefthat his conduct was reasonable and legal." Paul R. Rice, 2 Attorney-ClientPrivilege in the United States, sec. 9:53, at 434 (2013-2014 ed. 2013). United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), involves an appeal from convictions for financial crimes. The trial court had ruled that, ifthe defendant testified regarding his good-faith efforts to c

Section 9 ofAppendix E t the Holdings Agreement states that petitioner's interest in Crescent Holdings sháll be subject to all the terms and conditions ofthe Holdings Agreement. Section 4 ofAppendix E states "Arthur W. Fields shall be entitled to participate, from time¡to time, in distributions from the Company to its Members in proportion to his P

Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 ofthe Constitution originally prohibited "direct" taxes; and when the Constitution was amended to curtail that prohibition, the Sixteenth Amendmentprovided (echoing Article I, section 8) that "[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes".

cable revenue procedures.3 The applicable revenue procedures provide that the Commissioner will not exercise his discretion under section 482 to adjust income ifthe taxpayer complies with the terms and conditions ofthe APAs. See Rev. Proc. 2004-40, sec. 9.02, 2004-2 C.B. at 61; Rev. Proc. 96-53, sec. 10.02, 1996-2 C.B. at 383. The applicable revenue procedures detail the limits on respondent's discretion to administer the APAs at issue. Respondent could require petitioner to establish good faith

9:1252 (2008) Petitioner tax matters partner claims that the servitude was created in accordance with the express statutory provisions ofLa. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. - 9 - 9:1252. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 9:1252 provides for the creation ofa perpetual real right burdening the whole or any part ofimmovable property, including but not limited to it

to deductions for traveling expenses based on the per diem allowance, he should be entitled to deduct expenses ofdriving to and from the Forest, Dynalectric, and Chewning work locations using the standard mileage rate provided in Rev. Proc. 2007-70, sec. 9, 2007-2 C.B. 1162, 1168, and Announcement 2008-63, 2008-2 CB. 114. Petitioner introduced an undated, handwritten sheet ofpaper to support his standard mileage deduction claim. On the basis ofthe markings on this sheet ofpaper, petitioner asser

6671(a); see also Blaga v.

9:315.18(B)(1)(a) (2008). Though to my knowledge no court has yet ruled on the issue, Louisiana's statute could be broadly read to require the non-custodial parent to stay current on his support obligation in order to keep the exemption. See id. Notably, I have found no state that disallows conditioning the allocation ofthe dependency exemptio

the end óf 42006', Deutsahe Bank iss'ued, to petitioners a Form 1099/MISC, Miscellaneous Income, lepotting "Other income" of $3,3§9,6112 from the termihätion ofs the swap, ánd a Form21099-INT, ·Interest Indåme, r~eporting $60,291.69 of "Interest income" Petitioners' inchme in 006 Iir 2006 pet fóners deceuréd adjusted g oss indome totaling almost $3î inillion '(including"tihe $3.4 mill'ion from terminating the away) .

(cid:16)042 Section 9.1 provided that the general partner could terminate or dissolve the partnership, but only after the sale or disposition of all or substantially all partnership assets.

Section 9 of the agreement stated that all income earned after they were married would be considered the separate property of the party earning the income "as though the marriage had never occurred." Thus, Shebby purported to give up any claim to his wife's earnings. On June 9, 2008, Shebby submitted a Form 433-A that did not disclose his wife's in

ar for the amount of her underpayment attributable to her deduction for "incidentals" but that she had reasonable cause for the amount of her underpayment attributable to her claiming excess meals and incidental expenses as a deduction (addressed in section 9 below). 1. The Rules Governing the Deduction of Travel Expenses A taxpayer has the burden of proving he or she incurred the amounts that support his or her claims for deductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (ci

Section 9 binds the parties and, their-,assigns .',i Schedule A-1. lists. theinterest rate , maturity_ date,. ., a d other terms°x of'iathew loan . ,T This document therefore . acts: at least=formally as a- debt: instrument. Observing Formalities,.of¢Loan.8' ..:The,.parties'; continuing course. of deal-ing also ., supp.orts. a 'finding that they in

v. Coney, 59 A. 952, 952-953 (Me. 1905 . In those situations, the grantee holds the property in trust for the benefit of the person who paid the.purchase price.. S e Wood v. LeGoff, supra; Herlihy v. Coney, supra; see also 1 Restatement, Trusts 3d, sec. 9 (2003). However, where the transferèe is a spouse, descendant, - 30 - or other natural object of the bounty of the person who paid the purchase price, a gift is presumed. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945); 1 Restatement, supr

He began his testimony by reading 'a statement as follows : "I do not" believe that I owe taxes on my wages because Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the U .S .

