§911 — Citizens or residents of the United States living abroad
255 cases·142 followed·24 distinguished·5 questioned·3 criticized·1 limited·7 overruled·73 cited—56% support
Statute Text — 26 U.S.C. §911
At the election of a qualified individual (made separately with respect to paragraphs (1) and (2)), there shall be excluded from the gross income of such individual, and exempt from taxation under this subtitle, for any taxable year—
the foreign earned income of such individual, and
the housing cost amount of such individual.
For purposes of this section—
The term “foreign earned income” with respect to any individual means the amount received by such individual from sources within a foreign country or countries which constitute earned income attributable to services performed by such individual during the period described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (d)(1), whichever is applicable.
The foreign earned income for an individual shall not include amounts—
received as a pension or annuity,
paid by the United States or an agency thereof to an employee of the United States or an agency thereof,
included in gross income by reason of section 402(b) (relating to taxability of beneficiary of nonexempt trust) or section 403(c) (relating to taxability of beneficiary under a nonqualified annuity), or
received after the close of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the services to which the amounts are attributable are performed.
The foreign earned income of an individual which may be excluded under subsection (a)(1) for any taxable year shall not exceed the amount of foreign earned income computed on a daily basis at an annual rate equal to the exclusion amount for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins.
For purposes of applying subparagraph (A), amounts received shall be considered received in the taxable year in which the services to which the amounts are attributable are performed.
In applying subparagraph (A) with respect to amounts received from services performed by a husband or wife which are community income under community property laws applicable to such income, the aggregate amount which may be excludable from the gross income of such husband and wife under subsection (a)(1) for any taxable year shall equal the amount which would be so excludable if such amounts did not constitute community income.
The exclusion amount for any calendar year is $80,000.
In the case of any taxable year beginning in a calendar year after 2005, the $80,000 amount in clause (i) shall be increased by an amount equal to the product of—
such dollar amount, and
the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable year begins, determined by substituting “2004” for “2016” in subparagraph (A)(ii) thereof.
If any increase determined under the preceding sentence is not a multiple of $100, such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $100.
For purposes of this section—
The term “housing cost amount” means an amount equal to the excess of—
the housing expenses of an individual for the taxable year to the extent such expenses do not exceed the amount determined under paragraph (2), over
an amount equal to the product of—
16 percent of the amount (computed on a daily basis) in effect under subsection (b)(2)(D) for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins, multiplied by
the number of days of such taxable year within the applicable period described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (d)(1).
The amount determined under this paragraph is an amount equal to the product of—
30 percent (adjusted as may be provided under subparagraph (B)) of the amount (computed on a daily basis) in effect under subsection (b)(2)(D) for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the individual begins, multiplied by
the number of days of such taxable year within the applicable period described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (d)(1).
The Secretary may issue regulations or other guidance providing for the adjustment of the percentage under subparagraph (A)(i) on the basis of geographic differences in housing costs relative to housing costs in the United States.
The term “housing expenses” means the reasonable expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year by or on behalf of an individual for housing for the individual (and, if they reside with him, for his spouse and dependents) in a foreign country. The term—
includes expenses attributable to the housing (such as utilities and insurance), but
does not include interest and taxes of the kind deductible under section 163 or 164 or any amount allowable as a deduction under section 216(a).
Housing expenses shall not be treated as reasonable to the extent such expenses are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances.
Except as provided in clause (ii), only housing expenses incurred with respect to that abode which bears the closest relationship to the tax home of the individual shall be taken into account under paragraph (1).
If an individual maintains a separate abode outside the United States for his spouse and dependents and they do not reside with him because of living conditions which are dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise adverse, then—
the words “if they reside with him” in subparagraph (A) shall be disregarded, and
the housing expenses incurred with respect to such abode shall be taken into account under paragraph (1).
To the extent the housing cost amount of any individual for any taxable year is not attributable to employer provided amounts, such amount shall be treated as a deduction allowable in computing adjusted gross income to the extent of the limitation of subparagraph (B).
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the limitation of this subparagraph is the excess of—
the foreign earned income of the individual for the taxable year, over
the amount of such income excluded from gross income under subsection (a) for the taxable year.
The amount not allowable as a deduction for any taxable year under subparagraph (A) by reason of the limitation of subparagraph (B) shall be treated as a deduction allowable in computing adjusted gross income for the succeeding taxable year (and only for the succeeding taxable year) to the extent of the limitation of clause (ii) for such succeeding taxable year.
For purposes of clause (i), the limitation of this clause for any taxable year is the excess of—
the limitation of subparagraph (B) for such taxable year, over
amounts treated as a deduction under subparagraph (A) for such taxable year.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “employer provided amounts” means any amount paid or incurred on behalf of the individual by the individual’s employer which is foreign earned income included in the individual’s gross income for the taxable year (without regard to this section).
For purposes of this paragraph, an individual’s foreign earned income for any taxable year shall be determined without regard to the limitation of subparagraph (A) of subsection (b)(2).
For purposes of this section—
The term “qualified individual” means an individual whose tax home is in a foreign country and who is—
a citizen of the United States and establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that he has been a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable year, or
a citizen or resident of the United States and who, during any period of 12 consecutive months, is present in a foreign country or countries during at least 330 full days in such period.
The term “earned income” means wages, salaries, or professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually rendered, but does not include that part of the compensation derived by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which represents a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services actually rendered.
In the case of a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business in which both personal services and capital are material income-producing factors, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services rendered by the taxpayer, not in excess of 30 percent of his share of the net profits of such trade or business, shall be considered as earned income.
The term “tax home” means, with respect to any individual, such individual’s home for purposes of section 162(a)(2) (relating to traveling expenses while away from home). An individual shall not be treated as having a tax home in a foreign country for any period for which his abode is within the United States, unless such individual is serving in an area designated by the President of the United States by Executive order as a combat zone for purposes of section 112 in support of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an individual who—
is a bona fide resident of, or is present in, a foreign country for any period,
leaves such foreign country after
August 31, 1978
—
during any period during which the Secretary determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State or his delegate, that individuals were required to leave such foreign country because of war, civil unrest, or similar adverse conditions in such foreign country which precluded the normal conduct of business by such individuals, and
before meeting the requirements of such paragraph (1), and
establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such individual could reasonably have been expected to have met such requirements but for the conditions referred to in clause (i) of subparagraph (B),
shall be treated as a qualified individual with respect to the period described in subparagraph (A) during which he was a bona fide resident of, or was present in, the foreign country, and in applying subsections (b)(2)(A), (c)(1)(B)(ii), and (c)(2)(A)(ii) with respect to such individual, only the days within such period shall be taken into account.
If—
an individual who has earned income from sources within a foreign country submits a statement to the authorities of that country that he is not a resident of that country, and
such individual is held not subject as a resident of that country to the income tax of that country by its authorities with respect to such earnings,
then such individual shall not be considered a bona fide resident of that country for purposes of paragraph (1)(A).
No deduction or exclusion from gross income under this subtitle or credit against the tax imposed by this chapter (including any credit or deduction for the amount of taxes paid or accrued to a foreign country or possession of the United States) shall be allowed to the extent such deduction, exclusion, or credit is properly allocable to or chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income under subsection (a).
The sum of the amount excluded under subsection (a) and the amount deducted under subsection (c)(4)(A) for the taxable year shall not exceed the individual’s foreign earned income for such year.
If travel (or any transaction in connection with such travel) with respect to any foreign country is subject to the regulations described in subparagraph (B) during any period—
the term “foreign earned income” shall not include any income from sources within such country attributable to services performed during such period,
the term “housing expenses” shall not include any expenses allocable to such period for housing in such country or for housing of the spouse or dependents of the taxpayer in another country while the taxpayer is present in such country, and
an individual shall not be treated as a bona fide resident of, or as present in, a foreign country for any day during which such individual was present in such country during such period.
For purposes of this paragraph, regulations are described in this subparagraph if such regulations—
have been adopted pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act (
50 U.S.C. 4301
et seq.) or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (
50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), and
include provisions generally prohibiting citizens and residents of the United States from engaging in transactions related to travel to, from, or within a foreign country.