Article I, section 9, clause 4 of the Constitution originally prohibited "direct" taxes; and when thå Constitution was amended to curtail that prohibition, the Sixteenth Amendment provided (echoing Article I, section 8) that ' The Congress shall have =power to lay and collect taxes on incomed" .

ral power to "lay and collect taxes, .duties, imposts, and excises" conferred by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, and required by that .section to be uniform throughout the United States, is limited by § 2 of the same article, which requires "direct" taxes to be apportioned, and section 9, which provides that "no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census" directed by the Constitution to be taken .

Commissioner, supra at 565-566, has the following explanation : The test adopted by the Sanders court is the same test advanced by Restatement (Second) of Agency § 9, comment d (1958), which-read as follows : A person has reason to know of a fact if he had information from which a person of ordinary intelligence which such person may have, or of the superior intelligence which such person may have, would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its exi

Section 9 of the stock purchase agreement further states : a . This Agreement cancels and supersedes al l other previous or contemporaneous agreements , between the parties , with the exception f the Separation Agreement ,3 whether oral or writ en , relating to the subject matter hereof . This Agr~ement may be amende d 2Specifically , petitioner wa

r and petitioner's former wife were not members of the same household during the year in issue . The only remaining issue is whether petitioner is liable t o make any payment for any period after the death of his forme r wife . The first sentence of section 9 .c . of the PSA states unconditionally that "the parties agree that the allocation , * * * is $1,700 .00 child support and $1,500 .00 alimony ." But the second sentence says that "If Wife proceeds to file a child .support modification actio

On Form 433-A, section 9, petitioner .

Consequently, the section 9Petitioner's 1996 return did not disclose the omitted income, and petitioner did not attach a statement to the return disclosing the omitted income in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of these items .

9:1252 (1991)]". La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 9:1252 (1991) provides for the creation of a perpetual real right burdening the whole or any - 32 - part of immovable property, including but not limited to its facade, in favor of an entity formed exclusively for certain public purposes. Pertinent portions of that section are set out in the margin.8

In section 9 of petitioners' Form 433-A, petitioners listed various income and expense items . With respect to the income items listed in that section, petitioners indicated that they had total monthly income of $4,587 consisting of Mr . Dailey's wages of $1,100 and Ms . Dailey's wages of $3,487 . With respect to the expense items listed in section 9

(the "Company"), and, as set forth in Section 9 below, takes effect on the eighth day after the date Mr .

In section 9 of petitioner's June 24, 2005 Form 433-A, petitioner listed various income items and various living expense items . With respect to the income items listed in that section, petitioner indicated that he had total monthly income of $4,342 .33 consisting of $2,708 .33 of monthly income from wages and $1,634 of monthly income from his pension

Section 9 of Form 433-A listed various income items and various living expense items. With respect to the income items listed in that section, petitioner stated that she was unem- ployed. With respect to the expense items listed in section 9 of Form 433-A, petitioner indicated that she had total monthly living expenses of $4,003, consisting of $3,6

The amount accounts for all the 8 The Form 433-A in evidence does not include page 6, which would include “Section 9, Monthly Income and Expense Analysis” and the signature line.

In section 9 of petitioner’s March 15, 2005 Form 433-A, petitioner listed various income items and various living expense items. With respect to the income items listed in that section, petitioner indicated that he had total monthly income of $1,010 consisting of $500 of monthly net income from business and $510 of monthly net rental income. With resp

§ 9: “The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs,” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 n.25 (1974). The first two delegations are the kind that tax lawyers would say lead to “legislative

9-207(a) requires a secured creditor in possession to use "reasonable care in serving as custodian of the property" .and suggested that the taxpayers might have been entitled to credit against their tax liability if they could have shown "affirmative negligence" by the Government in this regard. Id. The Court of Appeals in Stead had no occasio

9:2-5 (West 2002) (upon the death of the custodial parent, the care and custody of the children “shall not revert to the surviving parent without an order or judgment of the Superior Court to that effect”). It follows that there would be no interim period during which - 38 - petitioner might be required, pending judicial action, to make payme