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any individual during any period in which such individual’s activities are not in violation of the regulations described in subparagraph (B).
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section, including regulations providing rules—
for cases where a husband and wife each have earned income from sources outside the United States, and
for married individuals filing separate returns.
An election under subsection (a) shall apply to the taxable year for which made and to all subsequent taxable years unless revoked under paragraph (2).
A taxpayer may revoke an election made under paragraph (1) for any taxable year after the taxable year for which such election was made. Except with the consent of the Secretary, any taxpayer who makes such a revocation for any taxable year may not make another election under this section for any subsequent taxable year before the 6th taxable year after the taxable year for which such revocation was made.
If, for any taxable year, any amount is excluded from gross income of a taxpayer under subsection (a), then, notwithstanding sections 1 and 55—
if such taxpayer has taxable income for such taxable year, the tax imposed by section 1 for such taxable year shall be equal to the excess (if any) of—
the tax which would be imposed by section 1 for such taxable year if the taxpayer’s taxable income were increased by the amount excluded under subsection (a) for such taxable year, over
the tax which would be imposed by section 1 for such taxable year if the taxpayer’s taxable income were equal to the amount excluded under subsection (a) for such taxable year, and
if such taxpayer has a taxable excess (as defined in section 55(b)(1)(B)) for such taxable year, the amount determined under the first sentence of section 55(b)(1)(A) for such taxable year shall be equal to the excess (if any) of—
the amount which would be determined under such sentence for such taxable year (subject to the limitation of section 55(b)(3)) if the taxpayer’s taxable excess (as so defined) were increased by the amount excluded under subsection (a) for such taxable year, over
the amount which would be determined under such sentence for such taxable year if the taxpayer’s taxable excess (as so defined) were equal to the amount excluded under subsection (a) for such taxable year.
For purposes of this paragraph, the amount excluded under subsection (a) shall be reduced by the aggregate amount of any deductions or exclusions disallowed under subsection (d)(6) with respect to such excluded amount.
In applying section 1(h) for purposes of determining the tax under paragraph (1)(A)(i) for any taxable year in which, without regard to this subsection, the taxpayer’s net capital gain exceeds taxable income (hereafter in this subparagraph referred to as the capital gain excess)—
the taxpayer’s net capital gain (determined without regard to section 1(h)(11)) shall be reduced (but not below zero) by such capital gain excess,
the taxpayer’s qualified dividend income shall be reduced by so much of such capital gain excess as exceeds the taxpayer’s net capital gain (determined without regard to section 1(h)(11) and the reduction under clause (i)), and
adjusted net capital gain, unrecaptured section 1250 gain, and 28-percent rate gain shall each be determined after increasing the amount described in section 1(h)(4)(B) by such capital gain excess.
In applying section 55(b)(3) for purposes of determining the tax under paragraph (1)(B)(i) for any taxable year in which, without regard to this subsection, the taxpayer’s net capital gain exceeds the taxable excess (as defined in section 55(b)(1)(B))—
the rules of subparagraph (A) shall apply, except that such subparagraph shall be applied by substituting “the taxable excess (as defined in section 55(b)(1)(B))” for “taxable income”, and
the reference in section 55(b)(3)(B) to the excess described in section 1(h)(1)(B), and the reference in section 55(b)(3)(C)(ii) to the excess described in section 1(h)(1)(C)(ii), shall each be treated as a reference to each such excess as determined under the rules of subparagraph (A) for purposes of determining the tax under paragraph (1)(A)(i).
Terms used in this paragraph which are also used in section 1(h) shall have the respective meanings given such terms by section 1(h), except that in applying subparagraph (B) the adjustments under part VI of subchapter A shall be taken into account.
For administrative and penal provisions relating to the exclusions provided for in this section, see sections 6001, 6011, 6012(c), and the other provisions of subtitle F.
Treasury Regulations
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-1 Partial exclusion for earned income from sources within a foreign country and foreign housing costs
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-1(a) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-1(b) Scope.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2 Qualified individuals
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(a) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(b) Tax home.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(c) Determination of bona fide residence.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(d) Determination of physical presence.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(e) Special rules.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(f) Waiver of period of stay in foreign country due to war or civil unrest.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(g) United States.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(h) Foreign country.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-2(i) §1.911-2(i)
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3 Determination of amount of foreign earned income to be excluded
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(a) Definition of foreign earned income.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(b) Definition of earned income—(1) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(c) Amounts not included in foreign earned income.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(d) Determination of the amount of foreign earned income that may be excluded under section 911(a)(1)—(1) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(e) Attribution rules—(1) In general.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(f) Examples.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-3(i) §1.911-3(i)
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-4 Determination of housing cost amount eligible for exclusion or deduction
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-4(a) Definition of housing cost amount.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-4(b) Housing expenses—(1) Included expenses.
- Treas. Reg. §Treas. Reg. §1.911-4(c) Base housing amount—(1) In general.
255 Citing Cases
Smith’s position, therefore, required an analysis of how the 1982 Treaty interacts with the Pine Gap Agreements and Australian law — including, for example, whether the 1982 Treaty might be viewed as overruling the Pine Gap Agreements, see Owner-Operator Indep.
6114(a)(a taxpayer claiming that a treaty overrules or modifies a Federal tax law must disclose that position to the Commissioner).
The treaty regarding Antarctica is still in effect, and therefore Antarctica remains a sovereignless region.3 Petitioner nevertheless contends that Martin has been overruled and superseded by the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v.
We are confident that the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit would find these cases governed by the reasoning and result ofLemay and Bujol and factually distinguishable from Jones.
We are confident that the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit would find these cases governed by the reasoning and result ofLemay and Bujol and factually distinguishable from Jones.
Here, however, the issue ofwhether petitioner's 2007 compensation is excludible under section 911(a) was not actually litigated in this Court in the prior case at Dinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. No. 4060-07. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505 (1953) (there was "apro forma acceptance by the Tax Court of an agreement between the parties to settle their controversy for reasons undisclosed"). Therefore, we hold that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case.
While section 911 excludes foreign earned income from gross income under certainl circumstances, section 911 does not apply to self-employment income .
For our purposes, however, we need not decide where petitioner’s abode (whatever its meaning) was during either year in issue.
435, 440 (1934).8 7Under the circumstances, we need not decide whether Mr.
435, 440 (1934).8 7Under the circumstances, we need not decide whether Mr.
Because we find that the petitioners are not entitled to deduct any of Maguire's disputed expenses, we need not decide whether any portion ofthose deductions is subject to the limitations ofsection 911(d)(6).
We disagree with petitioner's contentions.
Respondent argues that petitionerwas confined to the Green Zone when not on missions and prohibited from having any foreign contacts.
Section 911(d)(6) disallows a deduction to the extent expenses are allocable to amounts excluded from income pursuant to section 911(a) (foreign earned income exclusion).
Likewise, we hold that petitioner's principal place ofbusiness, and thus his tax home, was in San Jose, his home base and the location ofhis gateway travel airport, SJC.
- 4 - [*4] earned income exclusion ("FEIE") ofsection 911 (we hold that he was not); (2) whether the Bellwoods were entitled to deduct unreimbursed employment expenses for 2013, 2014, or 2015 (we hold that they were not); and (3) whether the Bellwoods are liable for accuracy-related penalties for their 2013, 2014, and 2015 returns (we hold that the Bellwoods are l
We hold she is not eligible.
6662(a) 2004 $33,458 $8,364.50 $6,691.60 2005 42,053 10,513.25 8,410.60 2006 14,143 2,981.50 2,828.60 After concessions, the issues for decision are whether petitioners are eligible to exclude from their taxable income wages earned in Iraq and in Germany during those years pursuant to section 911, whether they are liable for the late-filing additions to tax, and whether they are liable for the substantial understatement penalties.
Petitioner attached to his returns Forms 2555, Foreign Earned Income, on which he claimed, pursuant to section 911, exclusions of$67,690 and $100,800 for 2014 and 2015, respectively.