Super Rite a lien and secu- rity interest in all right, title and interest which Retailer may now or hereafter have in, to and under the following, wherever located (collectively, the “Collat- eral”): (i) all “Inventory”, as such term is defined in Section 9-106(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code * * * (the “Code”) * * *; (ii) all “Accounts” as such term is defined in Section 9-106 of the Code * * *; (iii) all “Equipment” as such term is defined in Sec- tion 9-109(2) of the Code * * *; and (iv) a

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted the following standard for reason to know in deduction cases: The test adopted by the Sanders court is the same test advanced by the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 9, comment d (1958), which reads as follows: A person has reason to know of a fact if he had information from which a person of ordinary intelligence which such person may have, or of the superior intelligence which such person may have, would infer that the fact in question exists

32, are special procedural devices available to the IRS to protect and satisfy its liens, United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116 (CA 3 1964), and are analogous to the remedies available to private secured creditors. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9- 503, 3A U.L.A. 211-212 (1981); n.14, supra. They are provisional remedies that do not determine the Service’s rights to the seized property, but merely bring the property into the Service’s legal custody. See 4 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of In

than not, waivers must be found by implication from client conduct that is inconsistent with any reasonable claim of confidentiality and that would make maintenance of the privilege unfair. * * * Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, sec. 9:22, at 56-57 (2d ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Hanson v. AID, 372 F.3d 286, 293-294 (4th Cir. 2004) (“A client can waive an attorney-client privilege expressly or through his own conduct. Implied waiver occurs when a party claiming

ived, the following rights associated with petitioners’ interest in MIL (references are to the MIL amended partnership agreement): (1) The right to vote on MIL partnership matters (section 3.10); (2) The right to redeem the MIL partnership interest (section 9.02(b)); (3) The right to inspect financial and other pertinent information relating to MIL (section 3.09(d)(i)-(v)); (4) The right to access any properties or assets owned by MIL (section 3.09(d)(vi)); and (5) The right to veto early liquid

9:2-5 (West 2003).] It “implicitly recognizes the inherent right of the non-custodial parent to the reversion to his or her custody of the children born of the marriage upon the custodial parent’s death and the satisfaction of the statutory conditions.” In re D.T., 491 A.2d 7, 9 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (referring to N.J. Stat. Ann

9:2-5 (West 2003).] New Jersey law does not specify whether unallocated support payments terminate on the death of the payee spouse. Ms. Kean relies on Gonzales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-332, in which this Court held that New Jersey law would not necessarily have relieved the payor spouse of his obligation to pay family support had the

9:2-5 (West 2003).] New Jersey law does not specify whether unallocated support payments terminate on the death of the payee spouse. Ms. Kean relies on Gonzales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-332, in which this Court held that New Jersey law would not necessarily have relieved the payor spouse of his obligation to pay family support had the

On that record, we find further that petitioners have failed to carry their burden of establishing that they are not liable for 1999 for the accuracy-related penalty under section 9Moreover, by reporting only $1,892, instead of $21,891.95, as the amount of nonemployee compensation that Mr.

1278; Pub. L. 96-541, sec. 1, 94 Stat. 3204; Pub. L. 97-248, sec. 269(c), 96 Stat. 552; Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1706, 100 Stat. 2781; and Pub. L. 104-188, sec. 1122, 110 Stat. 1766. - 3 - Background Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein b

Section 9.2 of the agreements provides that the partnerships will continue for a period of 35 years. Section 9.3 provides that a limited partner will not be permitted to withdraw from the partnership, receive a return of contribution to capital, receive distributions in liquidation, or redemption of interest except upon dissolution, winding up, and

151-152 (1982); Bittker & Lokken, 5 Federal Taxation of Income, Estates & Gifts, par. 135.3.10 at 135-57 through 135-59 (2d ed. 1993). - 148 - 1946). However, in gift tax cases, the transferring stockholder or partner (putative donor) is under no immediate obligation to sell. See Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385, 386 (2d Cir. 1

151-152 (1982); Bittker & Lokken, 5 Federal Taxation of Income, Estates & Gifts, par. 135.3.10 at 135-57 through 135-59 (2d ed. 1993). - 148 - 1946). However, in gift tax cases, the transferring stockholder or partner (putative donor) is under no immediate obligation to sell. See Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385, 386 (2d Cir. 1