Accordingly, we hold that Mr.
whether section 911 entitles petitioners to exclude from their gross income for the subject years foreign earned income and housing costs of$184,207, $174,632, $177,876, and $140,416, respectively.5 We hold in accordance with 4Petitioners concede that they failed to report the following items for 2006: interest of$789 from the Larkin Family Partnership (LFP), a "small partnership" within the meaning ofsec.
whether section 911 entitles petitioners to exclude from their gross income for the subject years foreign earned income and housing costs of$184,207, $174,632, $177,876, and $140,416, respectively.5 We hold in accordance with 4Petitioners concede that they failed to report the following items for 2006: interest of$789 from the Larkin Family Partnership (LFP), a "small partnership" within the meaning ofsec.
We hold that he was not.
However, pursuant to section 911(b)(1)(B)(ii), the foreign earned income for an individual does not include amounts "paid by the United States or an agency thereofto an employee ofthe United States or an agency thereof".
-17- [*17] We hold, as we did in Faltesek, that the Secretary's interpretation and implementation ofthe statute is valid, because it reasonably implements Congress's specific grant ofauthority in section 911(d)(9) to prescribe regulations that are necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes ofthe statute, and
is entitled to exclude from gross income, as "foreign earned income" under section 911(a), the wages he earned while deployed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan.¹ Because we find that petitioner was an employee ofthe United States when performing these services, we hold that section 911(b)(1)(B)(ii) prevents his compensation from being characterized as "foreign earned income." Background This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122.
citizen and has no foreign earned income taxable under section 911 and related regulations.
- 17 - [*17] Generally, section 911 provides to U.S.
- 9 - [*9] An individual who fails to meet the 330-day physical presence test of section 911(d)(1)(B) shall be treated as a qualified individual ifhe or she is eligible for a waiver ofperiod ofstay in a foreign country pursuant to section 911(d)(4).
taxation; (2) whetherpursuant to section 911 she is entitled to a larger foreign earned income exclusion than respondent has allowed; and (3) whetherpursuantto section 901 she is entitled to any amount offoreign tax credit.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder .
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “foreign country” pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder .
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder .
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder .
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder .
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “foreign country” pursuant to section 911 and - 4 - the regulations thereunder.
After a concession, the sole issue for decision is whether section 911 entitles petitioner to exclude from gross income the wage income he earned in Antarctica in 2001.
6662 Penalty 2001 $27,555 $5,511 2002 6, 790 1,358 IER` ED FEB 2 2 2007 J - 2 - After concessions by the parties, the primary issue for decision is whether petitioners qualify for the foreign earned income exclusion of section 911 (hereinafter sometimes "exclusion") under the two conjunctive requirements thereof .
island. Held: Ps may not exclude from their gross income under sec. 931, I.R.C., the compensation they earned on Johnston Island because that island is not a specified possession as defined in sec. 931(c), I.R.C. Alternatively, Ps claim that, under sec. 911, I.R.C., and sec. 1.931-1(b)(2), Income Tax Regs., they can exclude from gross income up to $70,000 of the 1Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Eric N. Umbach, docket No. 12348-99; and Robert J. Haessly, docket No.
Petitioner contends that income is defined only by section 911 and the regulations under section 861 and that his receipts are excluded from those definitions.
island. Held: Ps may not exclude from their gross income under sec. 931, I.R.C., the compensation they earned on Johnston Island because that island is not a specified possession as defined in sec. 931(c), I.R.C. Alternatively, Ps claim that, under sec. 911, I.R.C., and sec. 1.931-1(b)(2), Income Tax Regs., they can exclude from gross income up to $70,000 of the 1Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Eric N. Umbach, docket No. 12348-99; and Robert J. Haessly, docket No.
Respondent contends that petitioners had unreported income before 1988, that petitioners may not deduct a casualty loss in 1985, and that petitioners may not exclude income under section 911 from 1982 to 1989.
The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner may exclude from gross income under either section 931 or section 911 compensation he earned for personal services he performed in 1997 - 2 - on Johnston Island, a U.S.
citizens of the rights awarded to them by the Congressional enacted [sic] IRC § 911.” Article 9 of Pine Gap I has no apparent effect on U.S.
The SERVED Dec 13 2016 - 2 - issue for decision is whether Curtis Lee Owens (petitioner), a civilian employee of the Red River Army Depot, is entitled to exclude under section 911 income earned while deployed in Kuwait during 2010.
me from whatever sources derived". The United States employs a worldwide tax system, taxing its citizens on their income regardless ofits geographic sources. There are exceptions to the general rule, such as the foreign earned income exclusion under section 911. However, exemptions and exclusions from taxable income are construed narrowly, and the taxpayers must bring themselves within the clear scope ofthe exclusions. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949). Section 911(a) provi
The issues for decision are whether all or a portion ofpetitioners' income may be excluded under section 911 and whetherpetitioners are liable for the SERVED MAR 13 2013 - 2 - [*2] accuracy-relatedpenalty.
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) .(Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is n
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 (d)(1) establishes requirements a taxpayer must meet in order to be considered a qualified individual for purposes of section 911(a) . 26 First, the taxpayer' s "tax home" must have 26 Sec . 911(d)(1) defines the term "qualified individual" as follows : (1) * * * The term "qualified individual" means an individual whose tax home is in a
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed: the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is n
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T. C. 89, 91-96 (2006 ) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F. 3d 790 ( 7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
s within the clear scope of the exclusion . Id . III . Section 91 1 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder . Arnett v . Commi
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to which an appeal of the case herein apparently lies, agreed with our analysis of section
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
rctica. R issued a notice of deficiency for 2000 in which R determined that the income Ps earned during 2000 from working in Antarctica is not excludable from income. Held: The income Ps earned in Antarctica is not excludable from income pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 911. Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89 (2006), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007), followed. - 2 - Larry D. Harvey, for petitioners. Randall L. Preheim, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C. 89, 1-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnet II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein rega ding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir uit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our con c usion that Antarctica is not
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to which an appeal of the case herein apparently lies, agreed with our analysis of section
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not
within the clear scope of the exclusion . Id . III . Section 91 1 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder . Arnett v . Commis
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
within the clear scope of the exclusion . Id . III . Section 91 1 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 911 and the regulations thereunder . Arnett v . Commis
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006 ) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F .3d 790 ( 7th Cir . 2007 ) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is n
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
within the clear scope of the exclusion . Id . III . Section 91 1 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II ), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion tha t Antarctica is not a "foreign country" pursuant to section 1,911 and the regulations thereunder . Arnett v . Com
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is n
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T.C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U.S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to which an appeal of the case herein apparently lies, agreed with our analysis of section 911 an
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner , 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v . Commissioner, 126 T .C . 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd . 473 F .3d 790 (7th Cir . 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911 . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is no
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
Section 911 In Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 91-96 (2006) (Arnett I), affd. 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007) (Arnett II), we addressed the arguments made by the parties herein regarding section 911. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with our analysis of section 911 and affirmed our conclusion that Antarctica is not a “fore
s of Practice and Procedure. - 2 - The issues for decision are: (1) Are the wages that petitioner received during 1998 while he was residing and working in Johnston Island excludable from petitioner’s gross income for that year under section 931 or section 911? We hold that they are not. (2) Is petitioner liable for the year at issue for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)? We hold that he is. FINDINGS OF FACT Most of the facts have been stipulated by the parties and are so found.
An individual’s tax home for purposes of applying section 911 is the same as an individual’s tax home for purposes of section 162(a)(2), relating to traveling expenses while away from home.
Department of State, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO), qualifies for the section 911 foreign earned income exclusion.
ndent Docket No. 5731-93. Filed October 12, 1995. Pursuant to the U.S. Code, U.S. employees may be either detailed or transferred to international organizations for foreign service. P was transferred from the U.S. Army to NATO. For years after 1981, sec. 911, I.R.C., was amended to exclude from the definition of foreign earned income amounts "paid by the United States or an agency thereof to an employee of the United States or an agency thereof". Held: P was an employee of NATO, and not an emplo
Like similarly situated employees, he was asked to sign (and he and his wife allegedly did sign) a Closing Agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) waiving the right to claim, with respect to wages earned at the base, the “foreign earned income exclusion” (FEIE) provided by section 911.1 In exchange Australia agreed that no Australian income tax would be withheld from his wages.