4 (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). Petitioner’s argument is without merit. In upholding the Federal gift tax against a challenge based on the Direct Tax Clause, the Supreme Court stated in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136-1

equest, for taxpayers to make requests for Appeals review of collection action under respondent’s Collection Appeals Program (CAP). CAP is an administrative review program not required by statute. See 5 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec. 9.4, at - 5 - 15,261. On June 3, 1999, petitioner sent a Collection Appeal Request, Form 9423, to respondent regarding her income tax liabilities for 1993, 1994, and 1995. In an attachment to the form requesting a “CAP hearing”, petitioner state

Section 9.4 of the - 49 - HFA-II limited partnership agreement is substantially identical to section 9.4 of the AVA limited partnership agreement set out supra in section III.A.2. In pertinent part, it provides that a limited partner “shall have no right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership.” Mr. Schreiber, acting as a general partner i

Section 9.4 of the - 49 - HFA-II limited partnership agreement is substantially identical to section 9.4 of the AVA limited partnership agreement set out supra in section III.A.2. In pertinent part, it provides that a limited partner “shall have no right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership.” Mr. Schreiber, acting as a general partner i

Section 9.4 of the - 49 - HFA-II limited partnership agreement is substantially identical to section 9.4 of the AVA limited partnership agreement set out supra in section III.A.2. In pertinent part, it provides that a limited partner “shall have no right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership.” Mr. Schreiber, acting as a general partner i

Section 9.4 of the - 49 - HFA-II limited partnership agreement is substantially identical to section 9.4 of the AVA limited partnership agreement set out supra in section III.A.2. In pertinent part, it provides that a limited partner “shall have no right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership.” Mr. Schreiber, acting as a general partner i

Subject to the provisions of Section 9.4.1.2 of this Agreement, sell or otherwise dispose of, upon such terms and conditions as the General Partner may deem advisable, appropriate or convenient, any of the assets of the Partnership; 9.1.6.

Section 9.02 states that no limited partner shall have the right to withdraw from the partnerships before the partnerships dissolve and liquidate. However, class B limited partners have a “put right”; i.e., the right to require the partnership to purchase part or all of a class B limited partnership interest at “fair market value” as defined in sec

ioners likewise secured a conditional use permit and variance to have the existing 1,400-square-foot home redesignated and allowed to remain in place as a “second dwelling unit on a single family zoned lot”, in accordance with Turlock Municipal Code section 9-2-506. These administrative steps were - 4 - necessitated by petitioners’ plans for the new structure to include, on two floors, a living room, kitchen, great room, bedrooms, bathrooms, laundry room, art studio, and garage, such that two fu

A licensed manufacturer of pickle cards sells or supplies the pickle cards to licensed distributors, who then sell them to licensed organizations. Id. at secs. 9-307 (1997), 9-313 (1997), 9-331 (Supp. 1997), 9-332 (Supp. 1997), 9-340 (1997). Only licensed organizations may sell the pickle cards to licensed pickle card operators.

esult, petitioner contends, the portion of the estate tax attributable to property that is paid to the Government in satisfaction of the estate tax is not a mere excise tax on the transfer of property at death but a direct tax on the value of the property itself, which is unconstitutional because it is not apportioned in accordance with Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution.

9 (1975) (now 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/9 (West 1993)); Kohlhaas v. Smith, 97 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill. 1951). A resulting trust arises at the instant title is taken, or not at all. See Prassa v. Corcoran, supra. The burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish a resulting trust, and, because recorded legal title is being rebutted, the stand

ount of a tort or tort type claim by Mr. D’Amico alleging personal injuries or sickness. In fact, the record shows that the Company considered the $23,255 payment to be wage type compensation to Mr. D’Amico, which it reflected in the Form W-2 7Under sec. 9 of the settlement agreement, Mr. D’Amico agreed to keep strictly confidential and not to disclose any information concerning the settlement or the facts and circumstances that led to his termination of employment by the Company and the settlem

Petitioner has not presented any evidence or argument on brief regarding the section 9 In this case, the taxable period is the period commencing May 31, 1988, and ending Aug.

or other preceding period to the date of such removal or resignation, including a description - 7 - of all securities and investment purchases and sales with the cost or net proceeds of such purchases or sales and showing all cash, securities and other property held at the close of such fiscal year or other period, valued currently as provided in Section 9.1, and such other information as may be required of the Trustee under any applicable law.