Severance, which was detailed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, attached to the 2010 joint return; unemployment compensation of $26,503 attributable to petitioner; and an exclusion of $91,500 of foreign earned income under section 911 attributable to Mr.
§ 36B(d)(2)(A); see also Treas.
itions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) and (2). Petitioner timely filed a Petition arguing that he qualifies for the foreign earned income exclusion because he is a resident of Saudi Arabia and otherwise meets the bona fide residence requirements of section 911. After filing his Petition, petitioner provided respondent with a Form W–2, Wage and Tax Statement, showing $109,024 in taxable wages, a Form 1099–R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insura
The Lamprechts understated their gross income for 2006 and 2007 by omitting all foreign source income from 25 [*25] their tax returns, and accordingly they claimed a tax benefit, either directly by maintaining implicitly that they were entitled to the section 911 foreign earned income exclusion (discussed below), or indirectly by understating their tax liabilities and receiving tax savings through underpayments.
36B(d)(2)(A); see also sec.
After concessions, the issues for decision are whether petitioner's income may be excluded from gross income under section 911 and whether he is liable for the accuracy-relatedpenalty and the late-filing addition to tax.¹ Background Some ofthe facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference.
at 722. The amendment sought to address the situation in which a cooperative wished to make cash payments to patrons at some point before the time the cooperative was able to determine its net earnings. S. Rept. No. 91-552, at 293 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 609. Such payments would generally not qualify as patronage dividends becau
under principles oftax law, not bankruptcy law. Walstatter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-152, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 170, at *24; s_ee also Arnett v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89, 95 (2006) (holding that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" under sec. 911 even though it is a "foreign country" for purposes ofthe Federal Tort Claims Act). - 14 - [*14] that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to, that portion. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The determination ofwhetherthe taxpayer acted with reasonab
On his 2010 Form 2555 petitioner reported that his residence in Iraq 3Petitioner understood that he could have opted not to have taxes withheld by filing with Triple Canopy Form 673, Statement for Claiming Exemption From Withholding on Foreign Earned Income Eligible for the Exclusion(s) Provided by Section 911, but he chose not to exercise that option.
1.36B-1(e)(2), Income Tax Regs.; see also sec.
Neither section 911 nor the regulations thereunder define "abode". Thus we turn to our caselaw. In prior section 911 cases, we have examined and contrasted a taxpayer's domestic ties (i.e., his familial, economic, and personal ties to the United States) with his ties to the foreign country in which he claims a tax home in order to determine whether his abo
Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to a foreign earned income exclusion under section 911 for tax year 2010 SERVED Apr 26 2017 - 2 - [*2] because he failed to make a timely election as required by the governing regulations.¹ We agree with respondent and accordinglywill grant the motion.
Gereneser claimed both a section 911 foreign earned income exclusion and a foreign tax SERVED Aug 10 2016 - 2 - [*2] credit.¹ The Commissioner allowed the foreign earned income exclusion but disallowed the foreign tax credit because it would be an impermissible double benefit to exclude income and then claim a credit with respect to that same income.2 As to other non-NATO
, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (American Red Cross is an "instrumentality" ofthe United States) with Rev. Rul. 60-36, 1960-1 C.B. 279 (American Red Cross is not an "agency" ofthe United States for purposes ofexcluding foreign income from taxation under former section 911). None ofthese courts found the term "agency" or "instrumentality" to have a plain meaning, and none ofthem relied on -23- dictionary definitions as a reliable guide to discerning the proper interpretation of these words in context. Petit
4 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (American Red Cross is an “instrumentality” of the United States), with Rev. Rul. 60-36, 1960-1 C.B. 279 (American Red Cross is not an “agency” of the United States for purposes of excluding foreign income from taxation under former section 911). None of these courts found the term “agency” or “instrumentality” to have a plain meaning, and none of them relied on dictionary definitions as a reliable guide to discerning the proper interpretation of these words in context. Petition
1972) , to support their position that petitioner' s gambling winnings income is income from personal services: Robida addressed "earned income" under section 911 (regarding foreign earned income and taxation of,U.S.
citizen but resident of France, on all or a portion of her income; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to exclude all or a portion of her income under section 911; (3) whether petitioner is entitled to a credit under section 901 for all or a portion of the taxes paid to France; and (4) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662.