m, any computer work that petitioner wants to have done with respect to the names developed as a result of the Contract “must be done at W&H or at a company designated by W&H.” The Contract provides as follows with respect to its “no- risk” nature: Section 9. Payments to W&H and Suppliers. W&H assumes full obligation and responsibility for the payment of all vendor, suppliers and W&H invoices arising out of the fulfillment of W&H’s obligations hereunder, said invoices to be subsequently reimburs

9 (West 1987) (repealed by 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287); see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, sec. 9.1 (West Supp. 1996) for current version. Since Oklahoma law treats punitive damages as noncompensatory, we conclude that the $13,500 of the settlement proceeds that we allocated to punitive damages are not "on account of" petitioner's personal injuries

Petitioner participated in the Plan from - 4 - its inception through its termination, at which time his accrued benefit was fully vested.3 Section 9.05 of the Plan, captioned “Nonreversion”, prohibited the Plan funds from being used for any purpose other than for the exclusive benefit of the participants or their beneficiaries, except that Upon termination of the Plan, any assets remaining in the Trust Fund because of an erroneous actuarial computation after the satisfaction of all fi

The statute, thus, has left gaps creating ambiguity as to its precise meaning.9 Regulations issued under section 9 Moreover, by treating the change in method of accounting required under sec.

Section 9 of the Contract provides as follows: Section 9. QUANTITIES. (A)(1) The following phrases are used in this agreement with the following meanings: (a) "Daily Deliverability,” with respect to a particular well, refers to the average daily rate at which the well can lawfully deliver gas under the conditions of this contract as determined by a

Since we have held that petitioner does not qualify as an exempt institution under the provisions of section 9 501(c)(3), we need not go further and examine whether or not petitioner would qualify as a church under section 170.

Section 9 of the Contract provides as follows: Section 9. QUANTITIES. (A)(1) The following phrases are used in this agreement with the following meanings: (a) "Daily Deliverability,” with respect to a particular well, refers to the average daily rate at which the well can lawfully deliver gas under the conditions of this contract as determined by a

itely to the succeeding years. Sec. 1366(d)(2). Prior cases have established certain principles in respect of the application of the indebtedness limitation under section 1366(d)(1)(B). See Eustice & Kuntz, Federal Income Taxation of S Corporations, sec. 9.05 at 9-47 through 9-54 (3d ed. 1993).2 Most important to our analysis is the requirement that there be an actual economic outlay by the taxpayer. See Underwood v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976), affg. 63 T.C. 468 (1975); Hitchins

Section 9 of the loan agreement provides to MHLC certain "collateral security", including the following: An assignment to MHLC of RTS' rights to the proceeds (principally rent) under the U.S. Telephone lease and a grant to MHLC of a security interest in the telecommunications equipment. Sale by RTS to Proz Pursuant to an agreement between Proz and

* * * * * * * * * * The term "outstanding", when used with reference to Debentures, shall, subject to the provisions of Section 9.04, mean, as of any particular time, all Debentures, except (a) Debentures theretofore cancelled by the Trustee or delivered to the Trustee for cancellation; (b) Debentures for the payment or redemption of which moneys in the necessary amount shall have been deposited in trust with the Trustee, provided that if such Debentures are to be r

OPINION Respondent contends that the Transfer Refund does not qualify for forward averaging because it does not constitute a "lump sum distribution" within the meaning of section 9 The discrepancy between the taxable portion of the Transfer Refund as determined in the notice of deficiency, i.e., $136,094.23, and the taxable portion as stipulated by the parties of that part of the Transfer Refund that was paid to petitioner in March 1990, i.e., $136,681.18, is unexplained in the record.

Section 9 of the loan agreement provides to MHLC certain "collateral security", including the following: An assignment to MHLC of RTS' rights to the proceeds (principally rent) under the U.S. Telephone lease and a grant to MHLC of a security interest in the telecommunications equipment. Sale by RTS to Proz Pursuant to an agreement between Proz and

9-01-02 (1987); Gerhardt v. Fleck, 256 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1977). Contracts are to be interpreted in a manner to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. N.D. Cent. Code sec. 9-07-03 (1987); Pamida, Inc. v. Meide, 526 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1995). Under North Dakota law, when parties have entered int