Section 911, which applies to Mrs . Rogers is an exception to the U .S .. worldwide tax system . Section 911(a) allows~a "qualified individual" .to exclude from gross income "foreign ; earned income" .10 A "qualified individual"'is a U .S . citizen whose tax home is in a foreign country if that individual His a bona fide resident of a foreign count
Section 911 does not. define "employee" . Accordingly, we apply common law rules to determine whether a taxpayer is an employee . See United States v. Si-1k,,331 U.S . 704 (1947) ; Matthews v. Commissioner, 907 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D .C. Cir. 1990), affg. 92 T .C . 351 (1989) ; Weber v . Commissioner, 103 T .C . 378, 386 (1994), affd . 60 F.3d 1104 (4t
Petitioner filed Federal income tax returns for 2002, 2003, and 2004 and attached to them Forms 2555-EZ, Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, claiming that all of his income in those years was foreign earned income excluded from gross income under section 911 for Federal income tax purposes .
Citizens, directly leads to §911 of Title 26 USC, which has to do with U.S.
Hargrove are not entitled to an exclusion under section 911 of $44,850 in 2000 and $31,861 in 2001, determined that the correct amount of tax is $16,533 for 2000 and $12,620 for 2001, and determined that Mr.
territory, such as Johnston Island, that they may not claim the exclusion for personal service income earned in a U.S. possession under sec- tion 931. They also cannot exclude this income as "foreign earned income" under the exclusion provision in section 911. At one time Johnston Island was listed as a U.S. pos- session for purposes of the possessions exclusion under 2Throughout 1999 and 2001, Mr. Smith worked on Johnston Island for Washington Group International, formerly Raytheon. For conven
Hargrove are not entitled to an exclusion under section 911 of $44,850 in 2000 and $31,861 in 2001, determined that the correct amount of tax is $16,533 for 2000 and $12,620 for 2001, and determined that Mr.
ence to that section;8 and (3) petitioners were not entitled to exclude from gross income the value of lodging under section 119. Petitioners do not dispute that they signed the closing agreement and that they agreed not to claim an exclusion under section 911. Petitioners contend that they did not claim an exclusion under section 911, but that they claimed an exclusion under section 912, which was not prohibited in the closing agreement. Moreover, petitioners contend that they claimed exclusion
As may be seen supra note 3, the revision of the dependent taxpayer rule continues the term “earned income”, but eliminates the reference to section 911 and does not provide any replacement definition.
2001), and held that Johnston Island does not constitute a foreign country for purposes of section 911 and does not constitute a specified possession for purposes of section 931.3 Therefore, the District Court, in spite of the conflicting regulation, which listed Johnston Island as a possession, concluded that wages earned on Johnston Island constituted taxable income.
(Part II) 109. The damages provision was later adopted as section 6673 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In 1989, Congress added section 6673(a)(2) to provide for an award of costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees against an attorney where an attorney, including an attorney appearing on behalf of the Commissioner, has unreasona
Section 6673 Section 911 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch.
Section 6673 Section 911 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch.
Section 6673 Section 911 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch.
Section 6673 Section 911 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch.
In California, the Ninth Circuit held that the claim filing requirements of California Government Code section 911.2, which required that all claims for money or damages for which the State is liable be presented within 1 year of the date that the claim arose, was applicable to the Federal Government.
territories and possessions; (3) income earned within the 50 States is exempt from tax under section 911 as foreign earned income;7 and (4) respondent has no authority delegated by the Secretary of Treasury to assess and collect subtitle A tax in the 50 States.
asonable cause. Second, petitioner claims that he based his decision not to file on advice he received from the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong that a return was not required if his income was less than 18Subject to certain limitations and restrictions, sec. 911 allows a citizen or resident of the United States living abroad to exclude from gross income up to $70,000 in foreign earned income. Sec. 911(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). - 25 - $70,000. However, petitioner admits that he did not disclose the fact that